Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 620 (N.D. Ill. 1998). · Go Syfert
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Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 620 (N.D. Ill. 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
20 citation events (20 in the last 25 years) across 10 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Kress Stores of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc. (ca1, 2024-11-12)
Treatment trajectory · 2003 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2003 2014 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 16 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Kress Stores of Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Wal-Mart Puerto Rico, Inc.
1st Cir. · 2024 · confidence medium
Ariz. 2009) (following "authority from other courts provid[ing] that allegations against multiple and unrelated defendants for acts of patent, trademark, and - 59 - copyright infringement do not support joinder under Rule 20(a)"); Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 620, 623 (N.D.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Garner v. Buzz Finco LLC
N.D. Ill. · 2023 · confidence medium
Ill. 2005); Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 620, 622 (N.D.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Thousand Oaks Barrel Co. v. Deep South Barrels LLC
E.D. Va. · 2017 · confidence medium
P. See Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F.Supp.2d 620, 623 (N.D.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Fleming v. Janssen Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
W.D. Tenn. · 2016 · confidence medium
Mar. 24, 2016), ECF No. 20; Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F.Supp.2d 620, 622 (N.D.Ill.1998). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Body Science LLC v. Boston Scientific Corp.
N.D. Ill. · 2012 · confidence medium
Dec. 5, 2011) (“We concur with our colleagues in this district, who have consistently held that the first element of Rule 20’s joinder test is not met where, as here, plaintiff merely accused unrelated defendants of independently infringing the same patent.”); Golden Scorpio Corp. v. Steel Horse Bar & Grill, 596 F.Supp.2d 1282, 1285 (D.AZ.2009) (“allegations against multiple and unrelated defendants for acts of patent, trademark, and copyright infringement do not support joinder under Rule 20(a)”); Pergo, Inc. v. Alloc, Inc., 262 F.Supp.2d 122, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“[T]he fact that…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wacoh Co. v. Kionix Inc.
D. Del. · 2012 · confidence medium
Corp. v. Contec Corp., 220 F.R.D. 415, 417 (D.Del.2004) (two patents); Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F.Supp.2d 620, 623 (N.D.Ill.1998) (one patent); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, 564 F.Supp. 1358, 1370-71 (D.Del.1983) (one patent), with SRI International, Inc. v. Internet Security Systems, Inc., 2005 WL 851126 , *4 (D.Del.2005) (multiple patents); MyMail, Ltd. v. America Online, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 455, 456-57 (E.D.Tex.2004) (one patent).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Golden Scorpio Corp. v. Steel Horse Bar & Grill
D. Ariz. · 2009 · confidence medium
Oct. 22, 2004) (holding that claims did not arise from the same transaction or occurrence where separate defendants had each independently infringed the same trademark); SB Designs v. Reebok Int’l, Ltd., 305 F.Supp.2d 888, 892 (N.D.Ill.2004) (“The fact that the defendants allegedly violated the same trademark does not mean that plaintiffs’ claims against them arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.”); Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F.Supp.2d 620, 623 (N.D.Ill.1998) (holding that the joinder of three manufacturers in a patent infringement suit was improper because the cla…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ex Parte Novartis Pharmaceuticals Corp.
Ala. · 2007 · confidence medium
Co., 497 F.2d 1151, 1154 (2d Cir.1974) (holding in case where associations of insurance agents sued 164 insurance companies that joinder of the defendants was improper because the transactions between the companies and the agents were different and there were no allegations of conspiracy or other concerted action); DIRECTV v. Loussaert, 218 F.R.D. 639, 642-43 (S.D.Iowa 2003) (joinder of individual purchasers of pirate-access devices was improper in the absence of a common purpose among the defendants); Wynn v. National Broad. *301 Co., 234 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1078 (C.D.Cal. 2002) (mere assertion t…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc.
Ala. · 2007 · confidence medium
Co., 234 F.Supp.2d 1067, 1078 (C.D.Cal.2002) (mere assertion that the 51 defendants were members of a common industry was not enough to permit joinder of defendants); Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F.Supp.2d 620, 623 (N.D.Ill.1998) (in patent-infringement action, claims against different companies with different products in competition with each other had been improperly joined); Rappoport v. Steven Spielberg, Inc., 16 F.Supp.2d 481, 496 (D.N.J.1998) (joinder was improper where each defendant allegedly used plaintiffs work separately and differently); Tele-Media Co. of W.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sotelo v. DIRECTREVENUE, LLC
N.D. Ill. · 2005 · confidence medium
Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F.Supp.2d 620, 622 (N.D.Ill.1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Franconia Associates v. United States
Fed. Cl. · 2004 · confidence medium
Corp. 202 F.R.D. 638, 640-41 (D.Nev.2001) (consumers could not bring single action despite all allegedly having been injured by products containing pehylpropanolamine); Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F.Supp.2d 620, 623 (N.D.Ill.1998) (corporations alleged to have infringed the same patent could not be joined as defendants); Grayson v. K-Mart, Corp., 849 F.Supp. 785, 788-89 (N.D.Ga.1994) (employees could not be joined in single suit despite claiming discrimination against them derived from a single corporate policy); Paine, Webber, 564 F.Supp. at 1371 ; Movie Sys., Inc. v. Abel, 99 F.R.D.…
cited Cited "see" Muir v. NBTY, Inc.
N.D. Ill. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See 31 F. Supp. 2d 620 (N.D.
cited Cited "see, e.g." Foxmind Canada Enterprises, Ltd v. The Individuals Corporations Limited Liability Company's Partnerships And Unincorporated Associations Identified on Schedule A Hereto
N.D. Ill. · 2022 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 620 , 622‒23 (N.D.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Philips Electronics North America Corp. v. Contec Corp.
D. Del. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Oct. 7, 1991), aff'd, 983 F.2d 1087 (Fed.Cir.1992) (“Infringement of the same patent by different machines and parties does not constitute the same transaction or occurrence to justify joinder .... ”); see also Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F.Supp.2d 620, 623 (N.D.Ill.1998) (finding joinder of defendant companies selling different products in competition with each other impermissible, notwithstanding alleged infringement of the same patents).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." SB Designs v. Reebok International, Ltd.
N.D. Ill. · 2004 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F.Supp.2d 620, 623 (N.D.Ill.1998) (defendants in patent infringement case who sold different products and were competitors of one another were improperly joined); Pergo, Inc. v. Alloc, Inc., 262 F.Supp.2d 122, 128 (S.D.N.Y.2003) (“[T]he fact that two parties may manufacture or sell similar products, and that these sales or production may have infringed the identical patent owned by the plaintiffs is not sufficient to join unrelated parties as defendants in the same lawsuit pursuant to Rule 20(a).”).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Pergo, Inc. v. Alloc, Inc. (2×)
S.D.N.Y. · 2003 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F.Supp.2d 620, 623 (N.D.Ill.1998)(finding joinder of defendant companies selling different products in competition with each other impermissible, notwithstanding alleged infringement of same patents); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F.Supp. 1358, 1370-71 (D.Del.1983) (“Allegations of infringement against two unrelated parties based on different acts do not arise from the same transaction.”); New Jersey Machine, Inc. v. Alford Indus.
Gary ANDROPHY, M.D., Plaintiff,
v.
SMITH & NEPHEW, INC., a Delaware Corporation, Johnson & Johnson, a New Jersey Corporation, Stryker Corp., a Michigan Corporation, Osteonics Corp., a New Jersey Corporation, and Howmedica, Inc., a Delaware Corporation, Defendants
98 C 1078.
District Court, N.D. Illinois.
Dec 23, 1998.
31 F. Supp. 2d 620
Joseph Nevi Hosteny, John Charles Janka, Raymond P. Niro, Niro, Scavone, Haller & Niro, Ltd., Chicago, IL, for Gary Androphy, M.D., plaintiff., Thomas David Rein, Sidley & Austin, Chicago, IL, Jan K. Simpson, Paul E. Krieger, Pravel, Gambrell, Hewitt, Kimball & Krieger, Houston, TX, for Smith & Nephew Inc., defendant., Dianne B. Elderkin, Barbara L. Mullin, Woodcock, Washburn, Kurtz, Maekiewicz & Norris, Philadelphia, PA, Harry J. Roper, Steven Raymond Trybus, Roper & Quigg, Chicago, IL, for Johnson & Johnson Inc., defendant., Malcolm Hirsten Brooks, Marc L. Fogel-berg, Steffanie N. Garrett, McBride, Baker & Coles, Chicago, IL, Arnold B. Dompieri, William L. Mentlik, Lerner, David, Litten-berg, Krumholz and Mentlik, Westfield, NJ, for Stryker Corp. and Osteonics Corp., defendants., William Denby Heinz, Jenner & Block, Chicago, IL, Rudolf E. Hutz, Harold Pez-zner, Connolly, Bove, Lodge & Hutz, Wilmington, DE, for Howmedica Inc, defendant., Raymond P. Niro, Niro, Scavone, Haller & Niro, Chicago, IL, for plaintiff., Thomas D. Rein, Sidley & Austin, Chicago, IL, Paul E. Krieger, Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP, Houston, TX, Harry J. Roper, Roper & Quigg, Chicago, IL, Philip S. Johnson, Woodcock, Washburn, Kurtz, Maekiewicz & Norris, LLP, Philadelphia, PA, Malcom H. Brooks, McBride Baker & Coles, Chicago, IL, Arnold Dompieri, Lerner, David, Litten-berg, Krumholz & Mentlik, Westfield, NJ, William D. Heinz, Jenner & Block, Chicago, IL, Harold Pezzner, Connelly, Bove, Lodge & Hutz, Wilmington, DE, for defendants.
Bucklo.
Cited by 17 opinions  |  Published

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

BUCKLO, District Judge.

Plaintiff Gary Androphy, an orthopaedic surgeon, filed suit alleging the defendants infringed U.S.Patent Nos. 4,487,203 (tripla-nar knee resection method) and 4,567,885 (triplanar knee resection system). Both patents are directed to the surgical implantation of artificial knees. Defendants Johnson & Johnson (“Johnson”), Stryker Corporation (“Stryker”), Osteonics Corporation (“Osteon-ies”), and Howmedica, Inc. (“Howmedica”) filed motions to dismiss or sever claims for misjoinder, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 21. Johnson also filed a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). For the reasons set forth below, the motions are granted in part and denied in part.

Background

Johnson is a New Jersey holding corporation with its principal place of business in Brunswick, New Jersey. It neither manufactures nor sells instruments for implanting[*622] artificial knees, [1] but its wholly owned subsidiary, Johnson & Johnson Professional, Inc. (“JJPI”), is active in that field. Johnson and JJPI are separate corporate entities.

Stryker is a Michigan corporation with its principal place of business in Kalamazoo, Michigan. Stryker is the parent of Osteon-ics, a New Jersey corporation and a wholly owned subsidiary. Osteonics’ principal place of business is in Allendale, New Jersey Both companies [2] manufacture and sell instruments for implanting artificial knees, as does Howmedica, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Rutherford, New Jersey. Also engaged in manufacturing and selling such instruments is Smith & Nephew, Inc. (“Smith”), a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Memphis, Tennessee.

Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction

The first issue is whether Johnson is subject to personal jurisdiction. Under the “catch-all” provision of the Illinois long-arm statute, jurisdiction may be exercised on any basis “now or hereafter permitted by the Illinois Constitution and the Constitution of the United States.” 735 ILCS 5/2-209(c).

Johnson is not subject to personal jurisdiction under the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Johnson has never manufactured, used or sold the knee-resection instruments at issue in the instant suit, either in Illinois or elsewhere. Further, it is not registered to do business in Illinois, and it has no agents here. It is a holding company which neither transacts business nor contracts to provide products or services in Illinois. Thus, Johnson lacks the “minimum contacts” with the forum state that would justify exercise of personal jurisdiction. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945). It has not “purposefully avail[ed] itself of the privilege of conducting activities” in Illinois, Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2 L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), and could not “reasonably anticipate being haled into court there.” Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474, 105 S.Ct. 2174, 85 L.Ed.2d 528 (1985) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297, 100 S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980)).

Further, personal jurisdiction cannot be asserted over Johnson as the parent of JJPI. “In general, the parent-subsidiary relationship is insufficient to confer personal jurisdiction.” Integrated Bus. Info. Serv. Ltd. v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 714 F.Supp. 296, 299 (N.D.Ill.1989). That is particularly true where, as here, the parent is shown to be separate from its subsidiary. Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 558 F.Supp. 188, 191 (E.D.Ill. 1982) (citing Cannon Mfg. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333, 45 S.Ct. 250, 69 L.Ed. 634 (1925)).

Johnson and JJPI are separate corporations. JJPI is fully capitalized, and Johnson does not pay any of JJPI’s salaries, nor does it cover any of JJPI’s expenses or losses. Each company maintains its own separate and independent bylaws, minutes, corporate records, financial records and bank accounts. In addition, each has its own independent board of directors. Most important, each company manages its own day-to-day business activities independently of the other. See Brandt Consol., Inc. v. Agrimar Corp., 801 F.Supp. 164, 169 (C.D.Ill.1992); see generally Graco, 558 F.Supp. at 191 (listing factors in determining whether parent is sufficiently separate from subsidiary).

Johnson’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is therefore granted, and its motion to dismiss or sever claims for misjoinder is denied as moot.

Motion to Dismiss or Sever Claims

Stryker/Osteonics and Howmedica have filed motions to dismiss or sever claims for misjoinder. [3] Under Federal Rule of Civil[*623] Procedure 20(a), parties may be joined as defendants “where the claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence or the same series of transactions or occurrences and where common questions of law or fact are presented.” Magnavox Co. v. APF Electronics, Inc., 496 F.Supp. 29, 34 (N.D.Ill.1980). For joinder to be proper, both requirements must be met. Id.

There is a common question of law or fact here. Both Stryker and Howmedica are alleged to have infringed the same patents. However, that does not mean the claims against the two companies arise from a common transaction or occurrence. In Magna-vox, joinder was held improper where the defendants were alleged to have infringed the same patent, but sold different products. 496 F.Supp. at 34. The court found no common transaction or occurrence. Id. Here, Stryker and Howmedica are separate companies that independently design, manufacture and sell different products in competition with each other. Clearly, the common transaction requirement has not been met as to the claims against Stryker and Howmedica. See New Jersey Mach. Inc. v. Alford Indus. Inc., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 2033, 2034-35 (D.N.J. 1991) (“claims of infringement against unrelated defendants, involving different machines, should be tried separately against each defendant”).

Accordingly, the joinder of Stryker and Howmedica is improper. However, misjoinder is not grounds for dismissal. Pursuant to Rule 21, the claims against Stryker/Osteonics and Howmedica are to be severed and proceeded with separately. Fed.R.Civ.P. 21.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, Johnson’s motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction is granted, and its motion to dismiss or sever claims for misjoinder is denied as moot. The motions by Howmedica and Stryker/Os-teonics to dismiss or sever claims for misjoin-der are granted as to severance and denied as to dismissal.

1

. The instruments at issue in this case are used by surgeons to cut and prepare bones in knee replacement surgery.

2

. Because Stryker and Osteonics bring their Rule 21 motion and subsequent arguments jointly, they are treated herein as one defendant.

3

.Because Howmedica's and Stryker’s Rule 21 motions are based on the same rationale, they are treated together.