UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS ROCK ISLAND DIVISION

JERRY HARRIS, ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Case No. 4:25-cv-04075-SEM ) TYRONE BAKER et al., ) Defendants. )

MERIT REVIEW ORDER SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, United States District Judge: Before the Court is a Complaint (Doc. 1) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and a Motion for Counsel (Doc. 5) filed by Plaintiff Jerry Harris, an inmate at Menard Correctional Center. The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s pleading for failure to state a claim and denies his request for counsel for the following reasons. I. COMPLAINT A. Screening Standard The Court must “screen” Plaintiff’s Complaint and dismiss any legally insufficient claim or the entire action if warranted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. A claim is legally insufficient if it “(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Id. In reviewing the Complaint, the Court

accepts the factual allegations as accurate, liberally construing them in the plaintiff’s favor. Turley v. Rednour, 729 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2013). However, conclusory statements and labels are

insufficient. Enough facts must be provided to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Alexander v. United States, 721 F.3d 418, 422 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).

B. Alleged Facts Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges violations at Hill Correctional Center against Warden Tyrone Baker, Mail Room Supervisor Laura

Henson, and Internal Affairs Officer Roy L. Little. On March 19, 2024, Plaintiff was escorted to restrictive housing. On March 25, 2024, Plaintiff was served a disciplinary

report written by Defendant Little for violating the rule against drugs and drug paraphernalia. (Pl. Compl., Doc. 1 at 5; Disc. Rpt., Doc. 1-1 at 13.) According to Plaintiff and the appended disciplinary report, the mail room staff held two envelopes containing greeting

cards addressed to Plaintiff that were infused with an oil substance. (Id.) Little tested the envelopes and greeting cards using the “Nark II Narcotics Reagent Analysis Kit,” which indicated the presence of Fentanyl. (Disc. Rpt., Doc. 1-1 at 13.)

Plaintiff states he has “problems” with the determination that the envelopes were infused with a dangerous chemical substance because he did not know about these mailings, as he did not receive

them, and was not informed that the mail room staff would alert internal affairs of their suspicions. (Pl. Compl., Doc 1 at 5-6:3-4.) Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Little authored a false

disciplinary report and Defendants Baker and Henson, acting “in concert” with Little, deprived him of his constitutional rights. (Id. at 6:5.) Plaintiff claims that no evidence exists that he was involved with the mail sent and calls into question the reliability of the testing kit. C. Analysis

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), a complaint need only contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “This requirement is satisfied if the complaint (1) describes the claim in

sufficient detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests and (2) plausibly suggests that the plaintiff has a right to relief above a speculative level.” Bravo v. Midland Credit Mgmt., 812 F.3d 599, 601–02 (7th Cir. 2016); see

also Charleston v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. at Chi., 741 F.3d 769, 772 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Instead, a plausible claim must include ‘factual content’ sufficient to allow the court ‘to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’”) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions that Defendants agreed to

violate his constitutional rights do not provide the specificity to state a claim against Defendants Baker, Henson, or Little. Additionally, Plaintiff’s assertion that Defendant Little filed a false

disciplinary report is insufficient to state a constitutional violation given this record. The Seventh Circuit has “long held that as long as procedural

protections are constitutionally adequate, [courts] will not overturn a disciplinary decision solely because evidence indicates the claim was fraudulent.” McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784, 787 (7th Cir. 1999). “[E]ven assuming fraudulent conduct on the part of prison

officials, the protection from such arbitrary action is found in the procedures mandated by due process.” Id. “Wolff v. McDonnell[, 418 U.S. 539, 558 (1974),] sets forth the minimum due process requirements for prison disciplinary

proceedings when the prisoner has been charged with serious misconduct which could result in loss of good time credits, punitive segregation, or which might also be punishable in state criminal

proceedings.” Chavis v. Rowe, 643 F.2d 1281, 1285 n.3 (7th Cir. 1981). However, when an inmate’s “sanction is less onerous” than

revocation of good time credits, prison officials “need not use all of the procedures required by Wolff when reaching decisions.” Sylvester v. Hanks, 140 F.3d 713, 715 (7th Cir. 1998). An inmate is entitled to

only informal, nonadversary procedures when “the State’s interest implicates the safety of other inmates and prison personnel.” Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 228–29 (2005); see also Westefer

v. Neal, 682 F.3d 679, 684-86 (7th Cir. 2012) (concluding that informal, nonadversary procedures do not involve the right to call or cross-examine witnesses, record evidence, receive a written decision, or administrative appeal).

“[I]nformal due process requires only that an inmate is provided (1) ‘notice of the reasons for the inmate’s placement’ in segregation and (2) ‘an opportunity to present his views,’ for instance, in a written statement or at a hearing.” Ealy v. Watson, 109 F.4th 958, 966 (7th

Cir. 2024) (quoting Adams v. Reagle, 91 F.4th 880, 895 (7th Cir. 2024). “[T]he Supreme Court has made clear that ‘[o]rdinarily a written statement by the inmate will accomplish this purpose .... So

long as this occurs, and the decisionmaker reviews the charges and then-available evidence against the prisoner, the Due Process Clause is satisfied.’” Adams, 91 F.4th at 895 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459

U.S. 460, 476, 103 S.Ct. 864, 74 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983)). Due process is also satisfied if a plaintiff presents his arguments orally during the Committee hearing. Adams, 91 F.4th at 896.

The record shows that Plaintiff appeared before an adjustment committee the day after he was served the disciplinary report, where he pleaded not guilty and provided written and oral

statements. The adjustment committee documented its basis for determining that Plaintiff committed the violations alleged and recommended three months of C-grade status, six months of segregation, and a disciplinary transfer. (Cmte. Sum. Rpt., Doc 1-1

at 10.) Consequently, Plaintiff’s Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim. However, if Plaintiff believes he can revise his

pleading to state a cause of action, he may file a motion for leave to file an amended complaint. If Plaintiff decides to file an amended pleading, it must be attached to his motion for leave.

The Court does not accept piecemeal amendments. Plaintiff’s amended pleading must stand independently without reference to his initial filing and contain all claims against all defendants.

Plaintiff’s amendment must specify the constitutional violation, when it occurred, and the Defendant or Defendants personally involved. See Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995)

(“To recover damages under § 1983, a plaintiff must establish that a defendant was personally responsible for the deprivation of a constitutional right.”).

The Court informs Plaintiff that any attempt to join unrelated claims and defendants in his amended complaint is not permitted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2). In other words, multiple claims against a single defendant are allowed, but “Claim A against Defendant 1

should not be joined with unrelated Claim B against Defendant 2.” George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007). “Unrelated claims against different defendants belong in different suits.” Id. Plaintiff’s Motion for Status (Doc. 7) is moot with the entry of the

Court’s Order. II. COUNSEL Plaintiff has no constitutional right to counsel, and the Court

cannot mandate an attorney accept pro bono appointments in civil cases. The most the Court can do is ask for volunteer counsel. See Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1071 (7th Cir. 1992)

(holding that although indigent civil litigants have no constitutional right to counsel, a district court may, in its discretion, request counsel to represent indigent civil litigants in certain circumstances).

In considering Plaintiff’s motion for counsel, the Court must ask two questions: “(1) has the indigent plaintiff made a reasonable attempt to obtain counsel or been effectively precluded from doing so; and if

so, (2) given the difficulty of the case, does the plaintiff appear competent to litigate it himself?” Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff’s Motion for Counsel (Doc. 5) is denied because he has

not satisfied his threshold burden of demonstrating that he has attempted to hire counsel, which typically requires writing to several lawyers and attaching the responses received.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED: 1) Plaintiff’s Motions for Counsel (Doc. 5) is DENIED

2) Plaintiff’s Complaint (Doc. 1) is DISMISSED under 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b)(1) for failure to state a federal claim.

3) Plaintiff is GRANTED leave to file an amended complaint within thirty days of the entry of the Court’s Merit Review Order and in compliance with the Court’s guidance. If Plaintiff does not submit an amendment on or before the thirty-day deadline, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff’s case.

ENTERED December 17, 2025. s/ Sue E. Myerscough _______________________________________ SUE E. MYERSCOUGH UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE