Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 (1899). · Go Syfert
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Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 (1899). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the right to challenge is the right to reject, not to select, a juror.”
415 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 73 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Kamari Lowery v. State of Florida (fladistctapp, 2026-03-25)
Treatment trajectory · 1900 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1900 1963 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 17 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Kamari Lowery v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2026 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the right to challenge is the right to reject, not to select, a juror.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wright v. West (2×)
SCOTUS · 1992 · confidence medium
Caldwell v. Texas, 137 U. S. 692, 698 (1891); Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 175 (1899).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States of America Ex Rel. Gilbert John Gaugler v. Joseph Brierley, Superintendent, State Correctional Institution at Pittsburgh
3rd Cir. · 1973 · confidence medium
Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 [ 20 S.Ct. 77, 78 , 44 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gray v. Whitmore
Cal. Ct. App. · 1971 · confidence medium
(See Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 176 [ 44 L.Ed. 119, 121 , 20 S.Ct. 77 ]; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U.S. 114, 123-124 [ 32 L.Ed. 623, 626 , 9 S.Ct. 231 ]; Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 [ 86 L.Ed. 1595, 1601 , 62 S.Ct. 1252 ]; Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530 [ 98 L.Ed. 911, 921 , 74 S.Ct. 737 ]; Mihans v. Municipal Court, 1 Cal.App.3d 479, 484 [ 87 Cal.Rptr. 17 ].) The definition in each case depends upon the circumstances varying with the subject matter and the necessities of the situation.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Horner v. State
Fla. · 1964 · confidence medium
Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314, 322 , 36 L. ed. 986, 991, 13 Sup.Ct.Rep. 105 ; McNulty v. California, 149 U.S. 645 , 37 L. ed. 882; 13 Sup.Ct.Rep. 959 ; Plodgson v. Vermont, 168 U.S. 262, 272 , 42 L.ed. 461, 464; 18 Sup.Ct.Rep. 80 ; Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 384 , 42 L.ed. 780, 18 Sup.Ct.Rep. 383 ; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 176 [ante, 119], 20 Sup.Ct.Rep. 77 , 44 L.ed. [119]; Bolin v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83 [ante 382], 20 Sup.Ct.Rep. 287 , 44 L.ed. [382]” This Court regards the question presented as settled by no less an authority on the Constitution of the United States than …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Bernstein
Cal. Ct. App. · 1945 · confidence medium
“The state has full control over the procedure in its courts, both in civil and criminal eases, subject only to the qualification that such procedure must not work a denial of fundamental rights, or conflict with specific and applicable provisions of the constitution.” (Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 174 [ 20 S.Ct. 77 , 44 L.Ed. 119 ].) Under the authorities and, by virtue of the record herein, it cannot be held that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting in evidence the former testimony of the absent witness.
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Parman
Cal. · 1939 · confidence medium
(Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 175 [ 44 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission
SCOTUS · 1937 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 174, 175 ; West v. Louisiana, 194 U. S. 258, 262, 263 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Great Northern Railway Co. v. Washington (2×)
SCOTUS · 1937 · confidence medium
West v. Louisiana, 194 U.S. 258, 262, 263 ; Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 174, 175 ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 101 ; Luria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9, 25 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Shannon
Cal. · 1928 · confidence medium
(Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 175 [ 44 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cordrey v. Steamship
Or. · 1922 · confidence medium
Ed. 467 , 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 344), it is said: “The fourteenth amendment in no way undertakes to control the power of a state to determine by what process legal rights may be asserted or legal obligations may be enforced, provided the method of procedure adopted for these purposes gives reasonable notice and affords fair opportunity to be heard before the issues are decided.” In Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172, 175 ( 44 L.
examined Cited "see" United States v. Roscoe Thomas Brewer (3×)
10th Cir. · 1970 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172, 175 , 20 S.Ct. 77 , 44 L.Ed. 119 ; United States v. Williams, supra, 417 F.2d at 631 .
examined Cited "see" United States v. Michael Allen Williams (3×)
10th Cir. · 1969 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 , 20 S.Ct. 77 , 44 L.Ed. 119 (1899).
discussed Cited "see" Jaca Hernández v. Delgado
prsupreme · 1961 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 ; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 ; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 ; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 ; Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 .
discussed Cited "see" Antonio Fournier v. González
prsupreme · 1958 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U.S. 172 ; Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 ; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 ; Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 ; Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46 ; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 ; Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Teregno v. Shattuck (2×)
D. Mass. · 1920 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, Brown v. New Jersey, 175 U. S. 172 , 20 Sup. Ct. 77, 44 L.
cited Cited "see, e.g." West v. Louisiana
unknown court · 1904 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Brown v. New Jersey, supra, as to a struck jury.
Brown
v.
New Jersey
290.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Nov 20, 1899.
175 U.S. 172
Mr. William D. Daly for plaintiff in error. Mr. Joseph M. Noonan was with him on the brief., Mr. James S. Erwin for defendant in error.
Brewer, Harlan.
Cited by 218 opinions  |  Published
Mr. Justice Brewer,

after making the above statement of the case, delivered the opinion of the court.

That the statutory provisions for a struck jury are not in conflict with the constitution of New Jersey is for this court foreclosed by the decision of the highest court of the State. Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U. S. 278, 294; Hallinger v. Devis, 146 U. S. 314, 319; Forsyth v. Hammond, 166 U. S. 506.

The first ten amendments to the Federal Constitution contain no restrictions on the powers of the State, but were intended to operate solely on Federal Government. Barron v. Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243; Fox v. Ohio, 5 How. 410; Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 7 Wall. 321; United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U. S. 542, 552; Spies v. Illinois, 123 U. S. 131; In re Sawyer, 124 U. S. 200, 219; Eilenbecker v. District Court of Plymouth County, 134 U. S. 31; Davis v. Texas, 139 U. S. 651; McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U. S. 155; Thorington v. Montgomery, 147 U. S. 490; Miller v. Texas, 153 U. S. 535.

[*175] The State has full control over the procedure in its courts, both in civil and criminal cases, subject only to the qualification that such procedure must not work a denial of fundamental rights or conflict with specific and applicable provisions of the Federal Constitution. Ex parte Reggel, 114 U. S. 642; Iowa Central Railway v. Iowa, 160 U. S. 389; Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226. “ The Fourteenth Amendment does not profess to secure to all persons in the United States the benefit of the same laws and the same remedies. Great diversities in these respects may exist in two States separated only by an imaginary line. On one side of this line there may be a right of trial by jury, and on the other side no such right. Each State prescribes its own modes of judicial proceeding.” Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, 31.

The State is not tied down by any provision of the Federal Constitution to the practice and procedure which existed at the common law. Subject to the limitations heretofore named it may avail itself of the wisdom gathered by the experience of the century to make such changes as may be necessary. For instance, while at the common law an indictment by the grand jury was an essential preliminary to trial for felony, it is within the power of a State to abolish the grand jury entirely and proceed by information. Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516.

In providing for a trial by a struck jury, empanelled in accordance with the provisions of the New Jersey statute, no fundamental right of the defendant is trespassed upon. The manner of selection is one calculated to secure an impartial jury, and the purpose of criminal procedure is not to enable the defendant to select jurors, but to secure an impartial jury. “The accused cannot complain if he is still tried by an impartial jury. He can demand nothing more. Northern Pacific Railroad v. Herbert, 116 U. S. 642. The right to challenge is the right to reject, not to select a juror. If from those who remain an impartial jury is obtained, the constitutional right of the accused is maintained.” Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, 71.

[*176] Due process and equal protection of the laws are guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and this amendment operates to restrict the powers of the State, and if trial by a struck jury conflicts with either of these specific provisions it cannot be sustained. A perfectly satisfactory definition of due process may perhaps not be easily stated. In Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S. 516, 537, Mr. Justice Matthews, after reviewing previous declarations, said: “It follows that any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and custom or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good, which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law.” In Leeper v. Texas, 139 U. S. 462, 468, Chief Justice Fuller declared “ that law in its regular course of administration through courts of justice is due process, and when secured by the law of the State the constitutional requirement is satisfied.” Within any and all definitions trial by a struck .jury in the manner prescribed must, when authorized by a statute, valid under the constitution of the State, be adjudged due process. A struck jury was not unknown to the common law, though, as urged by counsel for plaintiff in error, it may never have been resorted to in trials for murder. But if appropriate for and used in criminal trials for certain offences, it could hardly be deemed essentially bad when applied to other offences. It gives the defendant a reasonable opportunity to ascertain the qualifications of proposed jurors, and to protect himself against any supposed prejudices in the mind of any particular individual called as a juror. Whether better or not than, any other method, it is certainly a fair and reasonable way of securing an impartial jury, was provided for by the laws of the State, and that is all that due process in this respect requires.

It is said that the equal protection of the laws was denied because the defendant was not given the same number of peremptory challenges that he would have had in a trial before an ordinary jury. In the latter case he would have been entitled under the statute to twenty peremptory challenges, but when a struck jury is ordered he is given only five.[*177] But that a State may make different arrangements for trials under different circumstances of even the same class of offences, has been already settled by this court. Thus, in Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U. S. 22, in certain parts of the State an appeal was given from a final judgment of a trial court to the Supreme Court of the State, while in other parts this was denied; and it was held that a State might establish one system of law in one portion of its territory and a different system in another, and that in so doing there was no violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. So, in Hayes v. Missouri, 120 U. S. 68, it appeared that a certain number of peremptory challenges was allowed' in cities of over 100,000 inhabitants, while a less number was permitted in other portions of the State. It was held that that was no denial of the equal protection of the laws, the court saying, page 71: “ The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the objects to which it is directed, or by the territory within which it is to operate. It merely requires that all persons subjected to such legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed.”

It is true that here there is no territorial distribution, but in all cases in which a struck jury is ordered the same number of challenges is permitted, as similarly in all cases in which the trial is-by an ordinary jury. Either party, State or defendant, may apply for a struck jury, and the matter is one which is determined by the court in the exercise of a sound discretion. There is no mere arbitrary power in this respect, any more than in the granting or refusing of a continuance. The fact that in one case the plaintiff or defendant is awarded a continuance and in another is refused does not make in either a denial of the equal protection of the laws. That in any given case the discretion of the court in awarding a trial by a struck jury was improperly exercised may perhaps present a matter for consideration on appeal, but it amounts to nothing more.

Perceiving no error in the record, the judgment is

Affirmed.

Mr. Justice Harlan concurred in the result.