Groover v. Adiv Holding Co., 202 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). · Go Syfert
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Groover v. Adiv Holding Co., 202 So. 2d 103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
15 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Rhea v. District Board of Trustees (fladistctapp, 2013-03-13)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rhea v. District Board of Trustees
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Groover v. Adiv Holding Co., 202 So.2d 103, 104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Associated Elec. & Gas Ins. Servs., Ltd. v. Houston Oil & Gas Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
Co. v. Ramanovski, 443 So.2d 302, 304 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (quoting Groover v. Adiv Holding Co., 202 So.2d 103, 104-105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ALAVA EX REL. ALAVA v. Allstate Ins.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
We therefore hold that appellants have demonstrated that the trial court's findings are against the manifest weight of the evidence, see General Insurance Co. v. Ramanovski, 443 So.2d 302 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Groover v. Adiv Holding Co., 202 So.2d 103, 104-105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967), and that Ernesto is entitled to coverage under his father's automobile insurance policy.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) General Ins. Co. v. Ramanovski
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
As a general principle of review, the decision of the trial court in a declaratory judgment action is accorded a presumption of correctness and the trial judge's "resolution of an issue ... should not be rejected on appeal unless based on a misapplication of law or shown by the record to be clearly wrong, against the manifest weight of evidence, or not supported by competent substantial evidence." Groover v. Adiv Holding Company, 202 So.2d 103, 104-105 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967).
cited Cited "see" Florida Keys Audubon Society, Inc. v. Monroe County
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Groover v. Adiv Holding Company, 202 So.2d 103 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967); Grable v. Hillsborough County Port Authority, 132 So.2d 423 (Fla. 2d DCA 1961).
cited Cited "see" Lalor v. Dade County
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1972 · signal: see · confidence high
See Groover v. Adiv Holding Co., Fla.App.1967, 202 So.2d 103 .
J. Erwin GROOVER, Appellant,
v.
ADIV HOLDING COMPANY, a Florida Corporation, T.J. Bomar, Individually and As Trustee, and Helen G. Bomar, and Humble Oil & Refining Company, Appellees.
66-967.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Sep 12, 1967.
202 So. 2d 103
Charles Carroll, C.J., and Hendry and Swann.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published

[*104] Pruitt & Pruitt, Miami, for appellant.

Mershon, Sawyer, Johnston, Dunwody & Cole, Miami, for Adiv Holding Co., Forrest & Friedman, Miami, for Bomar, Carlton, Fields, Ward, Emmanuel, Smith & Cutler and Peter J. Winders, Tampa, for Humble Oil & Refining Co., appellees.

Before CHARLES CARROLL, C.J., and HENDRY and SWANN, JJ.

SWANN, Judge.

The plaintiff, J.E. Groover, appeals from a final decree of dismissal of his second amended complaint for declaratory decree against the defendants, Adiv Holding Company, et al.

A final hearing was held on the issues raised by plaintiff's second amended complaint, as well as the undisposed motions and answers of the defendants. At its conclusion, the defendants moved for an involuntary dismissal under Rule 1.35(b), Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, 1965 Revision, 30 F.S.A. The chancellor dismissed the cause. In his final decree he made the findings that there was no justiciable issue; that the amended complaint and testimony were insufficient to entitle plaintiff to a declaratory decree, and that there was no bona fide dispute between the parties which presented a justiciable question.

Plaintiff's claim for reversal on appeal is directed solely to the question of whether the second amended complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action to entitle him to a declaratory decree. This does not appear, however, to have been the basis for the ruling by the chancellor. His ruling indicates that it was based on both the insufficiency of the complaint and the evidence offered by plaintiff in support thereof. See Rule 1.35(b), supra.

Even if we assume, without deciding, that the second amended complaint alleged sufficient factual allegations to withstand a motion to dismiss, we are then confronted with the question of whether upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown a right to relief after the presentation of his evidence.

The plaintiff alleged certain factual matters in his second amended complaint and offered evidence in support thereof. The factual issues alleged in his complaint for declaratory decree are to be tried and determined in the same manner as other issues of fact in other civil actions in the circuit court in which the proceeding is pending. Section 87.08, Florida Statutes F.S.A.; Bituminous Casualty Corp. v. B. & B. Chemical Co., Fla.App. 1965, 179 So.2d 125.

The plaintiff therefore has the burden of establishing the existence of a present, actual controversy,[1] as well as proving the material allegations of his second amended complaint. The chancellor found that the plaintiff had not carried the necessary burden of proof and dismissed this cause.

A chancellor's decision is presumed to be correct and his resolution of an issue tried on controverted and conflicting evidence should not be rejected on appeal unless based on a misapplication of law or shown by the record to be clearly wrong, against the manifest weight of evidence, or not supported by competent substantial[*105] evidence. Marucci v. Linder, Fla. App. 1965, 177 So.2d 237; Gaer v. Gaer, Fla.App. 1964, 168 So.2d 789.

No error having been clearly demonstrated by the appellant, we affirm the final decree herein appealed.

Affirmed.

1 May v. Holley, Fla. 1952, 59 So.2d 636; M. & E. Land Co. v. Siegel, Fla.App. 1965, 177 So.2d 769; Hunt v. Smith, Fla.App. 1962, 137 So.2d 232; Grable v. Hillsborough County Port Authority, Fla.App. 1961, 132 So.2d 423; Colby v. Colby, Fla. App. 1960, 120 So.2d 797. See also Stephenson v. Stephenson, (7th Cir.1957), 249 F.2d 203.