Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963). · Go Syfert
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Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
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cited 3× by 1 distinct case · …it is not the label affixed to the cause of action under state law that controls the determination of the relationship between state and federal jurisdiction.
587 citation events (33 in the last 25 years) across 74 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Brands v. First Transit, Inc. (ca9, 2008-05-08) · Strongest negative: Robert A. Maheu, and v. Hughes Tool Company, a Corporation, Now Known as Summa Corporation, Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant And (ca9, 1978-01-12)
Treatment trajectory · 1963 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1963 1994 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed Cited "but see" Robert A. Maheu, and v. Hughes Tool Company, a Corporation, Now Known as Summa Corporation, Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant And (2×)
9th Cir. · 1978 · signal: but cf. · confidence high
But cf. Iacurci v. Lummus Co., 387 U.S. 86, 88 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 , 18 L.Ed.2d 581 (1967). 171 The test to determine the propriety of judgment n. o. v. is the same for district and appellate judges.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Brands v. First Transit, Inc. (3×)
9th Cir. · 2008 · signal: see · quote attribution · 3 verbatim quotes · confidence high
it is not the label affixed to the cause of action under state law that controls the determination of the relationship between state and federal jurisdiction.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rodríguez Vázquez y otros v. Hospital Español Auxilio Mutuo
prsupreme · 2025 · confidence medium
Véase, además, Plumbers' Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 693-694 (1963); San Diego Unions v. Garmon, supra, págs. 244-245; Lognshoremen's v. Davis, supra, pág. 394.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Cesar Moreno v. Utiliquest, LLC (3×) also: Cited "see"
9th Cir. · 2022 · confidence medium
In connection with Garmon preemption, “[i]t is not the label affixed to the cause of action under state law that controls the determination of the relationship between state and federal jurisdiction.” United Ass’n of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 698 (1963).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Darrell Kroeger v. Vertex Aerospace LLC
C.D. Cal. · 2020 · confidence medium
United Assoc. of Journeymen & Apprentices, v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 698 (1963).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Anthony Henry v. Laborers Local 1191 (2×)
Mich. · 2014 · confidence medium
Borden, 373 US at 693 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers International Ass'n Local Union No. 6 (2×)
SCOTUS · 1989 · confidence medium
Respondent calls to our attention language in some of our decisions recognizing that "[t]he problems inherent in the operation of union hiring halls are difficult and complex, and point up the importance of limiting initial competence to adjudicate such matters to a single expert federal agency." Journeymen and Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U. S. 690, 695 (1963) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Garman
Iowa · 1985 · confidence medium
The problems inherent in the operation of union hiring halls are difficult and complex, see Rothman, The Development and Current Status of the Law Pertaining, to Hiring Hall Arrangements, 48 Va.L.Rev. 871, and point up the importance of limiting initial competence to adjudicate such matters to a single expert federal agency. 373 U.S. at 694-696 , 83 S.Ct. at 1426 , 10 L.Ed.2d at 641-42 (emphasis in original).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Robillard v. Local 10 Sheet Metal Workers' International Ass'n (5×) also: Cited "see"
Minn. Ct. App. · 1984 · confidence medium
Id. at 697 , 83 S.Ct. at 1427 (emphasis added) (citation deleted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ben Carter v. Sheet Metal Workers' International Association and Local 85 Sheet Metal Workers' International Association
11th Cir. · 1984 · confidence medium
Under these circumstances, the Court concluded that “the conduct on which the suit is centered ... is conduct whose lawfulness could initially be judged only by the federal agency vested with exclusive primary jurisdiction to apply federal standards.” Id. at 698 , 83 S.Ct. at 1428 (emphasis original).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bebensee v. Ross Pierce Electric, Inc.
Mich. · 1977 · confidence medium
In fact, the Supreme Court in Borden explicitly refused to consider the possible effect of the fair representation doctrine on the pre-emption question. 373 US 690, 696, fn 7 .
examined Cited as authority (rule) Writers' Guild of America West, Inc. v. Superior Court (3×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1975 · confidence medium
(Plumbers' Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 694 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 638, 641-642 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 ].) Thus there is federal preemption where “it is reasonably ‘arguable’ that the matter comes within the [National Labor Relations] Board's jurisdiction.” (Plumbers' Union v. Borden, supra, 373 U.S. 690, 696 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 638, 642-643 ]; Hill v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters etc. of America, Local 25, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d 614, 623 .) Where union action and resulting inability of a union member to obtain employment are in some way “based on [the employee’s] actual or believed failure to comply …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Breitegger v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1974 · confidence medium
(Plumbers’ Union v. Borden (1963) 373 U.S. 690, 694-695 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 638, 641-642 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 ]; Iron Workers v. Perko (1963) 373 U.S. 701, 706-707 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 646 , 649- *288 650, 83 S.Ct. 1429 ]; N.L.R.B. v. A & B Zinman, Inc. (2d Cir. 1967) 372 F.2d 444 , 445; Flack v. N.L.R.B. (7th Cir. 1963) 327 F.2d 396, 399 .) Appellant does not deny that the activities complained of are also unfair labor practices under the act. 2 However, the Garmon rule does not apply to a suit for breach of the collective bargaining agreement under section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act ( 29 U.S…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Magallanes v. Local 300, Laborers' International Union (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Cal. Ct. App. · 1974 · confidence medium
(Plumbers’ Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 697 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 638, 643 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 ].) In the first category of cases, unfair discrimination in employment is deemed merely incidental so that the National Labor Relations Act is not sufficiently involved to preempt state court jurisdiction.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach Employees of America v. Lockridge (2×)
SCOTUS · 1971 · confidence medium
But when the union member has a dispute with his union, he has no power on which to rely." Plumbers' Union v. Borden, 373 U. S. 690, 700 (dissenting).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Stites v. Local 367 (3×) also: Cited "see"
Alaska · 1967 · confidence medium
Local 100 of United Ass’n of Journeymen, etc. v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 697 , 83 S.Ct. 1423, 1427 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638, 643 (1963). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chasis v. Progress Manufacturing Co.
E.D. Pa. · 1966 · confidence medium
“Nor do we regard it as significant that Borden’s complaint against the union sounded in contract as well as in tort. * * * In the present case the conduct on which the suit is centered, whether described in terms of tort or contract, is conduct whose lawfulness could initially be judged only by the federal agency vested with exclusive primary jurisdiction to apply federal standards.” (Plumbers’ Union- Local 100 of the United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 698 , 83 S.Ct. 1423, 1427 (1963). .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers of America, Local 114 (2×)
SCOTUS · 1966 · confidence medium
In short, as we said in Plumbers’ Union v. Borden, 373 U. S. 690, 693-694 (1963): “[I]n the absence of an overriding state interest such as that involved in the maintenance of domestic peace, state courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board in cases in which the activity that is the subject matter of the litigation is arguably subject to the protections of § 7 or the prohibitions of § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Blum v. International Ass'n of Machinists
unknown court · 1964 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court found that since it was reasonably arguable that the matter came within the Board’s jurisdiction, the state court was precluded. 373 U. S., at pp. 693-696, 83 S. Ct. 1423, 10 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Blum v. INTERNATIONAL ASS'N OF MACHINISTS, AFL-CIO.
N.J. · 1964 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court found that since it was reasonably arguable that the matter came within the Board's jurisdiction, the state court was precluded. 373 U.S., at pp. 693-696, 83 S.Ct. 1423, 10 L.Ed. 2 d, at pp. 642-643.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Genesco, Inc. v. JOINT COUNCIL 13, UNITED SHOE WKRS. OF AMER.
S.D.N.Y. · 1964 · confidence medium
Actions under Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 185 ) are not preempted, Smith v. Evening News Association, 371 U.S. 195, 197-198 , 83 S.Ct. 267 , 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962), nor are actions under Section 303 of the Act ( 29 U.S.C. § 187 ) [See, Local 100 of United Ass’n of Journeymen and Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, at 693 , 83 S.Ct. 1423, at 1425 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638, note 3 (1963) ] where a legal remedy is provided concurrently with the administrative remedy, both available for the identical occurrence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) City Line Open Hearth, Inc. v. Hotel, Motel & Club Employees' Union (2×)
Pa. · 1964 · confidence medium
In order to vest the National Labor Relations Board with exclusive jurisdiction and divest State Courts of Equity jurisdiction which they have possessed for a very long period of time, it is necessary, in this class of case, for the parties who claim that the N.L.R.B. has exclusive jurisdiction to prove, inter alia, (1) that the employer was engaged in interstate commerce or that its activities substantially * affect interstate commerce and (2) that the challenged activities were expressly or arguably within the jurisdiction of the N.L.R.B.: Local 100, United Association of Journeymen & Appren…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stout v. Construction & General Laborers District Council of Chicago & Vicinity
N.D. Ill. · 1963 · confidence medium
“So far as favored job referral is concerned, it seems clear from the terms of the National Labor Relations Act, as well as the reported cases construing it, that plaintiffs’ allegations that some employees are being favored and others disfavored in the referral of jobs for extra waiters involve a charge for exclusive N.L.R.B. jurisdiction, either certainly, or, at least (which is sufficient), ‘arguably.’ The recent case of Local 100, United Ass’n. of Journeymen and Apprentices v. Borden (1963), 373 U.S. 690 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638 , was just such a case, the court holding (…
examined Cited "see" Anzevino v. DePasquale (3×)
Ohio Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Plumbers v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 697 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 , 10 L.E.2d 638 (1963). {¶18} The defendants also note that at the time the file was copied and mailed, appellant was not happy with the handling of a claim he wished to pursue against a prior employer for his termination, and he had filed charges against them for their handling of various labor issues.
discussed Cited "see" Fowlkes v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local No. 76 (2×)
Wash. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Local 100 of United Ass'n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 , 10 L.
examined Cited "see" Lynn L. Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assoc., Local Union No. 6 (3×)
6th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Local 100, Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 695-696 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638 (1963); Int'l Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 239 , 91 S.Ct. 609 , 28 L.Ed.2d 10 (1971); Turner v. Local Lodge No. 455, 755 F.2d 866 (11th Cir.1985). 3 It is of no consequence that the union's allegedly discriminatory referral policies are described as a breach of the NLRA's duty of fair representation or as a violation of the LMRDA's bill of rights.
examined Cited "see" Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assoc., Local Union No. 6 (3×)
6th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Local 100, Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 695-696 , 83 S.Ct. 1423, 1426-1427 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638 (1963); Int'l Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 239 , 91 S.Ct. 609, 613 , 28 L.Ed.2d 10 (1971); Turner v. Local Lodge # 455, 755 F.2d 866 (11th Cir.1985).
examined Cited "see" Ray Lewis v. Local Union No. 100 of the Laborers' International Union of North America, Afl- CIO (4×)
7th Cir. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Plumbers' Union v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 694 , 83 S.Ct. 1423, 1425 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638 (1963); NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir.1963).
discussed Cited "see" International Union v. Facet Enterprises, Inc. (2×)
E.D. Mich. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Local 100 v. Borden, 378 U.S. 690 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638 (1963); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 , 57 S.Ct. 615 , 81 L.Ed. 893 (1937); Lexington Cartage Co. v. Teamsters, 713 F.2d 194 , 195 (6th Cir.1983); Mayer v. Ordman, 391 F.2d 889 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 925 , 89 S.Ct. 257 , 21 L.Ed.2d 261 (1968).
discussed Cited "see" Farmer v. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 25
SCOTUS · 1977 · signal: see · confidence high
See Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195 (1962), Section 14 (c)(2) of the NLRA, as added by Title VII, § 701 (a) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 73 Stat. 541 , 29 U. S. C. § 164 (c)(2), permits state agencies and state courts to assert jurisdiction over “labor disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction." 9 In Plumbers v. Borden, 373 U. S. 690 (1963), for example, an employee sued Ms union, which operated a hiring hall, claiming that the union had arbitrarily refused to refer him for employ…
discussed Cited "see" International Brotherhood of Boilermakers, Iron Shipbuilders, Blacksmiths, Forgers & Helpers v. Hardeman (2×)
SCOTUS · 1971 · signal: see · confidence high
The union argues that the gravamen of Harde-man’s complaint — which did not seek reinstatement, but only damages for wrongful expulsion, consisting of loss of income, loss of pension and insurance rights, mental anguish and punitive damages — is discrimination against him in job referrals; that any such conduct on the part of the union is at the very least arguably an unfair labor practice under §§8 (b)(1)(A) and 8 (b)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 141 , as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 158 (b)(1)(A), 158 (b)(2); and that in such circumstances, “the federal courts must…
examined Cited "see" Local Union No. 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers of America, Afl-Cio v. National Labor Relations Board (3×)
5th Cir. · 1966 · signal: see · confidence high
E. g., International Ladies Garment Workers Union A.F.L.C.I.O. v. NLRB, 1961, 366 U.S. 731 , 81 S.Ct. 1603 , 6 L.Ed.2d 762 ; Communications Workers, etc. v. NLRB, 1960, 362 U.S. 479 , 80 S.Ct. 838 , 4 *21 L.Ed.2d 896; Radio Officers, etc. v. NLRB, 1954, 347 U.S. 17 , 74 S.Ct. 323 , 98 L.Ed. 455 ; NLRB v. United Packinghouse Workers, 5th Cir. 1957, 274 F.2d 816 ; NLRB v. International Woodworkers of America, 5th Cir. 1957, 243 F.2d 745 ; see Local 100 of the United Ass’n of Journeymen, etc. v. Borden, 1963, 373 U. S. 690 , 83 S.Ct 1423 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638 . 15 .
discussed Cited "see" Meyer v. Joint Council 53, International Brotherhood of Teamsters (2×)
Pa. · 1965 · signal: see · confidence high
See Iron Workers Union v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963) and Local 100, United Association of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963).
examined Cited "see" Casida v. International Union of Operating Engineers (3×)
Tex. · 1964 · signal: see · confidence high
See Local 100, United Association of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638 (1963); San Diego Building Trades Council, etc. v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 , 79 S.Ct. 773 , 3 L.Ed.2d 775 ; Local No. 207, Intern.
discussed Cited "see" Cross Co. v. UAW Local No. 155 (2×)
Mich. · 1963 · signal: see · confidence high
See Local 100 of the United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices [Plumbers] v. Borden (June 3, 1963), 373 US 690, 693, 694 ( 83 S Ct 1423, 1425 , 10 L ed 2d 638, 641). 10 CLS 1956, § 423.9f (Stat Ann 1960 Rev § 17.454[10.5]), provides : “It shall be unlawful (.1) for any person or persons to hinder or prevent by mass picketing, unlawful threats or force the pursuit of any lawful work or employment, (2) to obstruct or interfere with entrance to or egress from any place o^-employment, (3) to obstruct or interfere with free and uninterrupted- use of publie roads, streets, highways, railway…
examined Cited "see" Lester Morton v. Local 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, And Helpers Union (3×)
6th Cir. · 1963 · signal: see · confidence high
See Local 100 of the United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Borden, 1963, 373 U.S. 690 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 , 10 L.
examined Cited "see" Morton v. Local 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs, & Helpers Union (3×)
6th Cir. · 1963 · signal: see · confidence high
See Local 100 of the United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Borden, 1963, 373 U.S. 690 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638 , footnote 3, of which reads as follows: “49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157 , 158.
examined Cited "see" Kipbea Baking Co. v. Strauss (3×)
E.D.N.Y · 1963 · signal: see · confidence high
See Local 100 of United Ass’n of Journeymen and Apprentices v. Borden, 1963, 373 U.S. 690 , 83 S.Ct. 1423, 1425 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638, n. 3 . 2 .
examined Cited "see, e.g." Dunton v. United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of the Plumbing & Pipefitting Industry of the United States & Canada, Local 403 (3×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
Alleged discrimination in job referral by a union is within the primary jurisdiction of the NLRB. ( 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b); see, e.g., Plumbers’ Union v. Borden (1963) 373 U.S. 690, 694-696 [ 10 L.Ed.2d 638, 641-643 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 ]; Carter v. Sheet Metal Wkrs.’ Intern.
examined Cited "see, e.g." Cerniglia v. Pretty (3×)
D. Maryland · 1987 · signal: see also · confidence low
Although there is no Maryland case directly on point, it is well established that “one principal is not civilly liable to another for the tortious acts of an agent who acts for both parties with their consent, unless he in some manner participates in the wrong.” 3 Am.Jur. 2d, Agency, Section 280, at 783; see also Hodges v. Mayes, 240 Ga. 643 , 242 S.E.2d 160, 162 (1978), United Association of Journeymen v. Borden, 160 Tex. 203 , 328 S.W.2d 739 , 744 (1959), rev’d on other grounds, 373 U.S. 690 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638 (1963), Annot., 4 A.L.R.3d 224 , 229 (1965).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Davis (2×)
SCOTUS · 1986 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e. g., Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U. S. 690, 698 (1963); Iron Workers v. Perko, 373 U. S. 701, 708 (1963); Liner v. Jafco, Inc., 375 U. S. 301, 309-310 (1964); Linn v. Plant Guard Workers, 383 U. S. 53, 60 (1966); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U. S. 171, 179 (1967); Motor Coach Em ployees v. Lockridge, 403 U. S. 274, 285-291 (1971); Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U. S. 290, 296-297, 305 (1977); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U. S. 180, 188-190 (1978); Operating Engineers v. Jones, 460 U. S. 669, 676 (1983); Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, supra, at 510-511 ; Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U. S. 491, 502-50…
examined Cited "see, e.g." Matt Gray v. Local 714, International Union of Operating Engineers (3×)
5th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see also · confidence low
E.g., Belknap, 463 U.S. at 498 , 103 S.Ct. at 3177 , 77 L.Ed.2d at 806 ; see also Local 100 of the United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638 (1963); Ex Parte Dilley, 160 Tex. 522, 530-32 , 334 S.W.2d 425, 431-32 (1960).
examined Cited "see, e.g." National Labor Relations Board v. South Central Bell Telephone Company (3×)
5th Cir. · 1982 · signal: see also · confidence low
Section 8(a)(3) of the Act prohibits employers from discriminating against employees with respect to “any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.” It is well established that “‘membership’ as used in section 8(a)(3) refers not only to the employee’s basic decision whether to join or remain in a union, but also to his decision as to the level of his participation in the union and union activities.” Teamsters, Local 20 v. NLRB, 610 F.2d 991 , 993 (D.C.Cir. 1979), citing Radio Officers Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 39-42 , 74 S.…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Koenig v. Clark (2×)
D.N.J. · 1982 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233 , 91 S.Ct. 609 , 28 L.Ed.2d 10 (1970) (Action under section 101(a)(5) of the LMRDA not within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB) with Local 100 v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 , 89 S.Ct. 1423 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638 (1963) (Diversity action in federal court complaining of discriminatory work referrals within exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Builders Ass'n v. Commercial Piping Co.
Ohio · 1982 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Local 100, United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Borden (1963), 373 U. S. 690 .
examined Cited "see, e.g." Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Gorman (3×)
N.D. Iowa · 1979 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Local 100, United Assoc. of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 698 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638 (1963).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Statler v. International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 71
Ohio · 1977 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare International Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales (1958), 356 U. S. 617 (potential conflict with NLRB too remote when state court awards reinstatement of union membership, damages for mental and physical suffering resulting from expulsion—which NLRB could not do—and damages for loss of wages resulting from expulsion), with Plumbers Union v. Borden (1963), 373 U. S. 690 , and Iron Workers v. Perko (1963), 373 U. S. 701 (in both cases, the gist of the action was interference with existing or prospective employment relations rather than internal union matters and there was absent a specif…
examined Cited "see, e.g." Tyree v. Edwards (3×)
D. Alaska · 1968 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Vaca v. Sipes, note 16 supra, with Local 100 of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690, 694 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638 (1963). .
examined Cited "see, e.g." Painter's Local Union No. 567 of the Brotherhood of Painters, Decorators & Paperhangers v. Tom Joyce Floors, Inc. (3×)
Nev. · 1965 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Local 100, United Ass’n of Journeymen v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638 .
examined Cited "see, e.g." William C. Linn v. United Plant Guard Workers Of America, Local 114 (3×)
6th Cir. · 1964 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Dunn v. Retail Clerks Internat'l Ass'n, 307 F.2d 285 (CA6, 1962). 14 Our conclusion that Garmon has foreclosed plaintiff's entry into the courts is supported by the later decisions in Local 100, United Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 , 83 S.Ct. 1423 , 10 L.Ed.2d 638 (1963) and Local No. 207, Internat'l Ass'n of Bridge, etc. Workers v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 , 83 S.Ct. 1429 , 10 L.Ed.2d 646 (1963) wherein, in obedience to Garmon, state courts were denied jurisdiction to entertain actions by workmen for intentional and tortious interference by a union with their me…
Local 100, United Association of Journeymen & Apprentices,
v.
Borden
541.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jun 3, 1963.
373 U.S. 690
L. N. D. Wells, Jr. argued the cause for petitioner. 'With him on the briefs was Charles J. Morris., Robert Weldon Smith argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Ewell Lee Smith, Jr., J. Albert Woll, Robert C. Mayer, Theodore J. St. Antoine and Thomas E. JIarris filed a brief for the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations, as amicus curiae, urging reversal.
Harlan, Douglas, Goldberg, Clark.
Cited by 198 opinions  |  Published
1 passages pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 69%
Citer courts: Ninth Circuit (3)

Lead Opinion

[*691] Mr. Justice Harlan

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case presents one facet of the recurrent problem of defining the permissible scope of state jurisdiction in ; the field of labor relations. The particular question before us involves consideration and application, in this suit by a union member against a local union, of the principles declared in International Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617, and San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236.

H-i

The respondent, H. N: Borden, who was then a member of the Shreveport, Louisiana, local of the plumbers union, arrived in Dallas, Texas, in September 1953, looking for a job with the Farwell Construction Company on a particular bank construction project. Farwell’s hiring on this project was done through union referral, although there was no written agreement to this effect. Borden was unable to obtain such a referral from the business agent of the Dallas local of the plumbers union, even after the agent had accepted Borden’s clearance card from the Shreveport local and after the Farwell foreman on the construction project had called the business agent and asked to have Borden sent over. According to Borden’s testimony, the business agent told him:

“You are not going, to work down there on the bank job or for Farwell, you have come in here wrong, you have come in here with a job in your pocket.”

And according to the Farwell foreman, the business agent answered his request by saying: .

“I am not about to send that old-down there, he shoved his card down our throat and I am not about to send him to the bank.”

[*692] Borden never did get the job with Farwell, although he was referred to and accepted several other jobs during the period before the bank construction project was completed.

Subsequently, he brought the present suit against the Dallas local, petitioner here, and the parent International,[1] seeking damages under state law for the refusal to refér him to Farwell. He alleged that the actions of the defendants constituted a willful, malicious, and discriminatory interference with his right to. contract and to pursue a lawful occupation; that the defendants had breached a promise, implicit in the membership arrangement, not to discriminate unfairly or to deny any member the right to work; and that the defendants had violated certain state statutory provisions.[2]

Petitioner challenged the state court’s jurisdiction, asserting that the subject matter of the suit was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. The trial court upheld the challenge and dismissed the suit, but on appeal the Texas Court of Civil Appeals, relying on this Court’s decision in International Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales, supra, reversed and remanded for trial. 316 S. W. 2d 458. The Texas Supreme Court granted a writ of error on another point, in the case and affirmed the remand. 160 Tex. 203, 328 S. W. 2d 739.

At trial, the case was submitted to the jury on special issues and the jury’s answers included findings that Borden had been promised a job by a Farwell representa[*693] tive; that the Farwell foreman asked the union business agent to refer Borden; that the business agent “wilfully” refused to let Borden work on the bank project, knowing that Borden was entitled to work on that project under union rules; and that the conduct of the business agent was approved by the officers and members of petitioner. Actual loss of earnings resulting from the refusal to refer Borden to the Farwell job was found to be $1,916; compensation for mental suffering, $1,500; and punitive damages, $5,000. The trial court disallowed recovery for mental anguish and ordered a remittitur of the punitive damages in excess of the amount of actual dámages, thus awarding total damages of $3,832. The Court of Civil Appeals affirmed, 355 S. W. 2d 729, again rejecting petitioner’s preemption argument. Following denial of a writ of error by the Supreme Court of Texas, we granted certiorari, 371 U. S. 939, to consider the question whether federal labor law precludes the exercise of state jurisdiction over this dispute.

II.

This Court held in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, that in the absence of an overriding state interest such as that involved in the maintenance of domestic peace, state courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board in cases in which the activity that is the subject matter of the litigation is arguably subject to the protections of § 7 or the prohibitions of § 8 of the National Labor Relations Act.[3] This relinquishment of state jurisdic[*694] tion, the Court stated, is essential “if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted,” 359 U. S., at 245, and is as necessary in a suit for damages as in a suit seeking equitable relief. Thus the first inquiry, in any case in which a claim of federal preemption is raised, must be whether the conduct called into question may reasonably be asserted to be subject to Labor Board cognizance.

In the present case, respondent contends that no such assertion can be made, but we disagree.[4] The facts as alleged in the complaint, and as found-by the jury, are that the Dallas union business agent, with the ultimate approval of the local union itself, refused to refer the respondent to a particular job for which he had been sought, and that this refusal resulted in an inability to obtain the employment. Notwithstanding the state court’s contrary view, if it is assumed that the refusal and the resulting inability to obtain employment were in some way based on respondent’s actual or believed failure to comply with internal union rules, it is certainly “arguable” that the union’s conduct violated § 8 (b) (1) (A), by restraining or coercing Borden in the exercise of his protected right to refrain from observing those rules, and § 8 (b)(2), by causing an employer to discriminate against Borden in violation of §8 (a)(3).[5] See, e. g., [*695] Radio Officers v. Labor Board, 347 U. S. 17; Local 568, Hotel Employees, 141 N. L. R. B. No. 29; International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 524. A-B, 141 N. L. R. B. No. 57. As established in the Radio Officers case, the “membership” referred to in §8 (a) (3) and thus incorporated in § 8 (b) (2) is broad enough to embrace participation in union activities and maintenance of good standing as well as mere adhesion to a labor organization. 347 U. S., at 39-42. And there is a substantial possibility in this case that Borden’s failure to live up to the internal rule prohibiting the solicitation of work from any contractor [6] was precisely the reason why clearance was denied. Indeed this may well have been the meaning of the business agent’s remark, testified to by Bordep himself, that “you have come in here wrong, you have come in here with a job in your pocket.”

It may also be reasonably contended that after inquiry into the facts, the Board might have found that the union conduct in question was not an unfair labor practice but rather was protected concerted activity within the meaning of § 7. This Court has held that hiring-hall practices do not necessarily, violate the provisions of federal law, Teamsters Local v. Labor Board, 365 U. S. 667, and the Board’s appraisal of the conflicting testimony might have led it to conclude that the refusal to refer was due only to the respondent’s efforts to circumvent a lawful hiring-hall arrangement rather than to his engaging in protected activities. The problems inherent in the operation of union hiring halls are difficult and complex, see Rothman, The Development and Current Status of the Law Pertaining to Hiring Hall Arrangements, 48 Va. L. Rev. 871, and point up the importance of limiting initial competence[*696] to adjudicate such matters tó a single expert federal agency.

We need not and should not now consider whether the petitioner’s activity in this case was federally protected or prohibited, on any of the theories suggested above or .on some different basis.[7] It is sufficient for present purposes to find, as we do, that it is reasonably “arguable” that the matter comes within the Board’s jurisdiction.

I — I HH

Respondent urges that even if the union’s interference with his employment is a matter that the Board could have dealt with, the state courts are still not deprived of jurisdiction in this case under the principles declared in International Assn. of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617. Gonzales was a suit against a labor union by an individual who claimed that he had been expelled in violation of his contractual rights and who was seeking restoration of membership. He also sought consequential damages flowing from the expulsion, including loss of wages resulting from loss of employment and compensation for physical and mental suffering. It was recognized in that case that restoration of union membership was a remedy that the Board could not afford and indeed that the internal affairs of unions were not in themselves a matter within[*697] the Board’s competence.[8] The Court then went on to hold that, in the presence of admitted state jurisdiction to order restoration of membership, the State was not without power “to fill out this remedy” by an award of consequential damages, even though these damages might be for conduct that constituted an unfair labor practice under federal law. The Taft-Hartley Act, the Court stated, did not require mutilation of “the comprehensive relief of equity.” 356 U. S., at 621.

The Gonzales decision, it is evident, turned on the Court’s conclusion that the lawsuit was focused on purely internal union matters, i. e., on relations between the individual plaintiff and the union not having to do directly with matters of employment, and that the principal relief sought was restoration of union membership rights. In this posture, collateral relief in the form of consequential damages for loss of employment was not to be denied.

We need not now determine the extent to which the holding in Garmon, supra, qualified the principles declared in Gonzales with respect to jurisdiction to award consequential damages, for it is clear in any event that the present case does not come within the Gonzales rationale. The suit involved here was focused principally, if not entirely, on the union’s actions with respect to Borden’s efforts to obtain employment. No specific equitable relief was sought directed to Borden’s status in the union, and thus there was no state remedy to “fill out” by permitting the awaid of consequential damages. The “crux” of the action (Gonzales, 356 U. S., at 618) concerned Borden’s employment relations and involved conduct arguably subject to the Board’s jurisdiction.

[*698] Nor do we regard it as significant that Borden’s complaint against the union sounded in contract as weir as in tort. It is not the label affixed to the cause of action under state law that controls the determination of the relationship between state and federal jurisdiction. Rather, as stated in Garmon, supra, at 246,

“[o]ur concern is with delimiting areas of conduct which must be free from state regulation if national policy is to be left unhampered.” (Emphasis added.)

In the present case the conduct on which the suit is centered, whether described in terms of tort or contract, is conduct whose lawfulness could initially be judged only by the federal agency vested with exclusive primary jurisdiction to apply federal standards.

Accordingly, we conclude that the judgment of the court below must be Reversed.

Mr. Justice Goldberg took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
1

The trial court granted a directed verdict in favor of the parent International, and the parent organization is therefore no longer in the case.

2

Tex. Civ. Stat. Ann., 1962, Art. 5207a — “Right to bargain freely . . .” — vas cited by Borden in his complaint. This statute, however, was not relied upon by the courts below as supporting recovery, and its effect need not be considered here.

3

49 Stat. 452, as amended, 29 U. S. C. §§ 157, 158. We do not deal here with suits brought in state courts under § 301 or § 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 156, 158, 29 U. S. C. §§ 185, 187, which are governed by federal law and to which different principles are applicable. See, e. g., Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U. S. 195.

4

Respondent does not challenge the existence of the requisite effect on commerce to bring the matter within the scope of the Board’s jurisdiction.

5

Section 8 (a) of the Act provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer “(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization

Section 8 (b) of the Act provides that it shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents “(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 7 ... ,” or “ (2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) ... .”

6

Section 30 of Article I of the bylaws of petitioner provides in pertinent part that “Members shall not solicit work from any contractor or their representative. All employment must be procured through Business Office of Local Union No. 100.”

7

As one possible additional basis on which the conduct in question might have been held to be prohibited, for example, petitioner refers us to the Board’s recent decision in Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N. L. R. B. No. 7, in which the majority held that a statutory bargaining representative violates § 8 (b) (2) “when, for arbitrary or irrelevant reasons or upon the basis of an unfair classification, the union attempts to cause or does cause an employer to derogate the employment status of an employee.” Again, we need not and do not pass upon the-correctness of that decision or its applicability in the circumstances of this case.

8

Section 8 (b)(1)(A), it should be noted, contains a proviso to the effect that “this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein.”

Dissent

Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Clark concurs,

dissenting.

While I dissented in International Association v. Gonzales, 356 U. S. 617, I fail to see how that case can fairly be distinguished from this one. Both Gonzales and San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U. S. 236, were written by the same author, who had no difficulty in reconciling them. And they were decided before Congress reentered the labor- relations field with the Landrum-Griffin Act of 1959. 73 Stat. 519. Yet, the Court points to no indication that Congress thought Gonzales had incorrectly interpreted the balance it had struck between state and federal jurisdiction over these matters.

The distinction the Court draws between this case and Gonzales — that in Gonzales the lawsuit focused on purely[*699] internal union matters — is not one that a court can intelligently apply in the myriad of cases in the field. This lawsuit started with a quarrel between respondent and his union, concerning the scope of membership rights in the union, as did Gonzales; and it is with those rights that this litigation is concerned, as was Gonzales.. And, as here, it was conceded in Gonzales that the conduct complained of might well amount to an unfair labor practice within the Labor Board’s jurisdiction. Because of these similarities, and because the Court is clearly right in saying “[i]t is not the label affixed to the cause of action under state law that controls the determination of the relationship between state and federal jurisdiction,” I am able to find no support for the Court’s distinction of Gonzales in the fact that it was primarily an “equitable” case where damages were allowed only to “fill out” the union member’s remedy. Cf. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 1, 2, and 54 (c).

San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, supra, involved a controversy between union and employer in the classical case for National Labor Board jurisdiction. Suits for damages by individual employees against the union or the employer fall in the category of Moore v. Illinois Central R. Co., 312 U. S. 630. As a matter of policy, there is much to be said for allowing the individual employee recourse to conventional litigation in his hometown tribunal for redress of grievances. Washington, D. C., and its administrative agencies — and even regional offices — are often distant and remote and expensive to reach. Under today’s holding the member who has a real dispute with his union may go without a remedy.*[*700] See, e. g., San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, supra; Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U. S. 1. When the basic dispute is between a union and an employer, any hiatus that might exist in the jurisdictional balance that has been struck can be filled by resort to economic power. But when the union member has a dispute with his union, he has no power on which to rely. If Gonzales — written in the spirit of Moore — is to survive, this judgment should be affirmed.

It is by no means clear that the General Counsel, who by § 3 (d) has “final authority” to investigate charges and to issue complaints, can be made to file a charge on behalf of this individual claimant. See Hourihan v. Labor Board, 91 U. S. App. D. C. 316, 201 F. 2d 187; Dunn v. Retail Clerks, 299 F. 2d 873; 307 F. 2d 285.