Moretto v. Sussman, 274 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). · Go Syfert
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Moretto v. Sussman, 274 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
13 citation events (4 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: & SC16-341 Renaldo Devon McGirth v. State of Florida & Renaldo & Devon McGirth v. Julie L. Jones, etc. (fla, 2017-01-26)
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) & SC16-341 Renaldo Devon McGirth v. State of Florida & Renaldo & Devon McGirth v. Julie L. Jones, etc.
Fla. · 2017 · confidence medium
If no reasonable basis appears for a finding of ineffective representation, the trial court should so state on the record and advise the defendant that if he discharges his original counsel the State may not thereafter be required to appoint a substitute. 274 So.2d at 259.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Campbell v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Where the reason for the desired discharge is counsel’s alleged incompetence, the court “should make a sufficient inquiry of the defendant and his appointed counsel to determine whether or not there is reasonable cause to believe that the court appointed counsel is not rendering effective assistance to the defendant.” Nelson, 274 So.2d at 259.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Holland v. State
Fla. · 2005 · confidence medium
The trial court's duty in a Nelson inquiry is to "make a sufficient inquiry . . . to determine whether or not there is reasonable cause to believe that the court appointed counsel is not rendering effective assistance to the defendant." Nelson, 274 So.2d at 259.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Moore v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Nelson, 274 So.2d at 259.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cerrito v. Kovitch
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
In Moretto v. Sussman, 274 So.2d 259, 260 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973), we noted that: Usury is a creature of statute.
discussed Cited "see" Miller v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Nelson, 274 So.2d at 259.
cited Cited "see" Hollywood, Inc. v. City of Hollywood
Fla. · 1975 · signal: see · confidence high
See Leopold v. Richard Bertram and Co., 276 So.2d 225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973) and Moretto v. Sussman, 274 So.2d 259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Cerrito v. Kovitch
Fla. · 1984 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Moretto v. Sussman, 274 So.2d 259 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973).
Ronald G. MORETTO et al., Appellants,
v.
Irving SUSSMAN, As Trustee, Appellee.
72-1039.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Mar 16, 1973.
274 So. 2d 259
Walden.
Cited by 5 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 83%
Citer courts: District Court of Appeal of Fl… (1)

[*260] Leo Greenfield, of Law Offices of Leo Greenfield, North Miami, for appellants.

Joe D. Matheny, of Law Offices of Henderson & Matheny, Titusville, for appellee.

WALDEN, Judge.

This is an appeal from an interlocutory order which denied defendants' request for jury trial and dismissed defendants' amendment to their counter-claim, which amendment sought punitive damages because of plaintiff's alleged violation of the usury statute. We affirm.

The details of the financial dealings between the parties are unimportant here. Because of defendants' defaults, plaintiff sued for multiple relief, including the foreclosure of a mortgage. Defendants counterclaimed, charging usury and seeking statutory sanctions and penalties under F.S. 687.02, 687.04 and 687.071, Laws of 1969, F.S.A. The time for jury trial demand came and went per Rule 1.430, F.R. Civ.Proc., 30 F.S.A., and neither party timely requested such. Much later, with the cause being at issue and set for non-jury trial, the defendants undertook to amend and file a second count to their counter-claim. It again charged the same usury but, this time, demanded punitive damages thereby. Additionally, defendants thereafter demanded a jury trial. The instant order resulted.

First, are punitive damages allowable in addition to the statutory penalties and relief as a consequence of usury? The answer is "no".

Defendants assert that they are so entitled, resting their position on Chakford v. Sturm, Fla. 1953, 65 So.2d 864. With respect, they misplaced their confidence, as this case provides for no relief other than that allowed by statute. The statute of that time provided in certain instances for the forfeiture of principal and interest. The particular holding was that usurious payments previously made could be recovered and statutorily forfeited.

Usury is a creature of statute. Thus, usury violations are statutorily governed and give rise only to those penalties and relief statutorily contained or provided. Other damages, compensatory or punitive, are not recognized or permitted. See Coral Gables First National Bank v. Constructors of Florida, Fla.App. 1960, 119 So.2d 741; Coe v. Muller, Fla. 1917, 74 Fla. 399, 77 So. 88; Tel Service Co. v. General Capital Corp., Fla. 1969, 227 So.2d 667; Spinney v. Winter Park Building & Loan Ass'n., Fla. 1935, 120 Fla. 453, 162 So. 899.

Second, as to the re-opening of the closed period for demanding a jury trial, we feel that had the defendants been able to plead a new and valid cause of action, they would newly be entitled to request and receive jury trial for the whole case or such part of it as would be appropriate. Rule 1.430, F.R.Civ.Proc.

However, we are of the opinion that the new pleading being legally inadequate, does not justify a new entitlement. If it were so, the time limit rule for demanding a jury trial would be rendered impotent and meaningless. A tardy pleader could simply file an abortive and insufficient pleading and thereby nullify the rule maker's intent and the trial court's discretion by using the worthless pleading as a vehicle to remedy his earlier default in failing to timely request jury trial.

No reversible error having been demonstrated, the order appealed is

Affirmed.

CROSS and MAGER, JJ., concur.