green
Positive treatment
5.1 score
Treatment trajectory · 1969 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1969
1997
2026
Top citers, strongest first. 33 distinct citers.
discussed
Cited "but see"
ca1 1983
But see Riverside Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 410 F.2d 267, 275 (6th Cir.) (damages may be assessed only for losses resulting from the specific acts of conduct that are clearly unlawful), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 , 90 S.Ct. 89 , 24 L.Ed.2d 95 (1969). 50 In the instant cases our review of the record convinces us that the district court did not err in finding that the concrete planks were not available to Abreen as a result of the picketing at the Natick site which was unlawful.
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Cited "but see"
Abreen Corp. v. Laborers' International Union
But see Riverside Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers, 410 F.2d 267, 275 (6th Cir.) (damages may be assessed only for losses resulting from the specific acts of conduct that are clearly unlawful), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 , 90 S.Ct. 89 , 24 L.Ed.2d 95 (1969).
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Cited "but see"
People v. Davis
In sanctioning a procedural device for the early exercise of a discretion already extant in the trial courts (see People v Caviness, 38 NY2d 227, 233 ; but cf. People v Zabrocky, 26 NY2d 530, 535 ), it looked to the more efficacious accommodation on a case-by-case basis of jurisprudential considerations whose existence had long been recognized (e.g., People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 247 , cert den 396 US 846 ; People v Sorge, supra, pp 201-202 ; People v Webster, 139 NY 73, 84 ; People v Tice, 131 NY 651, 657-658 ; People v Duffy, 44 AD2d 298, 301 [Shapiro, J.], affd 36 NY2d 258 , cert den 4…
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Cited "see"
People v. Goston
“The trial court did not abuse the discretion vested in it, in determining the extent of the cross-examination bearing on defendant’s credibility, and the exercise of that discretion should not be disturbed” (People v Greer, 42 NY2d 170, 176 [1977]; see People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 244-245 [1969], mot to amend remittitur granted 24 NY2d 914 [1969], rearg denied 24 NY2d 916 [1969], cert denied 396 US 846 [1969]).
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Cited "see"
In re Mi-Kell V.
Addressing first respondent’s contention of trial error, we note that " '[i]t is well settled that the scope of cross-examination rests largely in the sound discretion of the court’ ” (Matter of Devanand S., 188 AD2d 533, 534 , quoting People v Quevas, 178 AD2d 441, 442 ; see, People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241 , cert denied 396 US 846 ).
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Cited "see"
People v. Arhin
"It is well established that the trial courts have broad discretion to keep the proceedings within manageable limits and to curtail exploration of collateral matters” (People v Hudy, 73 NY2d 40, 56 ; see, People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 244 , rearg denied 24 NY2d 916 , cert denied 396 US 846 ).
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Cited "see"
Wayne Fox v. Ira Kelso
See Cappetta v. Wainwright, 406 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 , 90 S.Ct. 55 , 24 L.Ed.2d 96 (1969) 10 ; see also Harrison v. Indiana, 597 F.2d 115 (7th Cir.1979).
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Cited "see"
Badr v. Hogan
It is well settled that "extrinsic evidence introduced solely to impeach credibility on a collateral issue is, with special exceptions, inadmissible” (Halloran v Virginia Chems., 41 NY2d 386, 390 ; see, People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241 , cert denied 396 US 846 ; Getlin v St.
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Cited "see"
People v. Johnson
It has been stated, however, that "facts are not 'collateral’ if they are relevant to some issue in the case, or if they are independently admissible to impeach the witness” (Richardson, Evidence § 491, at 478 [Prince 10th ed]; see, People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 245 , rearg denied 24 NY2d 916 , cert denied 396 US 846 ).
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Cited "see"
People v. Syposs
While a defendant may be cross-examined concerning immoral, criminal or vicious acts which have a bearing on his credibility as a witness, provided the cross-examiner questions in good faith and upon a reasonable basis in fact (People v Duffy, 36 NY2d 258, 262 , mod 36 NY2d 857 , cert denied 423 US 861 ; People v Kass, 25 NY2d 123, 125-126; Richardson, Evidence § 498 [Prince 10th ed 1973]), "the law is inflexibly set against questioning as to such acts when the obvious intent is to show from character or experience a propensity to commit the crime for which defendant is on trial” (People v …
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Cited "see"
People v. Grant
While it is true that such testimony is highly inflammatory and irreparably prejudicial when offered and received to show that a defendant is of a criminal bent or character and is thus likely to have committed the crime charged (People v Molineux, 168 NY 264; see People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241 , cert den 396 US 846 ), where the charged crimes are not single instance crimes, such as robbery, assault or rape, but crimes that cover a lengthy period of time during which the defendant subdues the victim’s will through physical force, intimidation and fear, evidence of such crimes is highly pr…
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Cited "see"
Occhino v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Company
Accord Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 407 F.2d 624, 626-27 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 , 90 S.Ct. 90 , 24 L.Ed.2d 95 (1969). 6 29 Having concluded that Northwestern Bell's actions in terminating Occhino's telephone service were not effectuated under color of state law, it is clear that section 1983 is inapplicable to this case. 7 30 (E) 42 U.S.C. § 1985 31 42 U.S.C. § 1985 provides a civil remedy for conspiracies to interfere with certain civil rights.
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Cited "see"
Occhino v. Northwestern Bell Telephone Co.
Accord Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 407 F.2d 624, 626-27 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 , 90 S.Ct. 90 , 24 L.Ed.2d 95 (1969). 6 Having concluded that Northwestern Bell’s actions in terminating Occhino’s telephone service were not effectuated under color of state law, it is clear that section 1983 is inapplicable to this case. 7 (E) 42 U.S.C. § 1985 42 U.S.C. § 1985 provides a civil remedy for conspiracies to interfere with certain civil rights.
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Cited "see"
Bension v. Meredith
See Cappetta v. Wainwright, 406 F.2d 1238, 1239 (5th Cir.), cert. *665 denied, 396 U.S. 846 , 90 S.Ct. 55 , 24 L.Ed.2d 96 (1969); United States ex rel.
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Cited "see"
Moore v. Newell
See Riverside Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 410 F.2d 267 (6th Cir.) cert. den. 396 U.S. 846 , 90 S.Ct. 89 , 24 L.Ed.2d 95 (1969).
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Cited "see"
Donald E. Powers v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation v. McKie Lighter Co., Inc., Donald E. Powers v. McKie Lighter Co., Inc.
See Atkins v. Greenville Shipbuilding Corp., 411 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 , 90 S.Ct. 105 , 24 L.Ed.2d 96 (1969). 4 In our own case of DeMartino v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 164 F.2d 177, 179 (1st Cir. 1947), holding that a floating dock was not a vessel, we cited Berton v. Tietjen & Lang Dry Dock Co., 219 F. 763 (D.N.J.1915), in which, at 771, the court said, .
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Cited "see"
Lisenby v. Texas Employers' Insurance Ass'n
See Atkins v. Greenville Shipbuilding Corporation, 411 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied 396 U.S. 846 , 90 S. Ct. 105 , 24 L.Ed.2d 96 .
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Cited "see, e.g."
High Value Trading, LLC v. Shaoul
Moreover, evidence of other similar acts can be introduced to establish intent in fraud cases ( Matter of Brandon , 55 NY2d 206, 211 [1982]; see also People v Schwartzman , 24 NY2d 241, 246-248 [1969], cert denied 396 US 846 [1969]; compare People v Allen , 198 AD2d 789, 789 [4th Dept 1993], affd 84 NY2d 982 [1994]).
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Cited "see, e.g."
Young v. Lacy
Although it is true, as plaintiff points out, that, because of the collateral evidence rule, defendant’s attorney would have been bound by plaintiffs answers concerning her federal tax returns without “refut[ing] [those] answers . . . by calling other witnesses or by producing extrinsic evidence” (Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-305 [Farrell 11th ed]; see also People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 245 [1969], cert denied 396 US 846 [1969]; Casa de Meadows Inc. [Cayman Is.] v Zaman, 76 AD3d 917 , 924 [2010]), we nevertheless conclude that defendant’s attorney should have been allowed t…
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Cited "see, e.g."
YOUNG, BONNIE v. LACY, BARBARA
Although it is true, as plaintiff points out, that, because of the collateral evidence rule, defendant’s attorney would have been bound by plaintiff’s answers concerning her federal tax returns without “refuting [those] answers by calling other witnesses or by producing extrinsic evidence” (Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-305 [Farrell 11th ed]; see also People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 245 , cert denied 396 US 846 ; Casa de Meadows Inc. [Cayman Is.] v Zaman, 76 AD3d 917 , 924), we nevertheless conclude that defendant’s attorney should have been allowed to ask the questions (see…
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Cited "see, e.g."
Young v. Lacy
Although it is true, as plaintiff points out, that, because of the collateral evidence rule, defendant’s attorney would have been bound by plaintiffs answers concerning her federal tax returns without “refut[ing] [those] answers . . . by calling other witnesses or by producing extrinsic evidence” (Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-305 [Farrell 11th ed]; see also People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 245 [1969], cert denied 396 US 846 [1969]; Casa de Meadows Inc. [Cayman Is.] v Zaman, 76 AD3d 917 , 924 [2010]), we nevertheless conclude that defendant’s attorney should have been allowed t…
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Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Mattys
Because the underlying facts were introduced to establish an element of the crime charged, they were not collateral (see, Prince, Richardson on Evidence § 6-305 [Farrell 11th ed]; see also, People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 245-246 , mot to amend remittitur granted 24 NY2d 914 , rearg denied 24 NY2d 916 , cert denied 396 US 846 ).
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Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Walker
One traditional method of accomplishing these ends is to demonstrate through questioning that the witness has been guilty of prior immoral, vicious or criminal conduct bearing on credibility (id., § 455; see, e.g., People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 244 , cert denied 396 US 846 ; People v Webster, 139 NY 73 ).
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Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Ashner
However, trial courts retain wide discretion to limit cross-examination "based on concerns about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’ safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant” (Delaware v Van Arsdall, 475 US 673, 679 ; see also, People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 244 , cert denied 396 US 846 ; People v Sorge, 301 NY 198 ).
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Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Green
It is well settled that evidence of uncharged crimes is generally admissible on the issue of a defendant’s intent (see, People v Molineux, 168 NY 264, 293 ; see also, People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 247-248 , cert denied 396 US 846 ).
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Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Zarrelli
Evidence of relatively contemporaneous attempted and completed sales of cocaine would be highly relevant to negate this defense, and probative of defendant’s intent to commit the crime charged (see, People v Tune, 103 AD2d 990, 992 ; see also, People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 249 , cert denied 396 US 846 ).
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Cited "see, e.g."
People v. Beavers
(People v Pavao, 59 NY2d 282, 288 , citing Richardson, Evidence § 491, at 477 [Prince 10th ed]; see also, People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 245 , cert denied 396 US 846 .) "It is well established that the party who is cross-examining a witness cannot introduce extrinsic documentary evidence or call other witnesses to contradict a witness’ answers concerning collateral matters solely for the purpose of impeaching that witness’ credibility.” (People v Pavao, supra, at 288-289 ; accord, People v Zabrocky, 26 NY2d 530, 535 ; Richardson, Evidence § 491, at 477 [Prince 10th ed].) As the Cou…
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People v. Francis
Nor were the dismissals of such a nature as "bespeaks the absence of a reasonable basis for believing the truth of the charge” (People v Korn, 40 AD2d 561 ; see also, People v Schwartzman, 24 NY2d 241, 250 , remittitur amended 24 NY2d 914 , cert denied 396 US 846 ).
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Cited "see, e.g."
White & White, Inc. v. American Hospital Supply Corp.
See also, Riverside Coal Co. v. United Mine Workers of America, 410 F.2d 267 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 , 90 S.Ct. 89 , 24 L.Ed.2d 95 (1969).
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Cited "see, e.g."
Volpicelli v. Salamack
See, e. g., People v. Schwartzman, 24 N.Y.2d 241, 245 , 299 N.Y.S.2d 817, 821 , 247 N.E.2d 642, 644-645 , cert, denied, 396 U.S. 846 , 90 S.Ct. 103 , 24 L.Ed.2d 96 (1969). 44 .
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Cited "see, e.g."
McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co.
See also Particular Cleaners, Inc. v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 457 F.2d 189 (C.A.7, 1972), and Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 407 F.2d 624 (C.A.7), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 846 , 90 S.Ct. 90 , 24 L.Ed.2d 95 (1969).
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Cited "see, e.g."
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co.
Compare Kadlec v. Illinois Bell Telephone Co., 407 F. 2d 624 (CA7), cert. denied, 396 U. S. 846 (1969); Lucas v. Wisconsin Electric Power Co., 466 F. 2d 638 (CA7 1972), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1114 (1973), with Palmer v. Columbia Gas of Ohio, Inc., 479 F. 2d 153 (CA6 1973), modified in Turner v. Impala Motors, 503 F. 2d 607 (CA6 1974).
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Cited "see, e.g."
William Arvidson v. Dillingham Corporation, a Corporation Doing Business Under the Assumed Business Name of Albina Engine & MacHine Works
See, e. g., Atkins v. Greenville Shipbuilding Corp., 5 Cir. 1969, 411 F.2d 279 , cert. denied 396 U.S. 846 , 90 S.Ct. 105 , 24 L.Ed.2d 96 ; Vantrease v. United States, 6 Cir. 1968, 400 *4 F.2d 853; Storey v. Garrett Corporation, C.D.Cal.1967, 43 F.R.D. 301 ; Miller v. United States, E.D.Va.1969, 307 F.Supp. 932 . 8 .
United Mine Workers of America
v.
Riverside Coal Co., Inc.
v.
Riverside Coal Co., Inc.
No. 291.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 13, 1969.
Edward L. Carey, Harrison Combs, Willard P. Owens, and E. H. Rayson for petitioner.
Douglas, Granted, Should.
Cited by 1 opinion | Published
C. A. 6th Cir. Certiorari denied.
Mr. Justice Douglas is of the opinion that certiorari should be granted.