DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968). · Go Syfert
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DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
1,323 citation events (267 in the last 25 years) across 82 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Hansford v. United States (innd, 2025-01-14) · Strongest negative: State v. Flores Ramos (or, 2020-12-24)
Treatment trajectory · 1968 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1968 1997 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
examined Overruled State v. Flores Ramos (3×)
Or. · 2020 · confidence high
Under DeStefano v. Woods, 392 US 631 , 88 S Ct 2093 , 20 L Ed 2d 1308 (1968), overruled by Griffith, 479 US 314 , the Sixth Amendment was not applicable to the cases tried before Duncan, even if those cases were still on direct appeal.
examined Cited "but see" John J. Vaccaro v. United States (3×)
5th Cir. · 1972 · signal: but see · confidence high
But see, Adams v. Illinois, supra 6 Johnson v. New Jersey, 1966, 384 U.S. 719 , 89 S.Ct. 1772 , 16 L.Ed.2d 882 , denying retroactive application of Escobedo v. Illinois, 1964, 378 U.S. 478 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 , 12 L.Ed.2d 977 and Miranda v. Arizona, 1966, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 7 Witherspoon v. Illinois, 1968, 391 U.S. 510 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 , carrying an announcement of retroactive application of its own holding, 391 U.S. at 523 n. 22, 88 S.Ct. 1770 8 DeStefano v. Woods, 1968, 392 U.S. 631 , 88 S.Ct. 2093 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1308 , denying retroactivity to Bloom v. I…
examined Cited "but see" Robert Chester Galloway v. Dr. George J. Beto, Director, Texas Department of Corrections (3×)
5th Cir. · 1970 · signal: but see · confidence high
Johnson v. New Jersey, supra; Desist v. United States, supra; but see DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 , 88 S.Ct. 2093 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1308 (1968).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hansford v. United States
N.D. Ind. · 2025 · confidence medium
This holds true for fundamental jury rights—even the general right to a jury trial was procedural and nonretroactive, DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633 (1968), so there is little reason to treat this jury right in the context of sentencing differently.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Rodney
N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. · 2024 · confidence medium
Just as "[t]he values implemented by the right to jury trial would not measurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons convicted in the past by procedures not consistent with the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial" ( DeStefano v Woods , 392 US 631, 634 [1968]), neither would they be served by requiring resentence on the same grounds.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Rodney
N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. · 2024 · confidence medium
Just as "[t]he values implemented by the right to jury trial would not measurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons convicted in the past by procedures not consistent with the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial" ( DeStefano v Woods , 392 US 631, 634 [1968]), neither would they be served by requiring resentence on the same grounds.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Rodney
N.Y. Sup. Ct., New York Cty. · 2024 · confidence medium
Just as "[t]he values implemented by the right to jury trial would not measurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons convicted in the past by procedures not consistent with the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial" ( DeStefano v Woods , 392 US 631, 634 [1968]), neither would they be served by requiring resentence on the same grounds.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ronald Hunter
6th Cir. · 2021 · confidence medium
“Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential to the 5See, e.g., Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 639-40 (1965) (refusing to give retroactive effect to Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), which incorporated the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule against the States); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 721 (1966) (rejecting retroactivity for Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 444- 45 (1966), which required police to inform individuals in custody of certain rights before ques…
examined Cited as authority (rule) Edwards v. Vannoy (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
SCOTUS · 2021 · confidence medium
Ante, at 12–13 (citing DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 633 (1968) (per curiam) and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Edwards v. Vannoy (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
SCOTUS · 2021 · confidence medium
Ante, at 12–13 (citing DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 633 (1968) (per curiam) and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Edwards v. Vannoy (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
SCOTUS · 2021 · confidence medium
Ante, at 12–13 (citing DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 633 (1968) (per curiam) and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Edwards v. Vannoy (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
SCOTUS · 2021 · confidence medium
Ante, at 12–13 (citing DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 633 (1968) (per curiam) and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Edwards v. Vannoy (3×) also: Cited "see", Cited "see, e.g."
SCOTUS · 2021 · confidence medium
Ante, at 12–13 (citing DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 633 (1968) (per curiam) and Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145 (1968)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ramos v. Louisiana
SCOTUS · 2020 · confidence medium
In “the years since Teague, we have rejected every claim that a new rule satisfied the requirements for water- shed status.” Id., at 418, 421 (rejecting retroactivity for Crawford v. Washington, 541 U. S. 36 (2004)); see, e.g., Beard v. Banks, 542 U. S. 406, 420 (2004) (rejecting retro- activity for Mills v. Maryland, 486 U. S. 367 (1988)); Sum- merlin, 542 U. S., at 358 (rejecting retroactivity for Ring v. Arizona, 536 U. S. 584 (2002)); O’Dell v. Netherland, 521 U. S. 151 , 167–168 (1997) (rejecting retroactivity for Sim- mons v. South Carolina, 512 U. S. 154 (1994)); Lambrix v. Sing…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. JA
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 2008 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Schriro, supra, 542 U.S. at 358 , 124 S.Ct. at 2526-27 , 159 L.Ed.2d at 452-53 (rule requiring a jury rather than a judge to decide if aggravating factors were present when considering whether to sentence a defendant to death); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633-34 , 88 S.Ct. 2093, 2095-96 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1308, 1311-12 (1968) (rule which applied the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee to the States); Whorton, supra, 127 S.Ct. at 1177 , 167 L.Ed.2d at 6 (the rule of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), concerning testimonial hearsay statem…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. J.A.
N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. · 2008 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Schriro, supra, 542 U.S. at 358 , 124 S.Ct. at 2526-27 , 159 L.Ed.2d at 452-53 (rule requiring a jury rather than a judge to decide if aggravating factors were present when considering whether to sentence a defendant to death); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633-34 , 88 S.Ct. 2093, 2095-96 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1308, 1311-12 (1968) (rule which applied the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee to the States); Whorton, supra, 127 S.Ct. at 1177 , 167 L.Ed.2d at 6 (the rule of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 , 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004), concerning testimonial hearsay stat…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bockting v. Bayer
9th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
The Court also stressed that this conclusion followed logically from its observation in DeSte- fano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (per curiam), “that, although ‘the right to jury trial generally tends to prevent arbi- trariness and repression[,] . . . [w]e would not assert . . . that every criminal trial—or any particular trial—held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would be by a jury.’ ” Summer- lin, 124 S. Ct. at 2525, quoting DeStefano, 392 U.S. at 633-34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Humphress v. United States
6th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
Citing DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633-34 (1968) (holding that procedural rule applying the Sixth Amendment’s jury-trial guarantee to the states has no retroactive effect), the Schriro Court observed that “[i]f . . . a trial held entirely without a jury was not impermissibly inaccurate, it is hard to see how a trial in which a judge finds only aggravating factors could be.” 124 S. Ct. at 2526.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bockting v. Bayer
9th Cir. · 2005 · confidence medium
The Court also stressed that this conclusion followed logically from its observation in DeSte- fano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968) (per curiam), “that, although ‘the right to jury trial generally tends to prevent arbi- trariness and repression[,] . . . [w]e would not assert . . . that every criminal trial—or any particular trial—held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would be by a jury.’ ” Summer- lin, 124 S. Ct. at 2525, quoting DeStefano, 392 U.S. at 633-34 (internal quotation marks omitted).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Schriro v. Summerlin (6×)
SCOTUS · 2004 · confidence medium
But we held in that case that “fa]H three factors favor only prospective application of the rule.” 392 U. S., at 633 (emphasis added).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Arizona v. Roger Wayne Murray
Ariz. · 2003 · confidence medium
DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633 , 88 S. Ct. 2093, 2095 (1968) (per curiam).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Griffith v. Kentucky (2×)
SCOTUS · 1987 · confidence medium
See, e. g., Stovall v. Denno, supra ; DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 635, n. 2 (1968); Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 253-254 (1969); Daniel v. Louisiana, 420 U. S. 31 (1975) (per curiam) .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Andrews v. Morris
Utah · 1983 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S., at 301 [ 87 S.Ct. at 1972 ]; DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633 [ 88 S.Ct. 2093, 2095 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1308 ] (1968); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278, 284-285 [ 92 S.Ct. 916, 920 , 31 L.Ed.2d 202 ] (1972) (plurality opinion); Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47 [ 93 S.Ct. 1966 , 36 L.Ed.2d 736 ] (1973).
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Johnson (4×)
SCOTUS · 1982 · confidence medium
See, e. g., Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S., at 301 ; DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 633 (1968); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U. S. 278, 284-285 (1972) (plurality opinion); Michigan v. Payne, 412 U. S. 47 (1973).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bowman v. Leverette
W. Va. · 1982 · confidence medium
Cf. Griffin v. Illinois, supra, 351 U.S. at 20-26 , 76 S.Ct. at 591-594 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 11 See Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 676 , 91 S.Ct. 1160, 1172 , 28 L.Ed.2d 404, 411 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring): “[Non-retroactivity] was the product of the Court’s disquietude with the impacts of its fast moving pace of constitutional innovation in the criminal field.” 12 See, e.g., Tehan v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 410 , 86 S.Ct. 469 , 462, 16 L.Ed.2d 463 , 456 (1966); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 727 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 , _, 16 L.Ed.2d 882, 888 (1966); Stovall v. Denno,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brown v. Louisiana (2×)
SCOTUS · 1980 · confidence medium
Shott, 382 U. S., at 419 ("an impact upon the administration of their criminal law so devastating as to need no elaboration"); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 634 (1968).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Navarette
Cal. Ct. App. · 1976 · confidence medium
Fourth, the question of the retroactive or prospective application of Taylor was addressed and decided in Daniel v. Louisiana (1975) 420 U.S. 31 [ 42 L.Ed.2d 790 , 95 S.Ct. 704 ], Weighing the relevant factors set out in the cases, namely, (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards; (b) the extent of the reliance by the law enforcement authorities on the old standards; and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards (Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293, 297 [ 18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1203 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 ]; DeStefano v. Woods (1968) 392 U.S…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brunson v. Commonwealth
Mass. · 1975 · confidence medium
In Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 726-735 (1966), the court, after citing the Linkletter and Tehan cases, said, at 726-727: “These cases establish the principle that in criminal litigation concerning constitutional claims, ‘the Court may in the interest of justice make the rule prospective . . . where the exigencies of the situation require such an application.’ 381 U.S., at 628 ; 382 U.S., at 410 .” In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 296-297 (1967), the court cited these same cases and then said: “The criteria guiding resolution of the question implicate (a) the purpose to be …
examined Cited as authority (rule) Codispoti v. Pennsylvania (4×)
SCOTUS · 1974 · confidence medium
And in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631 (1968) ( per curiam ), the Court held that the decisions in Duncan and Bloom would not retroactively apply to "trials [begun] prior to May 20, 1968." Id., at 635.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Edge
Cal. Ct. App. · 1973 · confidence medium
For example, see Johnson v. New Jersey (1966) 384 U.S. 719 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 882 , 86 S.Ct. 1772 ], which held that the doctrines announced in Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 378 U.S. 478 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 977 , 84 S.Ct. 1758 ], and *155 Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S. 436 [ 16 L.Ed.2d 694 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 10 A.L.R.3d 974 ], would apply only to cases in which trial began after the date of those decisions; and DeStefano v. Woods, supra, 392 U.S. 631, 633 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 1308, 1311 ], which held that the right to a jury trial under Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) 391 U.S. 145 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 491 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 ] an…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Adams v. Superior Court (2×)
Cal. Ct. App. · 1972 · confidence medium
(DeStefano v. Woods (1968) 392 U.S. 631, 635 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 1308, 1312 , 88 S.Ct. 2093 ].)
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Argersinger v. Hamlin (2×)
unknown court · 1972 · confidence medium
To this extent, the definition used herein differs from the federal statutory definition of "petty offense," which includes offense punishable by not more than six months' imprisonment or by a fine not exceeding $500. 18 U. S. C. § 1 . [3] 236 So. 2d 442 (1970). [4] See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U. S. 45, 60-61 (1932). [5] Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 156 (1968). [6] Although we have given retroactive effect to our ruling in Gideon, Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U. S. 2 (1963), we have said that, "[t]he values implemented by the right to jury trial would not measurably be served by requi…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. v. Teleprompter Corp. (2×)
S.D.N.Y. · 1972 · confidence medium
Justice Portas stated in his Fortnightly dissent: “The vague ‘functional’ test of the meaning of the term ‘perform’ is . . . unsatisfactory.” (392 U.S. at 407, 88 S.Ct. at 2093).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Adams v. Illinois (2×)
SCOTUS · 1972 · confidence medium
C. 81, 317 F. 2d 145 (1963). [1] E. g., Eskridge v. Washington Prison Board, 357 U. S. 214 (1958); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335 (1963); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U. S. 368 (1964), (see also Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244 , 250 n. 15 (1969)); Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433 (1961). [2] Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 640 (1965); Tehan v. Shott, 382 U. S. 406, 419 (1966); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 736 (1966); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 302 (1967); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 635 (1968); Desist v. United States, 394 U. S. 244, 255 (1969); Halliday v. United St…
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Santiago
Haw. · 1971 · confidence medium
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 727 (1966); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 (1967); DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 633 (1968); Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 249 (1969).
examined Cited as authority (rule) United States v. United States Coin & Currency (4×)
SCOTUS · 1971 · confidence medium
As to Bloom , we recognized that one ground for the result was "the belief that contempt trials, which often occur before the very judge who was the object of the allegedly contemptuous behavior, would be more fairly tried if a jury determined guilt." Id., at 634.
examined Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. United States (4×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
SCOTUS · 1971 · confidence medium
So, too, the right to jury trial secured by the Sixth Amendment "generally tends to prevent arbitrariness and repression," DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631, 633 (1968), and the holdings in United States v. Wade, 388 U. S. 218 (1967), and Gilbert v. California, 388 U. S. 263 (1967), carry implications for the reliability of identification testimony.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Mutch (2×)
Cal. · 1971 · confidence medium
The United States Supreme Court has “ . . retroactively applied rules of criminal procedure fashioned to correct serious flaws in the fact finding process’ ” (italics added; Roberts v. Russell, 392 U.S. 293, 294 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 1100, 1102 , 88 S.Ct. 1921 ]; see also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 [ 12 L.Ed.2d 908 , 84 S.Ct. 1774 , 1 A.L.R.3d 1205 ]; Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, 372 U.S. 335 [ 9 L.Ed.2d 799 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 93 A.L.R.2d 733 ]), but has not retroactively applied rules of criminal procedure fashioned to correct flaws in the factfinding process that the United States Supreme Cou…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harkcom v. Parker
M.D. Penn. · 1970 · confidence medium
In holding that Duncan be prospectively applied the Court made the following observation, “As we stated in Duncan , ‘We would not assert, however, that every criminal trial — or any particular trial — held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would be by a jury.’ (Citation omitted.) The values implemented by the right to jury trial would not measurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons convicted in the past by procedures not consistent with the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial.” Id., 392 U.S. at 633, 634 ,…
examined Cited as authority (rule) DeBacker v. Brainard (6×)
SCOTUS · 1969 · confidence medium
In DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631 , we held that Duncan and Bloom "should receive only prospective application" and stated that we would "not reverse state convictions for failure to grant jury trial where trials began prior to May 20, 1968, the date of this Court's decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana and Bloom v. Illinois . " 392 U. S., at 633, 635 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Owens
N.J. · 1969 · confidence medium
DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U. S. 631 , 88 S. Ct. 2093 , 20 L.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. J.F.
Cal. Ct. App. · 1969 · confidence medium
(DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 635 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 1308, 1312 , 88 S.Ct. 2093 ].) Theoretically, however, there is still the possibility of arguments based on our state Constitution or the equal protection clause. 10 We now turn to the issues raised.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re JF
Cal. Ct. App. · 1969 · confidence medium
(DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631, 635 [ 20 L.Ed.2d 1308, 1312 , 88 S.Ct. 2093 ].) Theoretically, however, there is still the possibility of arguments based on our state Constitution or the equal protection clause. [fn. 10] *770 [6] We now turn to the issues raised.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ca7 1968
7th Cir. · 1968 · confidence medium
And, see Bloom v. State of Illinois (May 20, 1968), 391 U.S. 194 88 S.Ct. 1477 , 20 L.Ed.2d 522 2 De Stefano v. Woods (June 17, 1968), 392 U.S. 631 , 88 S.Ct. 2093 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1308 3 (1946), 326 U.S. 607 , 66 S.Ct. 402 , 90 L.Ed. 350
examined Cited "see" People v. Wenzinger (3×)
Colo. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Schriro v. Summerlin, supra, 542 U.S. at 357, 124 S.Ct. at 2526 ("If under [ DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 , 88 S.Ct. 2093 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1308 (1968)] a trial held entirely without a jury was not impermissibly inaccurate, it is hard to see how a trial in which a judge finds only aggravating factors could be.").
examined Cited "see" People v. Wenzinger (3×)
Colo. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Schriro v. Summerlin, supra, 542 U.S. at 357 , 124 S.Ct. at 2526 ("If under [DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 , 88 S.Ct. 2093 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1308 (1968) ] a trial held entirely without a jury was not impermissibly inaccurate, it is hard to see how a trial in which a judge finds only aggravating factors could be.").
cited Cited "see" Fulcher v. Motley
6th Cir. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Schriro, 125 S.Ct. at 2525 (discussing the Court’s refusal in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 (1968), to apply Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), retroactively).
examined Cited "see" Elem Ray Fulcher v. John Motley, Warden (6×)
6th Cir. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See Schriro, 124 S.Ct. at 2525 (discussing the Court’s refusal in DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 631 , 88 S.Ct. 2093 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1308 (1968), to apply Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 , 88 S.Ct. 1444 , 20 L.Ed.2d 491 (1968), retroactively).
discussed Cited "see" Washington v. State (2×)
Fla. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See DeStefano, 392 U.S. at 633 , 88 S.Ct. 2093 (explaining that the "purpose” served by a new rule of law is one of three factors for determining retroactivity under Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967), and then holding that "[a]ll three factors favor only prospective application” of the jury-trial guarantee to the states).
discussed Cited "see" Hughes v. State (2×)
Fla. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See DeStefano, 392 U.S. at 633-34 , 88 S.Ct. 2093 .
DeSTEFANO
v.
WOODS, SHERIFF
559.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 14, 1968.
392 U.S. 631
Anna R. Lavin for petitioner in No. 559., John J. Stamos and Elmer C. Kissane for respondent in No. 559., Robert Y. Thornton, Attorney General of Oregon, and David H. Blunt, Assistant Attorney General, for respondent in No. 941.
Douglas, Harlan, Stewart, Louisiana, Illinois, Black.
Cited by 431 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

Per Curiam.

Petitioner Carcerano was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced, on May 11, 1962, to life imprisonment. The Oregon Constitution, Art. I, §11, permits a jury[*632] to convict in noncapital cases if 10 of the 12 jurors support conviction. The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed petitioner’s conviction. 238 Ore. 208, 390 P. 2d 923, cert. denied, 380 U. S. 923. In 1967, petitioner sought collateral relief under Oregon’s post-conviction statute. The sole ground relied upon was that the State and Federal Constitutions were violated when the jury was told it could return a verdict of guilty even though the members did not unanimously favor that verdict. This issue had not been raised by petitioner on his direct appeal. The Oregon Supreme Court denied relief.

Petitioner DeStefano was found in criminal contempt of an Illinois court and sentenced to three concurrent one-year terms.[1] After affirmance by the Illinois Supreme Court and denial of certiorari by this Court, 385 U. S. 989, petitioner unsuccessfully sought state collateral relief and then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Petitioner’s contention was that he was unconstitutionally denied trial by jury. Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals held that the Constitution did not require jury trial for state criminal contempt proceedings.

In Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, we held that the States cannot deny a request for jury trial in serious criminal cases, and in Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194, that the right to jury trial extends to trials for serious criminal contempts. Duncan left open the question of[*633] the continued vitality of the statement in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U. S. 581, 586, that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial includes a right not to be convicted except by a unanimous verdict. Both Duncan and Bloom left open the question whether a contempt punished by imprisonment for one year is, by virtue of that sentence, a sufficiently serious matter to require that a request for jury trial be honored. These two issues posed in Nos. 941 and 559 must be considered at this time only if the decisions in Duncan and Bloom apply retroactively. We hold, however, that Duncan v. Louisiana and Bloom v. Illinois should receive only prospective application. Accordingly, the denials of collateral relief to petitioners must be affirmed regardless of whether, for cases to which the rules announced in Duncan and Bloom apply, the Fourteenth Amendment requires unanimous jury verdicts and affords a right to jury trial for criminal contempts punished by imprisonment for one year.

In Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 297, the Court stated the considerations that affect the judgment whether a case reversing prior doctrines in the area of the criminal law should be applied only prospectively:

“(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.”

All three factors favor only prospective application of the rule stated in Duncan v. Louisiana. Duncan held that the States must respect the right to jury trial because in the context of the institutions and practices by which we adopt and apply our criminal laws, the right to jury trial generally tends to prevent arbitrariness and repression. As we stated in Duncan, “We would not assert, however, that every criminal trial—[*634] or any particular trial — held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be as fairly treated by a judge as he would be by a jury.” 391 U. S., at 158. The values implemented by the right to jury trial would not measurably be served by requiring retrial of all persons convicted in the past by procedures not consistent with the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial. Second, States undoubtedly relied in good faith upon the past opinions of this Court to the effect that the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial was not applicable to the States. E. g., Maxwell v. Dow, supra. Several States denied requests for jury trial in cases where jury trial would have been mandatory had they fallen within the Sixth Amendment guarantee as it had been construed by this Court. See Duncan v. Louisiana, supra, at 158, n. 30. Third, the effect of a holding of general retroactivity on law enforcement and the administration of justice would be significant, because the denial of jury trial has occurred in a very great number of cases in those States not until now accepting the Sixth Amendment guarantee. For example, in Louisiana all those convicted of non-capital serious crimes could make a Sixth Amendment argument. And, depending on the Court’s decisions about unanimous and 12-man juries, all convictions for serious crimes in certain other States would be in jeopardy.

The considerations are somewhat more evenly balanced with regard to the rule announced in Bloom v. Illinois. One ground for the Bloom result was the belief that contempt trials, which often occur before the very judge who was the object of the allegedly contemptuous behavior, would be more fairly tried if a jury determined guilt. Unlike the judge, the jurymen will not have witnessed or suffered the alleged contempt, nor suggested prosecution for it. However, the[*635] tradition of nonjury trials for contempts was more firmly established than the view that States could dispense with jury trial in normal criminal prosecutions, and reliance on the cases overturned by Bloom v. Illinois was therefore more justified. Also, the adverse effects on the administration of justice of invalidating all serious contempt convictions would likely be substantial. Thus, with regard to the Bloom decision, we also feel that retroactive application is not warranted.

For these reasons we will not reverse state convictions for failure to grant jury trial where trials began prior to May 20, 1968, the date of this Court’s decisions in Duncan v. Louisiana and Bloom v. Illinois.2 The petitions for writs of certiorari are granted and the judgments are affirmed. R is w order&±

Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Stewart would deny certiorari for the reasons stated in Mr. Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinions in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U. S. 145, 171, and Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U. S. 194, 215.
1

Petitioner DeStefano was ordered released on bail by Mr. Justice Clark pending his direct appeals in the Illinois courts and his first petition for a writ of certiorari. He was again granted release on bail by Mr. Justice Clark pending his appeal to the Court of Appeals from the District Court’s denial of habeas corpus relief; this second bail order has continued in force pending consideration of the present petition. Prior to the first bail order, and between the first denial of certiorari and the second bail order, petitioner served a total of 207 days of his concurrent one-year sentences.

2

We see no basis for a distinction between convictions that have become final and cases at various stages of trial and appeal. See Stovall v. Denno, supra, at 300-301.

Dissent

Mr. Justice Douglas, with whom Mr. Justice Black joins,

dissenting.

1 am of the view that the deprivation of the right to a trial by jury should be given retroactive effect, as I thought should have been done with comparable constitutional decisions. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U. S. 335; Douglas v. California, 372 U. S. 353; Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U. S. 618, 640 (dissenting opinion); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U. S. 719, 736 (dissenting opinion); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U. S. 293, 302 (dissenting opinion).