Bowden v. State, 12 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1943). · Go Syfert
Bowden v. State, 12 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1943). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
23 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: David Lee May v. State of Mississippi (missctapp, 2019-05-21)
Treatment trajectory · 1943 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1943 1984 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) David Lee May v. State of Mississippi
Miss. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
A trial court has broad discretion to grant a continuance, see, e.g., McClendon v. State, 335 6 See, e.g., Sharp, 786 So. 2d at 379 (¶9) (“[A] delay caused by the withdrawal of the defendant’s attorney which entails allowing the new attorney a reasonable time to become familiar with the case and prepare for trial cannot be weighed against the State because it is beyond the State’s control.”). 12 So. 2d 887, 888 (Miss. 1976), and we cannot say that the trial judge abused his discretion by granting a continuance to give counsel time to prepare.
discussed Cited "see" Smith v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1959 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bowden v. State, 152 Fla. 715 , 12 So.2d 887 .” The trial court in its instructions gave all proper ones to indicate to the jury the difference between the conspiracy count and the substantive offenses, and this court holds that there was no reversible error shown by the appellant’s third question.
cited Cited "see" Frenette v. State
Fla. · 1947 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bowden v. State, 152 Fla. 715 , 12 Sou. (2) 887.
cited Cited "see" State v. Bowden
Fla. · 1944 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bowden v. State, (Fla.) 12 So. 2nd 887 .
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Merrone v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Bowden v. State, 152 Fla. 715 , 12 So.2d 887 (1943), opinion after remand, 154 Fla. 511 , 18 So.2d 478 (1944); Jackson v. State, 449 So.2d 411 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984). .
Rubin Bowden
v.
State of Florida
Supreme Court of Florida.
Apr 9, 1943.
12 So. 2d 887
Mabry A. Carlton and John E. Lake, for appellant. J. Tom Watson, Attorney General, Woodrow M. Melvin and John C. Wynn, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Buford, Terrell, Thomas, Adams, Sebring, Brown, Chapman.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published
BUFORD, C. J.:

On indictment charging rape, accused was convicted of assault with intent to commit rape. From judgment of conviction, appeal has been perfected to this Court.

[*716] The facts as disclosed by the record can arouse no sympathy on behalf of the appellant. We are convinced by the record and, in fact, by the testimony of the appellant that he ravished and had carnal knowledge of a child of the age of thirteen years.

The record indicates, though it was alleged in the indictment, that the victim was an unmarried female of previous chaste character.

The verdict of the jury, in effect acquitting the accused of rape and finding him guilty of assault with intent to commit rape, though contrary to the overwhelming evidence, has foreclosed the question as to penetration in favor of the accused.

The record fails to establish that the act was accomplished by force and against the will of the victim. At most, the record shows that the victim protested, but that while protesting she cooperated materially in attaining the consummation of the criminal assault.

Therefore, the judgment must be reversed with directions that the cause go back to the lower court to be certified to the criminal court of record for further proceedings.

It will be recognized that when the judgment of reversal shall have been entered here the cause goes back to the lower court in the same status as it would have if it stood there on indictment charging assault with intent to commit rape, and with the former verdict and judgment standing as a bar to the prosecution of any higher offense by reason of the acts here involved. Such verdict and judgment will not bar prosecution for the crime of assault with intent to have sexual intercourse with an unmarried female under eighteen years of age of previous chaste character.

Reversed and remanded.

So ordered.

TERRELL, THOMAS, ADAMS, and SEBRING, JJ., concur. BROWN and CHAPMAN, JJ., dissent.