In Re Clarence L. (i.o.) Hardzog Katy Lou Hardzog, Debtors. Clarence L. (i.o.) Hardzog Katy Lou Hardzog v. The Fed. Land Bank of Wichita, 901 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1990). · Go Syfert
In Re Clarence L. (i.o.) Hardzog Katy Lou Hardzog, Debtors. Clarence L. (i.o.) Hardzog Katy Lou Hardzog v. The Fed. Land Bank of Wichita, 901 F.2d 858 (10th Cir. 1990). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“courts are not well situated to craft and determine interest rates. judges are neither bankers nor lenders and do not have the expertise to set interest rates.”
135 citation events (35 in the last 25 years) across 43 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Leo Bernard Huninghake and Mary Lou Huninghake (ksb, 2023-12-15) · Strongest negative: In Re Hollinger (flnb, 2000-02-04)
Treatment trajectory · 1990 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1990 2008 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 47 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited "but see" In Re Hollinger (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Bankr. N.D. Fla. · 2000 · signal: but see · confidence high
See Camino, 818 F.2d at 1508 ; but see Hardzog, 901 F.2d at 860 (finding that judges lack financial expertise and thus courts are not well equipped to determine interest rates).
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Leo Bernard Huninghake and Mary Lou Huninghake (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Bankr. D. Kan. · 2023 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the holder of an allowed claim must receive property under the plan which has a value of no less than the amount of its allowed claim
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Zerr v. Montezuma Credit Union (In re Zerr) (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Bankr. D. Kan. · 1994 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
chapter 12 is predicated upon the theory that the lender is making á new loan to the debtor
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) In Re Cellular Information Systems, Inc. (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Bankr. S.D.N.Y. · 1994 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
courts are not well situated to craft and determine interest rates. judges are neither bankers nor lenders and do not have the expertise to set interest rates.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In re Stringer
Bankr. N.D. Miss. · 2014 · confidence medium
Land Bank of Wichita (In re Hardzog), 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990) (market rate for similar loans, but not higher than contract rate; interpreting parallel chapter 12 provision). 3.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Bivens
Bankr. N.D. Ill. · 2005 · confidence medium
Land Bank of Wichita (In re Hardzog), 901 F.2d 858, 859-60 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Arnold, 878 F.2d 925, 929-30 (6th Cir.1989); Scott, 248 B.R. at 790 ; Palmer, 224 B.R. at 684 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Smith
D. Kan. · 2004 · confidence medium
Debtors Mark and Rhonda Guy converted their proceedings to Chapter 7 on September 22, 2003. 2 . 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(5)(B)(ii). 3 . 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990). 4 . 28 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1), (b)(1), and (c)(1). 5 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Till v. SCS Credit Corp. (2×)
SCOTUS · 2004 · confidence medium
See In re Valenti, supra, at 64 (treasury rate plus 1%-3% risk premium); GMAC v. Jones, 999 F. 2d 63, 71 (CA3 1993) (contract rate); United Carolina Bank v. Hall, 993 F. 2d 1126, 1131 (CA4 1993) (creditor's rate for similar loans, but not higher than contract rate); In re Smithwick, 121 F. 3d 211, 214 (CA5 1997) (contract rate); In re Kidd, 315 F. 3d 671, 678 (CA6 2003) (market rate for similar loans); In re Till, 301 F. 3d 583, 592-593 (CA7 2002) (case below) (contract rate); In re Fisher, 930 F. 2d 1361, 1364 (CA8 1991) (market rate for similar loans) (interpreting parallel Chapter 12 provis…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Lewis Kidd and Roberta Kidd, Debtors. Household Automotive Finance Corporation v. Beverly Burden, Trustee (2×) also: Cited "see"
6th Cir. · 2003 · confidence medium
S.D.Ohio 1998) ("[A] `forced loan' of 100% of the value of an automobile is not customary in the industry, and produces additional risks to lenders.") See also, In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990) (listing numerous factors which are utilized by lenders in establishing interest rates). 10 Other courts considering the issue raised here have also employed a particularized approach which incorporates market-based factors including, inter alia, risk, in determining the appropriate cram-down interest rate.
examined Cited as authority (rule) In Re: Lee M. Till and Amy M. Till, Debtors-Appellants (4×)
7th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-America, ACA, 102 F.3d 874, 874 (7th Cir.1996); In re Smithwick, 121 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir.1997); In re Valenti, 105 F.3d 55 , 59-60 (2d Cir.1997); GMAC v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 66-67 (3d Cir.1993); United Carolina Bank v. Hall, 993 F.2d 1126, 1129-30 (4th Cir.1993); In re Fowler, 903 F.2d 694 , 696-97 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 859-60 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Arnold, 878 F.2d 925, 928-29 (6th Cir.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Till, Lee M. v. SCS Credit Corp (2×)
7th Cir. · 2002 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs. of Mid-America, ACA, 102 F.3d 874, 874 (7th Cir. 1996); In re Smithwick, 121 F.3d 211, 214 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Valenti, 105 F.3d 55 , 59-60 (2d Cir. 1997); GMAC v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63, 66-67 (3d Cir. 1993); United Carolina Bank v. Hall, 993 F.2d 1126 , 10 No. 00-4167 1129-30 (4th Cir. 1993); In re Fowler, 903 F.2d 694 , 696-97 (9th Cir. 1990); In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 859-60 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Arnold, 878 F.2d 925, 928-29 (6th Cir. 1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Evabank v. Baxter
N.D. Ala. · 2002 · confidence medium
Accord, In the Matter of Smithwick, 121 F.3d at 214 (“we are persuaded by the Third Circuit approach. . .which best calculates the present value of the payments offered under the plan”); Koopmans v. Farm Credit Services of Mid-America, 102 F.3d 874, 875 (7th Cir.1996)(“the creditor is entitled to the rate of interest it could have obtained had it foreclosed and reinvested the proceeds in loans of equivalent duration and risk”); United Carolina Bank v. Hall, 993 F.2d 1126, 1130-31 (4th Cir.1993)(“business opportunity that the secured creditor might otherwise have been able to pursue b…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Valley View Shopping Center, L.P.
Bankr. D. Kan. · 2001 · confidence medium
Debtor’s Exhibit MMM. 63 . 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (a)(11). 64 . 167 B.R. 226, 231 (Bankr.D.Kan.1994) [oversecured creditor entitled to contract rate for interest accruing preconfirmation]. 65 . 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990). 66 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Scott (2×) also: Cited "see"
Bankr. N.D. Ill. · 2000 · confidence medium
The “forced-loan” approach was also employed in General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63 , 67-70 *791 (3d Cir.1993); In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990) (dealing with cramdown in the context of Chapter 12); and In re Smithwick, 121 F.3d 211, 213-14 (5th Cir.1997), cert. denied sub nom.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Gorham (2×) also: Cited "see"
Bankr. W.D. Mo. · 2000 · confidence medium
Hardzog v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita (In re Hardzog), 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Ehrhardt
Bankr. W.D. Mo. · 1999 · confidence medium
General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63 (3rd Cir.1993) (declining to follow Doud); Hardzog v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita (In re Hardzog), 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990) (opining that Doud does not accurately reflect the market and "may unduly penalize the lender or borrower”); Warehouse Home Furnishings Distribs, Inc. v. Richards (In re Richards), 106 B.R. 762, 763-64 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1989). 11 .As in Lupfer Bros., Judge Venters held that confirmation had to be denied on the alternative ground that the 20-year repayment period was too long.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Lockard
Bankr. W.D. Mo. · 1999 · confidence medium
See e.g., General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Jones, 999 F.2d 63 (3rd Cir.1993) (declining to follow Doud); Hardzog v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita (In re Hardzog), 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990) (opining that Doud does not accurately reflect the market and "may unduly penalize the lender or borrower”); Warehouse Home Furnishings Distributors, Inc. v. Richards (In re Richards), 106 B.R. 762, 763-64 (Bankr.M.D.Ga.1989).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Felipe
Bankr. S.D. Florida · 1998 · confidence medium
The Tenth Circuit agreed, explaining that “the market rate should be easily susceptible of determination by means of a hearing where each party is given the opportunity to submit evidence concerning the current market rate of interest for similar loans in the region.” Hard-zog, 901 F.2d at 860 (“[CJourts are well equipped to determine market rates[.]”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Valenti (In re Valenti) (2×) also: Cited "see"
2d Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
See United Carolina Bank, 993 F.2d at 1130-31 ; Hardzog v. Federal Land Bank (In re Hardzog), 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Southern States Motor Inns, Inc. (In re Southern States Motor Inns, Inc.), 709 F.2d 647, 653 (11th Cir.1983); Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs., 196 B.R. at 427 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Valenti (2×) also: Cited "see"
2d Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
See United Carolina Bank, 993 F.2d at 1130-31 ; Hardzog v. Federal Land Bank (In re Hardzog), 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Southern States Motor Inns, Inc. (In re Southern States Motor Inns, Inc.), 709 F.2d 647, 653 (11th Cir.1983); Koopmans v. Farm Credit Servs., 196 B.R. at 427 . 46 Courts adopting the "forced loan" approach compute "present value" to include the profit that the creditor would have generated had the creditor received the value of the collateral immediately.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Hatcher
Bankr. E.D. Okla. · 1996 · confidence medium
Land Bank of Wichita (In re Hardzog), 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990), held: Considering that most courts are utilizing a market rate approach and further considering that courts are well equipped to determine market rate, we hold in the absence of special circumstances, such as the market rate being higher than the contract rate, Bankruptcy Courts should use the current market rate of interest used for similar loans in the region.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Koopmans v. Farm Credit Services (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
N.D. Ind. · 1996 · confidence medium
See General Motors Acceptance Corp., 999 F.2d at 67-70 ; United Carolina Bank v. Hall, 993 F.2d at 1130-1131 ; In re Fowler, 903 F.2d at 698; In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Arnold, 878 F.2d 925, 930 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Neal Pharmacol Co., 789 *428 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir.1986); Matter of Southern States Motor Inns, Inc., 709 F.2d 647, 651-652 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 , 104 S.Ct. 1275 , 79 L.Ed.2d 680 (1984); Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 431 (6th Cir.1982). 9 The bankruptcy court appears to have correctly appl…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Dingley
Bankr. N.D.N.Y. · 1995 · confidence medium
Bankruptcy courts, notwithstanding that they are “neither bankers nor lenders and do not have the expertise to set interest rates” (Hardzog v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990)), found themselves considering many of the same factors which lenders consider in the context of credit decisions.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Hollins
Bankr. N.D. Tex. · 1995 · confidence medium
Memphis Bank & Trust v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 431 (6th Cir.1982); See Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Fowler (In re Fowler), 903 F.2d 694, 697 (9th Cir.1990) (Adopts the market approach, but determines the market rate can also be determined by adding a market risk factor to a base rate); Jones, 999 F.2d at 65 ; Hall, 993 F.2d at 1130 ; See also United States v. Doud, 869 F.2d 1144, 1145-46 (8th Cir.1989) (Applying the market approach under § 1225(a)(5)(B)); Hardzog v. Fed’l Land Bank of Wichita (In re Hardzog), 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990) (Using the market rate for a chapter 12 cramdo…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) William J. Wade, Trustee v. Nathan Bradford and Beverly Bradford, Debtors
10th Cir. · 1994 · confidence medium
In Hardzog v. Federal Land Bank (In re Hardzog), 901 F.2d 858 (10th Cir.1990), we held that “in the absence of special circumstances, such as the market rate being higher than the contract rate, Bankruptcy Courts should use the current market rate of interest used for similar loans in the region.” Id. at 860 (footnote omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Foertsch
Bankr. D.N.D. · 1994 · confidence medium
Co. v. Monnier (In re Monnier Bros.), 756 F.2d 1386, 1339 (8th Cir.1985); Hardzog v. Federal Land Bank (In re Hardzog), 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990) (“Chapter 12 is predicated upon the theory that the lender is making a new loan to the debtor.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re River Village Associates
Bankr. E.D. Pa. · 1993 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Jones, supra, 999 F.2d at 70 (the interest rate under 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (a)(5)(B)® is that which the secured creditor would charge for a loan similar in character, amount and duration to the loan which the creditor is required to make under the plan); United Carolina Bank v. Hall, 993 F.2d 1126, 1130-31 (4th Cir.1993) (the interest rate in Chapter 13 cram down should be the lesser of the contract rate or the rate that secured creditor would otherwise be able to obtain in its lending market adjusted for expenses in obtaining such a loan); In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) General Motors Acceptance Corporation v. Alphonso Jones, Debtor, Robert M. Wood, Trustee (2×)
3rd Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
See United Carolina Bank v. Hall, 993 F.2d 1126 (4th Cir. 1993); In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Arnold, 878 F.2d 925, 930 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Neal Pharmacal Co., 789 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir.1986); Matter of Southern States Motor Inns, Inc., 709 F.2d 647, 651-52 (11th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1022 , 104 S.Ct. 1275 , 79 L.Ed.2d 680 (1984); Memphis Bank & Trust v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 431 (6th Cir.1982); In re General Development Corp., 135 B.R. 1008 (Bkrtcy.S.D.Fla.1991); In re Mellema, 124 B.R. 103 (Bkrtcy.D.Colo.1991). 6 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United Carolina Bank v. Loretta A. Degolier Hall
4th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
We *1131 have previously tacitly indicated our approval of this approach, see In re Bryson Properties, 961 F.2d 496, 500 (4th Cir.1992), and this approach seems to have been adopted by at least two other circuits, see In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990) (the court should look to the market of similar loans in the area); Memphis Bank and Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 431 (6th Cir.1982) (same).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Ropt Ltd. Partnership
Bankr. D. Mass. · 1993 · confidence medium
Under this approach, the appropriate rate of interest on deferred payments to secured creditors is “the current market rate of interest used for similar loans in the region.” In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990); In re Busconi, 147 B.R. 54, 55 (Bankr.D.Mass.1992) (choosing mar *409 ket rate approach as more fair to secured claimants and consistent with the weight of authority).
examined Cited as authority (rule) In Re Mellema (7×)
Bankr.D. Colo. · 1991 · confidence medium
In re Hardzog, supra at 860 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dominion Bank v. Cassell (In Re Cassell) (2×) also: Cited "see"
W.D. Va. · 1990 · confidence medium
In re Hardzog (Hardzog v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita), 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990) (courts are not well situated to use the “cost of funds” approach, which is “not susceptible of accurate determination without complex problems of proof”).
cited Cited "see" First National Bank v. Woods (In re Woods)
10th Cir. BAP · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See 11 U.S.C. § 1225 (a)(5)(B)(ii). . 901 F.2d 858 (10th Cir.1990). .
discussed Cited "see" In Re Rim Development, LLC
Bankr. D. Kan. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990), holding in a chapter 12 case that "[i]t therefore follows that the most appropriate interest rate is the current market rate for similar loans made in the region at the time the new loan is made.” 42 . 75 F.2d 941 (2nd Cir.1935). 43 .
cited Cited "see" In Re Pledger
Bankr. N.D. Ala. · 2002 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hardzog v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita (In re Hardzog), 901 F.2d 858 (10th Cir.1990) (the current market rate for similar loans made in the region).
examined Cited "see" In Re Segura (3×)
Bankr. N.D. Okla · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hardzog, 901 F.2d at 860 .
cited Cited "see" In Re Rienhardt
Bankr. N.D.N.Y. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Mellema, 124 *435 B.R. 103, 105 (Bankr.D.Colo.1991), citing In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858 (10th Cir.1990).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Case (In Re Case)
9th Cir. BAP · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Arnold, 878 F.2d 925, 980 (6th Cir.1989); United States v. Doud, 869 F.2d 1144, 1145-46 (8th Cir.1989).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re Sorrell
Bankr. D. Utah · 2002 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Hardzog v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita (In re Hardzog), 901 F.2d 858 (10th Cir.1990) (providing that in absence of special circumstances such as the market rate being higher than the contract rate, the bankruptcy court should use the market rate of interest).
cited Cited "see, e.g." In Re Value Recreation, Inc.
Bankr. D. Minn. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990) (recognizing Doud as applying just this methodology).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re Sacred Heart Hospital of Norristown
Bankr. E.D. Pa. · 1995 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858 , 859 & n. 6 (10th Cir.1990); In re River Village Associates, 161 B.R. 127, 135 (Bankr.E.D.Pa.1993), aff 'd, 181 B.R. 795 (E.D.Pa.1995); and In re Musil, 99 B.R. 448, 451 (Bankr.D.Kan.1988).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc. (In Re CF & I Fabricators of Utah, Inc.)
D. Utah · 1994 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858 (10th Cir.1990) (determining present value of future cash flows in Bankruptcy Chapter 12 context); In re Camino Real Landscape Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 818 F.2d 1503 (9th Cir.1987) (fixing present value of federal tax claims in Chapter 11 reorganization).
cited Cited "see, e.g." In Re P.J. Keating Co.
Bankr. D. Mass. · 1994 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858 (10th Cir.1990).
cited Cited "see, e.g." In Re Kellogg Square Partnership
Bankr. D. Minn. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990) (recognizing Doud as applying just this methodology).
cited Cited "see, e.g." In Re SM 104 Ltd.
Bankr. S.D. Florida · 1993 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990); In re Stratford Assocs.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." In Re Birdneck Apartment Associates, II, L.P.
Bankr. E.D. Va. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Hardzog v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita (In re Hardzog), 901 F.2d 858, 860 (10th Cir.1990); Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Whitman, 692 F.2d 427, 431 (6th Cir.1982); Dominion Bank v. Cassell (In re Cassell), 119 B.R. 89, 93 (W.D.Va.1990); In re Ropt Limited Partnership, 152 B.R. 406 (Bankr.D.Mass.1993); In re Eastland Partners Ltd.
cited Cited "see, e.g." In Re Computer Optics, Inc.
Bankr. D.N.H. · 1991 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., In re Hardzog, 901 F.2d 858 (10th Cir.1990); United States v. Arnold, 878 F.2d 925 (6th Cir.1989).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
In Re Clarence L. (I.O.) HARDZOG; Katy Lou Hardzog, Debtors. Clarence L. (I.O.) HARDZOG; Katy Lou Hardzog, Appellees,
v.
the FEDERAL LAND BANK OF WICHITA, Appellant
89-6064, 89-6065.
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Apr 19, 1990.
901 F.2d 858
B.J. Brockett, Anthony L. Jackson, and J. Mark Spaeth of B.J. Brockett, Inc., P.C., Oklahoma City, Okl., on the briefs, for ap-pellees., G. Blaine Schwabe, III, J. Eric Ivester, and Rob F. Robertson of Mock, Schwabe, Waldo, Elder, Reeves & Bryant, Oklahoma City, Okl., on the briefs, for appellant.
Seymour, Moore, Brorby.
Cited by 73 opinions  |  Published
BRORBY, Circuit Judge.

This appeal was set for oral argument during the March Term of this court. Counsel were unable to be present due to blizzard conditions. This court has therefore examined the briefs and appellate record and has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed.R.App.P. 34(a); 10th Cir.R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.

This appeal concerns the validity of a Bankruptcy Chapter 12 debt adjustment plan.

The significant facts are neither complex nor disputed. Appellant (Bank) made a loan to Appellees (Debtors) and secured this debt with a mortgage upon Debtors’ real property. After paying on this loan for approximately twelve years, Debtors commenced a Chapter 12 Bankruptcy proceeding. At that time, the mortgage called for approximately eighteen years of payments at 12.5 per cent per annum. The unpaid principal amounted to approximately $193,000. The total amount of the Bank’s allowed claim was approximately $204,0004. [1] The fair market value of the real property was approximately $230,000. The debtors filed their debt adjustment plan and proposed to pay the amount of the allowed claim in fifteen years [2] with inter[*859] est at 7.5 per cent per annum. The Bank objected to the plan and asserted it was entitled to interest at 12.5 per cent per annum, which was the agreed upon rate contained in the contract.

The Bankruptcy Court ultimately approved a modified plan, which called for payment of the allowed claim in fifteen years at an annual interest rate of ten per cent. The Bankruptcy Court established the interest rate by computing what it determined to be the Bank’s cost of funds. [3] It set the cost of Bank’s funds at 9.3 per cent and the cost of Bank’s risk factor at .7 per cent, thus yielding a total interest rate of 10 per cent.

Bank appeals, asserting: (1) the debt adjustment plan does not propose to pay the value of its claim; (2) if an interest rate other than the contract rate is applied, the Bank would then be deprived of its property without just compensation; and (3) numerous arguments contending that the Bankruptcy Court either should not have used the cost of funds approach or that the Bankruptcy Court miscomputed the cost of funds.

A broad, loose and generalized summary of Chapter 12 of the Bankruptcy Code will help place Bank’s arguments into perspective. Generally speaking, an eligible family farmer may obtain relief from debts and continue to reside upon and operate the farm if the Bankruptcy Court approves a debt adjustment plan. The debt adjustment plan may affect the rights of the holders of the debt. After the debt adjustment plan has been approved, the debtor pays the trustee who in turn pays the holders of the debt. To be confirmed, a debt adjustment plan must meet certain requirements specified by the Bankruptcy Code. One of these requirements is that the holder of an allowed claim must receive property under the plan which has a value of no less than the amount of its allowed claim. [4]

Bank contends it will not receive the allowed amount of its claim as it will not receive the agreed upon interest rate. Stated somewhat differently, Bank contends it cannot receive the value of its claim unless it receives its contract rate of interest. [5]

What becomes immediately obvious is that the Bankruptcy Court must determine the present value of a series of future cash flows; otherwise it cannot determine whether Bank will receive less than the allowed amount of the claim. This necessarily dictates that the Bankruptcy Court must arrive at a discount factor or interest rate. Once the unpaid principal, due date, payment periods, and payment amounts are determined, the problem still cannot be solved until the interest rate or discount factor is determined. Only with all of these figures known does the solution then become one of mathematical computation. The precise question before us is how to determine the interest rate to be applied to the formula.

Congress, in enacting Chapter 12, gave us no guidance in how to determine the applicable interest rate.

The Bankruptcy Code contains other provisions setting forth a present value requirement. [6] Courts, in interpreting these similar statutes, have not been uniform in their results. As one authority on Bankruptcy has stated:

While the cases considering the issue are fairly uniform in agreeing that a market rate of interest is appropriate, the cases differ drastically in their interpretation of how a “market rate” is to be determined.

[*860] 5 Collier on Bankruptcy § 1225.03 at 1225-21 (1989).

A review of court decisions determining an appropriate interest rate under Chapter 12 likewise reveals diverse results which include using the interest rate charged by the secured creditor; [7] using the legal rate on judgments in the absence of evidence concerning market rates; [8] using the contract rate after determining it was below market; [9] and of course the case now before this court, which holds a cost of funds approach to be proper.

The Eighth Circuit has addressed the problem before us in the case of United States v. Doud, 869 F.2d 1144 (8th Cir.1989). This decision endorsed the “market rate” approach while approving a method of determination of the “market cost” by first determining the rate of a risk-free loan, such as the yield on treasury bonds, and adding thereto two per cent as a risk factor. In short, this approach determines an appropriate interest rate, which consists of a “risk-free rate” plus additional interest to compensate a creditor for risks posed by the plan. We cannot agree that this represents a “market rate.” The advantage to this approach is a simplified and easy method of interest rate determination. The disadvantage is that this approach will probably not accurately reflect the market, and thus may unduly penalize the lender or borrower.

Courts are not well situated to craft and determine interest rates. Judges are neither bankers nor lenders and do not have the expertise to set interest rates. A lender, in establishing interest rates to be charged to a borrower, will consider and utilize many factors, including what the competition charges, its cost of funds, the condition of the local economy, its overhead, the character of the borrower, the capacity of the borrower to repay, the value of the collateral, the costs of servicing the loan, the status of the lender’s loan portfolio, the lender’s ratio of loans to assets, its liquidity, and a host of other factors. We therefore hold that a “cost of funds” approach should not be utilized by Bankruptcy Courts in establishing the appropriate interest factor. A “cost of funds” approach is not susceptible of accurate determination without complex problems of proof and may not result in fairness.

Considering that most courts are utilizing a market rate approach and further considering that courts are well equipped to determine market rates, we hold that in the absence of special circumstances, such as the market rate being higher than the contract rate, [10] Bankruptcy Courts should use the current market rate of interest used for similar loans in the region. Bankruptcy Courts, counsel, lenders, and borrowers should have a familiarity with current interest rates on like-type loans and when a dispute arises, the market rate should be easily susceptible of determination by means of a hearing where each party is given the opportunity to submit evidence concerning the current market rate of interest for similar loans in the region. We are persuaded to adopt this approach by two additional factors. Chapter 12 is predicated upon the theory that the lender is making a new loan to the debtor. It therefore follows that the most appropriate interest rate is the current market rate for similar loans made in the region at the time the new loan is made. This approach should also tend to assure that both the lender and the debtor are treated fairly with neither receiving an advantage over the other.

This decision renders moot the remaining issues raised by Bank.

The decision of the District Court affirming the decision of the Bankruptcy Court is therefore REVERSED, and this case is remanded for such other and further pro[*861-863] ceedings to be conducted in accordance with the holdings of this opinion.

1

. Interest was allowed at the contract rate up to the effective date of the plan.

2

. The parties do not present any issues to this court concerning the fifteen-year repayment, nor the effect thereof, if any, upon the subsequent question of present value.

3

. The Bankruptcy Court's decisions in this case are reported at 74 B.R. 701 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1987) and 77 B.R. 840 (Bankr.W.D.Okla.1987).

4

. 11 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii) provides that the holder of each secured claim shall receive “the value, as of the effective date of the plan, of property to be distributed ... under the plan on account of such claim is not less than the allowed amount of such claim.”

5

. It is important to note that Bank is an over-secured creditor, which is to say that its collateral has a value in excess of the amount of the allowed claim.

6

. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1129(a)(9)(B)(i) and (C), 11-29(b)(2)(A)(i)(II) and 1325(a)(5)(B)(ii).

7

. In re Citrowske, 72 B.R. 613 (Bankr.D.Minn.1987).

8

. In re Fleshman, 82 B.R. 994 (Bankr.W.D.Mo.1987).

9

. In re Turner, 87 B.R. 514 (Bankr.S.D.Ohio 1988).

10

. We deliberately reserve until the issue is properly before us, a definition of the parameters of "such special circumstances.”