Meriweather, Judge.

On May 14, 2025, Plaintiff Ashley Black (“Ms. Black”), proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint seeking damages for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, negligence in safeguarding confidential information, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.^[1] See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 2–3, 5–6. On May 19, 2025, Ms. Black filed a deficient document which the Court construed to be an amended complaint.^[2] See Am. Compl., ECF No. 8. The Amended Complaint and attachments, while difficult to follow, raise claims related to litigation initiated in the Northern District of Illinois.^[3] Ms. Black alleges judicial misconduct, denial of access to the court, ongoing trauma and emotional distress, appellate interference and record tampering, unconstitutional taking of property, and violations of her civil and constitutional rights and international law. See generally Am. Compl. The claims are brought against parties involved in Ms. Black’s ongoing litigation including individual defendants and their legal counsel, judicial officers, and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.

On June 25, 2025, the United States filed a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Rules of the United States Court Federal Claims (“RCFC”). See Def.’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 10 (“Mot.”). Giving deference to Ms. Black due to her pro se status, the United States contends that the Court should dismiss Ms. Black’s Amended Complaint as “her claims challenging the actions of other tribunals and private parties are frivolous as they lack an arguable basis in law or in fact and this Court manifestly lacks jurisdiction over them.” Id. at 1. The United States contends that although “some of Ms. Black’s claims are couched in terms with potential to be within this Court’s jurisdiction;” Ms. Black “fails to assert a non-frivolous basis for the Court’s jurisdiction.” Id. at 2. Having reviewed the parties’ briefs and the relevant law, the Court GRANTS the United States’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 10, and DISMISSES Ms. Black’s Amended Complaint, ECF No. 8.4

BACKGROUND5

Ms. Black’s Amended Complaint asserts claims on behalf of herself, Jaffrey Pullins,6 Jeremy Kinsey,7 and Harmony Wrencher,8 Ms. Black’s daughter.^[9] Ms. Black’s Amended Complaint alleges: (1) violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, Am. Compl. at 3, 4, 10; (2) fraud and tortious conduct and abuse of power by the courts, Id. at 4, Am. Compl. Ex. 8-2 at 4; (3) tortious interference in business relations and identity fraud, Am. Compl. at 7; (4) constitutional torts, Id. at 12, 111–14, Am. Compl. Ex. 8-29 at 3; (5) takings claims, Am. Compl. Ex. 8-46; and (6) violations of multilateral human rights treaties, Am. Compl. Ex. 8-48, Am. Compl. Ex., 8-49. Ms. Black includes claims against Judge April Perry, Chief Judge Virginia Kendall, Northern District of Illinois clerks and court staff, unknown federal officers, Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP, and individuals including Victoria Olson (“Ms. Olson”) and Ayinde Love (“Ms. Love”). See Am. Compl. at 16.

On January 31, 2025, Ms. Black filed her case in the Northern District of Illinois. Compl. at 2. The case was dismissed as frivolous on March 24, 2025. Id. at 5; see Black v. BPM LLP, et al., No. 25-cv-1112, Order. Subsequently, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed Ms. Black’s appeal for failure to comply with court rules. See Black v. BPM LLP, et al., No. 25-cv-1607 (7th Cir.), Docket; see also Am. Compl. Ex. 8-6 at 1 (dismissing the case for failure to comply with Circuit Rule 3(c)). Here, Ms. Black’s claims arise from the Northern District of Illinois and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals proceedings. Ms. Black alleges that she entered into a nondisclosure agreement with the District Court which was breached when the court provided information about the case to “unserved defendants” including Ms. Olson, Ms. Love, and BPM LLP. Compl. at 2, 4–5. After filing her district court complaint, Ms. Black received an answer and a motion to dismiss from Ms. Olson at her home address, prompting Ms. Black to file a report with the Chicago Police Department about “retaliatory” legal mail. Id. The ensuing actions taken by the individuals, judicial officers, and attorneys are the focal point of Ms. Black’s Amended Complaint.

Since filing the Complaint, “Ms. Black has burdened the Court with deficient miscellaneous filings, duplicative new case filings, and extensive communications in violation[] of the Court’s rules.”10 Anti-Filing Inj. Order at 3, ECF No. 23. On July 10, 2025, the Court entered an Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 15, requesting that Ms. Black show cause as to why the Court should not impose an anti-filing injunction restricting further filings in this case. Ms. Black continued to violate the Court’s rules despite acknowledging her “intense” and “voluminous” filing pattern. Am. Resp. at 2. On August 18, 2025, the Court issued a second Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 20, requesting that Ms. Black show cause as to why the Court should not impose an anti-filing injunction restricting further filings in the Court. On September 2, 2025, Ms. Black filed a Response to the Show Cause Order explaining that her “‘pattern’ of repetitive filing” is an “effort to secure a forum” for her constitutional claims. Response to the Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 22 (“Response”). Within a week of filing the Response, Ms. Black filed three new cases with the Court.^[11] Because Ms. Black’s behavior established a “vexatious pattern of filing multiple duplicative lawsuits,” the Court issued an injunction prohibiting Ms. Black from filing any new documents with the Court without first obtaining leave from the Chief Judge. Hemphill v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 374 F. App’x 41, 46 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (applying In re Powell, 851 F.2d 427, 430–31 (D.C. Cir. 1988)); see Anti-filing Inj. Order at 3.

LEGAL STANDARD

Pro se plaintiffs, such as Ms. Black, are held to a less stringent standard than plaintiffs with attorney representation; however, Ms. Black still bears the burden of establishing the Court’s jurisdiction. See Hale v. United States, 143 Fed. Cl. 180, 184 (2019) (“[E]ven pro se plaintiffs must persuade the court that jurisdictional requirements have been met.”) (citing Bernard v. United States, 59 Fed. Cl. 497, 499 (2004)); Riles v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 163, 165 (2010) (citing Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. ^[5], 9 (1980); Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). “If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the action.” RCFC 12(h)(3); see RCFC 12(b)(1); see also Folden v. United States, 379 F.3d 1344, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction may be challenged at any time by the parties or by the [C]ourt sua sponte.”) (citing Fanning, Philips & Molnar v. West, 160 F.3d 717, 720 (Fed. Cir. 1998)).

The Court derives its power primarily from the Tucker Act, which provides, in relevant part:

The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department,

United States, Case No. 25-cv-1299, filed on August 5, 2025 (“Black IV”); Black v. United States, Case No. 25-cv-1301, filed on August 5, 2025 (“Black V”); Black v. United States, Case No. 25-cv-1505, filed on September 10, 2025 (“Black VI”); Black v. United States, Case No. 25- cv-1506, filed on September 10, 2025 (“Black VII”); and Black v. United States, Case No. 25-cv- 1507, filed on September 10, 2025 (“Black VIII”).

or upon any express or implied contract with the United States, or for liquidated or unliquidated damages in cases not sounding in tort.

28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). Importantly, the Tucker Act is “only a jurisdictional statute; it does not create any substantive right enforceable against the United States for money damages.” United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 398 (1976). Therefore, to establish that a case falls within this Court’s limited jurisdiction, plaintiffs must base their claims on a substantive law that “can fairly be interpreted as mandating compensation by the Federal Government for the damage sustained.” Doe v. United States, 463 F.3d 1314, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206, 217 (1983)). This is commonly referred to as a “money-mandating” statute. Id.

DISCUSSION

I. The Court Lacks Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over Ms. Black’s Claims.

The Court lacks jurisdiction over Ms. Black’s claims because there is no applicable money-mandating statute on which she can base her claims.

First, Ms. Black’s contract claims asserted against the Northern District of Illinois for breach of a nondisclosure agreement fail. See Am. Compl. at 4, 13; Compl. at 2. “While this Court generally has ‘jurisdiction over express and implied-in-fact contracts,’ it lacks [subject- matter] jurisdiction over such claims where a plaintiff fails to plausibly allege such a contract.” Doiban v. United States, 173 Fed. Cl. 527, 536 (2024) (citing Stephens v. United States, 165 Fed. Cl. 341, 347 (2023)); Barksdale v. United States, 174 Fed. Cl. 168, 175 (2024) (This Court “may dismiss a claim for lack of jurisdiction where a plaintiff fails to plausibly allege [] a contract”); see also Starrett v. United States, No. 2022-cv-1555, 2023 WL 152827, at *4 (Fed. Cir. Jan. ^[11], 2023) (“Because . . . [plaintiff did] not plausibly allege the existence of an express or implied contract with the United States, the Claims Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case and correctly dismissed [plaintiff’s] complaint.”). Indeed, it is practically hornbook law that to prevail on a breach-of-contract claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate, “in the first place,” the existence of a “binding agreement,” i.e., a contract. Anderson v. United States, 344 F.3d 1343, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (cleaned up). “The requirements for a contract between the United States and a private party are (1) mutuality of intent to contract, (2) consideration, (3) lack of ambiguity in offer and acceptance, and (4) authority on the part of the government agent entering the contract.” Suess v. United States, 535 F.3d 1348, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2008). At the motion-to- dismiss stage, “a complaint must make more than ‘tender[ ] naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement.’” Richardson v. United States, No. 23-cv-1365, 2023 WL 8798072, at *2 (Fed. Cl. Dec. 19, 2023) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)) (dismissing plaintiff’s claim for breach of contract where the complaint contained “one bare allegation” of breach of a contract with the United States). Ms. Black must therefore allege detailed facts “that could plausibly be interpreted as manifesting a government intent to form a contract.” Starrett, 2023 WL 152827, at *3.

Ms. Black’s Amended Complaint does not plausibly allege the existence of a contract with the United States sufficient to confer this Court’s jurisdiction. Ms. Black’s contract claims are based on model nondisclosure forms with the names of individual defendants handwritten on the form. See Compl. at 20–25 (naming Craig Hamm as defendant), 26–28 (naming James Lichau CPA as defendant), 29–30 (naming William J. Emerson Heery as defendant), 32–43 (naming William J. Emerson Heery as defendant), 61–64 (naming Ms. Olson as defendant), 66– 69 (naming James Elliot as defendant), 72–73 (naming Ms. Love as defendant). Ms. Black signed the forms, but no other parties signed them and none of the forms were docketed. See Black v. BPM LLP, et al., No. 25-cv-112, Docket. Ms. Black’s bare allegations—based on unsigned, boilerplate documents, naming non-government individuals—are insufficient to demonstrate that she entered into an agreement with a government agent possessing authority to bind the United States in a contract. Ms. Black’s Amended Complaint “contains no non- frivolous, non-conclusory allegations of fact even remotely suggesting that [s]he had a contract with the United States.” Gorrio v. United States, No. 24-cv-0354, 2024 WL 5711596, at *3 (Fed. Cl. Apr. ^[11], 2024), aff’d, No. 2024-cv-1832, 2025 WL 1619774 (Fed. Cir. June 9, 2025). Thus, this Court must dismiss any purported breach-of-contract claim for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Second, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Ms. Black’s takings claims as she fails to allege any facts to demonstrate a taking by the United States. See Am. Compl. Ex. 8- 46. Under the Fifth Amendment’s just compensation clause, Ms. Black “must establish that [she] was the owner of property and that some portion of the property was taken for a public purpose.” Applegate v. United States, 35 Fed. Cl. 406, 413 (1996). Ms. Black is “required to plead [her] claim by a preponderance of evidence.” Mandry v. United States, 165 Fed. Cl. 170, 173 (2023) (citing McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp. of Ind., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)). Here, the takings claims include “[d]enial of in forma pauperis status under biased circumstances,”12 “[r]efusal to docket substantive motions,” and the failure to “safeguard[] Plaintiff’s identity and location under” the alleged nondisclosure agreement. Am. Compl. Ex. 8- 46 at 4. Ms. Black does not have a property right to control the federal court docket related to her case or to an appeal in forma pauperis where “‘a reasonable person could [not] suppose that the appeal has some merit.’” Black v. BPM LLP, et al., No. 25-cv-1112, Min. Entry (April 10, 2025), ECF No. 85 (quoting Walker v. O’Brien, 216 F.3d 626, 631–32 (7th Cir. 2000)). Because Ms. Black “fails to meet the elements necessary to plead a takings claim, this Court lacks jurisdiction.” Id. (referencing Parker v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 159, 163 (2010)).

Third, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Ms. Black’s claims involving federal judicial officers, individuals, and Hinshaw & Culbertson LLP. Ms. Black alleges Judge Perry and Chief Judge Kendall “abused discretion and obstructed filings in Plaintiff’s federal case,” while “other named actors connected to BPM LLP, Hinshaw Law, and various agencies, acted in coordinated retaliation and fraud.” Am. Compl. at 2, 7. “The only proper defendant for any matter before this court is the United States, not its officers nor any other individual.” Stephenson v. United States, 58 Fed. Cl. 186, 190 (2003). Where the “relief sought is against others than the United States,” the suit “must be ignored as beyond the jurisdiction of the [C]ourt.” United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 588 (1941). Consequently, it is well settled that “claims against state, local officials, or private individuals or entities” cannot proceed in this Court. Curie v. United States, 163 Fed. Cl. 791, 808–09 (2022) (collecting cases); see 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (“The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim against the United States . . . .”) (emphasis added). Ms. Black’s claims against federal officials, attorneys, and private parties are outside the Court’s jurisdiction. See Rohland v. United States, 136 Fed. Cl. 55, 65 (2018). Further, Ms. Black “cannot circumvent this Court’s jurisdiction ‘by merely naming the United States as defendant where the true nature of her allegations are lodged against a private party.’” Barksdale, 174 Fed. Cl. at 172 (quoting Doiban, 173 Fed. Cl. 527). Ms. Black’s Amended Complaint must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as she brings claims against Northern District of Illinois judges, courts, individuals, and non-federal entities. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a); Sherwood, 312 U.S. at 588.

Fourth, Ms. Black’s constitutional claims are outside of this Court’s jurisdiction. The Court lacks jurisdiction over constitutional claims that do not mandate payment. See LeBlanc v. United States, 50 F.3d 1025, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1995). Ms. Black alleges violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments. See ECF No. 8-2 at 3–5, 7–8, 12. However, none of these constitutional provisions are money mandating. See Stephens v. United States, 166 Fed. Cl. 598, 605 (2023) (citing United States v. Connolly, 716 F.2d 882, 887–88 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that “the Claims Court lacks jurisdiction over [plaintiff’s] first amendment claim”)); Kenyon v. United States, 683 F. App’x 945, 946 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“the Fourth, [] and Eighth Amendments, as well as the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments are not ‘money-mandating’”); Harvey v. United States, 683 F. App’x 942, 943 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (“The [Court of Federal Claim’s] limited jurisdiction does not extend to claims brought under . . . the Due Process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, because they do not contain money-mandating provisions.”).

Fifth, Ms. Black’s challenges to alleged civil rights violations by court officials are outside of the Court’s jurisdiction. See McDermott v. United States, 130 Fed. Cl. 412, 413–414 (2017) (explaining that it is “well settled” that the Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction over civil rights claims). Ms. Black alleges “civil rights violations committed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.” Am. Compl. Ex. 8-4 at 2. However, this Court cannot “intervene in any proceeding” before another court. McDermott, 130 Fed. Cl. at 414. Similarly, Ms. Black’s allegation of a constitutional tort under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (known as a Bivens claim), must be dismissed as being outside of the Court’s jurisdiction. See Jarvis v. United States, No. 17-cv-0762, 2017 WL 4674048, at *4 (Fed. Cl. 2017) (dismissing plaintiff’s Bivens claims); Brown v. United States, 105 F.3d 621, 624 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (finding that Bivens actions “lie outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Federal Claims”).

Sixth, the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over Ms. Black’s tort claims for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, tortious interference in business, and fraud. See Am. Compl. at 7. Again, “[i]t is well settled” that this Court “lacks [] jurisdiction to entertain tort claims.” Shearin v. United States, 992 F.2d 1195, 1197 (Fed. Cir. 1993). Indeed, the Tucker Act expressly limits this Court’s jurisdiction to “cases not sounding in tort.” 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (emphasis added); see also Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. United States, 655 F.2d 1047, 1059 (Ct. Cl. 1981) (“Tort claims, of course, are expressly beyond our Tucker Act jurisdiction.”); Bennett v. United States, 169 Fed. Cl. 486, 494 (2024) (“[I]t is axiomatic that this Court lacks jurisdiction over tort claims, as expressly stated by the Tucker Act.”). Accordingly, the Court must dismiss Ms. Black’s claims sounding in tort. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 655 F.2d at 1059.

Finally, the Court lacks jurisdiction over Ms. Black’s allegations of violations of her human rights based on the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”). See Am. Compl. Ex. 8-48. The Court does not have jurisdiction “of any claim against the United States growing out of or dependent upon any treaty entered into with foreign nations.” 28 U.S.C. § 1502. “[T]he Tucker Act contains no language permitting this court to entertain jurisdiction over claims founded upon customary international law” such as the UDHR. Phaidin v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 231, 234 (1993). “[M]ultinational agreements do not create enforceable obligations” establishing a “right for money damages against the United States under the Tucker Act.” Pikulin v. United States, 97 Fed. Cl. 71, 77–78 (2011), appeal dismissed, 425 Fed. Appx. 902 (Fed. Cir. 2011). Accordingly, Ms. Black’s claims arising under the ICCPR and UDHR are dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

As none of Ms. Black’s claims are within the scope of this Court’s narrow jurisdiction, the Court must dismiss Ms. Black’s Amended Complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1).13

II. The Motion for Relief from Judgment Under Rule 60(b) is Premature.

On June 30, 2025, Ms. Black filed a Motion for Relief from Judgment Under Rule 60(b), ECF No. 12. When that Motion was filed, the Court had not entered judgment in Ms. Black’s case. See Docket. Accordingly, the request for relief was premature, and the Court DENIES Ms. Black’s Motion.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Ms. Black’s claims and must dismiss them pursuant to RCFC 12(b)(1). Accordingly, the Court hereby GRANTS the United States’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 10, and DISMISSES Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, ECF No. 8. Additionally, Ms. Black’s deficient filings received between June 30, 2025 and July 29, 2025 are REJECTED, and the Motion for Relief From Judgment, ECF No. 12, is DENIED. The Clerk of Court shall enter JUDGMENT accordingly. The Court further CERTIFIES, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith because, as alleged, Ms. Black’s claims are outside the jurisdiction of this Court and incurable.^[14]

Ms. Black is reminded that she is enjoined from filing any new documents with the Court without first obtaining leave from the Chief Judge. See Anti-Filing Inj. Order. Any motion for leave to file must include as an attachment a full complaint that meets all the requirements of RCFC 8, including an explanation of why the complaint is timely and properly before this Court and unrelated to any prior litigation Ms. Black has pursued. If the Court grants a motion for leave to file, Ms. Black will be required to pay in full the Court's filing fee to proceed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.