Treatment trajectory · 1990 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed
Cited "but see"
Perodeau v. City of Hartford
Ed. 2d 600 (1994) (holding that similar definition of employer in Age Discrimination in Employment Act; 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq.; does not provide for individual liability); but see Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989) (when employee exercises sufficient supervisory authority over plaintiff, employee is employer for purposes of 42 U.S.C. § 2000e [b]), aff'd in part, rev’d in part, 900 F.2d 27 (1990); Hamilton v. Rodgers, 791 F.2d 439, 442-43 (5th Cir. 1986) (person is agent of employer if person participated in decision-making process that forms basis of discriminatio…
discussed
Cited "but see"
Alberte v. Anew Health Care Services, Inc.
But see Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated on other grounds by Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (holding that an employer's agent may be subject to individual liability under Title VII if evidence establishes that the company's management acquiesced in the agent's exercise of supervisory authority). 4 Under the ADEA, liability is limited to employers who have more than 20 employees. 29 U.S.C. § 630 (b). 5 One commentator has noted that Congress's inclusion of the phrase "and any agent" in Title VII's definition of *604 "employer" might be…
cited
Cited "but see"
DeLoach v. American Red Cross
But see Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 106 (4th Cir.1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990)(en banc).
discussed
Cited "but see"
Wathen v. General Electric Co.
But see Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir.1989) (finding that a supervisory employee was an “employer” individually hable under Title VII), vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990).
discussed
Cited "but see"
ca6 1997
But see Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir.1989) (finding that a supervisory employee was an "employer" individually liable under Title VII), vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990). 20 Similarly, the majority of the district courts within the Sixth Circuit that have addressed the issue have also rejected the concept of individual liability under Title VII. 7 We have not squarely addressed this issue before. 8 We now hold that an individual employee/supervisor, who does not otherwise qualify as an "employer," may not be held personally liable under Title …
discussed
Cited "but see"
Storr v. Anderson School
But see Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir.1989) (supervisory personnel may be personally liable under Title VII), rev’d in part, aff'd in relevant part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990) (en banc); Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225, 1231 (6th Cir.1986) (“individuals may be held liable ... as ‘agents’ of an employer under Title VII”); Goodstein, 889 F.Supp. at 764-65 (Parker, J.) (supervisor may be liable as agent of employer under Title VII); Shoemaker v. Metro Information Services, 910 F.Supp. 259, 265 (E.D.Va.1996) (supervisors who wield significant control over…
cited
Cited "but see"
Douglas v. Coca-Cola
But see Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'd in part, aff'd in relevant part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
discussed
Cited "but see"
Grissom v. Waterloo Industries, Inc.
See, e.g., Gary v. Long, *870 59 F.3d 1391, 1399 (D.C.Cir.1995) (supervisor not an “employer” subject to individual liability under Title VII); Grant v. Lone Star Co., 21 F.3d 649, 652-53 (5th Cir.) (same), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 115 S.Ct. 574 , 130 L.Ed.2d 491 (1994); Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir.1993) (same); Miller v. Maxwell’s Int’l, Inc., 991 F.2d 583, 587 (9th Cir.1993) (same), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 114 S.Ct. 1049 , 127 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994); Busby v. City of Orlando, 931 F.2d 764, 772 (11th Cir.1991) (same); Huebschen v. Department of Health & Soci…
discussed
Cited "but see"
Vodde v. Indiana Michigan Power Co.
But see, Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir.1989), vacated in part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990) (supervisor may be individually liable as “employer” under Title VII); Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir.1986) (same); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hospital, 824 F.Supp. 769 (N.D.Ill.1993); Strzelecki v. Schwartz Paper Co., 824 F.Supp. 821 , 829 n. 3 (N.D.Ill.1993); U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm. v. AIC Security Investigations Ltd., 1993 W.L. 427454 at *4-7 (N.D.Ill.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
In re: Doron Ezra Nava Tomer Ezra
Fegert, Inc., 887 F.2d 16 at 957 . 17 Notwithstanding this general rule, “[a] reviewing court may 18 consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal if 19 (1) there are exceptional circumstances why the issue was not 20 raised in the trial court, (2) the new issue arises while the 21 appeal is pending because of a change in the law, or (3) the 22 issue presented is purely one of law and the opposing party will 23 suffer no prejudice as a result of the failure to raise the issue 24 in the trial court.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Roberts (In re 25 Roberts), 175 B.R. 339, 345 (9th Cir. BAP 19…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Foster v. University of Maryland-Eastern Shore
Foster argues that she can still prevail because the University “should have known” about Jones’s harassment and should have stopped it preemptively because a previous employee — described in the record as Employee C — also complained that Jones had sexually harassed her. „ As we have previously held, an “employer’s knowledge that a male worker has previously harassed female employees other than the plaintiff will often prove highly relevant in deciding whether the employer should have anticipated that the plaintiff too would become a victim of the male employee’s harassing c…
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Graves v. Horry-Georgetown Technical College
Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 114 (4th Cir.1989) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting), cited with approval in Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 900 F.2d 27, 28 (4th Cir.1990). 4 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
DeWitt v. Mecklenburg County
Accord, EEOC v. Clay Printing Co., 955 F.2d 936, 944 (4th Cir.1992); Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 . (4th Cir.1985). 6 The Fourth Circuit has cautioned that constructive discharge claims must be “carefully cabined” by district courts because “the claim of constructive discharge is so open to abuse by those who leave employment of their own accord.” Paroline v. *600 Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 114 (4th Cir.1989) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), adopted en banc, 900 F.2d 27, 28 (4th Cir.1990).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Kathryn O. Reinhold v. Commonwealth of Virginia Virginia School for the Deaf and Blind
(2×)
We disagree. 53 In Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir.1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990), this court discussed the requirements for imputing the actions of a supervisor to an employer under Title VII and held that an individual is a supervisor "if he or she serves in a supervisory position and exercises significant control over the plaintiff's hiring, firing or conditions of employment." 4 Id. at 104 (emphasis added).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Grier v. Titan Corporation
Having reviewed the record, the arguments and briefs of counsel, and the order of the district court, we believe that the district court _________________________________________________________________ evidence that the inaction of the employer was directed at the plaintiff.") (emphasis in original), adopted by 900 F.2d 27, 28 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (per curiam). 4 correctly applied the proper standards in this case, and we affirm on the reasoning of the district court.3 AFFIRMED _________________________________________________________________ 3 It is far from clear that the district cour…
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Reinhold v. Commonwealth of Virginia
However, given the extent of the harassment and management’s actions following the incident, the Fourth Circuit concluded that “a reasonable finder of fact could infer that Unisys intended Moore’s earlier reprimand as nothing more than a slap on the wrist or perhaps even an outright sham.” Id. at 107.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Andrade v. Mayfair Management, Inc.
See Spicer v. Virginia Dep’t of Corrections, 66 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 900 F.2d 27, 28 (4th Cir.1990) (en banc) (per curiam) (adopting Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 113-15 (4th Cir.1989) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting)); Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 558 (4th Cir.1987); Katz, 709 F.2d at 255-56 ; see also Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas and Elec.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
ca4 1996
See Spicer v. Virginia Dep't of Corrections, 66 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 900 F.2d 27, 28 (4th Cir.1990) (en banc) (per curiam) (adopting Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 113-15 (4th Cir.1989) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting)); Swentek v. USAIR, Inc., 830 F.2d 552, 558 (4th Cir.1987); Katz, 709 F.2d at 255-56 ; see also Amirmokri v. Baltimore Gas and Elec.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Easley v. Stegall
See Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir.1994); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 900 F.2d 27, 28 (4th Cir.1990) (en banc) (per curiam) (adopting Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 113-15 (4th Cir.1989) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Easley v. Stegall
See Carter v. Ball, 33 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 1994); Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 900 F.2d 27, 28 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (per curiam) (adopt- ing Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 113-15 (4th Cir. 1989) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)); Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1082 (1986).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Karen Williams v. Bruce Banning
(2×)
Paroline held that "[a]n individual qualifies as an ‘employer’ under Title VII if he or she serves in a supervisory position and exercises significant control over the plaintiff's hiring, firing or conditions of employment.” Id. at 104.
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Riley v. TECHNICAL AND MANAGEMENT SERVICES CORP.
Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 114 (4th Cir.1989) (Wilkinson, dissenting), op. adopted by majority en banc, 900 F.2d 27, 28 (4th Cir.1990).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Diamond v. T. Rowe Price Associates, Inc.
(2×)
The Fourth Circuit has cautioned that constructive discharge claims must be “carefully cabined” by district court judges because “the claim of constructive discharge is so open to abuse by those who leave employment of their own accord.” Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 114 (4th Cir. 1989) (Wilkinson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), adopted en banc, 900 F.2d 27, 28 (4th Cir.1990).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
ca8 1993
Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 , 114 & n. 2 (4th Cir.1989) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting), vacated in part on reh'g, 900 F.2d 27, 28 (4th Cir.1990) (en banc) (adopting panel dissent's reasoning on constructive discharge issue); see Derr, 796 F.2d at 344 ; Held, 684 F.2d at 432 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hukkanen v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Hoisting & Portable Local No. 101
Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 , 114 & n. 2 (4th Cir.1989) (Wilkinson, J., dissenting), vacated in part on reh’g, 900 F.2d 27, 28 (4th Cir.1990) (en banc) (adopting panel dissent’s reasoning on constructive discharge issue); see Derr, 796 F.2d at 344 ; Held, 684 F.2d at 432 .
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Green v. Fairfax County School Board
Constructive Discharge claims must “be carefully cabined” by district court judges because “the claim of constructive discharge is so open to abuse by those who leave employment of their own accord.” Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 114 (4th Cir.1989), adopted by majority en banc at 900 F.2d 27, 29 (4th Cir.1990).
cited
Cited as authority (rule)
Poyer v. Sears Roebuck Co.
Pa- roline v. Unisys Cory., 900 F.2d 27, 28 (4th Cir.1990) (en banc).
cited
Cited "see"
Al-Deen v. Trustees of University of North Carolina Wilmington
See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir. 1989) opinion vacated in part on reh’g, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990). (3).
discussed
Cited "see"
Williams v. Silver Spring Volunteer Fire Department
See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir.1989) (recognizing that “[w]hether [a plaintiffs] harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive is quintessentially a question of fact”), overruled on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990).
discussed
Cited "see"
Beach v. McKenney
See id. (citing Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 112 (4th Cir. 1989), superseded en banc on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990), for the proposition that negligent retention is an extension of a claim for negligent hiring into a different time period).
cited
Cited "see"
Kilduff v. Cosential, Inc.
See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 112 , vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990).
cited
Cited "see"
Miller v. Bon Secours
See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 114 (4th Cir. 1989) (Wilkinson, J. dissenting), vacated in part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (adopting panel dissenting opinion).
discussed
Cited "see"
Wyss v. General Dynamics Corp.
(2×)
Case law defines an agent “as any employee exercising supervisory power or control within a company.” Iacampo, 929 F.Supp. at 571 (citing Showalter v. Allison Reed Group, Inc., 767 F.Supp. 1205, 1210-11 (D.R.I.1991)); see Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir.1989), rev’d in part, aff'd. in part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990).
cited
Cited "see"
ca4 1997
See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 106 (4th Cir.1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990) (en banc).
discussed
Cited "see"
Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
(2×)
See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 106 (4th Cir. 1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
discussed
Cited "see"
Williams v. Poretsky Management, Inc.
In the Fourth Circuit, a prima facie case of hostile environment sexual harassment in the work place is made upon showing that: “(1) the subject conduct was unwelcome; (2) it was based on the sex of the plaintiff; (3) it was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the plaintiffs conditions of employment and to create an abusive work environment; and (4) it was imputable on some factual basis to the employer.” Spicer v. Virginia Dep’t of Corrections, 66 F.3d 705, 710 (4th Cir.1995) (en banc); accord Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir.1989), aff'd in relevant part, vacated o…
cited
Cited "see"
Michael v. Sentara Health System
See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir.1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990).
discussed
Cited "see"
Stevenson v. Brod Dugan Paint and Wall Coverings
See, Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir.1989), vacated in part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990); Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir.1986); Janopoulos v. Walner & Associates, 835 F.Supp. 459 (N.D.Ill.1993); Raiser v. O'Shaughnessy, 830 F.Supp. 1134 (N.D.Ill.1993); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hospital, 824 F.Supp. 769 (N.D.Ill.1993); Sandoval v. Pagano, 763 F.Supp. 1087 (D.Col.1991).
cited
Cited "see"
Hernandez v. Wangen
See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir.1989), rev'd in part, aff'd in relevant part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990) (en banc).
cited
Cited "see"
Faltas v. State Newspaper
See Paroline v. Unisys, 879 F.2d 100, 110-111 (4th Cir.1989), as modified 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990) {en banc opinion).
discussed
Cited "see"
Chris E. Geary v. Levindale Hebrew Geriatric Center and Hospital
See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990) (in banc). 4 We therefore affirm the dismissal of this action on the reasoning of the district court.
discussed
Cited "see"
Geary v. Levindale Hebrew
See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 105 (4th Cir.), rev'd in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir. 1990) (in banc). 2 We therefore affirm the dismissal of this action on the reasoning of the district court.
discussed
Cited "see"
Griswold v. New Madrid County Group Practice, Inc.
See, Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir.1989), vacated in part, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990); Jones v. Continental Corp., 789 F.2d 1225 (6th Cir.1986); Janopoulos v. Walner & Associates, 835 F.Supp. 459 (N.D.Ill.1993); Raiser v. O'Shaughnessy, 830 F.Supp. 1134 (N.D.Ill.1993); Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hospital, 824 F.Supp. 769 (N.D.Ill.1993); Sandoval v. Pagano, 763 F.Supp. 1087 (D.Col.1991).
cited
Cited "see"
Ecklund v. Fuisz Technology, Ltd.
See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 104 (4th Cir.1989) reversed in part, vacated in part 900 F.2d 27 (1990).
cited
Cited "see"
Fiel v. Virginia Employment Commission
See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir.1989), vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990).
discussed
Cited "see"
Spicer v. Virginia
See Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 106 (4th Cir.1989) (in a Title VII sexual harassment case “[t]he adequacy of [the employer’s] remedy is a question of fact”), vacated in part on other grounds, 900 F.2d 27 (4th Cir.1990) (en banc); Dwyer v. Smith, 867 F.2d 184, 187 (4th Cir.1989). 1 Such findings are entitled to great deference and can be reversed only if clearly erroneous.
52 Fair empl.prac.cas. 845, 53 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 39,833 Elizabeth M. Paroline
v.
Unisys Corporation Edgar L. Moore
v.
Unisys Corporation Edgar L. Moore
88-1319.
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.
Mar 30, 1990.
Bruce Allan Frederickson, Webster & Frederickson, Washington, D.C. (Susan L. Brackshaw, Webster & Frederickson, Washington, D.C., Victor M. Glasberg, Alexandria, Va., on brief), for plaintiff-appellant., Thomas R. Bagby, Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C., Washington, D.C. (Ronald M. Green, Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C., Washington, D.C., Donald G. Kaas, Unisys Corp., Blue Bell, Pa., on brief), for defendants-appellees.
Ervin, Russell, Widener, Hall, Phillips, Murnaghan, Chapman, Wilkinson, Wilkins.
Cited by 267 opinions | Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion
Bruce Allan Frederickson, Webster & Frederickson, Washington, D.C. (Susan L. Brackshaw, Webster & Frederickson, Washington, D.C., Victor M. Glasberg, Alexandria, Va., on brief), for plaintiff-appellant.
Thomas R. Bagby, Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C., Washington, D.C. (Ronald M. Green, Epstein, Becker & Green, P.C., Washington, D.C., Donald G. Kaas, Unisys Corp., Blue Bell, Pa., on brief), for defendants-appellees.
Before ERVIN, Chief Judge, and RUSSELL, WIDENER, HALL, PHILLIPS, MURNAGHAN, CHAPMAN, WILKINSON, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges, sitting en banc.
PER CURIAM:
Lead Opinion
On January 21, 1988, appellant Elizabeth M. Paroline filed suit against appellee Uni-sys Corporation and its employee Edgar L. Moore, charging them with sexual harassment in the workplace and constructive dis[*28] charge under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq. In addition, she brought pendent state law claims against both defendants for intentional infliction of emotional distress, as well as a claim against Moore for assault and battery and a claim against Unisys for negligent failure to warn and reckless endangerment. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants on all claims except the one for assault and battery, which was voluntarily dismissed.
On appeal, a panel of this court reversed the district court in large part. Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100 (4th Cir.1989). The panel ruled that summary judgment was inappropriate on the Title VII claims because genuine issues of material fact existed concerning whether Moore was an “employer” within the meaning of the statute, whether Moore’s harassment was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment, and whether Pa-roline’s work conditions were so intolerable as to make her resignation a constructive discharge. On the state law claims, the panel held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment against Paro-line on her claims against Unisys for negligent failure to warn and reckless endangerment, and remanded those claims for clarification. Finally, the panel affirmed the grant of summary judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress ground.
We now vacate that portion of the panel’s decision concerning constructive discharge, discussed in section IV of the panel’s opinion, 879 F.2d at 108-10, and affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment on that point in favor of Unisys. We do so for reasons set forth in the dissent from the panel opinion, 879 F.2d at 113-15 (Wilkinson, J.).
Because Unisys took issue only with the panel’s holding in section IV on constructive discharge, the remainder of Judge Murnaghan’s opinion for the panel continues in effect.
The judgment is affirmed in part and reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED.
Dissent
dissenting:
For the reasons set forth in the opinion I authored for the panel majority, I dissent.
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge ERVIN, Judge HALL, and Judge PHILLIPS join in this dissent.