UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA ----oo0oo----

SHANNON RAY, KHALA TAYLOR, PETER No. 1:23-cv-00425 ROBINSON, KATHERINE SEBBANE, and 13 RUDY BARAJAS, Individually and on Behalf of All Those Similarly 14 Situated, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR 15 Plaintiffs, PRELIMINARY APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT 16 v. 17 NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated association, Defendant.

----oo0oo---- Plaintiffs Shannon Ray, Khala Taylor, Peter Robinson, Katherine Sebbane, and Rudy Barajas brought this putative class action against defendant National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”), alleging violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. (Second Am. Compl. (Docket No. 84).) Plaintiffs have filed an unopposed motion for preliminary approval of class action settlement. (Docket No. 159.) I. Background and Proposed Settlement This is one of two related cases assigned to this court involving antitrust challenges to a since-repealed NCAA bylaw barring “volunteer coaches” from receiving pay. The related case, Smart v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. 2-22-cv-02125 WBS CSL, 2025 WL 2651800 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2025), recently ended in settlement. The court previously granted plaintiffs’ motion to certify a class in this action, which consists of “[a]ll persons who from March 17, 2019, to June 30, 2023, worked for an NCAA Division I sports program other than baseball in the position of ‘volunteer coach,’ as designated by NCAA bylaws.” (Docket No. 128 at 27.) Plaintiffs now estimate the class has approximately 7,718 members. (Docket No. 159 at 8.) The parties propose a gross settlement amount of $303,000,000, to be paid in three separate installments of $101,000,000 into a common fund over the course of two calendar years. (See Plan of Allocation (Docket No. 159-1 ¶ 2).) Amounts paid to class members “will be determined by the school, sport, and year in which he or she worked.” (Docket No. 159 at 15.) More specifically, plaintiffs’ expert Dr. Ashenfelter “will calculate a Recognized Loss for each six-month period coached by a Class Member . . . based on the wages paid to the team’s lowest-paid coach during that period who was not designated as a ‘Volunteer Coach,’” and then incorporate a “stepdown” to account for the fact that class member coaching positions were “lower in the hierarchy than [their] reference coach.” (Id. at 16; Plan of Allocation ¶ 12.) The resulting payment for each claimant will be divided into three amounts corresponding with settlement distributions. (Id. at 12-13.) Plaintiffs’ counsel anticipates that attorneys’ fees will comprise up to 30% of the settlement fund. (Docket No. 159 at 27.) Plaintiffs further request service awards for the class representatives in the amount of $25,000 each. (Id. at 29.) II. Preliminary Approval of Class Action Settlements Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that “[t]he claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled . . . only with the court’s approval.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). This Order is the first step in that process and analyzes only whether the proposed class action settlement deserves preliminary approval. See Murillo v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 266 F.R.D. 468, 473 (E.D. Cal. 2010) (Shubb, J.). Preliminary approval authorizes the parties to give notice to putative class members of the settlement agreement and lays the groundwork for a future fairness hearing, at which the court will hear objections to (1) the treatment of this litigation as a class action and (2) the terms of the settlement. See id.; Diaz v. Tr. Territory of Pac. Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1989). The court will reach a final determination as to whether the parties should be allowed to settle the class action on their proposed terms after that hearing. A. Class Certification and Notice Having already certified a class under Rule 23, the court must now “direct to class members the best notice that is practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Rule 23(c)(2) governs both the form and content of a proposed notice. See Ravens v. Iftikar, 174 F.R.D. 651, 658 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172–77 (1974)). Although that notice must be “reasonably certain to inform the absent members of the plaintiff class,” actual notice is not required. Silber v. Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Plaintiffs’ counsel has provided the court with a proposed notice to be sent class members via email, First-Class Mail, and paid and earned media. (See Docket No. 159-3 at 4.) A dedicated website and toll-free telephone number will serve as additional resources. (Id.) The proposed notices explain the proceedings, define the scope of the class, and explain what the settlement provides and the minimum amount each class member can expect to receive in compensation. (See id. at 20-25.) The notices further explain the opt-out procedure, the procedure for objecting to the settlement, and the date and location of the final approval hearing. (See id.) The content of the notices therefore satisfies Rule 23(c)(2)(B). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B); Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566, 575 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Notice is satisfactory if it ‘generally describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come forward and be heard.’”) (quoting Mendoza v. Tucson Sch. Dist. No. 1, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352 (9th Cir. 1980)). The parties have selected A.B. Data, Ltd.’s Class Action Administration Company (“A.B. Data”) to serve as the Settlement Administrator. (Declaration of Elaine Pang (“Pang Decl.” (Docket No. 159-3) ¶ 4.) Pursuant to the notice plan, the Settlement Administrator will effectuate direct notice to each class member using a provided list of available names, schools, sports, email addresses, and/or mailing addresses for known class members. (See id. ¶ 10.) Further, the Settlement Administrator will establish a website and toll-free phone number, which will be referred to in the mail and email notices, to supplement direct notice and provide further information about the settlement to class members. (See id. ¶¶ 11-14.) The proposed notice procedures appear “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,” to apprise all class members of the proposed settlement. See Roes, 1-2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 1035, 1045–46 (9th Cir. 2019). B. Terms of the Settlement The court must next determine whether the terms of the parties’ settlement appear fair, adequate, and reasonable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2); Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998). This process requires the court to “balance a number of factors,” including “the strength of the plaintiff’s case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class action status throughout the trial; the amount offered in settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of counsel; the presence of a governmental participant; and the reaction of the class members to the proposed settlement.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. Because some of these factors cannot be considered until the final fairness hearing, at the preliminary approval stage “the court need only determine whether the proposed settlement is within the range of possible approval,” Murillo, 266 F.R.D. at 479 (quoting Gautreaux v. Pierce, 690 F.2d 616, 621 n.3 (7th Cir. 1982)), and resolve any “glaring deficiencies” in the settlement agreement before authorizing notice to class members, Ontiveros, No. 2:08-567 WBS DAD, 2014 WL 3057506, at[*12] (E.D. Cal. July 7, 2014) (citing Murillo, 266 F.R.D. at 478). This generally requires consideration of “whether the proposed settlement discloses grounds to doubt its fairness or other obvious deficiencies, such as unduly preferential treatment of class representatives or segments of the class, or excessive compensation of attorneys.” Murillo, 266 F.R.D. at 479 (quoting West v. Circle K Stores, Inc., 04-cv-438 WBS GGH, 2006 WL 1652598, at[*11] -12 (E.D. Cal. June 13, 2006)). Courts often begin by examining the process that led to the settlement’s terms to ensure that those terms are “the result of vigorous, arms-length bargaining” and then turn to the substantive terms of the agreement. See, e.g., Murillo, 266 F.R.D. at 479-80; Circle K, 2006 WL 1652598, at[*11] -12; In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d 1078, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (“[P]reliminary approval of a settlement has both a procedural and a substantive component.”). 1. Negotiation of the Settlement Agreement This action was filed in 2023. (Docket No. 1.) The court disposed of NCAA’s motions to dismiss and transfer venue in 2023. (Docket No. 38.) The parties attempted mediation in summer 2024 but were unsuccessful in reaching a settlement at that time. (Joint Declaration (Docket No. 159-1 ¶ 28.) Following additional litigation, including discovery motions, class certification proceedings, a petition for appeal, and filings on motions for partial summary judgment, the parties resumed settlement discussions in September 2025. (Docket No. 159 at 20.) These discussions involved almost daily exchanges of proposals over ten days and were informed by the extensive litigation up to that point. (Id.) The parties agreed to request a continuance of the impending hearing on plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment and engaged another professional mediator. (Id.) Follow further exchange of memoranda and a full-day mediation on October 10, 2025, the parties reached a settlement. (Id.) Given the extensive discovery and litigation conducted prior to settlement and counsel’s representation that the settlement was the product of arms-length bargaining, the court at this stage does not question that the proposed settlement is the result of informed and non-collusive negotiations between the parties. 2. Amount Recovered and Distribution In determining whether a settlement agreement is substantively fair to the class, the court must balance the value of expected recovery against the value of the settlement offer. See Tableware, 484 F. Supp. 2d at 1080. This inquiry may involve consideration of the uncertainty class members would face if the case were litigated to trial. See Ontiveros, 2014 WL 3057506, at[*14] . “In determining whether the amount offered in settlement is fair, the Ninth Circuit has suggested that the Court compare the settlement amount to the parties’ ‘estimates of the maximum amount of damages recoverable in a successful litigation.’” Litty v. Merrill Lynch & Co., No. 14-cv-0425 PA PJW, 2015 WL 4698475, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 27, 2015) (quoting In re: Mego Fin. Corp. Sec. Litig., 213 F.3d 454, 459 (9th Cir. 2000)); see also Almanzar v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 2:20- cv-0699 KJN, 2022 WL 2817435, at[*11] (E.D. Cal. July 19, 2022) (citing Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 964 (9th Cir. 2009)) (“In determining whether the amount offered is fair and reasonable, courts compare the proposed settlement to the best possible outcome for the class.”) Plaintiffs’ expert has calculated the total damages suffered by class members to be $299,600,000. (Dr. Ashenfelter Declaration (“Ashenfelter Decl.”) (Docket No. 159-2) ¶ 9.) The gross settlement amount of $303,000,000 represents over 100% of estimated damages to the class. This is an exceptional result for the class and is comfortably within the range of percentage recoveries that California courts have found to be reasonable. See Cavazos v. Salas Concrete, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-00062 DAD EPG, 2022 WL 2918361, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2022) (collecting cases). Based on these figures, the average payment per class member is $39,260 before allowed fees and expenses. (Docket No. 159 at 9.) This five-figure payout also represents a strong result for the class. Plaintiffs faced numerous risks in this complex antitrust litigation, including proving all elements of the claims, obtaining and maintaining class certification, establishing liability, and the costliness of litigation and potential appeals on these issues. In light of the risks associated with further litigation and the strength of the settlement terms, the court finds that the value of the settlement is within the range of possible approval such that preliminary approval of the settlement is appropriate. The court further finds the method of processing class member claims to be adequate, as each class member’s share of the settlement will be calculated on an individual basis by plaintiffs’ expert based on factors including school, sport, and length of employment. 3. Attorney’s Fees If a negotiated class action settlement includes an award of attorney’s fees, that fee award must be evaluated in the overall context of the settlement. Knisley v. Network Assocs., 312 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th Cir. 2002); Monterrubio v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 291 F.R.D. 443, 455 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (England, J.). The court “ha[s] an independent obligation to ensure that the award, like the settlement itself, is reasonable, even if the parties have already agreed to an amount.” In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011). Plaintiffs’ counsel will seek fees in an amount not to exceed 30% of the gross settlement amount. (Docket No. 159 at 27.) Counsel plans to file a fee petition contemporaneously with its motion for final approval which will provide details regarding expenses incurred and fees sought. (Id.) In deciding the attorney’s fees motion, the court will have the opportunity to assess whether the requested fee award is reasonable by multiplying a reasonable hourly rate by the number of hours counsel reasonably expended. See Van Gerwen v. Gurantee Mut. Life. Co., 214 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir. 2000). As part of this lodestar calculation, the court may consider factors such as the “degree of success” or “results obtained” by plaintiffs’ counsel. See Cunningham v. Cnty. of L.A., 879 F.2d 481, 488 (9th Cir. 1988). If the court, in ruling on the fees motion, finds that the amount of the settlement warrants a fee award at a rate lower than what plaintiffs’ counsel requests, then it will reduce the award accordingly. The court will therefore not evaluate the fee award here in considering whether the settlement is adequate. 4. Service Awards for Class Representatives “[A]wards that are intended to compensate class representatives for work undertaken on behalf of a class are fairly typical in class action cases.” In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F. 3d 934, 943 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Class counsel plans to request service awards for the class representatives in the amount of $25,000 each, for a total of $125,000. (Docket No. 159 at 29.) “Several courts in this District have indicated that incentive payments of $10,000 or $25,000 are quite high and/or that, as a general matter, $5,000 is a reasonable amount.” Harris v. Vector Marketing Corp., No. C-08-5198 EMC, 2012 WL 381202, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 6, 2012) (collecting cases). In justifying their request, class counsel provides some detail of the class representatives’ efforts in this action, including consulting with counsel on numerous occasions about their experience as college coaches, case strategy, and discovery, as well as responding to interrogatories and sitting for depositions. (Id.) The court notes, however, that counsel has not identified specific reasons for why five individuals were needed for these efforts. In light of the unusually high amount of the service award requested, and the number of class representatives listed, counsel is advised to provide a more substantial report in their motion for final approval of the class representatives’ contributions to this action meriting the requested award amounts, which should also explain the necessity for having five representatives. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary approval of the class action settlement (Docket No. 159) be, and the same hereby is, GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT: (1) The proposed settlement is preliminarily approved as fair, just, reasonable, and adequate to the members of the settlement class, subject to further consideration at the final fairness hearing after distribution of notice to members of the settlement class; (2) A.B. Data is appointed as the Settlement Administrator; (3) The form and content of the proposed Notices of Class Action Settlement (Docket No. 159-3 at 3-14) are approved, except to the extent that they must be updated to reflect the dates and deadlines specified in this Order and other information such as website addresses and phone numbers; (4) no later than seven (7) calendar days from the date this Order is signed, counsel shall provide the Settlement Administrator with the class members’ names, physical mailing addresses, telephone numbers, email addresses, and any other information pertinent to the administration of the Settlement, if they have not done so already; (5) no later than fourteen (14) calendar days from the date this Order is signed, the Settlement Administrator shall send a Notice of Class Action Settlement to all members of the settlement class via first class mail and email. If a Notice is returned to the Settlement Administrator with a forwarding address, the Settlement Administrator will re-send the Notice to the forwarding address. If no forwarding address is provided, the Settlement Administrator will attempt to locate a more current address within three (3) business days of receipt of the returned mail; (6) no later than sixty (60) days from the date Settlement Administrator mails the Notice of Class Action Settlement, though in the case of a re-mailed notice the deadline will be extended by fifteen (15) days, any member of the settlement class who intends to object to, comment upon, or opt out of the settlement shall provide written notice of that intent pursuant to the instructions in the Notice of Class Action Settlement; (7) A final fairness hearing shall be set to occur before this Court on May 11, 2026 at 1:30 p.m. in Courtroom 5 of the Robert T. Matsui United States Courthouse, 501 I Street, Sacramento, California, to determine whether the proposed settlement is fair, reasonable, and adequate and should be approved by this court; whether the settlement class’s claims should be dismissed with prejudice and judgment entered upon final approval of the settlement; whether final class certification is appropriate; and to consider class counsel’s applications for attorney’s fees, costs, and incentive awards for the class representatives. The court may continue the final fairness hearing without further notice to the members of the class; (8) no later than thirty-five (35) days before the final fairness hearing, class counsel shall file with this court a petition for an award of attorney’s fees and costs. Any objections or responses to the petition shall be filed no later than twenty-one (21) days before the final fairness hearing. Class counsel may file a reply to any objections no later than fourteen (14) days before the final fairness hearing; (9) no later than thirty-five (35) days before the final fairness hearing, class counsel shall file and serve upon the court and defendant’s counsel all papers in support of the settlement, the incentive awards for the class representatives, and any award for attorney’s fees and costs; (10) no later than thirty-five (35) days before the final fairness hearing, the Settlement Administrator shall prepare, and class counsel shall file and serve upon the court and defendant’s counsel, a declaration setting forth the services rendered, proof of mailing, a list of all class members who have opted out of the settlement, and a list of all class members who have commented upon or objected to the settlement; (11) any person who has standing to object to the terms of the proposed settlement may appear at the final fairness hearing (themselves or through counsel) and be heard to the extent allowed by the court in support of, or in opposition to, (a) the fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy of the proposed settlement, (b) the requested award of attorney’s fees, reimbursement of costs, and incentive award to the class representative, and/or (c) the propriety of class certification. To be heard in opposition at the final fairness hearing, a person must, no later than sixty (60) days from the date the Settlement Administrator mails the Notice of Class Action Settlement, (a) serve by hand or through the mails written notice of his or her intention to appear, stating the name and case number of this action and each objection and the basis therefore, together with copies of any papers and briefs, upon class counsel and counsel for defendant, and (b) file said appearance, objections, papers, and briefs with the court, together with proof of service of all such documents upon counsel for the parties. Responses to any such objections shall be served by hand or through the mails on the objectors, or on the objector’s counsel if there is any, and filed with the court no later than fourteen (14) calendar days before the final fairness hearing. Objectors may file optional replies no later than seven (7) calendar days before the final fairness hearing in the same manner described above. Any settlement class member who does not make his or her objection in the manner provided herein shall be deemed to have waived such objection and shall forever be foreclosed from objecting to the fairness or adequacy of the proposed settlement, the judgment entered, and the award of attorney’s fees, costs, and incentive awards to the class representatives unless otherwise ordered by the court; Tn ee EIEIO IEEE OSE SE IE IID ED

(12) pending final determination of whether the settlement should be ultimately approved, the court preliminarily enjoins all class members (unless and until the class member has submitted a timely and valid request for exclusion) from filing or prosecuting any claims, suits, or administrative proceedings regarding claims to be released by the settlement. Dated: January 6, 2026 oftte a ak beg! WILLIAM B. SHUBB UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE