Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 368 U.S. 940 (1962). · Go Syfert
Search
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass'n v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 368 U.S. 940 (1962). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
127 citation events across 43 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Dennis Pappas (ca2, 1996-09-03) · Strongest negative: Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Loc. U. No. 638 of UA (nysd, 1971-03-24)
Treatment trajectory · 1962 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1962 1994 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers.
cited Cited "but see" Rios v. Enterprise Ass'n Steamfitters Loc. U. No. 638 of UA
S.D.N.Y. · 1971 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
But cf. Taylor v. Board of Education of City School District of New Rochelle, 191 F.Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), aff’d. 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 368 U.S. 940 , 82 S.Ct. 382 , 7 L.Ed. 339 (1961).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Dennis Pappas
2d Cir. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Taylor v. Board of Education, 288 F.2d 600 , 604 (2d Cir.) (“[N]ot every order containing words of restraint is a negative injunction within 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (a)(1).”) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 , 82 S.Ct. 382 , 7 L.Ed.2d 339 (1961).
discussed Cited "see" Norwalk Core v. Norwalk Board of Education, Etc.
2d Cir. · 1970 · signal: see · confidence high
See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 , 87 S.Ct. 1817 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1010 (1968). 36 We have already shown our awareness of the hardships and disadvantages of contrived neighborhood lines, see Taylor v. Board of Education of City School Dist. of City of New Rochelle, 294 F.2d 36 , 39 n. 2, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 , 82 S.Ct. 382 (1961); contrived bussing and cross-bussing may pose similar problems.
discussed Cited "see" Brewer v. School Board of Norfolk
4th Cir. · 1968 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord Brooks v. County School Bd. of Arlington County, 324 F.2d 303, 308 (4th Cir. 1963), Taylor v. Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of New Rochelle, 294 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir.), cert, denied, 368 U.S. 940 , 82 S.Ct. 382 , 7 L.Ed.2d 339 (1961).
cited Cited "see" Offermann v. Nitkowski
W.D.N.Y. · 1965 · signal: see · confidence high
See Taylor v. Board of Ed. of City School Dist. of City of New Rochelle, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 , 82 S.Ct. 382 , 7 L.Ed.2d 339 (1961). 4 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jenkins v. State of Missouri
8th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36 , 38-39 (2d Cir.1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 , 82 S.Ct. 382 , 7 L.Ed.2d 339 (1961) (school board at time of litigation held liable for the discriminatory acts of predecessor boards.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Jenkins v. Missouri
8th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Taylor v. Board of Educ., 294 F.2d 36 , 38-39 (2d Cir.1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 , 82 S.Ct. 382 , 7 L.Ed.2d 339 (1961) (school board at time of litigation held liable for the discriminatory acts of predecessor boards.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. School District (2×)
Pa. · 1978 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Taylor v. Board of Educ. of New Rochelle, 191 F.Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 , 82 S.Ct. 382 , 7 L.Ed.2d 339 (1961)." Id. 427 Pa. at 167 , 233 A.2d at 295 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Armstrong v. O'CONNELL
E.D. Wis. · 1976 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e. g., Taylor v. Board of Education of City School District of New Rochelle, 195 F.Supp. 231, 238 (S.D.N.Y.1961), aff’d. 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied 368 U.S. 940 , 82 S.Ct. 382 , 7 L.Ed.2d 339 (1961).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission v. Chester School District (4×)
Pa. · 1967 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Taylor v. *168 Board of Educ. of New Rochelle, 191 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 294 F. 2d 36 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 940 , 82 S. Ct. 382 (1961).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Offermann v. Nitkowski
2d Cir. · 1967 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Springfield School Committee v. Barksdale, supra. The line between proscribed de jure and permitted de facto segregation has been described by this court as whether “race was made the basis for school districting, with the purpose and effect of producing a substantially segregated school.” Taylor v. Board of Education, 294 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 368 U.S. 940 , 82 S.Ct. 382 , 7 L.Ed.2d 339 (1961).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Offermann v. Nitkowski
2d Cir. · 1967 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also, Springfield School Committee v. Barksdale, supra. The line between proscribed de jure and permitted de facto segregation has been described by this court as whether 'race was made the basis for school districting, with the purpose and effect of producing a substantially segregated school.' Taylor v. Board of Education, 294 F.2d 36, 39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied 368 U.S. 940 , 82 S.Ct. 382 , 7 L.Ed.2d 339 (1961). 5 That there may be no constitutional duty to act to undo de facto segregation, however, does not mean that such action is unconstitutional.
Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Assn.
v.
Federal Power Commission Et Al.
427.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jan 22, 1962.
368 U.S. 940
Bryce Rea, Jr. for petitioner. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, Morton Hollander, Ralph S. Spritzer and Howard E. Wahrenbrock for the Federal Power Commission, and Donald E. Van Koughnet for the Blue Ridge Gas Company, respondents.
Black, Douglas.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

See 368 U.S. 979, 82 S.Ct. 477.

Petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.

Lead Opinion

United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Black, with whom Mr. Justice Douglas concurs,

dissenting from denial of certiorari.

This case raises a very important question which I think we should grant certiorari to settle. That question is whether the Federal Power Commission has authority[*941] to refuse to summon a witness to testify to relevant facts in a hearing before it on the ground that the party summoning that witness refuses to compensate him as an expert witness over and above the amount authorized to be paid witnesses in courts under 28 U. S. C. § 1821.

The issue before the Federal Power Commission was the economic feasibility of a project of the Blue Ridge Gas Company to supply natural gas to Harrisonburg, Virginia. The witness desired was an engineer who had previously prepared a study of the project for Blue Ridge[1] and who had reported to it that the economic feasibility of the project was highly doubtful. The subpoena requested was for the engineer to appear and bring the papers and documents he had already prepared and used in his previous report. This would have been offered to rebut the evidence of Blue Ridge, favorable to the project, given by a second engineer who had been hired by Blue Ridge after the first engineer had given his unfavorable report. Since this evidence was heavily relied on by the Commission in finding that the project was feasible, there can be no doubt that the witness desired, the first engineer, could have given evidence highly relevant to a proper decision of the question before the Commission. Nevertheless, and in spite of the fact that § 6 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 1005 (c), provides that agency subpoenas “shall be issued to any party upon request . . . upon a statement or showing of general relevance and reasonable scope of the evidence sought,” the Commission refused to summon the witness on the ground that petitioner “should arrange for compensation to be paid to him as an expert witness, and for his voluntary attendance at the hearing.” 21 F. P. C. 901, 902. This petition seeks certiorari to review the decision of the[*942] Court of Appeals, 110 U. S. App. D. C. 339, 293 F. 2d 627, upholding the Commission.

Since petitioner was willing to pay the fees prescribed for witnesses by Congress in 28 U. S. C. § 1821, the issue presented here seems to be substantially the same as that in Henkel v. Chicago, St. P., M. & O. R. Co., 284 U. S. 444. There the plaintiff, Henkel, who had recovered a judgment against the railroad under the FELA, asked the court for an order allowing fees above the amounts provided in 28 U. S. C. § 1821 for ordinary witnesses in order to give extra compensation to expert witnesses who had testified in his behalf. This Court, in an opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Hughes, unanimously held that the only fees to expert witnesses allowable as costs in the federal courts were those provided for in § 1821. Since that time this Court has never modified or criticized in any way its statement that:

“The Congress has dealt with the subject comprehensively and has made no exception of the fees of expert witnesses. Its legislation must be deemed controlling and excludes the application in the federal courts of any different state practice.” Id., at 447.[2]

Even so the Government seeks to justify enforced payment of extra fees by petitioner on two grounds: (1) that the Federal Power Commission acted within a discretion allowed it, and (2) that the error of the Commission, if any, in refusing to subpoena the witness was harmless. But administrative agencies, no more than courts, have inherent powers of discretion to nullify the mandatory provisions of 28 U. S. C. § 1821, and the Commission has pointed to no statute which gives it power to compel the payment of greater fees to expert witnesses than are paid[*943] to witnesses who testify in the courts. As for the Commission’s argument that the error was harmless, I can find nothing in this record to justify such a contention. The witness the Commission refused to summon had a broad knowledge of the economic feasibility of the gas project under consideration — his unfavorable report apparently being chiefly responsible for the dropping of the project once before. To sustain the Commission’s contention of harmless error in this case would be to assume that no evidence could possibly have been introduced that would have changed the Commission’s mind or altered the result on judicial review of the Commission’s order by the Court of Appeals. I am not willing to make any such assumption, nor am I willing to leave unchallenged the decision in this case which suggests that administrative agencies have a broad discretion in matters involving large public interests such as here to force parties before administrative agencies to pay burdensome expert witness fees in order to present admittedly relevant evidence to them. It is for that reason that I am expressing my objection to the denial of certiorari in this case.

Bryce Rea, Jr. for petitioner. Solicitor General Cox, Assistant Attorney General Orrick, Morton Hollander, Ralph S. Spritzer and Howard E. Wahrenbrock for the Federal Power Commission, and Donald E. Van Koughnet for the Blue Ridge Gas Company, respondents.
1

At that time Blue Ridge was known as Consumers Utility Company.

2

See In re Hayes, 200 N. C. 133, 156 S. E. 791, for a general discussion of compelled testimony of expert witnesses.