FILED NOT FOR PUBLICATION SEP 10 2020 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MICHAEL RICHARDSON, No. 19-16218

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:17-cv-01838-JAM-AC v. WILLIAM P. BARR*, Attorney General, MEMORANDUM**

Defendant, and XAVIER BECERRA, Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted September 8, 2020*** San Francisco, California

* William Barr has been substituted for his predecessor, Jefferson Sessions III, as Attorney General under Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2). ** This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. *** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, and HAWKINS and McKEOWN, Circuit Judges.

Michael Richardson appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his action challenging the constitutionality of California’s Sex Offender Registration Act (“SORA”), Cal. Penal Code §§ 290–290.024, and § 290.46 (“Megan’s Law”), which requires the California Department of Justice (“DOJ”) to maintain an Internet website that contains sex offender registration information. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) and a judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c). See Berg v. Popham, 412 F.3d 1122, 1125 (9th Cir. 2005). We affirm.

profession is a fundamental right, such that any state-sponsored barriers to entry would be subject to strict scrutiny” (citation and quotation marks omitted)). And, as for Richardson’s challenge to § 290.46, this Court has declined to find that sex offenders possess a “fundamental right to avoid publicity.” See Juvenile Male, 670 F.3d at 1012. Consistent with this precedent, we must uphold SORA and Megan’s Law under rational basis review. Id. (rejecting substantive due process challenge to SORNA because “[fundamental] rights are few,” and “[n]one of th[o]se rights [we]re, or could be, asserted by defendants,” a group of juvenile sex offenders subject to SORNA’s registration requirements); Tandeske, 361 F.3d at 597 (holding that Alaska’s SORA, including its publication provision,1 “serve[s] a legitimate nonpunitive purpose of public safety, which is advanced by alerting the public to the risk of sex offenders in their community” (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 102–03) (quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added)).2

Richardson repeatedly urges that SORA and § 290.46 are not rationally related to the state’s interest in public safety because they are premised on inaccurate data regarding recidivism rates among sex offenders. Richardson’s pleadings do not plausibly allege that the legislature had “no legitimate reason for its decision” to enact the registration and publication provisions at issue here. Kawaoka v. City of Arroyo Grande, 17 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1994) (emphasis added). Indeed, the legislature’s statements of intent indicate otherwise. See 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 908, § 1(e) (A.B. 1562) (stating that SORA “w[ould] further the governmental interests of public safety and public scrutiny of the criminal and mental health systems that deal with these offenders”); A.B. 488, 2003–2004 Legis. Sess. (Cal. 2004), § 5 (“In order to ensure that members of the public have adequate information about the identities and locations of sex offenders who may put them and their families at risk, it is necessary that this act take effect immediately.” (emphasis added)).3 current dangerousness.”). Accordingly, Richardson’s procedural due process challenge fails. See Tandeske, 361 F.3d at 596 (“Alaska’s sex offender statute bases the registration and notification requirements on the sole fact of plaintiffs’ convictions. Accordingly, bound by Connecticut Department of Public Safety, we hold that Alaska’s sex offender registration law does not deprive the Does of procedural due process.”).

290.46 is “so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [California’s] intention to deem it civil.” Id. at 963 (citation omitted); see also Smith, 538 U.S. at 92–105; cf. also Cal. Dep’t. of Justice, 173 Cal. App. 4th at 1109 (“[Section 290.46], which is substantively identical to Alaska law, also serves a protective rather than punitive purpose.”); People v. Presley, 156 Cal. App. 4th 1027, 1035 (2007) (“Based on . . . Smith, we conclude that the public notification requirements of sex offender registration do not constitute punishment for purposes of the Sixth Amendment.”).

and ready determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned”). Richardson requests judicial notice of these same materials and of an amicus brief submitted in another case. We deny his request because the contents of these materials are not judicially noticeable. See, e.g., Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. Akanoc Solutions, Inc., 658 F.3d 936, 940 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011) (declining to take judicial notice of amicus brief); Turnacliff v. Westly, 546 F.3d 1113, 1120 n.5 (9th Cir. 2008) (same as to witness declaration); Marks v. Crunch San Diego, LLC, 904 F.3d 1041, 1053 n.10 (9th Cir. 2018) (same as to newspaper articles); Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 690 (9th Cir. 2001) (same as to “disputed facts stated in public records”).