State v. Gazda, 257 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1971). · Go Syfert
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State v. Gazda, 257 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1971). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
80 citation events (39 in the last 25 years) across 18 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: United States v. Nathaniel James (ca11, 2019-04-24)
Treatment trajectory · 1971 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1971 1998 2026
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#1 Fla. Stat. § 921.02 cited 1× in this case · 1 total citations of statute #1 Fla. Stat. § 921.01 cited 1× in this case · 1 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 26 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Nathaniel James
11th Cir. · 2019 · confidence medium
State v. Gazda, 257 So. 2d 242, 243-44 (Fla. 1971).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Joseph Peter Clarke v. United States
Fla. · 2016 · confidence medium
Gazda, 257 So.2d at 243.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Jose Santos Lopez Hernandez
11th Cir. · 2013 · confidence medium
Relying on the Florida Supreme Court’s opinion in State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-44 (Fla.1971), we held that “the term ‘conviction’ means determination of guilty by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court.” Orellanes, 809 F.2d at 1528 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Miami-Dade County v. Dominguez
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · confidence medium
See Montgomery v. State, 897 So.2d 1282, 1285 (Fla. 2005) (specifying that a finding of guilt is a “conviction” even though adjudication of guilt is withheld); State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-44 (Fla.1971) (holding that “the term ‘conviction’ means determination of guilt by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court”); State v. Keirn, 720 So.2d 1085, 1087-88 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998) (finding *1002 that a defendant who “is found guilty by a jury has been ‘convicted’ ... even in the absence of an adjudication”) (citing Smith v. Bart…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Santiago
11th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
After consulting Florida law, we held that “ ‘the term “conviction” means determination of guilty by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court.’ ” Id. (quoting State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-44 (Fla.1971)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Euladio Santiago, Jr.
11th Cir. · 2010 · confidence medium
Thus, the only question before us is whether his guilty plea followed by a sentence of probation and a withholding of adjudication counts as a “conviction.” 5 determination of guilty by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court.’” Id. (quoting State v. Gazda, 257 So. 2d 242, 243-44 (Fla. 1971)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Montgomery v. State
Fla. · 2005 · confidence medium
In Florida, it is generally recognized that "the term `conviction' means determination of guilt by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court." State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-44 (Fla.1971).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Negron v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
In Florida, it is generally recognized that "the term `conviction' means determination of guilt by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court." State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-44 (Fla.1971).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) St. Lawrence v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
As the court held in Batchelor v. State, 729 So.2d 956, 958 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999): In Florida, it is generally recognized that "the term `conviction' means determination of guilt by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court." State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-44 (Fla.1971).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. McFadden
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
Limitation on Withheld Sentences: In State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-44 (Fla.1971), this Court construed the term "conviction" for purposes of section 775.14, Florida Statutes (1971), which provides that any person receiving a withheld sentence which has not been altered for five years shall not thereafter be sentenced for conviction of same crime for which sentence was imposed.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Trombley v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
We relied on State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-244 (Fla.1971): "the term `conviction' means determination of guilty by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court." See also Fla. R.Crim.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Batchelor v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
In Florida, it is generally recognized that "the term `conviction' means determination of guilt by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court." State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-44 (Fla.1971).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Raulerson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-244 (Fla. 1971).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Willis
11th Cir. · 1997 · confidence medium
Garron v. State, 528 So.2d 353, 360 (Fla.1988); State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-44 (Fla.1971); See also United States v. Thompson, 756 F.Supp. 1492 (N.D.Fla.1991).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Proffitt v. UNEMPLOYMENT APPEALS COM'N
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
For example, this court has noted that the Florida Supreme Court "has distinguished a `judgment of conviction' (which requires an adjudication) from a `conviction' (which does not necessarily require an adjudication)." Smith v. Bartlett, 570 So.2d 360, 361 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990) (citing State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-44 (Fla. 1971)), review denied, 581 So.2d 1310 (Fla. 1991).
cited Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Smith
S.D. Fla. · 1994 · confidence medium
State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-44 (Fla.1971).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Ramon Escobar
4th Cir. · 1993 · confidence medium
As the Orellanes court noted, the Florida Supreme Court has held that "the term 'conviction' means determination of guilty by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court." State v. Gazda, 257 So. 2d 242, 243-44 (Fla. 1971)
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Henry W. Hall
6th Cir. · 1992 · confidence medium
The court found that the Florida Supreme Court ruled in State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-44 (Fla.1971), that “the term ‘conviction’ means determination of guilty by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court.” Orellanes, 809 F.2d at 1528 .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Thompson (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
N.D. Fla. · 1991 · confidence medium
State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-244 (Fla.1971).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) United States v. Reinaldo Orellanes, A/K/A Reinaldo Orellana
11th Cir. · 1987 · confidence medium
We now turn to Florida law, as P.L. 99-308, § 101(5) instructs, in our effort to determine whether Orellanes was properly characterized as a “convicted felon.” In State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-44 (Fla. 1971), the Florida Supreme Court declared that “the term ‘conviction’ means determination of guilty by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court.” Consequently, we conclude that the district court correctly held that Orellanes was previously “convicted” of a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year.
cited Cited "see" Mazza v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242 (Fla.1971).
examined Cited "see" United States v. Harry James Chubbuck (4×)
11th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-44 (Fla.1971) (stating that “for purposes of construing § 775.14, ... the term ‘conviction’ means determination of guilty by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court”); Garron v. State, 528 So.2d 353, 360 (Fla.1988) (per curiam) (“[T]he plea of guilty is an absolute condition precedent before the lack of adjudication can be considered a conviction”); Burkett v. State, 518 So.2d 1363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (holding that adjudication of guilt is a conviction for purposes of the state felon in possess…
discussed Cited "see" United States v. Harry James Chubbuck (2×)
11th Cir. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-44 (Fla. 1971) (stating that “for purposes of construing § 775.14,. . . the term ‘conviction’ means determination of guilty by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court”); Garron v. State, 528 So.2d 353, 360 (Fla. 1988) (per curiam) (“[T]he plea of guilty is an absolute condition precedent before the lack of adjudication can be considered a conviction”); Burkett v. State, 518 So.2d 1363 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (holding that adjudication of guilt is a conviction for purposes of the state felon in poss…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Pedro Jose Moreno Hernandez v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., State v. Gazda, 257 So. 2d 242, 243 (Fla. 1971); see also Peralta-Mejia v. State, No. 3D25-1719, 2025 WL 2670773 (Fla. 3d DCA Sept. 18, 2025) (denying defendant’s petition for writ of prohibition seeking to prohibit the circuit court from entering a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Francisco Peralta-Mejia v. State of Florida (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
Id.; see, e.g., State v. Gazda, 257 So. 2d 242 (Fla. 1971); Hoskins v. State, 221 So. 2d 447 (Fla. 1st DCA 1969).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Lopez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., State v. Gazda, 257 So.2d 242, 243-44 (Fla.1971) (for purpose of determining the statute of limitations on withheld sentences, "conviction” means a "determination of guilty by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not require adjudication by the court”); Singletary v. State, 290 So.2d 116 , 118 n. 4 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974) (whether or not adjudication was withheld, "persons on probation are beyond the trial or guilt determining stage of the criminal process and are not bailable ‘as of right’”). .
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
John Leon GAZDA, Respondent.
40814.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sep 15, 1971.
257 So. 2d 242
Boyd.
Cited by 49 opinions  |  Published

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., and Charles W. Musgrove, Asst. Atty. Gen., for petitioner.

[*243] Walter N. Colbath, Jr., Public Defender, for respondent.

BOYD, Justice.

This cause is before us on petition for writ of certiorari to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, reported at 244 So.2d 454. The decision sought to be reviewed is certified by the District Court as one passing upon a question of great public interest, giving this Court jurisdiction under § 4, Article V, of the Florida Constitution, F.S.A.

The question presented is whether under Florida Statutes § 775.14, F.S.A., a sentence is valid which is imposed more than five years from the date a plea of guilty is accepted and adjudication withheld. The trial court, on motion to vacate, upheld the validity of the sentence imposed on respondent herein. The District Court reversed.

Respondent was charged by Information with robbery in the Criminal Court of Record, Palm Beach County, Florida, on November 6, 1963. On November 12, 1963, respondent entered a plea of not guilty. On July 28, 1964, respondent withdrew a plea of not guilty and entered a plea of guilty to grand larceny, a lesser included offense. On the same date, July 28, 1964, the Court accepted a plea of guilty to grand larceny and ordered that "adjudication and sentence be withheld and a pre-sentence investigation be ordered." On August 21, 1964, respondent was ordered to be delivered to the Southwest Florida Tuberculosis Hospital, Hillsborough County, Florida, for examination and care. The Superintendent of the Tuberculosis Hospital was ordered to deliver respondent to the Palm Beach County Sheriff's Department at such time as the respondent was cured, for the purposes of having respondent brought before the court for sentencing.

It appears that respondent never returned from the State Hospital for sentencing. On February 2, 1965, the trial judge issued a bench warrant in an effort to bring respondent before him for sentencing. But respondent was not returned to state custody until May 1, 1970. He had meanwhile acquired a two year federal sentence, which he was serving in Sandstone, Minnesota.

Respondent attacked his plea by Motion to Vacate filed July 28, 1969, after the State's detainer was lodged against him. On August 19, 1969, the State petitioned for and obtained a Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Prosequendum in order to have respondent returned from the federal prison.

On October 28, 1969, hearing was held on respondent's motion to vacate in the Criminal Court of Record, the motion was denied and the Court sentenced respondent to five years, sentence to begin on respondent's finishing any sentence previously imposed by other jurisdictions.

On appeal the District Court reversed the judgment and sentence, holding that the limitation of Florida Statutes § 775.14, F.S.A., was absolute and that the court could not create exceptions. Judge Walden dissented on the grounds that the statute did not apply because respondent was not convicted; because the reason for the delay in sentencing (hospitalization) was reasonable, so that the statutory purpose would not apply, and further that the statute was tolled by issuance of the bench warrant during the five-year period.

Florida Statutes § 775.14, F.S.A., provides as follows:

"Limitation on withheld sentences. — Any person receiving a withheld sentence upon conviction for a criminal offense, and such withheld sentence has not been altered for a period of five years, shall not thereafter be sentenced for the conviction of the same crime for which sentence was originally withheld."

We agree with the majority opinion below that for the purposes of construing § 775.14, supra, the term "conviction" means determination of guilt by verdict of the jury or by plea of guilty, and does not[*244] require adjudication by the court. It is important to distinguish a "judgment of conviction" which is defective unless it contains an adjudication of guilt.[1] A judgment of conviction is a necessary prerequisite to a valid sentence.[2] We note that the definitions in Florida Statutes § 921.01 and § 921.02, F.S.A.[3] support the distinction made here between a judgment of conviction and a conviction. The latter term does not necessarily include an adjudication, whereas the former does.

In the instant case respondent was convicted within the intent of Florida Statutes § 775.14, F.S.A., on July 28, 1964, the date the Court accepted his plea of guilty. On that date the five year period of time within which he could be sentenced began to run. However, when respondent left the jurisdiction of the Court and failed to make his whereabouts known, he rendered it impossible for the Court to impose a lawful sentence. The operation of the Statute was tolled on February 2, 1965, the date the trial court issued a bench warrant in an effort to bring respondent before him for sentencing.

The District Court held that since the Statute did not expressly authorize an exception in the case of a defendant who has wrongfully absented himself from the jurisdiction during the period within which he could be sentenced, the Statute was not tolled. We disagree with this holding of the majority of the District Court and approve the view of Mr. Justice Walden in his dissenting opinion as follows:[4]

"I simply cannot endorse the proposition that a trial court can temporarily postpone adjudication and sentence pending pre-sentence investigation and receipt by the defendant of medical care — have the defendant flee or by self-help defeat the court's jurisdiction — enjoy his freedom from sentence while the statute (F.S. 1969, § 775.14, F.S.A.) ran, and thereby defeat the administration of punishment. The majority construction, if I assay it correctly, has the effect of telling every defendant who awaits pre-sentence investigation that if he can only hide for five years the law will bar the court from ever imposing sentence. After all, a defendant must be present to be sentenced and it hardly comports with logic to say that the sentence here was withheld when defendant took himself out of the court's reach and could not be made answerable to a bench warrant."

Accordingly, certiorari is granted, the decision of the District Court, insofar as it holds the operation of Florida Statutes § 775.14, F.S.A., was not tolled, is quashed and the cause remanded with directions to reinstate the judgment and sentence of the trial court.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, C.J., and ERVIN, CARLTON and ADKINS, JJ., concur.

1 Ellis v. State, 100 Fla. 27, 30, 129 So. 106, 108 (1930): "[T]his court is firmly committed to the doctrine that a legal conviction of crime includes a judgment of the court as well as a plea or verdict of guilty."
2 State ex rel. Spitzer v. Mayo, 129 Fla. 426, 176 So. 434 (1937); Finch v. Mayo, 137 Fla. 762, 189 So. 27 (1939).
3 Fla. Stat. § 921.01, F.S.A.: "Judgment defined. — The term judgment as used in the criminal procedure law means the adjudication by the court that the defendant is guilty or not guilty."

Fla. Stat. § 921.02, F.S.A.: "Rendition of judgment. — If the defendant has been convicted, a judgment of guilty, and if he has been acquitted, a judgment of not guilty, shall be rendered in open court and entered on the minutes of the court."

(The foregoing statutes, in effect at the time of the proceedings below, were repealed by Laws 1970, Ch. 70-399, § 180, effective January 1, 1971, but Rules 1.650 and 1.670, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, 33 F.S.A., contain similar provisions.)

4 Gazda v. State, 244 So.2d 454, 457 (Fla. App. 4th 1971).