SELYA, Circuit Judge. A jury in the United States

District Court for the District of Massachusetts convicted defendants-appellants Juan Rodriguez and Junito Melendez of, inter alia, conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute more than 500 grams of cocaine. The defendants claim

that the trial was plagued by erroneous evidentiary rulings and defective jury instructions. In addition, Melendez claims that his sentence rested on incorrect guideline calculations.

Discerning no error, we affirm.

I

We briefly rehearse the relevant facts and travel of the case. Because these appeals do not present challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence but, rather, deal with other claims of error, we rehearse "the facts in a 'balanced' manner in which we

'objectively view the evidence of record.'" United States v. Amador-Huggins, 799 F.3d 124, 127 (1st Cir. 2015) (quoting United

States v. Burgos-Montes, 786 F.3d 92, 99 (1st Cir. 2015)); see

Gray v. Genlyte Group, Inc., 289 F.3d 128, 131 (1st Cir. 2002)

(explaining that, for issues such as admissibility of evidence and appropriateness of jury instructions, "evidence offered by either side or both may be pertinent").1

1Some of our older cases suggest that — even in the absence of a sufficiency challenge — we should rehearse the facts in the light most favorable to the verdict. See United States v. Rodríguez-Soler, 773 F.3d 289, 290 (1st Cir. 2014). Having

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A

Melendez and Rodriguez were convicted of working with several associates to carry out a scheme to purchase and distribute large quantities of cocaine in Massachusetts and New Hampshire.

The government's case against them was as follows. Melendez was

the front man of the enterprise: he interacted with customers and suppliers while Rodriguez managed the back-end operations from his residence in Worcester, Massachusetts. The two men acquired at

least some of the trafficked cocaine from Angel Cordova (whom the government believed to be their primary supplier). They then cooked portions of the acquired cocaine into crack cocaine, which they sold along with the rest of the powder cocaine. Their

principal customer was Carlos Richards (Lito) who lived in Manchester, New Hampshire. To transport the contraband from

Worcester to Manchester, the defendants sometimes employed couriers.

reexamined those decisions in light of the weight of modern authority, we abrogate them. In doing so, we have followed the procedure described in cases such as Trailer Marine Transport Corp. v. Rivera Vazquez, 977 F.2d 1, 9 n.5 (1st Cir. 1992), Gallagher v. Wilton Enterprises, Inc., 962 F.2d 120, 124 n.4 (1st Cir. 1992), and Carpenters Local Union No. 26 v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 215 F.3d 136, 138 n.1 (1st Cir. 2000). The panel opinion in this case was circulated to all active judges of the court prior to publication. None interposed an objection to our proposed course of action. We caution, however, that the use of this informal procedure does not convert this opinion into an opinion en banc, nor does it preclude a suggestion of rehearing en banc on any issue in this case. - 4 - The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) began focusing on the defendants in the summer of 2018 after local police in Worcester requested assistance with an ongoing probe. As relevant here, the ATF took custody of Melendez's iPhone in December of 2018 while he was detained on a charge unrelated to these appeals. The ATF secured a search warrant for the iPhone's contents and subsequently obtained three authorizations for wiretaps of the iPhone. Based on information that was recovered from the iPhone (such as photographs and notes) and conversations that were recorded by means of the wiretaps, the ATF and local police tracked the defendants' drug operations over the next few months. We briefly recount these drug transactions as they pertain to the issues on appeal. When the authorities arrested the defendants, the charges that they lodged stemmed from a series of seemingly scattered drug transactions that occurred over a period of approximately three months. Our odyssey along this trail begins on April 2, 2019, when a local police officer in Worcester observed one of Melendez's associates, Lujan Burgos, enter Melendez's residence and depart less than an hour later. Burgos was subsequently stopped and arrested for driving on a suspended license. A search of his person incident to his arrest yielded twenty-two grams of crack cocaine, which the government suspected - 5 - Burgos had procured from Melendez during his brief visit to Melendez's residence. The next day — April 3 — Rodriguez called Melendez for assistance in bailing out Burgos. Melendez responded that he would "make some moves" and that he should be able to help the next day — a response that hinted that Melendez would receive proceeds from a later cocaine sale. One of the enterprise's couriers, Antoine Mack, was to deliver cocaine to Richards in Manchester that afternoon. Local police observed Mack first at a dwelling in Worcester (later referred to as "Mula's spot") at which Melendez's vehicle was parked. Mack spent only a short time in the Worcester residence, after which tailing ATF agents lost sight of him. The government suspected that it had just witnessed Mack pick up a cocaine shipment from Melendez to transport to Richards in Manchester. Mack reappeared at Richards's residence, where he made only a quick stop and departed with a bag in hand. A later- discovered video showed Mack in his vehicle in Manchester with what looked like a large sum of cash in his lap. Mack then returned to Massachusetts and made another pilgrimage to Melendez's residence. After these events had transpired, Melendez told Rodriguez that he had secured the necessary funds to help bail out Burgos. From the government's perspective, this chain of events - 6 - indicated that Mack had successfully delivered the cocaine to Richards and returned the proceeds to Melendez. We fast-forward to April 12. On that date, Melendez telephoned Cordova, who reported that he "got five" — a statement which the ATF case agent understood to mean 500 grams of cocaine. Several additional telephone calls ensued during which the men discussed a meeting location for the transfer of the cocaine. Following these calls, Worcester police observed a "possible Hispanic male" leave the meeting location with what looked like a food container in a plastic bag. The government argued that police had just witnessed Melendez purchase cocaine from Cordova. This brings us to April 22. On that date, Melendez instructed Mack to go to Mula's spot, which the government understood as a direction to pick up cocaine and deliver it to Richards in Manchester. Mack's trip, though, was interrupted by a police officer who stopped him on an unrelated charge and had his vehicle towed. The officer recovered a plastic bag during the stop, but it did not contain contraband. Mack and Melendez regrouped and again attempted to execute the transaction. Attuned to their communications through the wiretaps, the ATF sent an agent to conduct surveillance. The surveilling agent observed an individual drive to Richards's residence in Manchester. The surveilling agent suspected that the purpose of this trip was to deliver cocaine. But because it was - 7 - dark and raining, the agent could not identify the messenger. Even so, after tailing the messenger's vehicle to a gas station on its return journey, the agent was able to identify Mack as the driver. The agent followed the vehicle to a house in Worcester and watched Mack enter the house with a bag in hand. It could reasonably be inferred from this observation that Mack returned with the proceeds from his most recent cocaine delivery. Later that week (on April 25), Melendez informed Cordova that he needed "seven or eight," which the ATF case agent interpreted to mean 700 or 800 grams of cocaine. On April 27, after further telephone exchanges, Melendez and Cordova were seen driving together toward a Massachusetts residence. On May 6, Cordova telephoned Melendez and — according to the ATF case agent's interpretation — agreed that Cordova would sell Melendez 500 grams of cocaine. ATF agents then observed Cordova, another courier (Kevin Jean), and a third unidentified person meet at Mula's spot. The following day, Melendez telephoned Richards. The case agent — interpreting coded language — testified that this call was intended to make plans to deliver 400 grams of cocaine to Richards in New Hampshire. Subsequent communications between Melendez and Jean supported an inference that Jean met with Richards that afternoon. On May 16, the case agent — again interpreting coded language — concluded that Melendez intended to procure at least 500 grams of cocaine from Cordova. This - 8 - conclusion was based on the case agent's review of a telephone call between Melendez and Cordova, which reflected that Melendez told Cordova that he would buy "[p]robably more, but five minimum." A day later, Cordova communicated to Melendez that he had "531 in one piece," a statement that the case agent interpreted to mean 531 grams of cocaine in one "brick." Melendez directed Cordova to come to his residence, where video footage shows the two men meeting for about three minutes. On May 23 and 24, Melendez and Cordova discussed the possibility of Cordova again supplying Melendez with cocaine. These discussions proceeded notwithstanding the fact that Melendez was displeased with the quality of the product that he had received earlier. On May 24, Melendez ordered "three" from Cordova, which the case agent interpreted to mean 300 grams of cocaine. This order was placed after Cordova advised Melendez that he had secured a different source of supply for the drugs. Melendez and Cordova subsequently were seen inside a Massachusetts residence, after which Melendez told Rodriguez that he could have "1 or 2." Following a telephone call with Melendez, Richards arrived at that location (about thirty minutes after Cordova had left) and then departed with a bag in hand. Shortly thereafter, two officers stopped Richards and found about 200 grams of cocaine, about 105 grams of crack cocaine, and many "white - 9 - papers" in his possession. The officers confiscated the contraband but did not arrest Richards. On June 5, ATF agents executed search warrants at Melendez's and Rodriguez's homes and arrested both men. In July, a federal grand jury sitting in the District of Massachusetts charged the defendants with one count of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. § 846; see also id. § 841(a)(1). The indictment further charged that 500 grams or more of cocaine was reasonably foreseeable and attributable to Melendez and that he had a prior conviction for a serious drug felony, see 21 U.S.C. § 802(57) — circumstances that warranted enhanced penalties under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii). The grand jury separately charged Melendez with one count of conspiracy to interfere with commerce by robbery (Hobbs Act robbery). See 18 U.S.C. § 1951. B After a thirteen-day trial at which the government presented evidence of these events, the jury found both Melendez and Rodriguez guilty of conspiracy to distribute cocaine and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. § 846. The jury separately found that Melendez had distributed 500 grams or more of cocaine under circumstances in which such distribution was reasonably foreseeable, after he had previously been convicted of a serious - 10 - drug felony. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B)(ii). Finally, Melendez pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery. See 18 U.S.C. § 1951. The district court sentenced Rodriguez to a 52-month term of immurement for the drug conspiracy. The court sentenced Melendez to concurrent terms of imprisonment of 156 months for his two conspiracy convictions. These timely appeals followed. II We start with Melendez's challenge to the search warrant and wiretaps issued for his iPhone. The wiretaps, in particular, yielded many of the communications deployed against Melendez at trial. A Some additional background is useful. While Melendez was in police custody on an unrelated matter, the ATF confiscated his phone and sought a search warrant for its contents. The government supported the warrant application with an affidavit from the ATF case agent asserting that there was probable cause to believe that Melendez committed drug and firearm trafficking offenses for which the phone's contents would provide evidence. The affidavit identified two confidential sources (both of whom have prior convictions and were cooperating in return for potential leniency on pending criminal charges). - 11 - The first source advised that Melendez was the leader of the Massachusetts section of the Vice Lords gang and possessed and distributed firearms. The second source substantiated the allegations of Melendez's role in the Vice Lords and his possession and distribution of firearms. That source also disclosed that Melendez was involved in the distribution of kilograms of crack and powder cocaine and that he sanctioned the use of violence to protect his drug-distribution activities. A magistrate judge issued a search warrant, and the government collected a mass of information on which it relied for a later wiretap application. In support of the wiretap application, the case agent explained that law enforcement was investigating Melendez's firearm and drug-distribution operations. The case agent noted Melendez's prior conviction, his apparent involvement in various criminal activities, and the statements from the two confidential sources. In addition, the case agent noted statements from two more confidential sources. The third source substantiated Melendez's involvement in the Vice Lords gang and his firearms dealings, and the fourth source was identified as a potential cooperator. The court granted the application. Two other wiretap applications, which relied in part on evidence from the first wiretap, were also granted. Melendez filed motions to suppress both the evidence obtained from the iPhone and the communications intercepted - 12 - through the wiretap. The district court denied these motions. Melendez now challenges these denials. B We begin by rehearsing standards of review applicable to the denial of motions to suppress evidence from search warrants and wiretaps.

When presented with a challenge to the denial of a motion to suppress, "we examine the district court's 'factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions, including its ultimate

constitutional determinations, de novo.'" United States v. Sheehan, 70 F.4th 36, 43 (1st Cir. 2023) (quoting United States v. Moss, 936 F.3d 52, 58 (1st Cir. 2019)). Where, as here, the principal "basis for a probable cause determination is information provided by a confidential informant, the affidavit must provide some information from which a magistrate can credit the informant's credibility." United States v. Gifford, 727 F.3d 92, 99 (1st Cir.

2013). Put bluntly, "the probability of a lying or inaccurate

informer [must have] been sufficiently reduced." United States v. Greenburg, 410 F.3d 63, 69 (1st Cir. 2005). To assess an informant's credibility, we look to factors such as:

(1) whether the affidavit establishes the probable veracity and basis of knowledge of persons supplying hearsay information; (2) whether an informant's statements reflect first-hand knowledge; (3) whether some or all

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of the informant's factual statements were corroborated wherever reasonable or practicable (e.g., through police surveillance); and (4) whether a law enforcement affiant assessed, from his professional standpoint, experience, and expertise, the probable significance of the informant's provided information.

Gifford, 727 F.3d at 99.

Congress has instructed that law enforcement must make

several specific showings before intercepting wire, oral, or electronic communications. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3). A wiretap application must show probable cause to believe "that an individual is committing, has committed, or is about to commit a

[qualifying] offense." Id. § 2518(3)(a). So, too, the application must show probable cause to believe that the intercepted communications will yield information about the offense and "that either the individual or the offense is

sufficiently connected to the means of communication that [the government] seeks to surveil." United States v. Encarnacion, 26

F.4th 490, 497 (1st Cir. 2022); see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(b), (d).

What is more, the application must show that "normal

investigative procedures have been tried and have failed or reasonably appear to be unlikely to succeed if tried or to be too dangerous." 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(c). In short, the wiretap must be reasonably necessary to the investigation. See Encarnacion, 26

- 14 - F.4th at 497. We will affirm a wiretap if "the application was at least 'minimally adequate' to support the authorization of the wiretap." Id. (quoting United States v. Gordon, 871 F.3d 35, 43 (1st Cir. 2017)). So long as the application clears this bar, a motion to suppress the fruits of the wiretap will be denied. See Gordon, 871 F.3d at 46. C We separately address the iPhone search and the wiretaps.

Melendez contends that the search of his iPhone lacked probable cause because the supporting affidavit from the case agent

(which incorporated the confidential sources' accounts) was not credible. He says that the case agent failed to provide any information in support of the sources' credibility. See United

States v. Barnard, 299 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 2002) (explaining that "[a] mere assertion of reliability without any information regarding the basis for the officer's belief, such as past tips leading to arrests," is a minimum showing that "is entitled to

only slight weight" (internal quotations omitted)). He adds, moreover, that the confidential sources' past criminal convictions and current quest for leniency undermine their credibility.

Without independent evidence of credibility, his thesis runs, these sources "had every reason to lie" in exchange for more

- 15 - favorable resolution of their pending criminal charges. He adds

that the information provided came without "any explanation for the[] basis of knowledge and consisted of conclusory allegations of criminal conduct devoid of the specificity necessary to determine whether the information was based on personal knowledge or hearsay."

These arguments fail because they depend upon

balkanization of the evidence. As a start, the fact that the confidential sources were cooperating with law enforcement does not, in and of itself, undermine their credibility. See United

States v. Leonard, 17 F.4th 218, 225 (1st Cir. 2021) (explaining

that, although confidential source "had pending charges at the time, providing perhaps an incentive to falsify information," this concern could be eased by offering information that corroborated the source's account); see also United States v. Vongkaysone, 434

F.3d 68, 74 (1st Cir. 2006) (explaining that, when one becomes an informant in exchange for potential leniency with pending criminal charges, "it [is] to his advantage to produce accurate information to the police so as to qualify for the leniency he [seeks]").

To be sure, a source may overstate his knowledge in the hope that the government can use what little information he can

provide to make an arrest and, thus, afford him leniency. The source may even fabricate information, such as in an attempt to mislead the government in furtherance of the criminal enterprise.

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See, e.g., United States v. Ramírez-Rivera, 800 F.3d 1, 28 (1st

Cir. 2015), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Leoner-

Aguirre, 939 F.3d 310, 316-17 (1st Cir. 2019); United States v. Vigeant, 176 F.3d 565, 570 (1st Cir. 1999).

In the case at hand, evidence supporting the veracity of the sources' information defeats any such theory. Each source spoke directly to investigators, so if either of them had later been found to be lying, he would have been exposed to additional punishment. This provided an incentive for the sources to be truthful in their accounts. See Barnard, 299 F.3d at 93 ("Unlike

an anonymous tipster, [a cooperating source is] . . . known to the police and could be held responsible if his assertions prove[]

inaccurate or false."). Additionally, it is noteworthy that the two separate sources both confirmed essentially the same information about Melendez's gang affiliation and criminal activities. This level of consistency furnishes a form of internal corroboration. See Leonard, 17 F.4th at 226 (noting importance of "cross-corroboration" among sources).

There is more. To bolster the sources' credibility, the government discloses additional context as to how the first two sources acquired their information. Notably, they observed some of Melendez's criminal activities first-hand. See United States v. Maglio, 21 F.4th 179, 186 (1st Cir. 2021) (noting that confidential source's reliability is bolstered if he "personally

- 17 - observed criminal activity"). The first source saw Melendez possess and/or distribute up to thirty-five firearms. The second source was in a trailer with Melendez when he saw Melendez cook crack cocaine. He also explained that Melendez generally had access to firearms and, on at least one occasion, observed Melendez in possession of a particular 9mm firearm.

Even when these sources proffered information that was not based on personal observation, they included extensive details showing that they "ha[d] a legitimate basis [to] know[]" or that an uninvolved person could not have "easily know[n]" that information. United States v. Khounsavanh, 113 F.3d 279, 284 (1st

Cir. 1997). For example, these sources shared the identities of additional gang members and some of Melendez's firearm straw purchasers. They also alerted the government to another unreported shooting. Melendez does not assign clear error to the district court's reliance on any of these facts — which further undermines his suggestion that the informants lacked credibility.

Last — but far from least — the government corroborated

the informants' accounts with independent information. The address of the gang house was confirmed when law enforcement

connected it to an overdose. The authorities confirmed that the unreported shooting did occur. And the government showed that

Melendez was linked to a couple of the firearm purchases. Once

- 18 - again, Melendez does not assign clear error to the district court's reliance on any of these facts. To say more would be to paint the lily. Taking into consideration "the 'totality of the circumstances' disclosed in the supporting affidavit[]," we conclude that it showed "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime [would] be found" in a search of the phone. Barnard, 299 F.3d at 93 (quoting United States v. Zayas-Diaz, 95 F.3d 105, 111 (1st Cir. 1996)).

Because the iPhone search was lawful, we must reject

Melendez's derivative argument that the wiretaps relied on fruit

of the poisonous iPhone tree. See Utah v. Strieff, 579 U.S. 232, 237 (2016). The evidence in support of the wiretaps is even stronger because it included a third confidential source who spoke directly to law enforcement and corroborated the allegations made

by the first two sources. That leaves his contention that the government failed to satisfy the necessity requirement as to the wiretap applications. In that regard, our inquiry focuses on whether "other investigative procedures [were] tried and failed" or whether the government explained "why [these procedures] reasonably appear[ed] to be unlikely to succeed if tried or [would]

be too dangerous." United States v. Santana-Dones, 920 F.3d 70, 76 (1st Cir. 2019) (quoting United States v. Nelson-Rodriguez, 319

F.3d 12, 32 (1st Cir. 2003)); see 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1).

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Melendez argues that the wiretap application did not

"explain why information from recorded phone conversations, text messages, and controlled drug buys between [the fourth confidential source] and [Melendez] would not accomplish the goals of the investigation." This argument lacks force.

The wiretap affidavit offered at least three compelling reasons for the search. The case agent explained that

sophisticated organizations remain wary of other methods, particularly confidential informants who try to infiltrate the organization. The government had tried and failed to introduce

two separate confidential informants into the organization. And a confidential informant posing as a buyer could learn only so

much about the structure of the conspiracy and the identities of those involved. Consequently, we hold that the district court did not err in finding that the government satisfied the necessity requirement by "offer[ing] specific and reasonable explanations

why" other investigative techniques "would have been unproductive, too dangerous, or insufficient to achieve its investigative goals." Encarnacion, 26 F.4th at 501. And because the court supportably concluded that the government satisfied the statutory requirements for a wiretap and did not rely on any clearly erroneous facts, we see no principled basis for overturning its denial of Melendez's motion to suppress.

- 20 - III The defendants jointly challenge two categories of admitted evidence that they deem both improper and unduly prejudicial under prevailing evidentiary rules. A Prior to trial, Melendez filed a motion in limine, seeking to exclude any law enforcement interpretation of statements made during the wiretapped conversations. During trial, Rodriguez made the same objection. The defendants argued that any such interpretation would constitute impermissible lay testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701. See Fed. R. Evid. 701. The district court reserved decision. At trial, however, the court denied the motion as to some testimony. The defendants now appeal. A few additional facts help to provide useful context. The government's principal witness at trial was the ATF case agent, who relied heavily on experience gained from his work over a decade and a half in law enforcement. This work included extensive experience in drug investigations. As the lead agent in this investigation, he reviewed numerous text messages and telephone calls that had been intercepted under the wiretap. Although he was never designated as an expert witness, the court permitted him to offer his opinion on the meaning of several obscure statements - 21 - gleaned from these text messages and telephone calls. The defendants assign error to the admission of this testimony. B We review a preserved objection to the district court's admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse of discretion. See United States v. Kilmartin, 944 F.3d 315, 335 (1st Cir. 2019). A discretionary decision "cannot be set aside by a reviewing court unless it has a definite and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment in the conclusion it reached upon a weighing of the relevant factors." Id. (quoting In re Josephson, 218 F.2d 174, 182 (1st Cir. 1954)). Withal, abuse of discretion is not a monolithic standard. See United States v. Padilla-Galarza, 990 F.3d 60, 73 (1st Cir. 2021). It "encompasses 'de novo review of abstract questions of law, clear error review of findings of fact, and deferential review of judgment calls.'" Id. (quoting United States v. Lewis, 517 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2008)). Federal Rule of Evidence 701 requires that opinion testimony from a witness who is not testifying as an expert be "rationally based on the witness's perception"; "helpful to clearly understanding the witness's testimony or to determining a fact in issue"; and "not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge within the scope of Rule 702." Fed. R. Evid. 701. "Application of Rule 701 in the drug-trafficking context is - 22 - not novel: 'we have long held that government witnesses with experience in drug investigations may explain the drug trade and translate coded language' for factfinders through lay opinion testimony." United States v. Dunston, 851 F.3d 91, 96 (1st Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Rosado-Pérez, 605 F.3d 48, 56 (1st Cir. 2010)); accord United States v. Hoffman, 832 F.2d 1299, 1310 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that one who is experienced in the field can "interpret[] . . . codes and jargon used in the drug trade" under Rule 702). To comply with the constraints of Rule 701, "such interpretive testimony must be anchored in the witness's personal experience in the field . . . and his experience-based understanding of the meaning of the terms used." Dunston, 851 F.3d at 97. Of course, such a law enforcement officer must limit his interpretation to language that is "peculiar to the[] defendants" in the particular case and ground his interpretation "largely on [his] immersion in the details of [the relevant] investigation." United States v. Albertelli, 687 F.3d 439, 446- 47 (1st Cir. 2012). C On appeal, the defendants first attack the case agent's testimony, "[b]ased on [his] experience in this investigation," that "Shit Lito" described transporting cocaine to Lito who lived in New Hampshire and that "Mula's spot" was 69 Cutler Street in - 23 - Worcester (where cocaine was distributed).2 (Alterations in original.) The defendants assert that the case agent was not "understanding, interpreting, and translating purposefully confusing drug lingo." United States v. Belanger, 890 F.3d 13, 25 (1st Cir. 2018). To the contrary, they contend that "he was interpreting perfectly clear communications about a meeting between [Melendez] and Mack to infer that Mack was going to obtain cocaine from [Melendez] and deliver it to a person in New Hampshire, even though Mack's car was stopped and searched on the way to New Hampshire and no drugs were found." In this circumstance, it is within the trial court's discretion to allow a law enforcement officer to provide lay opinion testimony when he can — based on his experience with drug investigations and his involvement in the current case — "explain the drug trade and translate coded language." Dunston, 851 F.3d at 96 (quoting Rosado-Pérez, 605 F.3d at 56). When the witness