¹ The Veterans Court characterized the denial as the Board Chairman’s action, e.g., Decision, at *1, even though the denial is signed by a Veterans Law Judge who was not the Chairman, J.A. 16–17, and section 20.1000 gives the Board the specified authority. The parties before us char- acterize the denial as the action of the Board, Young’s Opening Br. at 2; Secretary’s Br. at 2–3, and neither party suggests that the Board/Chairman distinction matters in this appeal. We refer to the ruling as the Board’s. Case: 24-1833 Document: 43 Page: 5 Filed: 01/13/2026 YOUNG v. COLLINS 5 U.S.C. § 7252, provides for “exclusive jurisdiction to review decisions of the Board” subject to a 120-day time bar found in 38 U.S.C. § 7266(a). The Secretary moved to dismiss, arguing that (1) Mr. Young’s appeal was untimely to the extent he was appealing the 1999 Board decision and (2) the Board’s denial of vacatur was not itself an appeala- ble decision, citing for the latter proposition the Veterans Court’s decision in Harms v. Nicholson, 20 Vet. App. 238, 240 (2006) (en banc) (Harms CAVC), affirmed, 489 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007). J.A. 19–22. Mr. Young opposed dis- missal, clarifying that he “did not and [was] not appealing the . . . 1999 decision.” J.A. 37. Rather, he contended that the Board’s denial of his section 20.1000(a) motion was an appealable decision. J.A. 36–37. The Veterans Court granted the Secretary’s motion to dismiss. The appeal of the denial of the motion to vacate was within the 120 days allowed by the appeal statute, so the only issue was whether that denial was an appealable decision. The Veterans Court held that it was not. It rea- soned that “[a] ‘decision’ of the Board, for purposes of [the Veterans Court’s] jurisdiction, is a decision with respect to the benefit sought by the veteran”—and that a denial of a (mere) motion to vacate makes no such decision about the benefit sought and is therefore not an appealable decision. Decision, at *2 (citation omitted). The Veterans Court fur- ther observed that “to permit the appeal of a denial of a motion to vacate—a procedural ruling—24 years after the underlying Board decision . . . ‘would render meaningless the 120-day statutory period for filing appeals.’” Id. (quot- ing Harms CAVC, 20 Vet. App. at 243). Mr. Young timely appealed the Veterans Court’s dis- missal. We have jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(a), (c). II Mr. Young challenges a legal ruling by the Veterans Court and therefore presents a question within our juris- diction under 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2). Mr. Young contends Case: 24-1833 Document: 43 Page: 6 Filed: 01/13/2026 6 YOUNG v. COLLINS that, contrary to the Veterans Court’s conclusion, the Board’s denial of a motion to vacate under section 20.1000(a) is a “decision” of the Board reviewable by the Veterans Court under 38 U.S.C § 7252. We answer such legal questions de novo. Flores-Vazquez v. McDonough, 996 F.3d 1321, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2021). Mr. Young’s argu- ment, we conclude, is foreclosed by controlling precedent, which Mr. Young has not persuasively shown to merit a narrow reading so as to distinguish this case based on the legal authorities he invokes. A In Harms v. Nicholson, 489 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (Harms CAFC), this court affirmed the Veterans Court’s dismissal of an appeal from the Board’s denial of a motion to vacate filed under 38 C.F.R. § 20.904(a) (2005)—which was later recodified without material change as section 20.1000(a). In Harms CAFC, the court reached that result by applying the reasoning of the Supreme Court’s decision in Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brotherhood of Lo- comotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270 (1987). Harms CAFC, 489 F.3d at 1379. Those decisions control the present case. Locomotive Engineers involved an unsuccessful chal- lenge by several labor unions to the Interstate Commerce Commission’s approval of certain railroad mergers. 482 U.S. at 273–74. The unions moved for reconsideration of that decision pursuant to a statutory provision that author- ized the Commission “at any time” to “reopen and recon- sider” a decision because of “material error, new evidence, or substantially changed circumstances.” See id. at 276– 78; 49 U.S.C. § 10327(g)(1) (1978). In particular, the un- ions invoked only the “material error” ground, alleging that the Commission’s original decision was legally (and mate- rially) erroneous. See Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. at 276, 278–79. The Commission denied reconsideration, and the unions appealed to the D.C. Circuit. Id. A statute im- posed a 60-day deadline for bringing appeals from a “final Case: 24-1833 Document: 43 Page: 7 Filed: 01/13/2026 YOUNG v. COLLINS 7 order” of the Commission; the unions’ appeal was brought within 60 days of the Commission’s denial of reconsidera- tion, but more than 60 days after the Commission’s original decision. Id. at 276–77. The D.C. Circuit concluded that the appeal could be heard. See id. at 276. The Supreme Court disagreed, ruling (as relevant here) that the Commission’s denial of the motion to reopen and reconsider was unreviewable. Id. at 277–80. The Court explained that “where no new data but only ‘material error’ has been put forward as the basis for reopening, an appeal places before the courts precisely the same sub- stance that could have been brought there by appeal from the original order” and “judicial review would serve only the peculiar purpose of extending indefinitely the time within which seriously mistaken agency orders can be judi- cially overturned.” Id. at 279–280 (emphasis in original). The Court distinguished the other reopening grounds spec- ified in the reopening statute, concluding that where reo- pening is sought “on the basis of new evidence or changed circumstances[,] review is available.” Id. at 284. The Veterans Court in Harms CAVC applied Locomo- tive Engineers to what is now section 20.1000(a). 20 Vet. App. at 243–44. Harms CAVC concerned a veteran’s mo- tion to vacate made more than 120 days after an unfavora- ble Board decision. Id. at 240–41. The motion alleged that the Board had denied him due process and erroneously re- quired certain evidence. See Harms CAFC, 489 F.3d at 1378. When the Board denied the motion to vacate, the veteran appealed within about a month. Harms CAVC, 20 Vet. App. at 241. He sought review of both the denial and the underlying merits decision, arguing that “a decision on a motion to vacate is a final Board decision” reviewable un- der 38 U.S.C. § 7252. Id. The Veterans Court disagreed, and dismissed the appeal, reasoning that the appeal from the underlying Board decision was untimely and that the Board’s denial of the motion to vacate was not appealable, as it was “not substantively distinguishable” from the Case: 24-1833 Document: 43 Page: 8 Filed: 01/13/2026 8 YOUNG v. COLLINS unappealable denial of reconsideration in Locomotive En- gineers. Id. at 244 (citation omitted). The veteran appealed, and we affirmed. Harms CAFC, 489 F.3d at 1377. We held that a mere denial of a motion to vacate under what is now section 20.1000(a)—which does not even purport to delay the finality of the underlying decision—does not constitute “a new Board decision on the merits of the original claims” and therefore is not itself ap- pealable. See id. at 1378–79. And we agreed with the Vet- erans Court’s application of Locomotive Engineers to such a denial, lest an essentially procedural mechanism “open an avenue to perpetual review of Board decisions.” Id. at 1379; see id. (citing Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. at 280– 81). This case comes within the rule of Harms CAFC that the Board’s denial of a motion to vacate under section 20.1000(a) is not itself reviewable. Mr. Young’s motion to vacate was predicated entirely on an allegation known to the Board in 1999 (the RO’s purported failure to search for certain records). There is no plausible argument here—if there ever could be under section 20.1000(a)—that the mo- tion rests on “new evidence” or “changed circumstances” so as to put the case outside the reach of Locomotive Engi- neers and, by extension, Harms CAFC. See Locomotive En- gineers, 482 U.S. at 284. Moreover, the veteran in Harms CAFC waited only about a year to move the Board to vacate its merits decision, while Mr. Young waited 23 years. Com- pare 489 F.3d at 1377–78 with J.A. 14–15. This case thus highlights the concern about “perpetual review” underlying Harm CAFC, 489 F.3d at 1379, and Locomotive Engineers, as a belated request like Mr. Young’s would likely involve different counsel from the original case, faded memories, or incomplete records, all increasing the risk of waste and er- ror. Finally, a holding of reviewability here would effec- tively subject the 120-day time bar of 38 U.S.C. § 7266 to a “proviso” that, as to an allegation of due process error, reads: “judicial review may be sought at any time.” Case: 24-1833 Document: 43 Page: 9 Filed: 01/13/2026 YOUNG v. COLLINS 9 Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. at 279–80. If that result was unwarranted in Locomotive Engineers, where two dif- ferent statutes provided, respectively, for the appeal dead- line and for reopening at any time, id. at 277–78, the same conclusion seems to follow a fortiori where, as here, the va- catur authority exists only by a regulation—one that does not delay the finality of the underlying decision. Mr. Young urges us to ignore Harms CAFC because, there, the veteran was openly seeking review of both the Board’s denial of vacatur and the underlying merits deci- sion whereas Mr. Young is not appealing the Board’s 1999 decision. Young’s Opening Br. at 12. That difference is immaterial. In Harms CAFC, we squarely held that a va- catur denial is not an appealable decision, rejecting the same argument Mr. Young makes here that a “decision to deny the request to vacate is a new final decision.” Harms CAFC, 489 F.3d at 1378. That holding is independent of whether an appeal of the underlying decision would still be timely or whether the veteran has chosen to appeal the un- derlying decision (in a timely or untimely manner) as well as the vacatur denial. It makes no sense that the rule of Harms CAFC and Locomotive Engineers, which precludes indefinite reviewability of challenges available at the time of the underlying decision, Harms CAFC, 489 F.3d at 1378–79; Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. at 278–80, would be subject to evasion by the appellant’s simple choice to re- frain from pressing an out-of-time appeal of the underlying decision. B Mr. Young contends that this case presents a question of first impression because he asks us to interpret the Vet- erans Court’s jurisdictional statute, 38 U.S.C. § 7252, in light of several other statutory and regulatory provisions assertedly not brought to this court’s attention in Harms CAFC. Young’s Reply Br. at 2–5. But Mr. Young cites nothing to support the notion that such new arguments are Case: 24-1833 Document: 43 Page: 10 Filed: 01/13/2026 10 YOUNG v. COLLINS a basis for a panel to depart from directly on-point prece- dent—where the precedent is firmly founded on a Supreme Court decision and there has been no intervening change in law. See Preminger v. Secretary of Veterans Affairs, 517 F.3d 1299, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (permitting departure from precedent only after a sufficient intervening change in governing law); see also Deckers Corp. v. United States, 752 F.3d 949, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2014). In Harms CAFC, we squarely concluded that the Veterans Court had not “mis- interpreted its jurisdiction under 38 U.S.C. §§ 7252(a) and 7266(a),” and we affirmed a Veterans Court decision that rejected some of the same arguments about regulatory pro- visions as those Mr. Young makes to us. 489 F.3d at 1378; see Harms CAVC, 20 Vet. App. at 244–45. And even if a panel may properly give a precedent an available narrow reading in light of persuasive new arguments, Mr. Young has not shown that this is a case for such action. The new arguments presented by Mr. Young do not undermine the straightforward application of Harms CAFC to this case.

² Chapter 72 of title 38, called “United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims,” prescribes the jurisdiction and procedures of the Veterans Court, among other things. See 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251–7299; Pub. L. No. 105-368, title V, § 512(a)(4)(A), 112 Stat. 3315, 3341 (1998) (enacting chap- ter heading into law). Case: 24-1833 Document: 43 Page: 12 Filed: 01/13/2026 12 YOUNG v. COLLINS the “final decision” (for the Secretary). It does not say that every decision of the Board is a “final decision” for purposes of Veterans Court review. By its reference to section 511, it leaves the latter issue to chapter 72. As to what chapter 72 means, our precedents point to a narrower understanding of what is required for a “deci- sion” to be reviewable by the Veterans Court than Mr. Young urges. We have repeatedly said that “[a] ‘deci- sion’ of the Board, for purposes of the Veterans Court’s ju- risdiction under [38 U.S.C. § 7252], is the decision with respect to the benefit sought by the veteran [where] bene- fits are either granted . . . or they are denied.” Maggitt v. West, 202 F.3d 1370, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2000); accord Mote v. Wilkie, 976 F.3d 1337, 1341–42 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (collect- ing cases); see May v. McDonough, 61 F.4th 963, 965–66 (Fed. Cir. 2023). The Veterans Court has consistently ap- plied that gloss to § 7252. See Dojaquez v. McDonough, 35 Vet. App. 423, 428–431 (2022) (discussing doctrinal devel- opments and collecting cases). Even were we free to do so, Mr. Young offers no compelling reason that we ought to de- part from that longstanding interpretation.