Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31 (1967). · Go Syfert
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Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31 (1967). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
399 citation events (12 in the last 25 years) across 52 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Edwards (moctapp, 2000-10-31) · Strongest negative: State v. Bogguess (kan, 2012-01-20)
Treatment trajectory · 1967 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1967 1996 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 41 distinct citers.
examined Cited "but see" State v. Bogguess (3×)
Kan. · 2012 · signal: but see · confidence high
State v. Miles, 233 Kan. 286, 295 , 662 P.2d 1227 (1983); but see Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 32-33 , 88 S. Ct. 192 , 19 L.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Edwards
Mo. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 32 , 88 S.Ct. 192, 193 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31, 33 (1967).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Griffin v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Further, although this Court recognizes that there is no absolute requirement that a voluntariness hearing be held outside the presence of the jury, it would be the better practice that it be done outside the presence of the jury as a matter of fairness and judicial economy. 2 See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U. S. 31, 32 (88 SC 192, 19 LE2d 31) (1967); Peinado v. State, 223 Ga. App. 271, 272 ( 477 SE2d 408 ) (1996); Schneider v. State, 130 Ga. App. 3, 5-6 ( 202 SE2d 238 ) (1973); Hilliard v. State, 128 Ga. App. 157, 158 ( 195 SE2d 772 ) (1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Peinado v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Ga. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
The Supreme Court of the United States “has never ruled that all voluntariness hearings be held outside the presence of the jury, regardless of the circumstances.” Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U. S. 31, 32 (88 SC 192, 19 LE2d 31).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Wise
Mo. Ct. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
“Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 1 A.L.R.3d 1205 (1964), held that a defendant’s constitutional rights are violated when his challenged confession is introduced without a determination by the trial judge of its voluntariness after an adequate hearing.” Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 32 , 88 S.Ct. 192, 193 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31, 33 (1967).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Acerbi
Mass. App. Ct. · 1983 · confidence medium
While conduct of a voir dire within the hearings of the jury with respect to the voluntariness of a confession is not appropriate, there is no constitutional requirement “that all voluntariness hearings must be held outside the presence of the jury, regardless of the circumstances.” Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 32 (1967).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Janis (2×)
S.D. · 1982 · confidence medium
Certainly, however, we determined in Lufkins that the facts therein fell within the purview of the holding in Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 33 , 88 S.Ct. 192, 193-194 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31, 33 (1967).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Lufkins (2×)
S.D. · 1981 · confidence medium
Although the voluntariness of appellant's statement was determined in the jury's presence contra to the requirements of Thundershield , we must defer to the United States Supreme Court ruling in Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 33 , 88 S.Ct. 192, 193-4 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31, 33 (1967) (footnotes omitted) wherein it was stated: A confession by the defendant found to be involuntary by the trial judge is not to be heard by the jury which determines his guilt or innocence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wainwright v. Sykes (2×) also: Cited "see"
SCOTUS · 1977 · confidence medium
This was the same type of waiver which the Court in Fay had said must be demonstrated in order to bar review on state procedural grounds in a federal habeas proceeding. [9] See n. 5, supra. [10] In Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U. S. 31, 32 (1967), the Court stated: " Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964), held that a defendant's constitutional rights are violated when his challenged confession is introduced without a determination by the trial judge of its voluntariness after an adequate hearing. . . ." In Lego v. Twomey, 404 U. S. 477, 478 (1972), we summarized the Jackson holding as conferring the …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hilliard v. State
Ga. Ct. App. · 1973 · confidence medium
The cases of Strickland v. State, 226 Ga. 750, 751 (3) ( 177 SE2d 238 ), and Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U. S. 31, 32 (88 SC 192, 19 LE2d 31), do not hold the requirement of a separate hearing of voluntariness is unnecessary.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Lindsey
Cal. Ct. App. · 1972 · confidence medium
In Pinto v. Pierce (1967) 389 U.S. 31, 32 [ 19 L.Ed.2d 31, 33 , 88 S.Ct. 192 ], the court said: “This Court has never ruled that all voluntariness hearings must be held outside the presence of the jury, regardless of the circumstances.” In United States ex rel.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States ex rel. Russo v. New Jersey
3rd Cir. · 1971 · confidence medium
Pinto v. Pierce, supra, 389 U.S. at 32, 88 S.Ct. 192 ; United States ex rel.
cited Cited as authority (rule) ca3 1971
3rd Cir. · 1971 · confidence medium
Pinto v. Pierce, supra, 389 U.S. at 32, 88 S.Ct. 192 ; United States ex rel.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Strickland v. State
Ga. · 1970 · confidence medium
In Clark v. Smith, 224 Ga. 766, 773 ( 164 SE2d 790 ), it was said: “It was held in Pinto v. Pearce, 389 U. S. 31, 32 (88 SC 192, 19 LE2d 31) (1967), that the United States Supreme Court ‘has never ruled that all voluntariness hearings must be held outside the presence of the jury, regardless of the circumstances.
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States of America Ex Rel. Robert Harvin v. Howard D. Yeager, Warden, New Jersey State Prison (3×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
3rd Cir. · 1970 · confidence medium
As pointed out in Pinto at p. 32, 88 S.Ct. 192 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31 n. 1 , since 1967 the New Jersey practice has been changed and hearings on admissibility are to be held outside the presence of the jury if the defendant so requests.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Clark v. Smith
Ga. · 1968 · confidence medium
It was held in Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U. S. 31, 32 (88 SC 192, 19 LE2d 31) (1967), that the United States Supreme Court “has never ruled that all voluntariness hearings must be held outside the presence of the jury, regardless of the circumstances.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Commonwealth v. Pinno
Pa. Super. Ct. · 1967 · confidence medium
“Jackson v. Denno means that the judge and the jury must each make an independent judgment of voluntariness of an admission, the judge for purposes of admissibility and the jury for evidentiary acceptability, credibility, and weight.” Concurring opinion of Fortas, J., in Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 34 (1967).
cited Cited as authority (rule) McKinley v. State
Wis. · 1967 · confidence medium
Ed. 2d 908 . 22 Id. at page 387. 23 Id. at page 389. 24 (1967), 389 U. S. 31 , 88 Sup. Ct. 192, 19 L.
examined Cited "see" State v. Gibson (3×)
Conn. App. Ct. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 32 , 88 S. Ct. 192 , 19 L.
examined Cited "see" United States v. William Harry Hack, Jr., Lucas Clinton Owens (3×)
10th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 32 , 88 S.Ct. 192, 193 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31, 33 (1967) (per curiam) (trial court did not commit reversible error by conducting voluntariness hearing in the jury’s presence when counsel consented to the procedure chosen by the court and the judge found the statement was voluntarily given).
examined Cited "see" Allen E. Fryer v. Crispus Nix, Warden of the Iowa State Penitentiary (5×)
8th Cir. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31 , 88 S.Ct. 192 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (1967). 7 In Pinto , the Supreme Court held that the challenged voluntariness hearing did not violate due *987 process, though it was held in the presence of the jury, because “the respondent in this case did not object to having the voluntariness of his admission considered in the presence of the jury.” Id. at 33 , 88 S.Ct. at 193 (emphasis added). 8 While we reject the contention that the presence of the jury in and of itself rendered Fryer’s voluntariness hearing constitutionally inadequate, we are mindful of the fact tha…
examined Cited "see" State v. Johnson (3×)
Conn. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 32 , 88 S. Ct. 192 , 19 L.
examined Cited "see" Fryer v. State (3×)
Iowa · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 32 , 88 S.Ct. 192, 193 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31, 32 , reh. den. 389 U.S. 997 , 88 S.Ct. 462 , 19 L.Ed.2d 499 (1967) (question of voluntariness determined in presence of jury; no constitutional denial of rights if defendant does not object to hearing in presence of jury).
cited Cited "see" State v. Peabody
Ga. · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U. S. 31 (88 SC 192, 19 LE2d 31) (1967).
discussed Cited "see" Watkins v. Sowders
SCOTUS · 1981 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U. S. 31 , 32: “This Court has never ruled that all voluntariness hearings must be held outside the presence of the jury, regardless of the circumstances. . . . [Bjecause a disputed confession may be found involuntary and inadmissi ble by the judge, it would seem prudent to hold voluntariness hearings outside the presence of the jury. ...
examined Cited "see" Commonwealth v. Hayes (6×)
Pa. · 1980 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 32 , 88 S.Ct. 192, 193 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (1967). [13] See Commonwealth v. Klinger, 75 D. & C.2d 664 (1976), in which the court held that since the Pennsylvania Constitution mandates that "all courts shall be open," representatives of the media could not be excluded from a preliminary hearing on a charge of murder in order to prevent publicity which may be prejudicial to a defendant's case.
examined Cited "see" Stover v. United States (3×)
D.C. · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 377-78 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 (1964); see Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 32 , 88 S.Ct. 192 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (1967) (per curiam).
discussed Cited "see" Gannett Co. v. DePasquale (2×)
SCOTUS · 1979 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U. S. 31, 32 (1967).
examined Cited "see" State v. Panella (3×)
Conn. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 32 , 88 S. Ct. 192 , 19 L.
examined Cited "see" George Charles Jones v. S. Lamont Smith, Warden, Georgia State Prison (3×)
5th Cir. · 1969 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31 [ 88 S.Ct. 192 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31 ] (1967).” The state contends, on appeal, that the trial court does not have to make a separate determination as to the voluntariness of a confession or extra-judicial admission, unless this issue is raised at the trial, either by the admission of evidence contradicting the admission or by an objection filed at the trial to the introduction of the admission into evidence.
examined Cited "see" Harold Konigsberg v. United States (3×)
3rd Cir. · 1969 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31 , 88 S.Ct. 192 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (1967). 16 . 373 U.S. 1 , 83 S.Ct. 1068 , 10 L.Ed. 2d 148 (1963).
examined Cited "see" Cano v. Arizona (3×)
D. Ariz. · 1969 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31 , 88 S.Ct. 192 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31 ; Jackson v. Denno, 387 U.S. 368 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 12 L.Ed.2d 908 .
examined Cited "see" Edgar M. Ellis v. C. J. Fitzharris, Department of Corrections of the State of California (6×)
9th Cir. · 1969 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 33 , 88 S.Ct. 192 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31 ; Gladden v. Unsworth, 9 Cir., 396 F.2d 373, 375, n. 1 . .
cited Cited "see" Day v. Mills
Ga. · 1968 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U. S. 31 (88 SC 192, 19 LE2d 31) and Abrams v. State, 223 Ga. 216 (1) ( 154 SE2d 443 ).
examined Cited "see" Estep v. State (3×)
Ark. · 1968 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U. S. 31 , 88 S. Ct. 192 (1967). 19 L.
examined Cited "see" Clarence T. Gladden, Warden, Oregon State Penitentiary v. William Edward Unsworth (3×)
9th Cir. · 1968 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31 , 88 S.Ct. 192 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31 . 2 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Savage v. Byrd
M.D. Tenn. · 2024 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31 , 32–33 (1967) (finding that voluntariness of defendant’s confession could be determined in jury’s presence without violating defendant’s rights, where neither defendant nor defense counsel objected); Brant v. Scafati, 301 F. Supp. 1374 , 1378–79 (D.
examined Cited "see, e.g." Frank W. Dearstyne v. William Mazzuca (3×)
2d Cir. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence low
Accordingly, in Jackson, “[a] constitutional rule was laid down ... that a jury is not to hear a confession unless and until the trial judge has determined that it was freely and voluntarily given.” Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 543-44 , 87 S.Ct. 639 , 17 L.Ed.2d 593 (1967); see also Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31, 32 , 88 S.Ct. 192 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (1967) (per curiam) (“Jackson v. Denno ... held that a defendant’s constitutional rights are violated when his challenged confession is introduced without a determination by the trial judge of its voluntariness after an adequate hearing.”).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Lodowski v. State (6×)
Md. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31 , 88 S.Ct. 192 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31 , reh. denied, 389 U.S. 997 , 88 S.Ct. 462 , 19 L.Ed.2d 499 (1967) (per curiam); Boles v. Stevenson, 379 U.S. 43 , 85 S.Ct. 174 , 13 L.Ed.2d 109 (1964).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Mulligan v. State
Md. Ct. Spec. App. · 1970 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U. S. 31 ; Smith v. State, supra. Y/e hold that the statement made in the police car was inadmissible.
examined Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Frederick J. Fayette (3×)
2d Cir. · 1968 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Pinto v. Pierce, 389 U.S. 31 , 88 S.Ct. 192 , 19 L.Ed.2d 31 (Oct. 23, 1967). 4 .
Pinto, Prison Farm Superintendent
v.
Pierce
284.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Dec 4, 1967.
389 U.S. 31
Thomas P. Ford, Jr., for petitioner.
Fortas, Black.
Cited by 130 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

Per Curiam.

Respondent was indicted by the grand jury of Essex County, New Jersey, on July 2, 1959, for the crime of robbery while armed. Following a plea of not guilty, he was tried before a jury, convicted and sentenced to a term of from 16 to 23 years in the New Jersey State Prison. On June 6, 1966, respondent filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey. The District Judge determined from the transcript of respondent’s trial that the trial court had heard in the presence of the jury testimony regarding the voluntariness of an incriminating statement sought to be introduced by the' prosecution, held that under prior decisions of this Court this procedure violated respondent’s constitutional rights and[*32] granted the writ. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed, and petitioner, the Superintendent of the New Jersey State Prison Farm, seeks a writ of certiorari.

The petition for certiorari is granted and the judgment is reversed. This Court has never ruled that all volun-tariness hearings must be held outside the presence of the jury, regardless of the circumstances. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964), held that a defendant’s constitutional rights are violated when his challenged confession is introduced without a determination by the trial judge of its voluntariness after an adequate hearing. A confession by the defendant found to be involuntary by the trial judge is not to be heard by the jury which determines his guilt or innocence. Hence, because a disputed confession may be found involuntary and inadmissible by the judge, it would seem prudent to hold voluntariness hearings outside the presence of the jury.[1] In this case, however, the confession was held voluntary and admitted as evidence suitable for consideration by the jury. In addition, there is no claim that because the hearing was held in the presence of the jury it was inadequate or had any other unfair consequences for the respondent.[2]

[*33] Finally, it is clear that the respondent in this case did not object to having the voluntariness of his admission considered in the presence of the jury. At his trial the court asked defense counsel whether there was any objection to the testimony being taken in the presence of the jury. Defense counsel replied, “None whatsoever.” The court continued, “As you know, it can be taken in their presence or outside of their presence, and that is a matter of discretion with the Court but I am inquiring of you if you have any objections. If you did I would hear you but I assume you have none.” Again counsel replied, “I have none.” The evidence regarding voluntariness, which included testimony by respondent, was then taken, after which the court ruled that the statement was voluntary.

Since trial counsel consented to the evidence on vol-untariness being taken in the presence of the jury, and the judge found the statement voluntary, respondent was deprived of no constitutional right. The motion of respondent for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the petition for certiorari are granted, the judgment is reversed and the case is remanded to the District Court with instructions to dismiss the writ of habeas corpus.

Mr. Justice Black concurs in the result.
1

The New Jersey Supreme Court has recently announced that from September 11, 1967, hearings on admissibility shall be outside the presence of the jury if the defendant so requests. See State v. Broxton, 49 N. J. 373, 386, n. 2, 230 A. 2d 489, 496, n. 2 (1967).

2

In United States v. Carignan, 342 U. S. 36 (1951), relied upon by the trial court, reversal of a conviction was affirmed because the trial judge, after hearing some evidence concerning voluntariness with the jury present, refused to permit the defendant to testify on the subject.

The other cases cited by the District Court granted writs of habeas corpus in cases in which trial judges had made no independent determination of voluntariness. See, for the citations to those eases, United States ex rel. Pierce v. Pinto, 259 F. Supp. 729, 731 (D. C N. J. 1966).

Concurrence

Mr. Justice Fortas,

concurring in the result.

I concur in the result because of trial counsel’s consent to the taking of evidence on voluntariness in the presence of the jury. Otherwise, I disagree. The rule of Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964), should be more than ritual. It was not intended to assure a determination by the judge at the cost of diluting the jury’s role in the determination of voluntariness and the weight to be given to admissions. “Just as questions of admissibility of evidence are traditionally for the court, questions of credi[*34] bility, whether of a witness or a confession, are for the jury.” Id., at 386, n. 13. See also id., at 378, n. 8, and cf. id., at 404 (separate opinion of Black,- J.).

Jackson v. Denno means that the judge and the jury must each make an independent judgment of volun-tariness of an admission, the judge for purposes of admissibility and the jury for evidentiary acceptability, credibility, and weight. A telescoped hearing before judge and jury, in which the judge finds voluntariness for purposes of admissibility, in reality reduces the jury function to an echo. Hearing the evidence simultaneously with the judge, the jury is not apt to approach disagreement with him. I believe that the procedure here sanctioned, by reducing the effectiveness of the jury, gravely impairs the constitutional principle of excluding involuntary confessions which Jackson v. Denno sought to serve.

The jury is the traditional and preferred arbiter of facts. The procedure countenanced here, by dicta, sanctions, in effect, a direction to the jury to accept and give full credence to the admission — because the judge, hearing the same testimony, has ruled that the admission is voluntary.