United States v. Mitchell, 271 U.S. 9 (1926). · Go Syfert
United States v. Mitchell, 271 U.S. 9 (1926). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
424 citation events (34 in the last 25 years) across 46 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Travelers Cas. Insurance v. Karns - ( (kanctapp, 2018-10-05)
Treatment trajectory · 1926 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1926 1976 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 33 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Travelers Cas. Insurance v. Karns - ( (3×)
Kan. Ct. App. · 2018 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
it is not to be thought that a question not raised by counsel or discussed in the opinion of the court has been decided merely because it existed in the record and might have been 311 raised and considered.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Kennebrew v. State (3×)
Ga. · 2018 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
it is not to be thought that a question not raised by counsel or discussed in the opinion of the court has been decided merely because it existed in the record and might have been raised and considered.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Travelers Cas. Insurance v. Karns (3×)
Kan. Ct. App. · 2018 · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
it is not to be thought that a question not raised by counsel or discussed in the opinion of the court has been decided merely because it existed in the record and might have been raised and considered.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Ramah Navajo Chapter v. Salazar (6×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
10th Cir. · 2011 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence low
it is not to be thought that a question not raised by counsel or discussed in the opinion of the court has been decided merely because it existed in the record and might have been raised and considered.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) United States v. Gary E. Chesney (6×)
6th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · quote attribution · 6 verbatim quotes · confidence high
it is not to be thought that a question not raised by counsel or discussed in the opinion of the court has been decided merely because it existed in the record and might have been raised and considered.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Daniel Frias v. Arturo Torrez
5th Cir. · 2015 · confidence medium
First, according to black letter law, “a question not raised by counsel or discussed in the opinion of the court” has not “been decided merely because it existed in the record and might have been raised and considered.” United States v. Mitchell, 271 U.S. 9, 14 , 46 S. Ct. 418, 420-21 (1926); see also HENRY 8 Case: 13-50768 Document: 00513043880 Page: 9 Date Filed: 05/14/2015 No. 13-50768 No. 14-10018 CAMPBELL BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS, OR, THE SCIENCE OF CASE LAW 37 (1912).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Harper v. Virginia Department of Taxation
Va. · 1991 · confidence medium
Tucker Truck Lines, 344 U.S. 33, 37-38 (1952); United States v. Mitchell, 271 U.S. 9, 14 (1926); Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mark E. Schlude and Marzalie Schlude, Husband and Wife v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (2×)
8th Cir. · 1960 · confidence medium
In the oft-cited case of United States v. Anderson, supra, the Supreme Court discussed the purpose of §§ 12(a) and 13(d) of the Revenue Act of 1916 (provisions similar to §§ 41, 42) in this language at page 440 of 269 U.S., at page 134 of 46 S.Ct.: 21 "It was to enable taxpayers to keep their books and make their returns according to scientific accounting principles, by charging against income earned during the taxable period, the expenses incurred in and properly attributable to the process of earning income during that period; and indeed, to require the tax return to be made on that basi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Albany Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Henderson
Ga. · 1944 · confidence medium
Questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents.” See also United States v. Mitchell, 271 U. S. 9, 14 (46 Sup. Ct. 418, 70 L. ed. 799); Gargilis v. Gleavy, 45 Fed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chase National Bank v. Chicago Title & Trust Co. (2×)
N.Y. Sup. Ct. · 1935 · confidence medium
However, it appears beyond dispute from the briefs on appeal that all parties failed to argue the construction of the trust deed in either court, and accordingly even the decision of the Appellate Division has little force as an obligatory pr ecedent. ( United States v. Mitchell, 271 U. S. 9, 14 ; Cross v. Burke, 146 id. 82, 87 ; Tefft, Weller & Co. v. Munsuri, 222 id. 114, 119; Matter of Lyman, 161 N. Y. 119 ; Molony v. Dows, 8 Abb.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hughes v. Commissioner
B.T.A. · 1933 · confidence medium
United States v. Whitehall, 271 U.S. 9 3.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bowen v. Commissioner
B.T.A. · 1933 · confidence medium
So was the tax considered in United States v. Mitchell, 271 U. S. 9, 12, 46 , but it could not be deducted until it was paid.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Eckert v. Burnet
SCOTUS · 1931 · confidence medium
So was the tax considered in United States v. Mitchell, 271 U. S. 9, 12, but it could not be deducted until it was paid.
discussed Cited "see" Kennebrew v. State (2×)
Ga. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Mitchell, 271 U. S. 9, 14 ( 46 SCt 418 , 70 LE 799) (1926) (“It is not to be thought that a question not raised by counsel or discussed in the opinion of the court has been decided 6 The State also cites State v. Betterley, 529 NW2d 216 (Wis. 1995), but that case does not apply.
examined Cited "see" Donald Zimmerman v. City of Austin, Texas (3×)
5th Cir. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See De La Paz v. Coy , 786 F.3d 367 , 373 (5th Cir. 2015) ("[A]ccording to black letter law, 'a question not raised by counsel or discussed in the opinion of the court' has not 'been decided merely because it existed in the record and might have been raised and considered.' ") (quoting United States v. Mitchell , 271 U.S. 9 , 14, 46 S.Ct. 418 , 70 L.Ed. 799 (1926), and citing Henry Campbell Black, Handbook on the Law of Judicial Precedents, or, The Science of Case Law 37 (1912) ).
examined Cited "see" Coats v. Penrod Drilling Corp. (6×)
5th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Mitchell, 271 U.S. 9, 11-15 , 46 S.Ct. 418, 419-20 , 70 L.Ed. 799 (1926). 43 As previously observed (see note 38, supra), the Court in Cooper Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 , 94 S.Ct. 2174 , 40 L.Ed.2d 694 (1974), refused to extend the Halcyon ban on contribution beyond its context of a contribution claim against the LHWCA employer of the injured plaintiff, and McDermott recognized that Ed-monds was LHWCA-driven and refused to extract from it a general principle to govern the effect of settlement in general maritime law multiple party cases.
examined Cited "see" United States v. Reed (3×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
It is recognized that “[questions which merely lurk in the record, neither brought to the attention of the court nor ruled upon, are not to be considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedent.” Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 [ 45 S.Ct. 148, 149 , 69 L.Ed. 411 ] (1925); see United States v. Mitchell, 271 U.S. 9, 14 [ 46 S.Ct. 418, 419 , 70 L.Ed. 799 ] (1926) (holding that "[i]t is not to be thought that a question not raised by counsel or discussed in the opinion of the court has been decided merely because it existed in the record and might have been raised and considere…
examined Cited "see" Cimarron Industries, Inc. v. Oklahoma Tax Commission (3×)
Okla. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Mitchell, 271 U.S. 9 , 46 S.Ct. 418 , 70 L.Ed. 799 (1926). 5 .
examined Cited "see" American Can Co. v. Commissioner (6×)
Tax Ct. · 1961 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Mitchell, 271 U.S. 9 , 12 , 13 , 46 S. Ct. 418 , 70 L.
discussed Cited "see" Aluminum Castings Co. v. Routzahn (2×)
SCOTUS · 1930 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Mitchell, supra, pp. 12, 13 .
discussed Cited "see" Niles Bement Pond Co. v. United States
SCOTUS · 1930 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Mitchell, 271 U. S. 9, 12-13 . 1 *361 The findings do not disclose whether the foreign taxes paid in 1918 had accrued in that or in earlier years, or whether under the petitioner’s system of bookkeeping their deduction in some earlier year was necessary in order to .ascertain true income.
cited Cited "see" Reinecke v. Gardner
SCOTUS · 1928 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Mitchell, 271 U. S. 9 ; American National Co. v. United States, 274 U. S. 99 .
cited Cited "see" Continental Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner
B.T.A. · 1926 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Mitchell, 271 U. S. 9 ; Appeal of Consolidated Asphalt Co., 1 B.
cited Cited "see" Shaver v. Commissioner
B.T.A. · 1926 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. Mitchell, 271 U. S. 9 .
examined Cited "see, e.g." Bova v. U.S. Bank, N.A. (3×)
S.D. Ill. · 2006 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Mitchell, 271 U.S. 9, 14 , 46 S.Ct. 418 , 70 L.Ed. 799 (1926) ("It is not to be thought that a question not raised by counsel or discussed in the opinion of the court has been decided merely because it existed in the record and might have been raised and considered.”).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Deborah A. KERSHAW, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Donna E. SHALALA Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Defendant-Appellee (3×)
5th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Mitchell, 271 U.S. 9, 11-15 , 46 S.Ct. 418, 419-20 , 70 L.Ed. 799 (1926).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Kershaw v. Shalala
5th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also United States v. Mitchell, 46 S.Ct. 418, 419-20 (1926).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Laxalt v. McClatchy (3×)
unknown court · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 , 45 S.Ct. 148, 149 , 69 L.Ed. 411 (1925) (questions which lurk in the record, neither brought to the court’s attention nor ruled upon, cannot be considered as having been decided as to constitute precedent); see also United States v. Mitchell, 271 U.S. 9, 12 , 46 S.Ct. 418, 419 , 70 L.Ed. 799 (1926); Sethy v. Alameda County Water District, 545 F.2d 1157 , 1160 (9th Cir.1976); Mead v. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, 523 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th Cir.1975).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Southern Pacific Transportation Co. v. United States (3×)
E.D. Cal. · 1978 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Mitchell, 271 U.S. 9, 12 , 46 S.Ct. 418, 419 , 70 L.Ed. 799, 802 (1926); Mead v. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n, 523 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th Cir. 1975).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Jenkins v. Bitgood (3×)
2d Cir. · 1939 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, United States v. Mitchell, 271 U.S. 9 , 46 S.Ct. 418 , 70 L.Ed. 799 .
examined Cited "see, e.g." Mt. Vernon Trust Co. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (3×)
2d Cir. · 1935 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare United States v. Mitchell, 271 U. S. 9 , 46 S. Ct. 418 , 70 L.
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Kombst
SCOTUS · 1932 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare United States v. Mitchell, 271 U. S. 9 .
cited Cited "see, e.g." Norton v. Commissioner
B.T.A. · 1927 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. Mitchell, 271 U. S. 9 .
UNITED STATES
v.
MITCHELL Et Al., EXECUTORS
Solicitor; General Mitchell, with whom Messrs. A. W. Gregg, Solicitor of Internal Revenue, and T. H. Lewis, Jr., were on brief, for the United States., Mr. A. L. Humes, with whom Mr. Stafford Smith was on the brief, for appellees.
Butler.
Cited by 185 opinions  |  Published
2 passages pin-cited by 5 cases
Pinpoint authority: #20,722 of 633,719
Citer courts: Sixth Circuit (6) · Court of Appeals of Kansas (6) · Tenth Circuit (3) · Supreme Court of Georgia (3)
Mk. Justice Butler

delivered the opinion of the Court.

November. 28, 1918, Dellora R. Gates, a resident- of Texas, died testate; and, January 6, 1919, the County Court of Jefferson County granted letters testamentary to appellees. The federal estate tax accrued one year after her death; and, November 26, 1919, the executors made a return showing $2,927,762.64 due the United States under the Revenue Act- of 1916. [1] They did not pay any part of the tax in 1919, but paid $1,000,000, February 25, 1920, and the balance May 27, of that year. Under the Revenue Act of 1918, [2] the executors;' March 14, 1920, made an income tax return for the estate for 1919, showing a balance due of $905,225.73. If the estate tax had been[*11] deducted there would have been no taxable income for that year. In 1919, the executors paid an inheritance tax of $357,739.34,. which was imposed and became due in that year under the laws of Texas. [3] If that amount had been deducted, the income tax of the estate for that year would have been reduced by $261,149.72. When the return was made, the rulings and regulations of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue and the Secretary of the Treasury did not permit the deduction of the federal estate tax or the state inheritance tax; and for that reason the executors did not claim that either should be deducted, and paid the amount shown by the return. After the decision of this court in United States v. Woodward (1921), 256 U. S. 632, the executors filed a claim for refund which was denied. The Bureau of Internal Revenue offered to allow them to deduct the estate tax paid in 1920 from gross income, in calculating the income tax on the estate, for that year. The executors refused to do so and brought this action in which they seek to recover the full amount of the 1919 income tax paid. And, in the event that the estate tax shall be held not deductible, they seek to recover $261,149.72, the amount by which the income tax would have been lessened if the Texas inheritance tax paid in that year had been deducted. The Court of .Claims held the estate tax deductible, and gave judgment for the fjill amount.

It is established that, in calculating the income tax on an estate during administration under the Revenue Act of 1918, § 214(a)(3), federal estate taxes are deductible. United States v. Woodward, supra. But the question presented by this case is whether, in calculating the income tax for 1919, the executors were entitled to deduct from the gross income actually received in that year the estate[*12] tax which was not paid until 1920. The executors maintain that under § 214(a)(3) estate'taxes are deductible if paid or if accrued within the'taxable year; and that the estate tax, accruing in 1919 and paid in 1920, was deductible from gross income actually received in 1919. When regard is had to other provisions of the Act, it is clear that this contention is not admissible. Section 200 declares that “ paid ” means “ paid or accrued,” and that the phrase paid or accrued ” shall be construed according to the method of accounting upon the basis on which the net income is cbmputed under § 212. And § 212 provides that net income shall be computed on the basis of the taxpayer’s annual accounting period in accordance with the method of accounting regularly employed in keeping the books of the taxpayer (United States v. Anderson, 269 U. S. 422); but if no such method has been employed, or if the method employed does not reflect the income, the computation shall be made upon a basis and in a manner that, in the opinion of the Commissioner, does clearly reflect the income. The return shows that it was made on the basis of income actually received in 1919. This indicates that the accounts were kept on the basis of actual receipts and disbursements, and there is nothing in the record to show that any other method was employed. The burden is on the executors to establish the invalidity of the tax. United States v. Anderson, supra. They have not shown that their books were kept on the accrual basis. Assuming, as we must, that the accounts of the estaje were kept on the basis' of a'ctual receipts and disbursements, the executors were required ,to make return on that basis. Notwithstanding the option given taxpayers, it is the purpose of the Act to require returns that clearly reflect taxable income. That purpose will not be accomplished unless income received and deductible disbursements made are treated consistently. It was not the purpose of the Act to permit gross income actually[*13] received to be diminished by taxes or other deductible' items disbursed in a later year/ even if accrued in the taxable year. It is a reasonable construction of the law that the same method be applied to both sides of the account.

Appellees contend that United States v. Woodward, supra, governs this case. The provisions of the Revenue Act of 1916 and of the Revenue Act of 1918 which are here involved were considered in that case. The cases are much alike. "Woodward died December 15, 1917, and the estate tax became due one year later, but it was not paid until February 8, 1919. It may be assumed that the return for 1918 included only the income- actually received in that year. The rales, and regulations then in force did not permit the deduction of the estate tax. If. that deduction had been made there would havé been no taxable income. The executors paid the tax under duress, and brought suit for the amount paid. The Court of Claims held them entitled to recover, and this court affirmed the judgment. The question considered and decided was whether in ascertaining net taxable income the estate tax was deductible. The opinion referred to the provision which imposes the- tax upon incomes of estates and that part of § 214 which authorizes the deduction of “ taxes paid or accrued within the taxable year imposed (a) by the authority of the United States, except income, war-profits and excess-profits taxes,” and, in discussing the clause defining -the deductions permitted to be made, the court said (p. 634), “The words of..Its major-clause are comprehensive and include every tax which is charged against the estate by the authority of the-United States. The excepting clause specifically enumerates what is to be excepted. The implication from the latter is that the taxes which it enumerates would be within the major clause were they not expressly excepted, and also that there, was no purpose to except any others. Estate taxes[*14] were as well known at the time the provision was framed as' the ones particularly excepted. . . . Thus their omission from the excepting clause means, that Congress did not intend to except them. The Act of 1916 calls the estate tax a ‘ tax ’ and particularly denominates it an 1 estate tax.’ This court recently has recognized that it is a duty or excise and is imposed in the exertion of the taxing power of the United States. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, ante, 345.” The question decided concerned the character of the exaction; that is, whether the so-called federal estate taxes ” were “ taxes ” within the meaning of that word as used in the clause of § 214 quoted. The government did not contend that, if deductible at all, the estate taxes could not be deducted in that case because the return was. made on the basis of income actually received in 1918, whereas the estate tax, accruing in that year, was not paid until 1919. That question was not presented to the court for decision, and no such question was considered or .decided. It is not to be thought that a question not raised by counsel or discussed in the opinion of the court has been decided merely because iexisted in the record and might have been raised and considered. Webster v. Fall, 266 U. S. 507, 511. The Woodward Case does not support the contention that, where the estate income tax return is made on the basis of income actually received in the taxable year, there may be deducted the estate tax accruing in that year but paid in the following year. ,

It remains to. be considered whether, in calculating the tax oh the income of the estate, the inheritance tax im-' posed by the law of Texas and paid by appellees in 1919 is deductible from the gross income received in that year. That law provides that all property, which shall pass by will op by the Jaws of descent, shall upon passing to or for the use, of any ¿person (with certain exceptions) be subject to' a tax for the- benefit of the State. We are of[*15] opinion that, in respect of the matter under consideration, the Texas inheritance tax law cannot be distinguished from the New York transfer tax law; and that under Keith v. Johnson, decided this day, ante, p. 1, the executors are entitled to have the inheritance tax paid in 1919 deducted from the income of the estate received in that year.

Judgment reversed

1

Section. 201, Act of September 8, 1916, c: 463, Title II, 39 Stat. 756,. 777, as amended March 3, 1917, c. 159, Title III, 39 Stat. 1000, 1002, and October 3, 1917, c. 63, Title IX, 40 Stat. 300, 324.

2

Act of February 4, 1919, c. 18, Title II, §§ 210, 214, 219, 40 Stat. 1057, 1062, 1067, 1071.

3

Vernon’s Sayle's’ Texas Civil Statutes, 1914 ed., as amended by c. 166, Laws of 1917, Art. 7487-7502.