Heiney v. Florida, 469 U.S. 920 (1984). · Go Syfert
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Heiney v. Florida, 469 U.S. 920 (1984). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the accepted standard on review ... is not whether the evidence failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt, but whether there was substantial, competent evidence for a jury to so conclude.”
326 citation events (24 in the last 25 years) across 41 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Benson v. State (fladistctapp, 1988-05-20)
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 41 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (quoted) Benson v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the accepted standard on review ... is not whether the evidence failed to exclude every reasonable hypothesis but that of guilt, but whether there was substantial, competent evidence for a jury to so conclude.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) People v. Thompson (2×)
Cal. · 1988 · confidence medium
(Id. at pp. 145-146; and see Heiney v. Florida (1984) 469 U.S. 920, 920-924 [ 83 L.Ed.2d 237, 238 , 105 S.Ct. 303 ] [dissent by Marshall, J. to den. of pet. to vacate death sentence].) But we have also noted there is a difference between calling upon residual feelings of doubt and inviting readjudication of matters resolved at the guilt phase.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Burr v. Florida
SCOTUS · 1985 · confidence medium
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447, 488, n. 34 (1984) (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan and Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Heiney v. Florida, 469 U. S. 920, 924 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
discussed Cited "see" Loehrke v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210 (Fla.) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Dennis William Blackstone
9th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. McCollum, 732 F.2d 1419, 1426 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 301 , 83 L.Ed.2d 236 (1984); United States v. Gaertner, 705 F.2d 210, 217 (7th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1071 , 104 S.Ct. 979 , 79 L.Ed.2d 216 (1984).
cited Cited "see" ca9 1993
9th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bruno v. Rushen, 721 F.2d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir.1983) (per curiam), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 302 , 83 L.Ed.2d 236 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Cassandra Y. Wilson
9th Cir. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bruno v. Rushen, 721 F.2d 1193, 1195 (9th Cir.1983) (comment that defense counsel had agreed to fabricate a defense for profit was direct attack on integrity of defense counsel and constituted reversible error), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Winiarz v. State
Nev. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally United States v. McCollum, 732 F.2d 1419, 1424-25 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 (1984) (evidence of prior bad acts may not be introduced to show intent if there is substantial dispute concerning whether the event charged as a crime occurred at all); United States v. Jimenez, 613 F.2d 1373, 1376 (5th Cir. 1980) (government must produce evidence of the prior act which would withstand directed verdict in a trial for that act).
discussed Cited "see" Taylor v. State (2×)
Fla. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210, 215 (Fla.) (premeditation may be inferred from the manner in which the homicide was committed and the nature and manner of the wounds), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Yoris v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984); Benson v. State, 526 So.2d 948, 954 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 536 So.2d 243 (Fla. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1069 , 109 S.Ct. 1349 , 103 L.Ed.2d 817 (1989) (quoting Dirring v. United States, 328 F.2d 512, 515 (1st Cir.1964) (“If enough pieces of a jigsaw puzzle fit together the subject may be identified even though some pieces are lacking.”)); Tumulty v. State, 489 So.2d 150, 152 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 496 So.2d 144 (Fla.1986); State v. Griffith, 561 So.2d 528, 530 …
discussed Cited "see" Penn v. State (2×)
Fla. · 1991 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Lazarowicz v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Lazarowicz v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Gonzalez v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210, 212 (Fla.1984), ce rt. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984); Rose v. State, 425 So.2d 521, 523 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909 , 103 S.Ct. 1883 , 76 L.Ed.2d 812 (1983).
examined Cited "see" State v. Hunt (4×)
N.J. · 1989 · signal: see · confidence high
Black, Capital Punishment: The Inevitability of Caprice and Mistake in Administering the Death Penalty (part I) (1981); see Heiney v. Florida, 469 U.S. 920, 921-22 , 105 S.Ct. 303, 304 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237, 238 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
discussed Cited "see" Santana v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210, 211 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984); Dellinger v. State, 495 So.2d 197, 198 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986), cert. denied, 503 So.2d 326 (Fla.1987); Bradwell v. State, 468 So.2d 1113, 1114 (Fla. 3d DCA 1985); Evans v. State, 452 So.2d 987, 988 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984); LaChance v. State, 396 So.2d 1234, 1235 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
discussed Cited "see" Russell v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Robinson v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984), and Trees v. K-Mart Corp., 467 So.2d 401 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985), review denied, 479 So.2d 119 (Fla.1985).
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Earl Benard Crawford
8th Cir. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 302 , 83 L.Ed.2d 236 (1984) (defendants’ conduct was a substantial step when they planned a bank robbery, surveyed the bank assembled the necessary weapons and disguises, and drove to the area of the bank in the getaway vehicle).
discussed Cited "see" Johnson v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210, 212 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984); Avery v. State, 505 So.2d 596, 597 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987); L.S. v. State, 446 So.2d 1148, 1150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984), aff'd, 464 So.2d 1195 (Fla.1985); Sorey v. State, 419 So.2d 810, 814 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982), rev. denied, 476 So.2d 675 (Fla.1985).
discussed Cited "see" Thomas v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984); State v. Williams, 444 So.2d 13 (Fla. 1984); Williams v. State, 437 So.2d 133 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 909 , 104 S.Ct. 1690 , 80 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984); Rose v. State, 425 So.2d 521 (Fla. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909 , 103 S.Ct. 1883 , 76 L.Ed.2d 812 (1983); In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 431 So.2d 594, 595 (Fla. 1981), citing with approval Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 , 75 S.Ct. 127 , 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954); Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d 1120 …
discussed Cited "see" Thomas v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984); State v. Williams, 444 So.2d 13 (Fla.1984); Williams v. State, 437 So.2d 133 (Fla.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 909 , 104 S.Ct. 1690 , 80 L.Ed.2d 164 (1984); Rose v. State, 425 So.2d 521 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909 , 103 S.Ct. 1883 , 76 L.Ed.2d 812 (1983); In re Standard Jury Instructions in Criminal Cases, 431 So.2d 594 , 595 (Fla.1981), citing with approval Holland v. United States, 348 U.S. 121 , 75 S.Ct. 127 , 99 L.Ed. 150 (1954); Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d 1120 (Fla…
discussed Cited "see" Harvard v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210 (Fla.) (whether evidence fails to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of innocence is for jury to determine, and where there is substantial, competent evidence to support jury verdict, supreme court will not reverse judgment based upon verdict), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984); Spinkellink v. State, 313 So.2d 666 (Fla.1975) (judgment of conviction comes to supreme court with presumption of correctness; defendant’s claim of insufficiency of the evidence cannot prevail where there is substantial, competent evidence to support …
discussed Cited "see" Tamer v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210, 212 (Fla.), cert, denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984); Smith v. State, 424 So.2d 726, 731 (Fla. 1982), cert denied, 462 U.S. 1145 , 103 S.Ct. 3129 , 77 L.Ed.2d 1379 (1983); Clark v. State, 363 So.2d 331, 335 (Fla.1978); Weeks v. State, 492 So.2d 719, 721 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986); Blair v. State, 481 So.2d 1279 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); T.G.B. v. State, 405 So.2d 427 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981).
cited Cited "see" United States v. Michael A. Griley, Jr.
4th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see · confidence high
See United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 153 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 302 , 83 L.Ed.2d 236 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Pendleton v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1985); Toole v. State, 472 So.2d 1174 (Fla. 1985); Lincoln v. State, 459 So.2d 1030 (Fla. 1984).
discussed Cited "see" Wilson v. State (2×)
Fla. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210, 215-16 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Lopez v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210 (Fla.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984); Rose v. State, 425 So.2d 521 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909 , 103 S.Ct. 1883 , 76 L.Ed.2d 812 (1983); Dino v. State, 405 So.2d 213 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981), rev. denied, 413 So.2d 875 (Fla.1982).
discussed Cited "see" Periu v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Andreasen v. State, 439 So.2d 226, 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983), pet. for review denied, 449 So.2d 264 (Fla. 1984); Snell v. State, 302 So.2d 487 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 314 So.2d 585 (Fla. 1975); Burroughs v. State, 221 So.2d 159 (Fla. 2d DCA 1969); see generally Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210, 212 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Cano v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210 (Fla.), cert. denied, — U.S. -, 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984); Rose v. State, 425 So.2d 521 (Fla.1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 909 , 103 S.Ct. 1883 , 76 L.Ed.2d 812 (1983); Tibbs v. State, 397 So.2d 1120 (Fla.1981), aff'd, 457 U.S. 31 , 102 S.Ct. 2211 , 72 L.Ed.2d 652 (1982).
discussed Cited "see" Ross v. State
Fla. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984); Waterhouse v. State, 429 So.2d 301 (Fla. 1983), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 104 S.Ct. 415 , 78 L.Ed.2d 352 (1984).
discussed Cited "see" Castro v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Heiney v. State, 447 So.2d 210 (Fla.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 105 S.Ct. 303 , 83 L.Ed.2d 237 (1984); McCampbell v. State, 421 So.2d 1072 (Fla. 1982); Breedlove v. State, 413 So.2d 1 (Fla.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 , 103 S.Ct. 184 , 74 L.Ed.2d 149 (1982); Tafero v. State, 403 So.2d 355 (Fla. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 983 , 102 S.Ct. 1492 , 71 L.Ed.2d 694 (1982); cf. State v. Hegstrom, 401 So.2d 1343 (Fla. 1981) (where jury rejected finding of premeditation, defendant could not be sentenced on underlying felony).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Harries v. State
Tenn. Crim. App. · 1997 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Campbell, 664 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Tenn. 1984), cert. denied 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 302 , 83 L.Ed.2d 236 (1984).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Harries v. State
Tenn. Crim. App. · 1997 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also State v. Campbell, 664 S.W.2d 281, 284 (Tenn.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 302 , 83 L.Ed.2d 236 (1984).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Neal
4th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Model Penal Code § 5.01(1)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1985); see also United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 (1984).
cited Cited "see, e.g." United States v. James Neal, Iii, A/K/A Sonny
4th Cir. · 1996 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Model Penal Code § 5.01(l)(c) (Proposed Official Draft 1985); see also United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149, 152 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 302 , 83 L.Ed.2d 236 (1984).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Robert TURNER, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Charles D. MARSHALL, Warden, Respondent-Appellee
9th Cir. · 1995 · signal: see also · confidence low
Id. at 615; see also Bruno v. Rushen, 721 F.2d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 302 , 83 L.Ed.2d 236 (1984).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Jay A. Korich
7th Cir. · 1994 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, e.g., United States v. Carmen Ramirez, 823 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir.1987) ("substantial step" found where defendants arrived armed at the bank in a stolen car but changed their plans when they learned that the police were waiting for them); United States v. Johnson, 962 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir.1992) (same result under similar facts); see also United States v. McFadden, 739 F.2d 149 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 (1984); United States v. Stallworth, 543 F.2d 1038, 1041 (2d Cir.1976).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Carroll v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Bruno v. Rushen, 721 F.2d 1193, 1194-95 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 302 , 83 L.Ed.2d 236 (1984); Arthur v. State, 575 So.2d 1165, 1185-86 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), cert. denied, 575 So.2d 1191 (Ala. 1991).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." United States v. Susana Sanchez-Robles
9th Cir. · 1991 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 645 , 94 S.Ct. 1868 , 40 L.Ed.2d 431, 438 (1974) (one instance of misconduct in extended trial does not render entire trial fundamentally unfair) with Bruno v. Rushen, 721 F.2d 1193, 1194-95 (9th Cir.1983) (per curiam) (infringement of right to counsel where prosecutor labels lawyer’s actions “unethical and perhaps even illegal” without any supporting evidence), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 302 , 83 L.Ed.2d 236 (1984), and United States v. McDonald, 620 F.2d 559, 563-64 (5th Cir.1980) (infringement of right to counsel where prose…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Mainland Industries, Inc. v. Standal's Patents Ltd., and Roderick E. MacDonald as of the Estate of George M. Standal
Fed. Cir. · 1986 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also United States v. McCollum, 732 F.2d 1419 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 920 , 105 S.Ct. 301 , 83 L.Ed.2d 236 (1984) (not an abuse of discretion to admit portions of videotaped hypnosis session for purposes of demonstrating basis for hypnotist’s opinion and excluding portion in which party recited his “enhanced memory” version of facts); see generally Durflinger v. Artiles, 727 F.2d 888 (10th Cir.1984) (in civil wrongful death action, not an abuse of discretion to admit videotaped confession of murder by the accused); compare Foster v. Crawford Shipping Co., Ltd., 496 F.2d 78…
Robert D. Heiney
v.
Florida
83-6994.
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct 15, 1984.
469 U.S. 920
Marshall, Brennan.
Cited by 124 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 86%
Citer courts: District Court of Appeal of Fl… (1)
Reporter's Syllabus — editorial summary, not part of the Court's opinion

On petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of Florida.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is denied.

Justice MARSHALL, with whom Justice BRENNAN joins, dissenting.

I continue to adhere to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 231, 96 S.Ct. 2909, 2973, 49 L.Ed.2d 859 (1976) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 314, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 2764, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (MARSHALL, J., concurring). I therefore dissent from the Court's denial of the petition and would vacate the death sentence here.

Lead Opinion

Sup. Ct. Fla. Certiorari denied.

Dissent

Justice Marshall, with whom Justice Brennan joins,

dissenting.

I continue to adhere to my view that the death penalty is in all circumstances cruel and unusual punishment forbidden by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U. S. 153, 231 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Furman v.[*921] Georgia, 408 U. S. 238, 314 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring). I therefore dissent from the Court’s denial of the petition and would vacate the death sentence here.

I

I must also write, however, to point out an aspect of the trial judge’s sentencing decision that violates indispensable principles contained in the prevailing death penalty jurisprudence of this Court. The trial judge in this case overturned a jury recommendation of life and sentenced the defendant to die, in part out of a belief as to the law that is wholly inconsistent with the constitutional principles of Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U. S. 104 (1982), and Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U. S. 586 (1978).

In reviewing the jury recommendation against death, the sentencing judge explained that he saw no mitigating circumstances, and that he believed the jury had based its recommendation on an “invalid” mitigating circumstance stemming from residual feelings of doubt as to guilt. Because he saw this as a legally improper mitigating circumstance he felt little hesitancy in putting their recommendation to the side. Since the sentencing here, the Florida Supreme Court seems to have added its voice in support of the proposition that lingering doubts as to guilt cannot be a ground for mitigating a death sentence.

“A convicted defendant cannot be ‘a little bit guilty.’ It is unreasonable for a jury to say in one breath that a defendant’s guilt has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt and, in the next breath, to say someone else may have done it, so we recommend mercy.” Buford v. State, 403 So. 2d 943, 953 (1981), cert. denied, 454 U. S. 1164 (1982).

The error of the sentencing judge in this case thus seems to have been enshrined in Florida law.

This Court, in Lockett and then more decisively in Eddings, held that any aspect of the case that could rationally support mitigation must be deemed a legally valid basis for mitigation. There is certainly nothing irrational — indeed, there is nothing novel— about the idea of mitigating a death sentence because of lingering doubts as to guilt. It has often been noted that one of the most fearful aspects of the death penalty is its finality. There is simply no possibility of correcting a mistake. The horror of sending an innocent defendant to death is thus qualitatively different from the horror of falsely imprisoning that defendant. The belief that such[*922] an ultimate and final penalty is inappropriate where there are doubts as to guilt, even if they do not rise to the level necessary for acquittal, is a feeling that stems from common sense and fundamental notions of justice. As such it has been raised as a valid basis for mitigation by a variety of authorities.

The wisdom behind mitigating death sentences in the face of doubts as to guilt led the drafters of the Model Penal Code to include that factor in their model death penalty statute as a mitigating factor so strong that its presence would exclude the possibility of death as a matter of law.

“Death Sentence Excluded. When a defendant is found guilty of murder, the Court shall impose sentence for a felony of the first dégree [i. e., a noncapital offense] if it is satisfied that:
“(f) although the evidence suffices to sustain the verdict, it does not foreclose all doubt respecting the defendant’s guilt.” ALI, Model Penal Code §210.6(1), p. 107 (Off. Draft, 1980).

In its explanatory comments the authors made their intentions clear:

“This provision is an accommodation to, the irrevocability of the capital sanction. Where doubt of guilt remains the opportunity to reverse a conviction on the basis of new evidence must be preserved, and a sentence of death is obviously inconsistent with that goal.” §210.6(1), Comment 5, p. 134.

The Fifth Circuit has also acknowledged the validity of the mitigating factor:

“The fact that jurors have determined guilt beyond a reasonable doubt does not necessarily mean that no juror entertained any doubt whatsoever. There may be no reasonable doubt — doubt based upon reason — and yet some genuine doubt exists. It may reflect a mere possibility; it may be but the whimsy of one juror or several. Yet this whimsical doubt — this absence of absolute certainty — can be real.
“The capital defendant whose guilt seems abundantly demonstrated may be neither obstructing justice nor engaged in an exercise in futility when his counsel mounts a vigorous defense on the merits. It may be proffered in the slight hope of unanticipated success; it might seek to persuade one or more to prevent unanimity for conviction; it is more likely to produce only whimsical doubt. Even the latter serves the[*923] defendant, for the juror entertaining doubt which does not rise to reasonable doubt can be expected to resist those who would impose the irremedial penalty of death.” Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F. 2d 573, 580-581 (1981), cert. denied, 459 U. S. 882 (1982).

Once again, the factor was presented as a valid one in Justice Stevens’ partial dissent in Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U. S. 447, 467 (1984). The dissent noted that the Spaziano jury “may well [have been] sufficiently convinced of [Spaziano’s] guilt to convict him, but nevertheless also sufficiently troubled by the possibility that an irrevocable mistake might be made . . . that [it] concluded that a sentence of death could not be morally justified in this case.” Id., at 488, n. 34. We did not then realize, however, that Florida seems to have denigrated this wholly proper mitigating factor as a matter of law.

Standing in sharp contradistinction to the Eddings and Lockett holdings, the refusal by Florida courts to consider this valid factor should be reviewed.

II -

Although this legal issue might arise in a sentencing scheme that respected the finality of a jury decision against death, it is not necessarily an accident that this case came from Florida’s system, where judges may override jury decisions for life. In Spaziano, which upheld the Florida system, the dissent cited data showing that judges are usually more likely to impose death than are juries. 468 U. S., at 488, n. 34. Where fully informed and rational juries decide that death is inappropriate, a judge’s override rarely if ever shows that, in spite of the jury, there was really no reasonable doubt but that death was appropriate. It is far more likely that the override decision simply fails to account for the more intangible or less traditionally “legal” elements of mitigation that informed a jury’s decision. This case seems a clear illustration. Indeed, the Spaziano dissent correctly suspected that a system of death sentencing by judges — “trained to distinguish proof of guilt from questions concerning sentencing” — would be less likely to recognize this valid mitigating circumstance. Ibid.

Eddings and Lockett entitle a defendant to a sentencer who can consider all mitigating circumstances, whether or not they conform to traditional legal categories. The weight assigned to any element can only be a function of the values of the community, for certainly there is no “objective” formula. Once a mitigating[*924] circumstance is considered, assigned weight, and determined to be sufficient to preclude death, the Constitution should allow no “superior” authority to remove that circumstance from the equation and impose death. To allow a judge to override a jury decision for life — as this Court did in Spaziano — not only places the defendant in the fundamentally unfair position of having to repetitively justify the appropriateness of one’s continued life, it also facilitates the denigration of a variety of mitigating circumstances.

Only a narrow reliance on legal formalism could lead one to question whether doubts as to guilt can be insufficient to preclude acquittal but sufficient to preclude death. The judge here concluded that the jury confronted the horror of sending to his death a defendant who might be innocent. But rather than accept that this was weighty logic in favor of life, he assumed that it was a form of logic that should be declared invalid by Florida courts. I dissent from the denial of the petition in this case.