Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893). · Go Syfert
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Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
682 citation events (29 in the last 25 years) across 57 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Brenda Porter v. Commonwealth of Kentucky (ky, 2024-02-14) · Strongest negative: United States v. Richard A. Whittington, Richard Wolfe, and W. Lewis Demoss, Jr. (ca5, 1986-04-02)
Treatment trajectory · 1900 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1900 1963 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 33 distinct citers.
examined Cited "but see" United States v. Richard A. Whittington, Richard Wolfe, and W. Lewis Demoss, Jr. (6×) also: Cited "see"
5th Cir. · 1986 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see 8 Wigmore on Evidence § 2251, at 311 n. 3(1) (McNaughton rev. 1961). 9 . 149 U.S. 60, 66 , 13 S.Ct. 765, 766 , 37 L.Ed. 650, 652 (1893). 10 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brenda Porter v. Commonwealth of Kentucky
Ky. · 2024 · confidence medium
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (Stewart, J., joined by White, J., dissenting), and Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 60 (1893), preceding Griffin, are the United State Supreme Court cases from which the principle flows.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Tomas Jaymitchell Hoyle
Wis. · 2023 · confidence medium
In Wilson v. United States, the Court said yes. 149 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1893).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Taylor, N., Aplt.
Pa. · 2020 · confidence medium
But “by ‘solemnizing the silence of the accused into evidence against him,’” Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 65 (2000) (quoting Griffin, 380 U.S. at 614) (brackets omitted), the juvenile court denied to Taylor—who, we must emphasize, remained cloaked in “the presumption of innocence which the law gives to everyone,” Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 (1893)—the privilege entrusted to him by the Bill of Rights.
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Robinson (4×) also: Cited "see"
SCOTUS · 1988 · confidence medium
The minds of the jurors can only remain unaffected from this circumstance by excluding all reference to it. " 149 U. S., at 65 (emphasis added).
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Hasting (3×) also: Cited "see"
SCOTUS · 1983 · confidence medium
Id., at 193, 215-216, 222-223, 485-486, 885, 903-904, 906 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Flinchbaugh
usnmcmilrev · 1977 · confidence medium
The statute [i. e., the 1878 progenitor of 18 USC §§ 3481 ] in tenderness to the weakness of those who from the causes mentioned might refuse to ask to be a witness, particularly when they may have been in some degree compromised by their association with others, declares that the failure of a defendant in a criminal action to request to be a witness shall not create any presumption against him.” Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 , 13 S.Ct. 765, 766 , 37 L.Ed. 650, 651-652 (1893).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Dean P. Epperson v. United States (2×)
7th Cir. · 1973 · confidence medium
See Hall v. United States, 150 U.S. 76, 81 ( 14 S.Ct. 22 , 37 L.Ed. 1003 ); Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118, 121 ( 14 S.Ct. 210 , 37 L.Ed. 1021 ); Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 68 ( 13 S.Ct. 765 , 37L.Ed. 650).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Davis (2×)
Pa. · 1973 · confidence medium
It is not everyone, however honest, who would, therefore, willingly be placed on the witness stand.’ Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 at 66 (1893).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. McKenzie (2×)
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 1973 · confidence medium
In Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 66 , 13 S.Ct. 765, 766 (1893), the highly personal nature of the right to remain silent was described by Justice Field, who wrote: "But the act was framed with a due regard also to those who might prefer to rely upon the presumption of innocence which the law gives to every one, and not wish to be witnesses.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. REICHARD
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1967 · confidence medium
It is not everyone, however honest, who would, therefore, willingly be placed on the witness stand.” Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 at 66 (1893). 3 A defendant may refuse to testify for reasons wholly unrelated to his innocence or guilt.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Bell
Cal. Ct. App. · 1967 · confidence medium
Exploration of the record in that regard would seem to be no different than that required to be made in any criminal case where the “miscarriage of justice” rule of People v. Watson, 46 Cal.2d 818, 835-836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ], or of Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 70 [ 37 L.Ed. 650 , 13 S.Ct. 765 ] (see also opinion of Justice Peters in People v. Modesto, 62 Cal.2d 436, at p. 462 [ 42 Cal.Rptr. 417 , 398 P.2d 753 ]) is being applied.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Garcia
Cal. Ct. App. · 1965 · confidence medium
In the light of all the other evidence against him, we hold that, in this nonjury trial, the error with respect to Mrs. Garcia’s statement was not prejudicial to Gumeeindo and does not require a reversal of his conviction, whether we apply the test as phrased in Wilson v. United States (1893) 149 U.S. 60, 70 [ 13 S.Ct. 765 , 37 L.Ed. 650 ], or as phrased in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ] (see, also, Fahy v. Connecticut (1963) 375 U.S. 85 [ 84 S.Ct. 229 , 11 L.Ed.2d 171 ]).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Steele
Cal. Ct. App. · 1965 · confidence medium
The definitive test, in California, for the application of the prejudicial error doctrine of article VI, section 4% of our state Constitution was in People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 , where the Supreme Court said (at p. 836 [ 299 P.2d 243 ]) : “. . .it appears that the test generally applicable may be stated as follows: That a ‘miscarriage of justice’ should be declared only when the court, ‘after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence,’ is of the ‘opinion’ that it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party would have been …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Modesto (2×)
Cal. · 1965 · confidence medium
The congressional provision that a defendant's failure to request to be a witness in the case "shall not create any presumption against him" ( 18 U.S.C. § 3481 ) has been interpreted to exclude any comment. ( Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 65 [ 13 S.Ct. 765 , 37 L.Ed. 650 ]; Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287, 292-293 [ 60 S.Ct. 198 , 84 L.Ed. 257 ]; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 50, fn. 6 [ 67 S.Ct. 1672 , 91 L.Ed. 1903 , 171 A.L.R. 1223 ].) [9] Although it is the federal privilege that is now protected by the Fourteenth Amendment ( Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10 [ 84 S.Ct. 1…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Milton v. United States
D.C. Cir. · 1940 · confidence medium
Note, 84 A.L.R. 784 , and eases there cited. 4 Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 67, 68 , 13 S.Ct. 765, 767 , 37 L.Ed. 650 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Frazier
La. · 1928 · confidence medium
Wilson v. United States, 149 U. S. 60, 67, 68 [ 13 S. Ct. 765 ] 37 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bain v. United States
6th Cir. · 1920 · confidence medium
For instances where it was thought that such an error might be sufficiently cured, see Wilson v. U. S., 149 U. S. 60, 67, 68, 13 Sup. Ct 765, 13 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. . Minkowitz
NY · 1917 · confidence medium
(Ruloff v. People, 45 N. Y. 213 ; People v. Rose, 52 Hun, 33, 39 ; People v. Valentine, 147 App. Div. 31 ; People v. Hoch, 150 N. Y. 291, 304 ; People v. Springer, 137 App. Div. 304 ; People v. Watson, 216 N. Y. 565 ; Dunn v. State, 118 Wis. 82 , *505 87; Wilson v. U. S., 149 U. S. 60, 66, 67, 70 ; Commonwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 239, 240, 241 ; Austin v. People, 102 Ill. 261, 264 .) In some of the above cases such improper remarks of the district attorney were held not to be error calling for a reversal of the conviction where the trial court instructed the jury to disregard such statements …
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dunn v. State
Wis. · 1903 · confidence medium
Wilson v. U. S. 149 U. S. 60, 66, 67, 69, 70 , 13 Sup. Ct. 765.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hall v. United States
SCOTUS · 1893 · confidence medium
Wilson v. United States, 149 U. S. 60, 67, 68 .
discussed Cited "see" People v. Clary
Mich. · 2013 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord United States v Zaccaria, 240 F3d 75, 79 (CA 1, 2001) (“[S]ilence per se generally has little or no probative value for impeachment purposes.”).6 See, also, MRE 401 and MRE 403. 6 Accordingly, to the extent that the majority opinion can be read to suggest that a defendant’s silence is per se highly probative, that a defendant’s silence at a previous trial is “plain evidence of guilt” that should not be suppressed, or that the use of a defendant’s 4 Indeed, there might be possible explanations for a defendant’s failure to testify, even if entirely innocent of the charge a…
examined Cited "see" United States v. Coy Ray Phelps (3×)
9th Cir. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 612-13 , 85 S.Ct. 1229, 1232 , 14 L.Ed.2d 106 (1965) (citing Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 , 13 S.Ct. 765 , 37 L.Ed. 650 (1893)).
examined Cited "see" State v. Kazda (6×)
Utah · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 , 13 S.Ct. 765 , 37 L.Ed. 650 (1893). .
examined Cited "see" United States v. Black (3×)
6th Cir. · 1973 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60, 65-68 , 13 S.Ct. 765 , 37 L.Ed. 650 (1893) ; United States v. Shipp, 359 F. 2d 185, 190 (6th Cir. 1966) (dissenting opinion) ; and Bell v. State, 66 Miss. 192 , 5 So. 389 (1889), for a discussion of this point. .
examined Cited "see" United States v. Marquez (3×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1970 · signal: see · confidence high
Since defendant's testimony placed his credibility in issue, the necessary implication of that holding is that his prior refusal to testify could not be used to impeach his general credibility." Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1 , 7 n. 14, 81 S.Ct. 941, 944 , 6 L.Ed. 2d 84 (1961). [16] 353 U.S. at 425 , 77 S.Ct. at 984 (Black, J., concurring). [17] 8 Wigmore, Evidence § 2272 at 437 (McNaughton Rev.Ed.1961). [18] 380 U.S. 609 , 85 S.Ct. 1229 , 14 L.Ed. 2d 106 (1965). [19] 18 U.S.C. § 3481 ; see Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1 , 81 S.Ct. 941 , 6 L.Ed.2d 84 (1961). [20] Wilson v. United…
examined Cited "see" Kelley v. United States (4×)
SCOTUS · 1968 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 , 13 S.Ct. 765 , 37 L.Ed. 650 (1893).
examined Cited "see" State v. Johnson (3×)
N.J. · 1965 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wilson v. United States, 149 U. S. 60 , 13 S. Ct. 765 , 37 L.
examined Cited "see" State v. Johnson (3×)
N.J. · 1965 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 , 13 S.Ct. 765 , 37 L.Ed. 650 (1893); Bruno v. United States, 308 U.S. 287 , 60 S.Ct. 198 , 84 L.Ed. 257 (1939).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Philip Charles Testa (6×)
3rd Cir. · 1964 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 [ 13 S.Ct. 765 , 37 L.Ed. 650 ]; Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1 [ 81 S.Ct. 941 , 6 L.Ed.2d 84 ].
discussed Cited "see" Piemonte v. United States (2×)
SCOTUS · 1961 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wilson v. United States, 149 U. S. 60 ; Stewart v. United States, 366 U. S. 1 .
discussed Cited "see" Scott v. California (2×)
SCOTUS · 1961 · signal: see · confidence high
See Wilson v. United States, 149 U. S. 60 .
examined Cited "see, e.g." Ingram v. United States (3×)
D.C. · 1955 · signal: see also · confidence low
Swenzel v. United States, 2 Cir., 22 F.2d 280 ; Becher v. United States, 2 Cir., 5 F.2d 45 , certiorari denied 267 U.S. 602 , 45 S.Ct. 462 , 69 L.Ed. 808 ; see also, Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 , 13 S.Ct. 765 , 37 L.Ed. 650 ; Bradford v. United States, 5 Cir., 129 F.2d 274 ; Kahn v. United States, 6 Cir., 20 F.2d 782 ; United States v. Glazer, D.C.Mo., 110 F. Supp. 558 , appeal dismissed, 8 Cir., 205 F.2d 421 .
Wilson
v.
United States
1284.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Apr 17, 1893.
149 U.S. 60
Mr. C. Stuart Beattie, for plaintiff in error, cited:, Mr. Assistant Attorney General Parker for defendant in error.
Field.
Cited by 248 opinions  |  Published
Me. Justice Field,

after stating the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

The act of Congress permitting the defendant in a criminal action to appear as a witness in his own behalf upon his request declares, as it will be seen, that his failure to request to be a witness in the case shall not create any presumption against him.

' To prevent such presumption being created, comment, especially hostile comment, upon such failure must necessarily be excluded from the jury. The minds of the jurors can only remain unaffected from this circumstance by excluding all reference to it.

At common law no one accused of crime could be compelled to give evidence in a prosecution against himself, nor was he permitted to testify in his own behalf. The accused • might rely upon the presumption of the law that he was innocent of the charge, and leave the government to establish his guilt in the best way it could.

This rule, while affording great protection to the accused against unfounded accusation, in many cases deprived him from explaining circumstances tending to create conclusions, of his guilt which he could readily have removed if permitted[*66] to testify. To relieve him from this embarrassment the law was passed. In mercy to him, he is by the act in question permitted upon his request to testify in his own behalf in the case. In a vast number of instances the innocence of the defendant of the charge with which he was confronted has been established.

But the act was framed with a due regard also to those-who might prefer to rely upon the presumption of innocence which the law gives to every one, and not wish to be witnesses. It is not every one who can safely venture on the witness stand though entirely innocent of the charge against him. Excessive timidity, nervousness when facing others and attempting to explain transactions of a suspicious character, and offences charged against him, will often confuse and embarrass him to such a degree as to increase rather than remove prejudices against him. It is not every one, however honest, who would, therefore, willingly be placed on the witness stand. The statute, in tenderness to the weakness of those who from the causes mentioned might refuse to ask to be a witness, particularly when they ma have been in some degree compromised by their association with others, declares that the failure of the defendant in a criminal action. to request to be a witness shall, not create any presumption against him.

In this case this provision of the statute was plainly disregarded. "When the District Attorney, referring to the fact that the defendant did not ask to be a witness, said to the jury, “ I want to say to you, that if I am ever charged with crime, I will not stop by putting witnesses on the stand to testify to my good character, but I will go upon the stand and hold up my hand before high Heaven and testify to my innocence of the crime,” he intimated to them as plainly as if he had said in so many words that it was a circumstance against the innocence of the defendant that he did not go on the stand and testify. Nothing could have been more effective with the jury to induce them to disregard entirely the presumption of innocence to which by the law he was entitled, and which by the statute he could not losé by a failure to offer himself as a[*67] witness. And when counsel for defendant called the attention of the court to this language of the District Attorney it was not met by any direct prohibition or emphatic condemnation of the court, which only said : “ I suppose the counsel should not comment upon the defendant not taking the stand.” It should have said that the counsel is forbidden by the statute to make any comment which would create or tend to create a presumption against the defendant from his failure to testify.

Instead of stating, after mentioning that the United States court is not governed by the State’s statutes, “ I do not know that it ought to be the subject of comment by counsel,” the court should have said that any such comment would tend necessarily to defeat the very prohibition of the statute. And the reply of the District Attorney to the mild, observation of the court only intensified the fact to which he had already called the attention of the jury: “ I did not mean to refer to it in that light, and I do not intend to refer in a single word to the fact that he did not testify in his own behalf,” which was equivalent to saying, “You gentlemen of the jury know full well that an innocent man would have gone on the stand and have testified to his innocence, but I do not mean to refer to the fact that he did not, for it is a circumstance which you will take into consideration without it.” By this action of the court in refusing to condemn the language of the District Attorney, and to express to the jury in emphatic terms that they should not attach to the failure any importance whatever as a presumption against the defendant, the impression was left on the minds of the jury that if he were an innocent man he would have gone on the stand as the District Attorney stated he himself would have done.

This language of the District Attorney, and this action, or rather want of action, of the court, are set forth in the bill of exceptions, and although exceptions are generally taken to some ruling, or want of ruling, by the eourt in the progress of the trial in the admission or rejection of evidence or the interpretation of instruments, yet. they can be taken to its action or want of proper action upon any proceeding in the progress of the trial from its commencement to its conclusion,[*68] and when properly presented, can be considered by the court on writ of error.

The refusal of the court to condemn the reference of the District Attorney and to prohibit any subsequent reference to the failure of the defendant to appear as a witness tended to his prejudice before the jury, and this effect should be corrected by setting the verdict aside and awarding a new trial.

Similar statutes to the one we have been considering have been passed by several States, and the rulings upon them have been substantially in accordance with our judgment in this case.

In 1866, the legislature of Massachusetts passed an act almost identical in terms with the act of Congress under consideration. It provided that “in the trial of all indictments, complaints and other proceedings against persons charged with the commission of crimes or offences, the person so charged shall, at his own request, but not otherwise, be •deemed a competent witness; nor shall the neglect or refusal to testify create any presumption against the defendant.” The provision has been since reenacted in substantially the same terms. Mass. Stats. 1866, c. 260; 1870, c. 393, § 1, cl. 3; Pub. Stats. 1882, p. 987, c. 169, § 18, cl. 3. And in the case of Commomwealth v. Scott, 123 Mass. 239, 240, 241, where the indictment against the defendants was for breaking and entering a house in the night time with intent to commit larceny therein, none of the defendants testified at the trial, and the prosecuting attorney, in his closing argument, commented upon this fact, when the counsel for the defendants interrupted him and asked the judge to rule that the fact that the defendants did not testify could not be commented on by the government. But the judge, having first stated the law that the fact that they did not testify did not create any presumption against them, ruled that, inasmuch as the matter had been referred to by their counsel, the prosecuting attorney had a right to comment on the reasons given for their not going upon the stand and testifying in their behalf, and also to give the reasons which the government contended really existed for their not testifying; and permitted the prosecuting attorney[*69] to proceed in Ms comments. The jury having rendered a verdict of guilty, the defendants alleged' exceptions, and the case went to the Supreme Judicial Court of the Commonwealth. The Chief Justice, in delivering the opinion of the court, after referring to the fact that the government had no right to interrogate a person accused of crime, or to compel him to testify, but was bound to sustain its charge by independent evidence, observed that “ the statutes allowing persons charged with the commission of crimes or offences to testify in their own behalf were passed for their benefit and protection, and clearly recognize their constitutional privilege, by providing that their neglect or refusal to testify shall not create any presumption against them.”

And again: “ The course of the closing argument for the prosecution tended to persuade the jury that the omission of the defendants to testify implied an admission or a consciousness of the crime charged; and the presiding judge in permitting such a course of argument, against the objection of the defendants, and in ruling that the prosecuting attorney had a right to comment on the reasons which the defendants’ cpunsel gave for their not going upon the stand and testifying in their behalf, and also to give the reasons which the government contended really existed for their not testifying, committed an error which was manifestly prejudicial to the defendants, and which obliges this court to set aside the verdict and order a new trial.”

The criminal code of Illinois, after providing that in criminal caa^s the accused may, on his own motion, testify in the case, declares, in a proviso, that “ his neglect to testify shall not create any presumption against him, nor shall the court permit any reference or comment to be made to or upon such neglect.”

In the case of Austin v. The People, 102 Illinois, 261, 264, a reference had been made to the neglect of the accused to testify, both in the opening and concluding argument for the prosecution, and the court, in setting aside the verdict of guilty which was rendered in that case, said : “ When the statute says that no presumption against the accused shall be created[*70] by his neglect to testify, it clearly meant that in cases where the defendant should not choose to avail himself of the privilege offered by the statute, the trial should be conducted in the same manner and upon the same presumptions as if the statute had not been passed.” And again: “We do not see how this statute can be completely enforced, unless it be adopted as a rule of practice that such improper and forbidden reference by counsel for the prosecution shall be regarded good ground for a new trial in all cases where the proofs of guilt are not so clear and conclusive that the court can say affirmatively the accused could not have been harmed from that cause.”

This view of the effect of the objections taken to the course of the district attorney, and to the failure of the court to properly condemn it, renders it unnecessary to consider any other alleged errors.

The judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded with di/re<Mons to a/wa/rd a new trial, and it is so ordered.