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Positive treatment
Hot · 70 in 5y
Quoted verbatim 11×
131.5 score
“he point at which a suspect is handcuffed and poses no risk of danger to the officer often is the pivotal point for excessive- force claims. we have held a number of times that severe force applied after the suspect is safely in custody is excessive.”
Treatment trajectory · 2015 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2015
2020
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Jamie Cunningham v. Cobb County, Georgia
(4×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
orce applied while the suspect has not given up and stopped resisting and may still pose a danger to the arresting officers, even when that force is severe, is not necessarily excessive.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Jeremy Jones v. David Ceinski, Jr.
we do not consider whether an officer acted in good faith or sadistically and mali- ciously.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Stewart v. Doe
police officer has no duty to intervene in another officer's use of force when that use of force is not excessive.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Blake v. White
police officer has no duty to intervene in another officer's use of force when that use of force is not excessive.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
James R. Leach v. Sarasota County Sheriff
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
we usca11 case: 23-10357 document: 44-1 date filed: 05/14/2024 page: 17 of 23 23-10357 opinion of the court 17 have held a number of times that severe force applied after the suspect is safely in custody is excessive.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Ratcliff v. Edge
florce applied while the suspect has not given up and stopped resisting and may still pose a danger to the arresting officers, even when that force is severe, is not necessarily excessive.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
William Robert Leonard v. Christian Silva
we review de novo a grant of summary judgment on the basis of qualified im- munity, drawing all inferences and viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Morris v. City of Lakeland, Florida
orce applied while a suspect has not given up and stopped resisting and may still pose a danger to the arresting officers, even when that force is severe, is not necessarily excessive.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Edwards v. City of Fort Myers
he point at which a suspect is handcuffed and poses no risk of danger to the officer often is the pivotal point for excessive- force claims. we have held a number of times that severe force applied after the suspect is safely in custody is excessive.
examined
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Leach v. Sarasota County
(3×)
also: Cited as authority (rule), Cited "see"
but force applied while a suspect has not given up and stopped resisting and may still pose a danger to the arresting officers, even when that force is severe, is not necessarily excessive.
discussed
Cited as authority (verbatim quote)
Torres v. Howard
orce applied while the suspect has not given up and stopped resisting and may still pose a danger to the arresting officers, even when that force is severe, is not necessarily excessive.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Keith Edwards v. Officer J. Grubbs
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Andrew Pears v. Arnold Oliver, III
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Kevin Lewis v. Sheriff, Fulton County Georgia
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation modified).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Marcano
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2015). 2 The court refers to Miya Marcano as Miya and Marlon Marcano as Marcano throughout this order to avoid confusion.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Shaw v. Carson
Sheriff Dep’t., 783 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2015).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Raden v. Fleming
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam) (quoting Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir. 2009) (per curiam)). “[T]he right to make an arrest . . . necessarily carries with it the right to use some degree of physical coercion or threat thereof to effect it.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 .
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Ammon Sumrall v. Georgia Department of Corrections
(3×)
also: Cited "see"
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2015).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
City of Paintsville v. Paula M. Haney, as Personal Representative of Estate of Donald Prater, Jr.
Sheriff Dept., 783 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2015); Hinton v. City of Elwood, Kan., 997 F.2d 774, 781 (10th Cir. 1993). 29 For example, in Estate of Collins v. Wilburn, 755 Fed.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Travis Roe v. Clint Redmond
(8×)
also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2015).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Latoya Glenn v. Shane Britt
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Owens v. Thornton
(2×)
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015); Glasscox v. City of Argo, 903 F.3d 1207, 1214 (11th Cir. 2018); Pequeno v. Seminole County, 1:20-CV-32, 2022 WL 5165147 , at *9 (M.D.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
PEREZ v. BRYANT
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)).
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
Dorey v. Hartmann
(5×)
also: Cited "see"
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) (first quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 ; and then quoting Lee v. Ferraro, 284 F.3d 1188, 1198 (11th Cir. 2002)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Pears v. Boddie
Sheriff Dep’t., 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Cherry v. Allen
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Saint Jean v. Altoona, Alabama, City of
Sheriff Dep’t., 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Roe v. Fryer
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1357 (11th Cir. 2015).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Henderson v. Milillo
(2×)
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) (citation omitted). “[G]ratuitous force against a suspect who is secure, not resisting, and not a safety threat to the officer or other officers” violates the Fourth Amendment.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Reynolds v. Woodall
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Wilkerson v. Hicks
See Br. in Support (Doc. 77) at 50-52; id. 35 at 65 (seeking to highlight the “similarity” of cases like Hinson, 927 F.3d 1103, 1120-21 , and Mobley v. Palm Beach County Sheriff Department, 783 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Anthony Retic v. John Hutton
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2015) (dismissing por- tion of appeal as moot where appellant challenged an order dis- missing his original complaint because the district court had amended that order to dismiss only the proposed amended com- plaint).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Perez v. Anderson
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1351, 1355 (11th Cir. 2015) (concluding officers’ use of force in striking, kicking, and tasing suspect was not excessive where the suspect, though pinned on the ground, was “refusing to surrender his hands to be cuffed”); Crosby v. Monroe Cnty., 394 F.3d 1328, 1334-35 (11th Cir. 2004) (concluding officer’s use of force was not excessive where suspect, though lying face down on the ground, “was able to wrestle his hand loose and push [the officer’s] foot away”).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Darling v. Zavaleta
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1351, 1355 (11th Cir. 2015)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Mackey v. Henry
Sheriff Dep’t., 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Kang v. The Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Savannah
Sheriff Dept., 783 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2015).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
PORTER v. CONSOLIDATED GOVERNMENT OF COLUMBUS GEORGIA
Sheriff Dep't, 783 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
St. Clair v. Mutz
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Maria Montefu Acosta v. Miami-Dade County
(2×)
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) USCA11 Case: 22-11675 Document: 50-1 Date Filed: 03/28/2024 Page: 9 of 21 22-11675 Opinion of the Court 9 (quotation marks and citations omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Smola v. Chronister
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015); Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 .
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Clinch v. Chambers
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) (per curiam)).10 2.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Allen v. City of Dunn
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1351, 1355 (11th Cir. 2015); Husbands ex rel.
examined
Cited as authority (rule)
UNDERWOOD v. SCARBROUGH
(3×)
Sheriff Dept., 783 F.3d 1347, 1355 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989)).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Estate of Ronald Singletary v. City of Philadelphia
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2015) (relying on arrestee’s “conce[ssion] that he had refused to surrender his hands”); DeGraff v. District of Columbia, 120 F.3d 298, 300 (D.C.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Kevin Lamar Blake v. Andrew E. Bryant
USCA11 Case: 21-13070 Document: 48-1 Date Filed: 07/26/2023 Page: 8 of 9 8 Opinion of the Court 21-13070 Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotations omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Richard John Lucibella v. Richard Ermeri
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1353 (11th Cir. 2015) (quotation omitted).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Messer v. Canty
Sheriff Dep’t, 783 F.3d 1347, 1356 (11th Cir. 2015).
Nathaniel BRENT, Personally and on Behalf of His-Minor Children SB and JB; Sherrie Brent, Personally and on Behalf of Her Minor Children SB and JB; Aaron Brent; Jamie Brent; Robert No. 14-2367 Brent, Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
Rick SNYDER, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
v.
Rick SNYDER, Et Al., Defendants-Appellees
14-2367.
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
Apr 21, 2015.
Gibbons, Sutton, Kethledge.
Published
ORDER
PER CURIAM.This matter is before the court upon consideration of the response to this court’s order directing Nathaniel Brent to show cause why his adult children Aaron Brent, Jamie Brent, and Robert Brent should not be removed as appellants in this appeal.
The district court dismissed the Brents’ lawsuit on September 21, 2014. Nathaniel filed a notice of appeal on October 17, 2014, well within Appellate Rule 4’s thirty-day limit. See Fed. R.App. P. 4(a)(1)(A). The notice identifies “all plaintiffs” as appellants, but only Nathaniel’s signature appears on the page.
The absence of other signatures does not pose a problem for Nathaniel’s wife Sherrie and his minor children. See Fed.R.App. P. 3(c)(2). But it does pose a problem for his adult children. Nathaniel does not appear to be licensed to practice law, and as a consequence may not represent them on appeal — or sign 'his name on their behalf. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654. Because his adult children did not sign the notice themselves, they have failed to perfect their appeal. See Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757, 763, 121 S.Ct. 1801, 149 L.Ed.2d 983 (2001). Fortunately for them, that is not the end of the matter. The signature requirement is mandatory but not jurisdictional. See id. at 765, 121 S.Ct. 1801. That means they may correct their error “by signing the paper on file or by submitting a duplicate that contains the signature.” Id. at 764, 121 S.Ct. 1801 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a)).
We therefore give Aaron Brent, Jamie Brent, and Robert Brent thirty days from this order’s entry to sign their already-filed notice of appeal or to submit a duplicate notice of appeal containing their signatures. Otherwise, we will dismiss them as appellants from this appeal.