Pearson v. Dodd, 429 U.S. 396 (1977). · Go Syfert
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Pearson v. Dodd, 429 U.S. 396 (1977). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
72 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 12 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Township of Montville v. Block 69, Lot 10 (nj, 1977-06-09)
Treatment trajectory · 1977 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1977 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Township of Montville v. Block 69, Lot 10
N.J. · 1977 · confidence medium
The Court noted that plaintiff was not challenging the notice required to transfer the interest to the State, but only the procedures by which the State subsequently sold her property to a third person. 429 U.S. 396 at 396-398 , 97 S.Ct. at 581-582, 50 L.Ed. 2d at 576-577. [6] See Note, supra, 84 Yale L.J. at 1506 et seq.; Note, "Requirements of Notice in In Rem Proceedings," 70 Harv.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Township of Montville v. Block 69, Lot 10, Assessed to Spitz
N.J. · 1977 · confidence medium
The Court noted that plaintiff was not challenging the notice required to transfer the interest to the State, but only the procedures by which the State subsequently sold her property to a third person. 429 U. S. 396 at 396-398 , 97 S. Ct. at 581-582, 50 L.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." N.L.R.B. v. Cal-Maine Farms, Inc.
5th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence low
NLRB v. Design Sciences, 573 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir.1978); see also Bayside Enterprises, 429 U.S. at 304 n. 14, 97 S.Ct. at 581 n. 14 (where the NLRB has construed the agricultural-laborer exemption, a reviewing court has a "limited" function and must give "appropriate weight" to the NLRB's judgment).
examined Cited "see, e.g." Johnson v. Kelly (3×)
E.D. Pa. · 1977 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare the factual situation presented in Pearson v. Dodd, 429 U.S. 396 , 97 S.Ct. 581 , 50 L.Ed.2d 574 (1977) (per curiam).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Izaak Walton League of America Endowment, Inc. v. State (2×)
Minn. · 1977 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, also, Pearson v. Dodd, 429 U. S. 396 , 97 S. Ct. 581 , 50 L. ed. 2d 574 (1977).
PEARSON
v.
DODD Et Al.
75-1318.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Jan 12, 1977.
429 U.S. 396
Philip G. Terrie argued the cause and filed briefs for appellant., Wrn. Roy Rice argued the cause for appellees. With him on the brief were John D. Daly and Thomas E. Morgan.*
Per Curiam.
Cited by 22 opinions  |  Published
Per Curiam.

When appellant failed to pay 1961 real estate taxes pertaining to her one-quarter interest in the oil and gas in 68 acres of land in Kanawha County, W. Va., the interest became subject to transfer to the State under West Virginia statutory procedures that afford notice to the landowner only through the posting of a delinquency list on the county courthouse door and the publication of the list in local newspapers. W. Va. Code §§ HA-2-10a, 11A-3-2 (1974). The interest was sold to the State under these procedures in 1962.[*397] West Virginia Code § 11A-3-8 (1974) gave appellant a statutory entitlement to redeem the interest at any time within 18 months of the date of the state purchase, but appellant did not redeem during that period. The State thereafter decided to sell the interest and, as required by West Virginia law, commenced a suit in State Circuit Court to effect a sale. The suit resulted in the conveyance in 1966, by tax deed, of the oil and gas interest to appellee W. P. Dodd. The only notice of this sale was by way of publication in two local newspapers, pursuant to § 11A-4-12 (1974). Over two years later, in July 1968, appellant attempted to pay the State Auditor a sum of money to redeem the interest. Appellant then brought this action in state court to quiet title. The Circuit Court rendered judgment for appellees. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed,-W. Va.-, 221 S. E. 2d 171 (1975). We noted probable jurisdiction. 426 U. S. 946 (1976).

The Jurisdictional Statement phrased the due process question presented by the appeal as whether notice by publication of the tax sale was constitutionally deficient, but was unclear whether the challenge was directed to the 1962 sale to the State or to the 1966 sale to appellee Dodd. At oral argument counsel for appellant made clear, however, that her challenge was not addressed to the procedures for notice attending the 1962 transfer of the interest to the State, Tr. of Oral Arg. 21-23, but solely to the procedures for notice attending the 1966 sale of the interest by the State to appellee Dodd. Indeed, we were repeatedly informed that the 1962 sale to the State was not even “an issue in this case.” Id., at 22, 25,. 26. But under state law absolute title had vested in the State at the expiration of the 18-month period after the 1962 sale during which appellant might have exercised but did not exercise her Tight to redeem: § 11A-A-12 expressly provides that in such circumstance “the State has absolute title to all . . . land sold to the State for nonpayment of[*398] taxes . . . [which has] become irredeemable . . . Appellant thus has no constitutionally protected property or entitlement interest upon which she may base a challenge of constitutional deficiency in the notice provisions attending the 1966 sale to appellee Dodd. The appeal is therefore dismissed for want of a properly presented federal question.

So ordered.