Thrasher v. First Natl. Bank of Miami, 288 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). · Go Syfert
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Thrasher v. First Natl. Bank of Miami, 288 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
11 citation events (2 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Xavier v. Leviev Boymelgreen Marquis Developers, LLC (fladistctapp, 2012-11-21)
Statutes interpreted (leading-cases list)
#4 Fla. Stat. § 679.503 cited 1× in this case · 5 total citations of statute
Top citers, strongest first. 4 distinct citers.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Xavier v. Leviev Boymelgreen Marquis Developers, LLC
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
Blue Supply Corp. v. Novos Electro Mech, Inc., 990 So.2d 1157, 1159 (Fla. 3d DCA 2008); Thrasher v. First Nat’l Bank of Miami, 288 So.2d 288, 289 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974); Fla. R.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Good To Go Food Store, Inc. v. LRM Realty, LLP
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
So long as the substance is expressed without prolixity, the forms may be varied to meet the facts of a particular case.”); Gomes v. LeGrand, 560 So.2d 389, 389 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (holding that complaint that alleged existence of agreement to pay rent and failure to pay that rent stated cause of action); Thrasher v. First Nat’l Bank of Miami, 288 So.2d 288, 288-89 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974) (for purposes of motion to dismiss complaint for failure to state cause of action, all allegations in complaint are taken to be true and all reasonable inferences are permitted on behalf of plaintiff; failure …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) MBank El Paso, N.A. v. Sanchez (2×)
Tex. · 1992 · confidence medium
Because of our disposition of the nondelegability issue, we do not reach this alternative ground for the court of appeals' holding. [3] See, e.g., Griffith v. Valley of Sun Recovery and Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 126 Ariz. 227 , 613 P.2d 1283, 1286 (1980); Henderson v. Security Nat'l Bank, 72 Cal.App.3d 764, 770 , 140 Cal.Rptr. 388, 391 (1977); Thrasher v. First Nat'l Bank, 288 So.2d 288, 289 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1974); Whisenhunt v. Allen Parker Co., 119 Ga.App. 813 , 168 S.E.2d 827 (1969); Van Bibber v. Norris, 404 N.E.2d 1365 (Ind.App.1980); Benschoter v. First Natl Bank, 218 Kan. 144 , 542 P.2d …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) General Electric Credit Corp. v. Timbrook
W. Va. · 1982 · confidence medium
Accord, Evers-Jordan Furniture Co. v. Hartzog, 237 Ala. 407 , 187 So. 491 (1939); Cox v. Stuart, 229 Ala. 409 , 157 So. 460 (1934); Griffith v. Valley of Sun Recovery and Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 126 Ariz. 227 , 613 P.2d 1283 , 1286 (1980); Henderson v. Security National Bank, 72 Cal.App.3d 764 , 770, 140 Cal.Rptr. 388 , 391 (1977); Thrasher v. First National Bank, 288 So.2d 288, 289 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1974); Southern Industrial Savings Bank v. Greene, 224 So.2d 416 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1969); Whisenhunt v. Allen Parker Co., 119 Ga.App. 813 , 168 S.E.2d 827 (1969); Van Bibber v. Norris, 404 N.E.2d …
Horace THRASHER and Rosa Thrasher, Appellants,
v.
FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MIAMI, Appellee.
73-636.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Jan 22, 1974.
288 So. 2d 288
Barkdull, C.J., and Pearson and Hendry.
Cited by 10 opinions  |  Published

Harvey M. Goldstein, Miami, for appellants.

McCarthy, Steel, Hector & Davis and Norman A. Coll, Miami, for appellee.

Before BARKDULL, C.J., and PEARSON and HENDRY, JJ.

HENDRY, Judge.

Appellants, plaintiffs in the trial court, seek review of an order by the trial court dismissing their amended complaint with prejudice.

The amended complaint in three counts charged appellee with a violation of appellants' civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and in Count II and III with trespass and conversion of appellants' automobile. The trial court dismissed Count I because no state action was alleged entitling appellants to relief, inasmuch as this case involves a private self-help repossession. In this regard, the trial judge was correct. See Northside Motors of Florida Inc. v. Brinkley, Fla. 1973, 282 So.2d 617.

However, we cannot agree with the dismissal of Count II and III alleging conversion. The trial court concluded that the amended complaint did not plead facts showing that appellants possessed a present or immediate right of possession of the property in question.

Appellants contend that the amended complaint alleged all which is required of them by Form 1.939 of the Florida R.C.P., 31 F.S.A., entitled "Conversion," and therefore a dismissal of the complaint with prejudice was improper. It is true that appellants'[*289] amended complaint did not include the monetary value of the automobile allegedly converted as is required by the form. However, we do not think this is fatal to the complaint. Florida R.C.P. 1.900, 31 F.S.A., entitled "Forms," states in part:

"(b) The other forms are sufficient for the matters that are covered by them. So long as the substance is expressed without prolixity, the forms may be varied to meet the facts of a particular case."

The appellants in addition to conversion alleged a wrongful trespass by the appellee in order to repossess the automobile. Earlier Florida cases have recognized the principle that where a repossession involves a trespass or assault, such repossession is illegal. McDowell v. Talcott, Fla.App. 1966, 183 So.2d 592; C.I.T. Corp. v. Brewer, 1941, 146 Fla. 247, 200 So. 910; C.I.T. Corp. v. Reeves, 1933, 112 Fla. 424, 150 So. 638. Also, the Florida Supreme Court in Northside Motors of Florida, Inc. v. Brinkley, supra, recognized that under Fla. Stat. § 679.503, F.S.A., a creditor may not undertake self-help repossession which results in a breach of the peace. Upon a motion to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a cause of action, all allegations in the complaint are taken to be true and all reasonable inferences are permitted on behalf of the plaintiff. Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State ex rel. Powell, Fla. 1972, 262 So.2d 881.

Therefore, for the reasons stated and upon the authorities cited, we hold that the court erred in dismissing Counts II and III of the amended complaint. Accordingly, the cause is affirmed as to the dismissal of Count I of the amended complaint and reversed and remanded for further proceedings as to Counts II and III.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part.