United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911). · Go Syfert
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
1,715 citation events (213 in the last 25 years) across 154 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. AMERISOURCEBERGEN CORPORATION (paed, 2023-11-06)
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discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) United States v. AMERISOURCEBERGEN CORPORATION
E.D. Pa. · 2023 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
any violation of the provisions of this act or such rules and regulations of the secretary shall be punished as prescribed in section 5388
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) American Nurses Association v. Leavitt
D.D.C. · 2009 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to make its own action depend.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) AMERICAN NURSES ASS'N v. Leavitt (3×)
D.D.C. · 2009 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
the legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes or intends to make its own action depend.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. Mary T. Grace (3×)
D.C. Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
he authority to make 823 administrative rules is not a delegation of legislative power, nor are such rules raised from an administrative to a legislative character because the violation thereof is punished as a public offense.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Pheasant (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 2025 · confidence medium
So too in Grimaud, where the Court rejected a nondelegation challenge to a statute that delegated authority to the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate the occupancy and use of public forest reservations to preserve them from destruction. 220 U.S. at 515, 522 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Kansas v. The United States Department of Labor
S.D. Ga. · 2024 · confidence medium
None of these statutes could confer legislative power.” United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allstates Refractory Contractors v. Julie Su (2×)
6th Cir. · 2023 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Marshall Field & Co., 143 U.S. at 692–93 (finding proper a delegation to the President to impose retaliatory tariffs if he “deemed” that American business was being treated unequally); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517, 521 (1911) (holding a delegation constitutional because Congress had established the “penalties” and the agency could properly “fill up the details” through administrative rules).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) National Horsemen's Benevolent v. Black
5th Cir. · 2022 · confidence medium
Such high-altitude oversight, the district court itself acknowledged, “largely gives the Authority the power to ‘fill up the details’ of the Act in places with less specific directives,” and “[f]illing up the details has long been recognized as the very business of regulating.” Black, 2022 WL 982464 , at *22 (citing Gundy, 139 S. Ct. at 2136 (Gorsuch, J., dissenting); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Oklahoma v. USA
E.D. Ky. · 2022 · confidence medium
“Filling up the details has long been recognized as the very business of regulating.” Nat’l Horsemen’s, 2022 WL 982464 , at *22 (citing United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gun Owners of America, Inc. v. Merrick B. Garland (2×) also: Cited "see"
6th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
The Court’s traditional approach, under the modern nondelegation doctrine, has been to allow Congress to delegate to the executive branch the responsibility for defining crimes, but only so long as it speaks “distinctly.” United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 519 (1911); United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677, 688 (1892).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Aposhian v. Wilkinson
10th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
But if Congress wants to give the executive branch discretion to define criminal conduct, it must speak “distinctly.” United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 519 (1911).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) in Re Certified Question (Midwest Inst of Health V
Mich. · 2020 · confidence medium
For a far-from- exhaustive list, see Gundy, 588 US at ___; 139 S Ct at 2129 (opinion by Kagan, J.); id. at 2131 (Alito, J., concurring in the judgment); Whitman v American Trucking Associations, Inc, 531 US 457, 472 ; 121 S Ct 903 ; 149 L Ed 2d 1 (2001); Mistretta, 488 US at 379 ; United States v Mazurie, 419 US 544, 556-557 ; 95 S Ct 710 ; 42 L Ed 2d 706 (1975); United States v Sharpnack, 355 US 286, 296-297 ; 78 S Ct 291 ; 2 L Ed 2d 282 (1958); American Power & Light Co v Securities & Exch Comm, 329 US 90, 104-106 ; 67 S Ct 133 ; 91 L Ed 5 103 (1946); Yakus v United States, 321 US 414, 425-4…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Mingo
2d Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
The Court has consistently "upheld delegations whereby the Executive or an independent agency defines by regulation what conduct will be criminal, so long as Congress makes the violation of regulations a criminal offense and fixes the punishment, and the regulations 'confin[e] themselves within the field covered by the statute."' Id. 9 (quoting United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 518 (1911)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Mingo
2d Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
The Court has consistently "upheld delegations whereby the Executive or an independent agency defines by regulation what conduct will be criminal, so long as Congress makes the violation of regulations a criminal offense and fixes the punishment, and the regulations 'confin[e] themselves within the field covered by the statute."' Id. 9 (quoting United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 518 (1911)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Big Time Vapes, Incorporated v. FDA
5th Cir. · 2020 · confidence medium
REV. 1223, 1231 (1985) (“The [intelligible-principle] test has become so ephemeral and elastic as to lose its meaning.”). 16United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911); see also Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 , 41–47 (1825) (upholding a provision of the Process and Compensation Act of 1792 that permitted federal courts to make rules altering the “forms and modes of proceeding” that Congress had adopted); Cargo of the Brig Aurora v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 382 , 383 (1813) (observing that the Non-Intercourse Act of 1809 authorized the President, by proclama…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Western Watersheds Project v. Bernhardt (2×) also: Cited "see"
D. Or. · 2019 · confidence medium
“The Taylor Grazing Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior ‘to issue or cause to be issued permits to graze livestock’ pursuant to ‘his rules and regulations.’” United States v. Estate of Hage, 810 F.3d 712, 717 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 315b). “[T]he implied license under which the United States has suffered its public domain to be used as a pasture for sheep and cattle . . . was curtailed and qualified by Congress, to the extent that such privilege should not be exercised in contravention of the rules and regulations.” United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gundy v. United States
SCOTUS · 2019 · confidence medium
In Cargo of Brig Aurora v. United States, this Court explained that it could “see no sufficient reason, why the legislature should not exercise its discretion [to impose an embargo] either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should direct.”40 Half a century later, Congress likewise made the construction of the Brooklyn Bridge depend on a finding by the Secretary of War that —————— 37 165 U. S. 526, 532 (1897). 38 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 522 (1911).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Damien Guedes v. ATF
D.C. Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
Under longstanding separation-of-powers principles, the Congress defines the criminal law and must speak distinctly to delegate its responsibility. 11 United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 519, 522 (1911); United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677, 688 (1892).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Thomas McDill, Jr.
8th Cir. · 2017 · confidence medium
See generally Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 (1996); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 518 (1911); United States v. Brown, 364 F.3d 1266, 1276 (11th Cir. 2004).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Nichols
10th Cir. · 2015 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
In fact, the Court has repeatedly and long suggested that in the criminal context Congress must provide more “meaningful[]” guidance than an “intelligible principle.” Touby, 500 U.S. at 166; Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 249-50 (1947); see also, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 272-73 (1967) (Brennan, J., concurring); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 , 140 n.7 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting); cf. United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 (1911); United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677, 687-88 (1892).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Erick Carter v. Welles-Bowen Realty, Inc.
6th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
The argument overlooks the reality that, if Congress wants to assign the executive branch discretion to define criminal conduct, it must speak “distinctly.” Grimaud , 220 U. S.. at 519, 31 S.Ct. 480 ; United States v. Eaton, 144 U.S. 677, 688 , 12 S.Ct. 764 , 36 L.Ed. 591 (1892).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wyoming v. United States Department of Agriculture
D. Wyo. · 2008 · confidence medium
While it “must be admitted that it is difficult to define the line which separates legislative power to make laws, from administrative authority *1355 to make regulations!,]” one thing is clear: “The Secretary of Agriculture [cannot] make regulations for any and every purpose.” United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517, 522, 31 S.Ct. 480 , 55 L.Ed. 563 (1911).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Gabrion
6th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 515 (1911).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Gabrion
6th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 515, 31 S.Ct. 480 , 55 L.Ed. 563 (1911). .
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Alghazouli (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
9th Cir. · 2008 · confidence medium
Id. at 519, 31 S.Ct. 480 ; see also Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768 , 116 S.Ct. 1737 , 135 L.Ed.2d 36 (1996) (quoting Grimaud, 220 U.S. at 518 , 31 S.Ct. 480 , to support the proposition that an agency can be delegated the power to define criminal conduct if “Congress makes the violation of regulations a criminal offense and fixes the punishment, and the regulations ‘con-fin[e] themselves within the field covered by the statute.’ ”) (alteration in Loving); Pappens v. United States, 252 F. 55, 56 (9th Cir.1918) (applying the Grimaud approach).
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Barry L. Brown (8×) also: Cited "see"
11th Cir. · 2004 · confidence medium
Id. at 517 , 31 S.Ct. at 483 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wyoming v. United States Department of Agriculture
D. Wyo. · 2003 · confidence medium
While it “must be admitted that it is difficult to define the line which separates legislative power to make laws, from administrative authority to make regulations^]” one thing is clear: “The Secretary of Agriculture [cannot] make regulations for any and every purpose.” United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517, 522 , 31 S.Ct. 480 , 55 L.Ed. 563 (1911).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Loving v. United States (2×)
SCOTUS · 1996 · confidence medium
We have upheld delegations whereby the Executive or an independent agency defines by regulation what conduct will be criminal, so long as Congress makes the violation of regulations a criminal offense and fixes the punishment, and the regulations "confin[e] themselves within the field covered by the statute." United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 518 (1911).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Martin
Cal. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
Control (1966) 65 Cal.2d 349, 369 [ 55 Cal.Rptr. 23 , 420 P.2d 735 ]; Moore v. Municipal Court (1959) 170 Cal.App.2d 548, 556 [ 339 P.2d 196 ].) “A rule does not assume ‘a legislative character because the violation thereof is punished as a public offense.’ (United States v. Grimaud (1911) 220 U.S. 506, 521 [ 55 L.Ed. 563 , 31 S.Ct. 480 ].)” (Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Dept. of Alcoholic Bev.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Broom
La. · 1983 · confidence medium
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 at 517 , 31 S.Ct. 480 at 483 , 55 L.Ed. 563 at 568 (1911), quoting Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard. [10] Because many federal executive agencies operate under token standards, it has been suggested that safeguards against arbitrary action are more important than standards. [11] One safeguard is congressional veto of administrative *368 action.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rights-of-Way Across National Forests
OLC · 1980 · confidence medium
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 515 (1911).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Batchelder
SCOTUS · 1979 · confidence medium
C Approaching the problem of prosecutorial discretion from a slightly different perspective, the Court of Appeals postulated that the statutes might impermissibly delegate to the Executive Branch the Legislature's responsibility to fix criminal penalties. *126 See United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812); United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 516-517, 519 (1911); United States v. Evans, 333 U. S., at 486 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Batchelder
SCOTUS · 1979 · confidence medium
See United States v. Hudson, 7 Cranch 32, 34 (1812) ; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 516-517, 519 (1911); United States v. Evans, 333 U. S., at 486 .
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. New Mexico (4×) also: Cited "see"
SCOTUS · 1978 · confidence medium
But a limited and regulated use for pasturage might not be inconsistent with the object sought to be attained by the statute.” United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 515-516 (1911).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Errol B. Resnick
5th Cir. · 1972 · confidence medium
Only the administrative rule was revoked, a power lawfully delegated to the executive “to fill up the details.” United States v. Gri-maud, 220 U.S. 506, 517 , 31 S.Ct. 480 , 55 L.Ed. 563, 568 (1911).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wilke & Holzheiser, Inc. v. Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (2×)
Cal. · 1966 · confidence medium
As we said in Allied Properties , "this aspect of the act does not involve any delegation of power, the sanctions being prescribed by the Legislature, not by the producers or wholesalers." ( 53 Cal.2d at p. 150 .) A rule does not assume "a legislative character because the violation thereof is punished as a public offense." ( United States v. Grimaud (1911) 220 U.S. 506, 521 [ 55 L.Ed. 563 , 31 S.Ct. 480 ].) So long as the Legislature itself prescribes the terms of the sanctions and defines the circumstances in which they apply, their presence in a statute in no way undermines either the conce…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Valley Forge Products, Inc. v. United States
E.D.N.Y · 1961 · confidence medium
U. S. v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 517-518 [ 31 S.Ct. 480 , 55 L.Ed. 563 ]; International Ry.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walls v. City of Guntersville
Ala. · 1950 · confidence medium
These cases and many others are sustained on the principle that these agencies and officials have not had delegated to them arbitrary or despotic power, but are merely the agencies to carry out a declared policy of the legislative body; that it was impracticable for Congress to provide specific regulations for the various and varying details of management and of necessity such details must be left to the agent for execution, which “was merely conferring administrative functions upon an agent, and not delegating to him legislative power.” United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 615, 516 , 3…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) First Industrial Loan Co. v. Daugherty
Cal. · 1945 · confidence medium
(United States v. Grimaud (1911), 220 U.S. 506, 515-518 [ 31 S.Ct. 480 , 55 L.Ed. 563 ]; Red “C” Oil Co. v. Board of Agriculture of North Carolina (1912), 222 U.S. 380, 394 [ 32 S.Ct. 152 , 56 L.Ed. 240 ]; Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator (1941), 312 U.S. 126, 144-145 [ 61 S.Ct. 524 , 85 L.Ed. 624 ]; Gaylord v. City of Pasadena (1917), 175 Cal. 433, 437 [ 166 P. 348 ]; In re Halck (1932), 215 Cal. 500, 505 [ 11 P.2d 389 ]; In re Weisberg (1932), 215 Cal. 624 [ 12 P.2d 446 ]; Fillmore Union High School Dist. v. Cobb (1935), 5 Cal.2d 26, 32 [ 53 P.2d 349 ]; 1 Cooley’s Constitutional Limit…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Forbes v. United States
9th Cir. · 1942 · confidence medium
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516, 517 , 31 S.Ct. 480 , 55 L.Ed. 563 ; Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406, 407 , 48 S.Ct. 348 , 72 L.Ed. 624 . ‘ The Secretary of the Interior is authorized by the Leasing Act “to prescribe necessary and proper rules and regulations and to do any and all things necessary to carry out and accomplish the purposes of this Act” (c. 85, § 32, 41 Stat. 450 , 30 U.S. C.A. § 189), which is entitled “An act to promote the mining of coal, phosphate, oil, oil shale, gas, and sodium on the public domain” (c. 85, 41 Stat. 437 ).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) M. Taboada & Co. v. Rivera Martínez
prsupreme · 1937 · confidence medium
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 518; Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364 ; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470 ; In re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526 ; Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320 .” Los procedimientos judiciales son. lentos por regla general.
cited Cited as authority (rule) People v. Ziady
Cal. · 1937 · confidence medium
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, p. 522 [31 Sup. Ct. 480, 55 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Kingan & Co. v. Smith
S.D. Ind. · 1936 · confidence medium
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 517, 518 , 31 S.Ct. 480 , 55 L.Ed. 563 ; International Railway Company v. Davidson, 257 U.S. 506, 514 , 42 S.Ct. 179 , 66 L.Ed. 341 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) American Baseball Club v. Philadelphia
SCOTUS · 1933 · confidence medium
Per Curiam: The appeal herein is dismissed for the want of a -substantial federal question. (1) Ex parte Poresky, ante, p. 30; Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105 ; Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Brown, 187 U. S. 308, 311 ; Pennsylvania Hospital v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20, 24 ; Roe v. Kansas, 278 U.S. 191 . (2) Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 144 ; Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 123 ; Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 396 . (3) United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506, 516, 518 ; United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1, 11, 12; Hampton & Co. v. United St…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Myers v. United States
Ct. Cl. · 1931 · confidence medium
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 517, 518 , 31 S. Ct. 480 , 55 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sawyer v. United States (2×)
2d Cir. · 1926 · confidence medium
Ed. 523 ), "would be `to stop the wheels of government.'" See, also, United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 519, 520 , 31 S. Ct. 480 , 55 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re McLain
Cal. · 1923 · confidence medium
(Field v. Clark, supra; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 520 [ 55 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Armour & Co. v. City of Richmond
Va. · 1916 · confidence medium
Ed. 294 and United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 520 , 31 Sup. Ct. 480, 55 L.
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Eleven Thousand One Hundred & Fifty Pounds of Butter (3×)
8th Cir. · 1912 · confidence medium
Ed. 278 ; United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 506, 519, 522 , 31 Sup. Ct. 480, 55 L.
discussed Cited "see" Gun Owners of America, Inc. v. Merrick B. Garland
6th Cir. · 2021 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 521 (rejecting the argument that the rules were invalid merely “because the violation thereof is punished as a public offense”).
United States
v.
Grimaud; Same v. Inda
241, 242.
Supreme Court of the United States.
May 3, 1911.
220 U.S. 506
Mr. Assistant Attorney General Fowler, with whom Mr. Loring C. Christie was on the brief; for the United States. Mr. Solicitor General Bowers on the original argument :, Mr. J. M. Hodgson, with whom Mr. W. W. Kaye and Mr. Robert P. Stewart were on the brief, for defendants-in error:
Lamar.
Cited by 665 opinions  |  Published
3 passages pin-cited by 6 cases
Pinpoint authority: #20,727 of 633,719
Citer courts: D.C. Circuit (3) · District of Columbia (3) · Alaska Supreme Court (2) · Court of Appeals of Washington (2)
Mr.. Justice Lamar,

after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendants were indicted for grazing sheep on the Sierra Forest Reserve without having obtained the permission required by the regulations adopted by the Secretary of Agriculture. They démurred on the ground that the Forest Reserve Act of 1891 was unconstitutional, in so far as it delegated to the Secretary of Agriculture power to make rules and regulations and máde a violation thereof a penal offense. Their several demurfers were sustained. The Government brought the case here under that clause of the Criminal Appeals Act, (March 2,1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat. 1246,), which allows a writ of error where the "decision complained of was based upon the invalidity of the statute.”

[*515] The Federal courts have been divided on the question as to whether violations of those regulations of the Secretary of Agriculture constitute a crime. The rules were held to be valid for civil purposes in Dastervignes v. United States, 122 Fed. Rep. 30; United States v. Dastervignes, 118 Fed. Rep. 199; United States v. Shannon, 151 Fed. Rep. 863; S. C., 160 Fed. Rep. 870. They were also sustained in criminal prosecutions in United States v. Deguirro, 152 Fed. Rep. 568; United States v. Domingo, 152 Fed. Rep. 566; United States v. Bale, 156 Fed. Rep. 687; United States v. Rizzinelli, 182 Fed. Rep. 675. But the regulations were held to be invalid in United, States v. Blasingame, 116 Fed. Rep. 654; United States v. Matthews, 146 Fed. Rep. 306; Dent v. United States, 8 Arizona, 138.

From the various acts relating to the establishment and management of forest reservations it appears that they were intended “to improve and protect the forest and to secure favorable conditions of water flows.” . It was declared that the acts should not be “construed to prohibit the egress and ingress of actual settlers” residing therein nor “to prohibit any person from entering the reservation for all proper and lawful purposes, including that of prospecting, and locating and developing mineral resources; provided that such persons comply with the rules and regulations covering such .forest reservation. ” (Act of 1897, c. 2, 30 Stat. 36.) It was also declared that the Secretary “may make such rules and regulations and establish such service as will insure the objects of such reservation, namely, to regulate their occupancy and use and to preserve the forests thereon from destruction; and any violation of the provisions of this act or such rules and regulations shall he punished” as is provided in § 5388, c. 3, p. 1044 of the Revised Statutes, as amended.

Under these acts, therefore, any use of the reservation for grazing or other lawful purpose was required to be[*516] subject to the rules and regulations established by the Secretary of Agriculture. To pasture sheep and cattle on the reservation, at will arid without restraint, might interfere seriously with the accomplishment of the purposes for which they were established. But a limited and regulated use for pasturage might not be inconsistent with the object sought to be attained by the statute. The determination of such questions, however, was a matter of administrative detail. What might be harmless in one forest might be harmful to another. What might be injurious at one stage of timber growth, or at one season of the year, might not be so at another.

In the nature of things it was impracticable for Congress to provide general regulations for these various and varying details of management. Each reservation had its peculiar and special features; and in authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to meet these local conditions Congress wás merely conferring administrative functions upon an agent, and not delegating to him legislative power. The authority actually given was much less than what has been granted to municipalities by virtue of which they make by-laws, ordinances and regulations for the government of towns and cities. Such ordinances do not declare general rules with reference to rights of persons and property, nor do they create or regulate obligations and liabilities, nor declare what shall be crimes nor fix penalties therefor.

By whatever name they are called they refer to matters of local management and local police. Brodbine v. Revere, 182 Massachusetts, 598. They are “not’of legislative character in the highest sense of the term; and as an owner may delegate to his principal agent the right to employ subordinates, giving them a limited discretion, so. it would seem that Congress might rightfully entrust to the local legislature [authorities] the determination of minor matters.” Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U. S. 126.

[*517] It must be admitted that it is difficult to define the line which separates legislative power to make laws, from administrative authority to make regulations. This difficulty has often been recognized, and was referred to by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman v. Southard, 10 Wheat. 1, 42, where he was considering the authority of courts to make rules. He there said: “It will not be contended that Congress can delegate to the courts, or to any other tribunals, powers which are strictly and exclusively legislative. But Congress may certainly delegate to others, powers which the legislature may rightfully exercise itself. ” What were these non-legislative powers which Congress could exercise but which might also be delegated to others was not determined, for he said: “The line has not been exactly drawn which separates those important subjects, which must be entirely regulated by the legislature itself, from those of less interest, in which a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions to fill up the details. ”

From the beginning of the Government various acts have been passed conferring upon executive officers power to make rules and regulations — not for the government of their departments, but for administering the laws which did govern. None of these statutes could confer legislative power. But when Congress had legislated and indicated its will, it could give to those who were to act-under such general provisions “power to fill up the details” by the establishment of administrative rules and regulations, the violation of which could be punished by fine or imprisonment fixed by Congress, or by penalties fixed by Congress or measured by the injury done.

Thus it is unlawful to charge unreasonable rates or to discriminate between shippers, and the Interstate Commerce Commission has been given authority to make reasonable rates and to administer the law against discrimination. Int. Com. Comm. v. Ill. Cent. R. R., 215 U. S. 452;[*518] Int. Com. Comm. v. Chicago, Rock Island &c. R. R., 218 U. S. 88. Congress provided that after a given date only-cars with drawbars of uniform height should be used in interstate commerce, and then constitutionally- left to the Commission the administrative duty of fixing a uniform standard. St. Louis & Iron Mountain R. R. v. Taylor, 210 U. S. 281, 287. In Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364; In re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526; Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U. S. 470, it appeared from the statutes involved that Congress had either expressly or by necessary implication made it unlawful, if not criminal, to obstruct navigable streams; to sell unbranded oleomargarine; or to import unwholesome teas. With this unlawfulness as a predicate the executive officers were authorized to make rules and regulations appropriate to the several matters covered by the various acts. A violation of these rules was then made an offense punishable as prescribed by Congress. But in making these regulations the officers did not legislate. They did not go outside of the circle of that which the act itself had affirmatively required to be done, or treated as unlawful if done. But confining themselves within the field covered by the statute they could adopt regulations of the nature they had thus been generally authorized to make, in order to administer the law and carry the statute into effect.

The defendants rely on United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677, where the act authorized the Commissioner to make rules for carrying the statute into effect, but imposed no penalty for failing to observe his regulations. Another section (5) required that the dealer should keep books showing certain facts, and providing that he should conduct his business under such surveillance of officers as the Commissioner might by regulation require. Another section declared that if any dealer should knowingly omit to do any of the things “required by law” he should pay a penalty of .a thousand dollars. Eaton failed to keep the[*519] books required by the regulations. But there was no charge that he omitted “anything required by law,” unless it could be held that the books called for by the regulations were '‘ required by law. ’ ’ The court construed the act as a whole and proceeded on the theory that while a violation of the regulations might have been punished as an offense if Congress had so enacted, it had, in fact, made no such provision so far as concerned the particular charge then under consideration. Congress required the dealer to keep books rendering return of materials and products, but imposed no penalty for. failing so to do. The Commissioner went much further and required the dealer to keep books showing oleomargarine received, from whom received and to whom the same was sold. It was sought to punish the defendant for failing to keep the books required by the regulations. Manifestly this was putting the regulations above the statute. The court showed that when Congress enacted that a certain sort of book should be kept, the Commissioner could not go further and require additional books; or, if he did make such regulation, there was no provision in the statute by which a failure to comply therewith could be punished. It said that, “if Congress intended to make it an' offense for wholesale dealers to omit to keep books and render returns required by regulations of the Commissioner, it would have done so distinctly” — implying that if it had done so distinctly the violation of the regulations would have been an offense.

But the very thing which was omitted in the Oleomargarine Act has been distinctly done in the Forest Reserve Act, which, in terms, provides that “any violation of the provisions of this act or such rules and regulations of the Secretary shall be punished as prescribed in section 5388 of the Revised Statutes as amended.”

In Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U. S. 364, 386, Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the court, said:

“By the statute in question Congress declared in effect[*520] that navigation should be freed from unreasonable obstructions arising from bridges of insufficient height, width of span or other defects. It stopped, however, with this declaration of a general rule and imposed upon the Secretary of War the duty of ascertaining what particular cases came within the rule prescribed by Congress, as well as the duty of enforcing the rule in such cases. In performing that duty the Secretary of War will only execute the clearly expressed will of Congress, and will not, in any true sense, exert legislative or judicial power.”

And again he said in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 694:

“The legislature cannot delegate its power to make a law, but it can make a law to delegate a power to determine some fact or state of things upon which the law makes, or intends to make its own action depend. To deny this would be to stop the wheels of government. There are many things upon which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be known to the lawmaking power, and must, therefore, be a subject of inquiry and determina^tion outside of the halls of legislation.” See also Caha v. United States, 152 U. S. 211; United States v. Bailey, 9 Pet. 238; Cosmos Co. v. Gray Eagle Co., 190 U. S. 309; Oceanic Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 333; Roughton v. Knight, 219 U. S. 537 (Decided this Term); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U. S. 167; Ex parte Reed, 100 U. S. 22; Gratiot v. United States, 4 How. 81.

In Brodbine v. Revere, 182 Massachusetts; 598, a boulevard and park board was given authority to make rules and regulations for the control and government of the roadways under its care. It was there held that the provision in the act that breaches of the rules thus made should be breaches of the peace, punishable in any court having jurisdiction, was not a delegation of legislative power which .was unconstitutional. The court called attention to the fact that the .punishment was not fixed by the board, saying that the making of the rules was administrative, while[*521] the substantive legislation was in the statute which provided that they should be punished as breaches of the peace.

That “Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the- integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitution.” Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649, 692. But the authority to make administrative rules .is not a delegation of legislative power, nor are such rules raised from an administrative to a legislative character because the violation thereof is punished as a public offense.

It is true that there is no act of Congress which, in express terms, declares that it shall be unlawful to graze sheep on a forest reserve. But the statutes, from which we have quoted, declare, that the privilege of using reserves for “all proper and lawful purposes” is subject to the proviso that the person so using them shall comply “with the rules and regulations covering such forest reservation.” The same act makes it an offense to violate those regulations, that is, to use them otherwise than in accordance with the rules established by the Secretary. Thus the implied license under which the United States had suffered its public domain to be used as a pasture for sheep and cattle, mentioned in Buford v. Houtz, 133 U. S. 326, was curtailed and qualified by Congress, to the extent that such privilege should not be exercised in contravention of the rules and regulations. Wilcox v. Jackson, 13 Pet. 498, 513.

If, after the passage of the act and the promulgation of the rule, the defendants drove and grazed their sheep upon the reserve, in violation of the regulations, they were making an unlawful use of the Government’s property. In doing so they thereby made themselves liable to the penalty imposed by Congress.

It was argued that, even if the Secretary could establish regulations under which a permit was required, there was[*522] nothing in the act to indicate that Congress had intended or authorized him to charge for the privilege of grazing sheep on the reserve. These fees were fixed to prevent excessive grazing and thereby protect the young growth, and native grasses, from destruction, and tó make a slight income with which to meet the expenses of management. In addition to the general power in the act of 1897, already quoted, the act of February 1, 1905, c. 288, p. 628, clearly indicates that the Secretary was authorized to make charges out of which a revenue from forest resources was expected to arise. For it declares that “all money received from the sale of any products or the use of any land or resources of said forest reserve” shall be covered into the Treasury and be applied toward the payment of forest expenses. This act was passed before the promulgation of regulation 45, set out in the indictment.

Subsequent acts also provide that money received from “any source of forest reservation revenue” should be covered into the Treasury, and a part thereof was to be turned over to the treasurers of the respective States to be expended for the benefit of the public schools and public roads in the counties in which the forest reserves are situated.. (C. 2907, 34 Stat. 684, 1270.)

. The Secretary of Agriculture could not make rules and regulations for any and every purpose. Williamson v. United States, 207 U. S. 462. As to those here involved, they all relate to matters clearly indicated and authorized by Congress. The subjects as to which the Secretary can regulate are defined. The lands are set apart as a forest reserve. He is required to make provision to protect them from depredations and from harmful uses. He is authorized “to regulate the occupancy and use and to preserve the forests from destruction.” A violation of reasonable rules regulating the use and occupancy of the property is made a crime, not by the Secretary, but by Congress. The statute, not the Secretary, fixes the penalty.

[*523] The indictment charges, and the demurrer admits that Rule 45 was promulgated for the purpose of regulating the occupancy and use of the public forest reservation and preserving the forest. The Secretary did not exercise the legislative power of declaring the penalty or fixing the punishment for grazing sheep without a permit, but the punishment is imposed by the act itself. The offense is not against the Secretary, but, as the indictment properly concludes-, “contrary to the laws of the United States and the peace and dignity thereof.” The demurrers should have been overruled. The affirmances by a divided court heretofore entered are set aside and the judgments in both cases

Reversed.