Michael Grecco Prods., Inc. v. The New York Performing Arts Academy, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2025). · Go Syfert
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Michael Grecco Prods., Inc. v. The New York Performing Arts Academy, Inc. (S.D.N.Y. 2025). Book View Copy Cite
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Michael Grecco Productions, Inc.
v.
The New York Performing Arts Academy, Inc.
1:23-cv-08120.
District Court, S.D. New York.
Feb 2, 2025.
Unknown

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK Case No. 1:23-cv-08120-ER MICHAEL GRECCO PRODUCTIONS, INC., Plaintiff, v. THE NEW YORK PERFORMING ARTS ACADEMY, INC., Defendant. PROPOSED DEFAULT JUDGMENT THIS CAUSE IS BEFORE THE Court upon plaintiff Michael Grecco Productions, Inc.'s ("Plaintiff") Motion for Default Final Judgment (the “Motion”), Doc. 21. The Court has considered the Motion, has noted the Clerk’s default against defendant The New York

Performing Arts Academy, Inc. (“Defendant”), and is otherwise advised in the premises. Pursuant to Rule 55 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court concludes that Plaintiff has met its burden of showing that it is entitled to a final default judgment as to Defendant. Plaintiff has also met its burden of showing that it is entitled to permanent injunctive relief against Defendant as specified herein. Accordingly, it is ORDERED AND ADJUDGED as follows: Findings of Fact1 1. Plaintiff is a celebrity photography agency, owned and operated by award-winning

1 A district court must exercise “independent judgment” in adopting a party’s proposed findings. Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 380 F.3d 729, 731-32 (3rd Cir. 2004). In this case, the Court has independently analyzed the evidence presented and has adopted only those findings which the Court has independently deemed appropriate under the circumstances. photojournalist Michael Grecco, that is hired by top-tier media outlets to take photographs of celebrities. Mr. Grecco has photographed legendary musicians, actors, directors, Olympians, technologists, comedians, athletes, fashion models and automobiles – such as Johnny Cash, Steven Spielberg, Will Smith, Chris Rock, Penelope Cruz, Steve Martin, Olympian Janet Evans, the

SnapChat Founders, and Porsche’s 911 sports automobile. [2]. Mr. Grecco’s photographs are widely published in some of the world’s most prominent magazines, including but not limited to, Vanity Fair, Rolling Stone, ESPN Magazine, Time, Forbes and Esquire. 3. This lawsuit concerns one (1) photograph of f New Zealand actress Lucy Lawless as Xena the Warrior Princess titled “19970506_Xena_Lawless_Lucy_MGP_0023” (the “Work”) owned by Plaintiff. 4. The Work was registered by Plaintiff with the Register of Copyrights on on August 29, 2017 and was assigned Registration No. VA 2-064-915. A copy of the Certificate of Registration pertaining to the Work is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit A thereto.

5. Defendant is an academy that provides tuition-based, comprehensive programs for aspiring performing artists in acting, theatre, dance, and voice. Defendant promotes on its website that “students receive world-class guidance and instruction from award-wining instructors here in Manhattan.” 6. On August 25, 2021 (after Plaintiff’s above-referenced copyright registration of the Work), Defendant published a copy of the Work on its website (at https://nyperformingartsacademy.org/2021/08/25/lucy-lawless-foresees-a-xena-reboot- happening-in-the-near-future/): > an re

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7. A true and correct copy of screenshots of Defendant’s website, displaying the copyrighted Work, is attached to the Complaint as Exhibit B thereto. 8. Defendant is not and has never been licensed to use or display the Work. Defendant never contacted Plaintiff to seek permission to use the Work in connection with its Facebook page or for any other purpose. 9. Defendant utilized the Work for commercial use. 10. Upon information and belief, Defendant located a copy of the Work on the internet and rather than contact Plaintiff to secure a license, simply copied the Work for its own commercial use. 11. Through its ongoing diligent efforts to identify unauthorized use of its photographs, Plaintiff first discovered Defendant’s unauthorized use/display of the Work on December 30, 2021. 12. _—_- Following Plaintiffs discovery of Defendant’s infringement, Plaintiff, through counsel, sent (via e-mail) one (1) infringement notice, at least two (2) follow-up emails and at least

two (2) phone calls to Defendant to notify it of the impermissible use. Defendants ignored the infringement notice and did not otherwise respond to Plaintiff prior to this lawsuit being filed. II. Conclusions of Law A. Applicable Legal Standards

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 sets forth two steps to obtain a default judgment. First, when a defendant fails to plead or otherwise defend a lawsuit, the clerk of court may enter a clerk’s default. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(a). Second, after entry of the clerk’s default, the Court may enter default judgment against the defendant so long as the defendant is not an infant or incompetent. Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2). “The effect of a default judgment is that the defendant admits the plaintiff’s well-pleaded allegations of fact, is concluded on those facts by entry by the judgment, and is barred from contesting on appeal the facts thus established.” Buchanan v. Bowman, 820 F.2d 359, 361 (11th Cir. 1987). The Court must review the sufficiency of the complaint before determining if a moving party is entitled to default judgment. See Brown v. Gabbidon, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35134

(S.D.N.Y. May 14, 2007); Sony Pictures Home Entm't, Inc. v. Chetney, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13314, 4-5 (S.D.N.Y. 2007). “While a complaint . . . does not need detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff’s obligation to show its entitlement to relief “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). If the admitted facts are enough to establish liability, the Court must then ascertain the appropriate amount of damages and enter final judgment in that amount. See Nishimatsu Constr. Co. v. Hous. Nat'l Bank, 515 F.2d 1200, 1206 (5th Cir. 1975). An evidentiary hearing on damages is not required by Rule 55, and it is within the Court’s discretion to choose whether to hold such a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2); Coventry Enters. Ltd. Liab. Co. v. Sanomedics Int'l Holdings, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122615, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2017); Cement & Concrete Workers Dist. Council Welfare Fund v. Metro Found. Contractors Inc., 699 F.3d 230, 234 (2d Cir. 2012). B. Copyright Infringement

The Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 501(a), provides that “[a]nyone who violates any of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner as provided by sections 106 through 122 [17 U.S.C. §§ 106-122] or of the author as provided in section 106A(a) [17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)] ... is an infringer of the copyright or right of the author, as the case may be.” 17 U.S.C. § 501(a). “Copyright infringement [has] two elements [that] must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of constituent elements of the work that are original." Clanton v. UMG Recordings, Inc., 556 F. Supp. 3d 322, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2021) (quoting Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991)). With respect to the first element, a certificate of registration “made before or within five years after first publication of the work shall constitute prima facie evidence of the validity of the

copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate. The evidentiary weight to be accorded the certificate of a registration made thereafter shall be within the discretion of the court.” 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). Here, the Complaint alleges that the Work was not registered until later than 5 years from first publication. The registration certificate therefore does not constitute “prima facie” evidence of validity, but it certainly is evidence enough to satisfy the first element of an infringement claim. See, e.g., Ultra-Images, LLC v. Franclemont, No. 05-60538-CIV, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93610, at[*11] -12 n.3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 20, 2007) (“Defendants also urge this Court to find invalidity of the registration because the registration was made over five years after the Jesse Portrait was published…. Based on the record at this stage in the proceeding, the Court cannot find, as a matter of law, that the certificate of registration is invalid.”); Lifetime Homes, Inc. v. Residential Dev. Corp., 510 F. Supp. 2d 794, 801 (M.D. Fla. 2007) (“Although Plaintiff did not file the copyright registration within the five year time period, Plaintiff has produced the certificate of registration for the Model A and Defendants have not pointed to any evidence indicating that

Plaintiff's certificate of registration is not valid. Further, Defendants make no argument nor present any evidence to support a finding that Plaintiff does not in fact own the copyright for the Model A plans.”). As succinctly explained in Southall v. Force Partners, LLC, No. 1:20-cv-03223, 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164680, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 31, 2021): The last sentence is crucial here: Section 410(c) confers discretion on the court on how to treat a certificate obtained five years after publication. In other words, the statute mandates a presumption of validity for pre-five-year certificates, but the statute does not forbid2 a presumption of validity for post-five-year certificates. Post-five-year certificates are still eligible to qualify as prima facie evidence of a valid copyright. Yurman Design, Inc. v. Golden Treasure Imps., Inc., 275 F. Supp. 2d 506, 515-16 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (holding that late registrations can be considered prima facie evidence of valid copyright); Telerate Sys., Inc. v. Caro, 689 F. Supp. 221, 227 n. 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (explaining "[e]ven if the certificate were ... issued more than five years after the actual date of first publication, the court would be inclined to give the certificate the weight of prima facie evidence, as permitted under Section 410(c)."). In any event, the strength of the presumption is not a matter that should be resolved at the pleading stage. The parties must develop facts in discovery before the certificate's evidentiary weight can be presented to the Court for decision.3 The copyright- infringement claim survives. Here, Plaintiff registered the Work pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 411(a) with the Register of Copyrights as set forth above. By virtue of its default, Defendant does not have any right to challenge Plaintiff’s registration/ownership of a valid copyright. [2] Emphasis in original. 3 Emphasis added. The copying element of an infringement claim has two components. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2008). First, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant copied the plaintiff's work as a factual matter, either through direct or indirect evidence. Id. Second, “the plaintiff must establish that the copying amounts to unlawful or

improper appropriation.” Id. “The plaintiff demonstrates that the copying is actionable ‘by showing that the second work bears a “substantial similarity” to protected expression in the earlier work.’” Id. (quoting Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g Group, Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 137 (2d Cir. 1998). Here, the screenshots of Defendant’s website unequivocally show Defendant’s copying of the Work. Defendant’s default further constitutes an admission as to such copying. There is no factual or subjective issue of “substantial similarity” here as Defendant copied and published a duplicate image of the Work. Thus, Defendant undisputedly copied Plaintiff’s copyrighted work and a Final Default Judgment should be entered against Defendant on Count I of the Complaint. C. Willfulness

Willful infringement occurs when “the defendant was actually aware of the infringing activity, or (2) that the defendant's actions were the result of ‘reckless disregard’ for, or ‘willful blindness’ to, the copyright holder's rights.” Mattel, Inc. v. 2012Shiningroom2012, No. 18-cv- 11648 (PKC), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 176838, at[*19] (S.D.N.Y. Sep. 25, 2020) (quoting Island Software & Computer Serv., Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 413 F.3d 257, 263 (2d Cir. 2005)). “Moreover, this Court may infer that Defendants willfully infringed Plaintiffs’ copyrights because of Defendants’ default.” Arista Records, Inc. v. Beker Enters., 298 F. Supp. 2d 1310, 1313 (S.D. Fla. 2003); see also Fallaci v. The New Gazette Literary Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1172, 1173 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (inference of willfulness drawn by “defendant's failure to appear and defend this action,” particularly in light of plaintiff's allegation of willfulness); Original Appalachian v. Yuil Int'l Corp., 5 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516, 1524 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (“willfulness may be inferred from a defendant's failure to appear and defend in an action such as this”). When awarding increased damages in the context of Section 504(c)(2), “deterrence of future violations is a

legitimate consideration” because “defendants must not be able to sneer in the face of copyright owners and copyright laws.” Cable/Home Communication Corp. v. Network Productions, 902 F.2d 829, 851 (11th Cir. 1990) (internal quotation omitted). Here, Plaintiff took the extra step of notifying Defendant of its infringement pre-lawsuit. Defendant ignored multiple communications by Plaintiff’s counsel (by Federal Express, e-mail, telephone, and voicemail), although it did finally remove the Work from the website. Defendant’s refusal to pay a reasonable licensing fee and engage in reasonable license negotiations demonstrates that Defendant had actual knowledge, or at least acted with reckless disregard, of the fact that its conduct infringed upon Plaintiff’s exclusive copyrights in the Work. Willfulness is likewise demonstrated by the inclusion on Defendant’s website of a

copyright disclaimer/notice (“© 2024 The MusicSquared Foundation, Inc.”). The inclusion of such disclaimer indicates that Defendant understands the importance of copyright protection and that it actually owns the content (including photographs) published on its website. See, e.g., Bell v. ROI Prop. Grp. Mgmt., LLC, No. 1:18-cv-00043-TWP-DLP, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127717, at *3 (S.D. Ind. July 31, 2018) (“[T]he willfulness of ROI’s infringement is evidenced by the fact that at the bottom of the webpage on which the Indianapolis photograph was unlawfully published appeared the following: ‘Copyright © 2017.’ By placing a copyright mark at the bottom of its webpage that contained Mr. Bell’s copyrighted Indianapolis Photograph, Mr. Bell asserts ROI willfully infringed his copyright by claiming that it owned the copyright to everything on the webpage); John Perez Graphics & Design, LLC v. Green Tree Inv. Grp., Inc., Civil Action No. 3:12-cv-4194-M, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61928, at[*12] -13 (N.D. Tex. May 1, 2013) (“Once on Defendant’s website, Defendant asserted ownership of Plaintiff's Registered Work by including a copyright notice at the bottom of the page. Based on these allegations, the Court finds Plaintiff has

sufficiently pled a willful violation….”). Accordingly, Defendant’s default and the well-pled facts of the Complaint, which are admitted by Defendant’s default, establish that Defendant’s infringement of the Work was willful and deliberate. D. Plaintiff’s Damages in this lawsuit has prevented Plaintiff from discovering any profits received by Defendant that would be recoverable pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) in addition to Plaintiff’s actual losses. To establish Defendant’s profits subject to disgorgement under § 504(b), a “copyright owner is required to present proof only of the infringer’s gross revenue, and the infringer is required to provide his or

[*11]

her deductible expenses and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work.” 17 U.S.C. § 504(b). Defendant solely controls all information concerning the gross revenue related to the infringing uses of the Work, and it has stymied Plaintiff’s ability to present that evidence to the Court. In view of the foregoing, actual damages are insufficient due to Defendant’s refusal to appear and participate in discovery, and Plaintiff thus elected to seek an award of statutory damages for Defendant’s willful infringement of Plaintiff’s copyrighted Work.

[*19]
1 Actual Damages Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(b), a “copyright owner is entitled to recover the actual damages suffered by him or her as a result of the infringement.” Actual damages are “primarily measured by the extent to which the market value of the copyrighted work at the time of the infringement has been injured or destroyed by the infringement.” Cordon Holding C.B. v. Nw. Publ'g Corp., 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3860, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2005) (quoting See Fitzgerald Publishing Co., Inc. v. Baylor Publishing Co., Inc., 807 F.2d 1110, 1118 (2d Cir. 1986) (internal quotations omitted); see Lorentz v. Sunshine Health Prods., No. 09-61529-CIV-MORE, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 148752, at *12 (S.D. Fla. Sep. 7, 2010) (actual damages are “often measured by the revenue that the plaintiff lost as a result of the infringement, which includes lost sales, lost opportunities to license, or diminution in the value of the copyright.”). The copyright owner may also recover the fair market value of the licensing fee that would have been charged for the work that was infringed. McCarthy v. Stollman, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 164542, at &16 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2010). To demonstrate entitlement to a reasonable license fee, the fair market value of an infringed work may be established by “evidence of benchmark licenses, that is, what licensors have paid for use of similar work.” Thornton v. J. Jargon Co., 580 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (M.D. Fla. 2008) (citing Montgomery v. Noga, 168 F.3d 1282, 1295 n.19 (11th Cir. 1999)). Plaintiff has charged and received fees ranging from $300 at the low end, to $40,000 at the high end, to secondary users for licenses to use its photographs. The specific license fee charged by Plaintiff and paid by a secondary user varies based on the term of the license sought, the nature and content of the specific copyrighted work being licensed, the scope of use authorized, and the number of copyrighted works licensed. Plaintiff offers to license some of the images in its portfolio on its stock website. See https://www.mgpstockphotos.com/portfolio. All the images in the catalog are offered as stock for a license fee, adjusted to the nature and duration of the use by a standard, automated formula. For a nearly identical photograph to the one at issue here, it is offered on Plaintiff’s website for $5,440 per month for worldwide usage on the internet for a medium-sized image, which appears to be the use that Defendant made of the Work. While it is unclear the duration of Defendant’s infringement, the image was used for at least four months (i.e., August 25, 2021 through December 30, 2021). See https://www.mgpstockphotos.com/image?& bqG=2& bqH=eJxNjssOgjAQRf.GDdHgwoAkXZ S2xEZptS1R2DRI8BHRhWBQvt6W.FrMzDmTzM3AbXbqLoc8UPWsbLM8mUbtiM1Jvy7DIJ x4ni3TqcYSgUd1Ldz6Xj7duujqqmmcYa8hw2BvGFGVATOlgopYQDxlSmSaSm6VSi3IkkBJ8 FtX 84FJcycUs6GFC4UEJAtDKeSCE0xSO03ce 743O.2eHO0SjS1MSA9oPpF0X8w8QiRAo0 VXErjw6yaS98pUzf&GI ID=: Nelo (oe [16 Select the image usage for your rights-managed license. p Select a usage region: ics te $ 5440 Select usage terms: isage Terms image respon a eickng onan advertisement or ink License Start Date: Had Defendant hired Plaintiff to license the Work and to reproduce and display the Work on its website, webpage, and/or social media in the manner alleged in the Complaint, Plaintiff would have charged at least $21,760.00 ($5,440 x 4) for the type of use at issue. The screenshots of Defendant’s website show that the Work was published by Defendant on August 25, 2021. Defendant’s failure to participate in this lawsuit has limited Plaintiff's ability to conduct discovery to fully discover the extent of its infringement and/or the exact date on which the Work was uploaded and/or removed from Defendant’s website, but it appears that the Work was uploaded on August 25, 2021 and was still published to the website as of December 30, 2021 (as seen in Exhibit B to the Complaint). Given these facts, Plaintiff proffers that the cost of the foregoing license ($21,760.00) is the most accurate measure of Plaintiff's actual damages based on presently-known facts (which would be the one month rate, multiplied by the at least four months that Defendant used Plaintiff’'s Work). Defendant’s inaction and refusal to participate in this lawsuit suppressed the information necessary to fully calculate Plaintiff's actual damages. Similarly, Defendant’s refusal to cooperate
2 Statutory Damages for Copyright Infringement Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 504(c), Plaintiff has elected to recover statutory damages for Defendant’s infringement of Plaintiff’s exclusive rights in the copyrighted Work, and enhancement of its statutory award based upon the willfulness of such infringement. Where (as here) willful infringement has occurred, courts in this Circuit will generally look to a plaintiff’s actual damages and award 3x – 5x to properly account for statutory damages. See, e.g., Corson v. Gregory Charles Interiors, LLC, No. 9:19-cv-81445, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 142932, at *5-7 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2020) (trebling the plaintiff’s actual damages after applying a scarcity multiplier); Joe Hand Promotions, Inc. v. Alburl, No. 5:18-cv-1935-LCB, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29309, at *16- 17 (N.D. Ala. Feb. 20, 2020) (“Courts have generally upheld awards of three times the amount of the proper licensing fee as an appropriate sanction to ensure that the cost of violating the copyright laws is substantially greater than the cost of complying with them.”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. N. Lights, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) (“[T]o put infringers on notice that it costs less to obey the copyright laws than to violate them, a statutory damage award should significantly exceed the amount of unpaid license fees. As such, courts often impose statutory damages in an amount more than double unpaid licensing fees where the infringement was not innocent.”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. Prana Hosp'y, Inc., 158 F. Supp. 3d 184, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (“[C]ourts in this Circuit commonly award, in cases of non-innocent infringement, statutory damages of between three and five times the cost of the licensing fees the defendant would have paid.”); Broad. Music, Inc. v. George Moore Enters., Inc., 184 F. Supp. 3d 166, 171-72 (W.D. Pa. Apr. 25, 2016) (“Statutory damages serve the dual purposes of compensation and deterrence: they compensate the plaintiff for the infringement of its copyrights; and they deter future infringements by punishing the defendant for its actions.”). In cases of non-willful infringement, statutory damages may be awarded up to $30,000.00 resulting from the infringement of the copyrighted Work. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1). However, as discussed above, Defendant’s conduct – as well as its decision not to defend against Plaintiff’s claim – demonstrates that its conduct is willful. Given the circumstances of the instant case, the Court finds that an award of statutory damages in the amount of $65,280.00 ($21,760.00 x 3) under 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) is appropriate to compensate Plaintiff for the damages suffered, to create a strong disincentive against infringers intentionally hiding the profits from their infringing conduct in the hope of earning more than they can be held accountable for in actual damages, and to deter future violations of copyright law. Even assuming, arguendo, that the Court is not convinced of Plaintiff’s actual damages, it is well within the Court’s discretion to award substantial damages to the Plaintiff upon a finding of willfulness. For example, in Corson v Brown Harris Stevens of the Hamptons, LLC, the court found that willfulness entitled plaintiff to the enhanced statutory damages provided by 17 U.S.C. §504(c)(2) (notwithstanding that the court found the plaintiff proved $0.00 in actual damages): So first the main issue was whether defendant's infringement was willful. I find here willfulness entitles plaintiff to the enhanced statutory damages provided by 17 U.S.C. Section 504(c)(2). The standard for willful infringement is not only knowledge on the defendant's part that what it did was infringement but also reckless disregard of the practice of protecting creativity, the very purpose of copyright. When the plaintiff can demonstrate, either directly or through circumstantial evidence, that defendant had knowledge that its actions constituted infringement, or recklessly disregarded that possibility, enhanced statutory damages for willful copyright infringement under 17 U.S.C. Section 504(c)(2) are appropriate. Plaintiff successfully proved that her photograph was copyright protected. It's clear that defendant, as a sophisticated business, knew there was copyright involved and did nothing to check those rights or to clear permission to reprint from the photographer. I find that the infringement was willful, and I find that the conduct of indifference to the rights of others was egregious and that the statutory damages should be $25,000. There were no actual damages. Corson v. Brown Harris Stevens of the Hamptons, LLC, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 248214, at *8–9 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 24, 2018). Brown Harris Stevens of the Hamptons, LLC was a fully litigated case in which, though the court found that plaintiff proved $0.00 in actual damages, a finding of willfulness permitted statutory damages to be awarded, as “[t]he Supreme Court instructs that the statutory rule formulated after long experience not merely compels restitution of profit and reparation from injury but also a desire to discourage wrongful conduct.” Id. at * 9 (citing F.W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 344 U.S. 228, 233 (1952)). E. Reasonable Costs and Attorneys’ Fees are Appropriate Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 505, “the court in its discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party… the court may also award reasonable attorney’s fee to pay the prevailing party as part of the costs.” Upon entry of a final judgment, Plaintiff is the prevailing party in this action. In view of the willful nature of Defendant’s infringement and its failure to defend or otherwise participate in this action, leading to unjustified delays and increased costs and fees, an award of full costs and attorney’s fees to Plaintiff is appropriate. The Court finds that an award of attorneys’ fees and costs is appropriate here. Defendant’s willful conduct, failure to engage Plaintiff in an attempt to pay a reasonable licensing fee, and failure to participate in this lawsuit resulted in unnecessary fees and costs being incurred. The Court has reviewed the declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel filed together with the Motion and finds such declaration to support the amount of fees and costs being sought. The Court finds that the costs sought by the Motion ($467.00) are taxable against Defendant. These costs consist of the filing fee for this lawsuit and the service of process costs. Having concluded Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees, the Court must now determine the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s requested fee amount. The Court has performed the lodestar analysis and finds that Plaintiff’s counsel reasonably expended 7.40 hours in connection with pursuing this matter. The Court further finds that $450.00 is a reasonable hourly rate for Plaintiff’s counsel (Daniel DeSouza) in this action given the complexity of the matter, the results obtained, and the experience of Plaintiff’s counsel which the Court found to be substantial. See Farrington v. Jewish Voice Inc., No. 21-CV-1575 (NGG) (AYS), 2022 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21812, at *15 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 2022) (“In copyright cases, courts in this district have approved rates between $350 and $500”); Pyatt v. Raymond, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58879, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2012) (collecting cases approving $400 to $650 hourly rates for partners in copyright and trademark cases); Bass v. Diversity Inc. Media, No. 19-cv-2261 (AJN), 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93318, at *14 (S.D.N.Y. May 28, 2020) (“A review of cases in this District and in the Eastern District of New York suggests that courts have approved associate rates of $350 and up to $500 for partners in copyright cases.”); Tetra Images, LLC v. Grahall Partners, LLC, No. 19-CV-05250 (PMH), 2021 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 125809, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2021) (in copyright infringement case, finding $475.00 hourly rate for managing partner in Florida and $450.00 hourly rate for partner in New York office to be reasonable); McLaughlin v. IDT Energy, No. 14 CV 4107 (ENV)(RML), 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 128347, at *51-53 (E.D.N.Y. July 30, 2018) (finding award of rates typical to the Eastern District and noted to be: “$550 for partners/equity owners with more than thirty years of experience, $500 for partners/equity owners with more than fifteen years of experience, $450 for partners/equity owners with more than ten years of experience, $400 for senior associates/associates with more than ten years of experience, $350 for senior associates/associates with six to nine years of experience, $300 for associates with three to five years of experience, $250 for associates with fewer than three years of experience”); Schwartz v. United States DEA, No. 13-CV-5004 (CBA) (ST), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34165, at *26-27 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 1, 2019) (awarding $500 hourly fee to partner litigating FOIA litigation, and listing awards of between $500 and $655 per hour for partners handling complex litigation); Nat'l Envtl. Saf. Co. v. Katz, No. 18-cv-02161 (JMA) (GRB), 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76044, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. May 6, 2019) (award based upon $500-$600 hourly rate to partners and $300 hourly rate for associates litigating breach of contract case). Mr. DeSouza is a 2004 graduate of the George Washington University Law School who is admitted to both the Florida Bar and the New York Bar. He previously worked at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP (from 2004 – 2010) and Becker & Poliakoff, PA (from 2010 – 2014) before forming DeSouza Law, PA in 2014 and jointly forming CopyCat Legal PLLC in 2019. He is admitted to a multitude of federal courts throughout the country and has extensive experience litigating cases in both federal and state court. Given the above, the Court has calculated the lodestar amount to be $3,330.00. F. Permanent Injunction Pursuant to 17 U.S.C. § 502(a), “[a]ny court having jurisdiction of a civil action arising under this title may, subject to the provisions of section 1498 of title 28, grant temporary and final injunctions on such terms as it may deem reasonable to prevent or restrain infringement of a copyright.” 17 USCS § 502. Injunctions are regularly issued pursuant to Section 502 because “the public interest is the interest in upholding copyright protections”; and courts also regularly issue injunctions as part of default judgements. Arista Records, 298 F. Supp. 2d at 1314 (entering permanent injunction against Defendants with respect to plaintiff’s copyrighted work, including plaintiff’s work to be created in the future). As established by the well-pled facts of the Complaint and admitted by Defendant’s default, this Court has proper jurisdiction over this action. Defendant’s conduct has caused, and any continued infringing conduct will continue to cause irreparable injury to Plaintiff, such that Plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. For example, the ability of Defendant to use Plaintiff’s work for its own commercial benefit without compensation to Plaintiff greatly impairs the market value of the work, since others competing in that business or in related business areas, will not want to obtain a license to Plaintiff’s works if it is already associated with a competing business; and potential licensees of Plaintiff will not want to pay license fees to Plaintiff if they see other commercial enterprises taking and using Plaintiff’s photographs for their own commercial purposes without paying any fee at all. Accordingly, this Court will enter a permanent injunction against Defendant, its employees, agents, officers, directors, attorneys, successors, affiliates, subsidiaries, vendors and assigns, and all those in active concert and participation with Defendant, prohibiting it from (a) directly or indirectly infringing Plaintiff’s copyrights or continuing to market, offer, sell, dispose of, license, lease, transfer, publicly display, advertise, reproduce, develop, or manufacture any works derived or copied from Plaintiff’s copyrighted photograph or to participate or assist in any such activity; and (b) directly or indirectly reproducing, displaying, distributing, otherwise using, or retaining any copy, whether in physical or electronic form, of any copyrighted photograph owned by Plaintiff. III. Conclusion Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff, Michael Grecco Productions, Inc. and against defendant The New York Performing Arts Academy, Inc. as follows: 1. Plaintiff shall recover from Defendant the principal sum of $69,077.00 for which let execution issue. The foregoing sum consists of $65,280.00 (statutory damages for copyright infringement), $467.00 (costs), and $3,330.00 (attorneys’ fees). 2. Defendant, its employees, agents, officers, directors, attorneys, successors, affiliates, subsidiaries and assigns, and all those in active concert and participation with Defendant are permanently enjoined from (a) directly or indirectly infringing Plaintiff’s copyright or continuing to market, offer, sell, dispose of, license, lease, transfer, publicly display, advertise, reproduce, develop, or manufacture any work derived or copied from Plaintiff’s copyrighted photograph or to participate or assist in any such activity; and (b) directly or indirectly reproducing, displaying, distributing, otherwise using, or retaining any copy, whether in physical or electronic form, of any copyrighted photograph owned by Plaintiff. 3. The Court will retain jurisdiction to enforce the Final Judgment and Permanent Injunction and consider any motion for attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs. 4. The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate the motion, Doc. 21. It is SO ORDERED. Dated: February 2, 2025 a New York, New York Edgardo Ramos, U.S.D.J.