Glenn v. State, 204 So. 3d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). · Go Syfert
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Glenn v. State, 204 So. 3d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“in sentencing within the law's minimum and maximum, the discretion afforded is about as broad as discretion can be for trial judges.”
40 citation events (40 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Alvin Davis v. State of Florida (fladistctapp, 2019-04-25)
Treatment trajectory · 2017 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
2017 2021 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 22 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Alvin Davis v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
the sentencing factors properly considered by the trial court relate to the defendant, his offense, and the victim.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Green v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
in sentencing within the law's minimum and maximum, the discretion afforded is about as broad as discretion can be for trial judges.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Alcantara-Menjivar v. State of Florida (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
Impermissible sentencing factor "[W]hen a trial court relies on impermissible factors in sentencing a defendant, the court violates the defendant's due process rights." Charles v. State, 204 So. 3d 63, 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Michael Geno Manna v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
“Generally, ‘when a sentence is within statutory limits, it is not subject to review by an appellate court.’” Landis v. State, 404 So. 3d 405 , 411 (Fla. 4th DCA 2024) (quoting Charles v. State, 204 So. 3d 63, 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Mitchell Robert Landis v. State of Florida (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Generally, “when a sentence is within statutory limits, it is not subject to review by an appellate court.” Charles v. State, 204 So. 3d 63, 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Howard v. State, 820 So. 2d 337, 339 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) CHARLES W. RANDOLPH, JR. v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Charles v. State, 204 So. 3d 63, 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ASHLEY NICOLE MCKENZIE v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
See State v. Brewer, 767 So. 2d 1249, 1253 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (Harris, J., concurring) (explaining that the four penological goals in sentencing are: retribution, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation); Charles v. State, 204 So. 3d 63, 66-67 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (collecting cases that discuss legitimate sentencing considerations, including incapacitation and protection of society).
cited Cited as authority (rule) NICO GALLO v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Charles v. State, 204 So. 3d 63, 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (internal citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) KIMBERLY JANE LUNDQUIST v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
N.D.W., 235 So. 3d at 1002 (quoting Charles v. State, 204 So. 3d 63, 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)); see also Fernandez v. State, 212 So. 3d 494, 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) ("[C]onsideration of a constitutionally impermissible sentencing factor is a fundamental error in the sentencing process.").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) REGINALD LEE TAYLOR, JR. v. STATE OF FLORIDA (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Charles v. State, 204 So. 3d 63, 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (quoting Howard v. State, 820 So. 2d 337, 339 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) KAREEN KENNETH WALKER v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Charles v. State, 204 So. 3d 63, 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
cited Cited as authority (rule) N.D.W. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Charles v. State, 204 So.3d 63, 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chambers v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
Even if it’s your very first crime.” In Charles v. State, 204 So.3d 63, 67 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016), we recently held that “it is not impermissible for a sentence to be used as a means of general deterrence.” There, we explained that “deterrence, both general (‘send a message to the community 1 ) and specific (send a message to the individual being sentenced), is not merely one factor amidst the sea of relevant sentencing considerations; it is a key component of punishment itself—the ‘primary purpose’ of sentencing under the CPC [Criminal Punishment Code].” Id.
discussed Cited "see" JOVANY LUIS ORTIZ v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Charles v. State, 204 So. 3d 63, 66 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016). ‘“[A] trial court’s consideration of a constitutionally impermissible sentencing factor is a fundamental error in the sentencing process’ which is reviewable for the first time on direct appeal.” Hillary v. State, 232 So. 3d 3 , 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Fernandez v. State, 212 So. 3d 494, 496 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)). “[I]t is a violation of due process for the court to rely on conduct of which the defendant has actually been acquitted when imposing a sentence.” Dinkines v. State, 122 So. 3d 47…
discussed Cited "see" MARCUS STRONG v. STATE OF FLORIDA (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Charles v. State, 204 So. 3d 63, 66-67 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (affirming where, after the state urged the court to “send a message,” the court imposed the maximum sentence without any comment or elaboration); Barlow v. State, 238 So. 3d 416, 417 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (affirming where there was no indication that the trial court based its sentence on testimony regarding uncharged conduct). “[T]rial judges are routinely made aware of information which may not be properly considered in determining a cause.
cited Cited "see" Frey v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see · confidence high
See Charles v. State, 204 So.3d 63 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." SHAUN WYRICH v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Smith v. State, 320 So. 3d 20 , 27 (Fla. 2021) (citing Sanford v. Rubin, 237 So. 2d 134, 137 (Fla. 1970)); see also Charles v. State, 204 So. 3d 63, 66 (Fla 4th DCA 2016) (stating that sentences within statutory limits are generally not subject to appellate review (quoting Howard v. State, 820 So. 2d 337, 339 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002))).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." DAVID FOX v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Charles v. State, 204 So. 3d 63, 67 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) “[W]hen a trial court relies on impermissible factors in sentencing a defendant, the court violates the defendant’s due process rights.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." RENALDO CHAMPAGNE v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Holland v. State, 953 So. 2d 19, 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ("[T]he points on the scoresheet totaled 1090 points and the [LPS] was 796.5 months' or 66.3 years' incarceration for this collection of second- degree felonies." (emphasis added)), Charles v. State, 204 So. 3d 63, 65 , 65 n.3 (Fla. -9- 4th DCA 2016) (noting that the offender's LPS was 79.8 months (6.65 years) yet he was sentenced to five years for the possession of Ecstasy/MDMA conviction), Robinson v. State, 160 So. 3d 521, 522 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (reversing denial of postconviction motion in part and stating that Robinson pleade…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Champagne v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Holland v. State , 953 So.2d 19 , 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ("[T]he points on the scoresheet totaled 1090 points and the [LPS] was 796.5 months' or 66.3 years' incarceration for this collection of second-degree felonies." (emphasis added) ), Charles v. State , 204 So.3d 63 , 65, 65 n.3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (noting that the offender's LPS was 79.8 months (6.65 years) yet he was sentenced to five years for the possession of Ecstasy/MDMA conviction), Robinson v. State , 160 So.3d 521 , 522 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (reversing denial of postconviction motion in part and stating that Robinson pleaded …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Champagne v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Holland v. State , 953 So.2d 19 , 20 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007) ("[T]he points on the scoresheet totaled 1090 points and the [LPS] was 796.5 months' or 66.3 years' incarceration for this collection of second-degree felonies." (emphasis added) ), Charles v. State , 204 So.3d 63 , 65, 65 n.3 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (noting that the offender's LPS was 79.8 months (6.65 years) yet he was sentenced to five years for the possession of Ecstasy/MDMA conviction), Robinson v. State , 160 So.3d 521 , 522 (Fla. 5th DCA 2015) (reversing denial of postconviction motion in part and stating that Robinson pleaded …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." KERN R. DAVIS v. STATE OF FLORIDA (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Charles v. State, 204 So. 3d 63, 71-74 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016) (Gross, J., dissenting). * * * Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. 7
David Allen GLENN
v.
STATE of Florida
No. 4D16-3141.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Oct 19, 2016.
204 So. 3d 63
David Allen Glenn, Avon Park, pro se., No appearance, required for appellee.
Conner, Damoorgian, Warner.
Published
PER CURIAM.

Affirmed. The trial court properly denied .relief on appellant’s' claim that the information charging him with burglary was fundamentally defective. See DuBoise, v. State, 520 So.2d 260, 265 (Fla.1988) (holding that an information is not fundamentally defective for failing to charge an essential element if it refers to the specific portion of the criminal code that details the elements); Fulcher v. State, 766 So.2d 243, 244-45 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000). Moreover, appellant’s reliance on Hicks v. State, 407 So.2d 252 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), is completely without merit, as the case was quashed in State v. Hicks, 421 So.2d 510, 510-11 (Fla.1982) (holding that consent to entry is an affirmative defense and non-consent is not an element of burglary).

WARNER, DAMOORGIAN and CONNER, JJ., concur.