Clearwater Fed. S. & L. Ass'n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1976). · Go Syfert
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Clearwater Fed. S. & L. Ass'n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1976). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“where an order after judgment is dispositive of any question, it becomes a final post decretal order.”
70 citation events (45 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Grady C. Judd, Sheriff of Polk County v. Christina Haegele, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Chance Haegele (fladistctapp, 2025-03-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1976 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1976 2001 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 32 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Grady C. Judd, Sheriff of Polk County v. Christina Haegele, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Chance Haegele
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
where an order after judgment is dispositive of any question, it becomes a final post decretal order.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jeromee Saffold v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2026 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976) (describing a “final post decretal order” as one that is “dispositive of any question,” constituting a “final and distinct adjudication of rights which have not been adjudicated in the original final judgment”); Fla. R.
cited Cited as authority (rule) State Attorneys for the Second, Seventh and Ninth Judicial Circuits v. Florida Pace Funding Agency, Etc.; Alachua County Tax Collector v. Florida Pace Funding Agency; Palm Beach County, Florida v. Florida Pace Funding Agency; Alachua County, Florida v. Florida Pace Funding Agency
Fla. · 2025 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976) (“Post decretal orders are not true interlocutory orders . . . .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Luke Johnson, as Trustee of the Doris Linda Trapnell Living Trust Dated October 15, 2013 v. Jessica Wolter, as Benificiary of the Doris Linda Trapnell Living Trust Dated October 15, 2013, and Jeffery Allen Trapnell
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976) (“Where an order after judgment is dispositive of any question, it becomes a final post decretal order.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stephen Grudenic v. Sundeep Singh
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976) (holding: “An interlocutory order entered after judgment, post decretal order, is not to be confused with one entered during the pendency of the proceedings before final judgment.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Charolette L. Alexander v. North Florida Construction Builders, LLC, a Florida Limited Liability Company (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) FERNANDEZ v. KIVIMAKI
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976) ("Where an order after judgment is dispositive of any question, it becomes a final post decretal order.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Combined Services, Inc. v. City of Opa-Locka
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976) (“Where an order after judgment is dispositive of any question, it becomes a final post decretal order.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Progressive Select Insurance Company v. Leslie Bunsee
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976) (characterizing a true “interlocutory order” as one leading up to a final judgment, and distinguishing that type of order from a “final post decretal order,” which is one coming after a final judgment that nevertheless “is dispositive of any question” and “completes the judicial labor on that portion of the” post-judgment cause).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Haslauer v. Haslauer
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976) (characterizing a true “interlocutory order” as one leading up to a final judgment and distinguishing that type of order from a “final post decretal order,” which is one coming after a final judgment that nevertheless “is dispositive of any question” and “completes the judicial labor on that portion of the” post-judgment cause). 12 An order under section 61.16 does not have this effect.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ALVARO MARTINEZ, JR., M.D. v. GIA M. MARTINEZ
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976) (holding: “Where an order after judgment is dispositive of any question, it becomes a final post decretal order”); Nat’l Equity Recovery Servs, Inc. v. Williams, 962 So. 2d 977 , 978 n. 1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (treating petition for writ of certiorari from post-judgment disbursement order as a plenary appeal because it ended judicial labor on that portion of the case after judgment). 2 the order denying the motion for contempt and remand for further proceedings.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Darryl Len Morgan v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2022 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State of Florida v. Michael James Jackson
Fla. · 2020 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) CHERYL PELPHREY - WEIGAND v. ROBERT K. WEIGAND
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Sampson, 336 So. 2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Collins Asset Group, LLC v. Property Asset Management, etc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So.2d 78, 79-80 (Fla.1976); Gaché v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 625 So.2d 86 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Wells v. Halmac Development, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So.2d 78, 79 (Fla.1976)); see also Fla. R.App.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Whitburn, LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So.2d 78, 79 (Fla.1976) ("Where an order after judgment is dispositive of any question, it becomes a final post decretal order.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jordan Alexander Drouin v. Ruby Megan Stuber n/k/a Ruby Megan Kane
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So.2d 78, 79-80 (Fla.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) W. W. FATHER OF N. S. a child v. Guardian Ad Litem Program and Dept. of Children etc
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
This view is consistent with the view expressed by the Florida Supreme Court in Clearwater Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Sampson, 336 So.2d 78, 79 (Fla.1976), which provides for appeal of post-judgment orders noting that many post-judgment orders are not really non-final in the same way as interlocutory orders.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) D'Alusio v. Gould & Lamb, LLC
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Such orders appear to come within the category of post-decretal orders described by the supreme court in Clearwater Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So.2d 78, 79 (Fla.1976): orders that “complete[ ] the judicial labor on that portion of the cause after judgment.” And the order on review could have been reduced to a judgment for which execution could immediately issue, although the trial court did not use such words of finality in its order.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Miller v. Miller
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Id. at 79 (internal citation omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Spinelli v. Spinelli
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So.2d 78, 79 (Fla.1976).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Caufield v. Cantele (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 2002 · confidence medium
I concur in result only because I do not agree with the majority's reliance on what I consider to be overly broad language in the pre-1977 case of Clearwater Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Sampson, 336 So.2d 78, 79 (Fla.1976), regarding when an order after judgment is a final appealable order.
cited Cited as authority (rule) BDO Seidman, LLP v. British Car Auctions, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Sav. and Loan Ass’n v. Sampson, 336 So.2d 78, 79-80 (Fla.1976).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Remington v. Remington
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Clearwater, 336 So.2d at 79 (emphasis supplied).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Edwards v. Edwards
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Sampson, 336 So.2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976); Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc. v. Bandes, 510 So.2d 315, 316 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987); Kucera v. Kucera, 330 So.2d 36, 37 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Francisco v. Victoria Marine Shipping (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
In Clearwater Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Sampson, 336 So.2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976), the Florida supreme court, in distinguishing orders entered after final judgment from those entered before, stated: An interlocutory order entered after judgment, post decretal order, is not to be confused with one entered during the pendency of the proceedings before final judgment.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hubert v. DIV. OF ADMIN., ST. DEPT. OF TRANSP.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
However, in Clearwater Federal Savings and Loan Assoc. v. Sampson, 336 So.2d 78, 79 (Fla. 1976), the Florida Supreme Court made the following distinction: Post-decretal orders are not true interlocutory orders, and perhaps the term "interlocutory" is a misnomer.
cited Cited "see" Popescu v. Laguna Master Ass'n
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See Clearwater, 336 So.2d at 79-80 ; see also Remington v. Remington, 705 So.2d 920, 922 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Francisco v. Victoria Marine Shipping, Inc., 486 So.2d 1386, 1390 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
cited Cited "see" NATIONAL EQUITY RECOVERY SERVS. v. Williams
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Clearwater Federal Savings and Loan Assn. v. Sampson, 336 So.2d 78, 79 (Fla.1976)("Where an order after judgment is dispositive of any question, it becomes a final post decretal order.
discussed Cited "see" Woolley v. Woolley
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · signal: see · confidence high
See Clearwater Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Sampson, 336 So.2d 78 (Fla. 1976); Small v. Small, 313 So.2d 749 (Fla. 1975); Smith v. Weede, 433 So.2d 992 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). [2] We likewise reject the former wife's argument that the doctrine of res judicata bars the former husband's motions for clarification and enforcement.
discussed Cited "see" Siegel v. Siegel
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Clearwater Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n. v. Sampson, 336 So.2d 78 (Fla. 1976); Morand v. Stoneburner, 516 So.2d 270 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987), rev. denied, 525 So.2d 879 (Fla. 1988). [2] See Pirino v. Pirino, 549 So.2d 219 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989). [3] Compare, e.g., Driscoll v. Driscoll, 547 So.2d 1247 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989) (court abused its discretion in failing to award fifty-seven year old wife permanent periodic alimony at conclusion of five year marriage where wife, by entering into the marriage, had given up alimony payments due from a previous marriage and was left in a "pathetic financial st…
CLEARWATER FEDERAL SAVINGS AND LOAN ASSOCIATION, Petitioner,
v.
Joseph E. SAMPSON, Respondent.
48158.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jul 28, 1976.
336 So. 2d 78
Roberts.
Cited by 46 opinions  |  Published

[*79] Dennis P. Thompson and Emil G. Pratesi, Richards, Nodine, Gilkey, Fite, Meyer & Thompson, Clearwater, for petitioner.

William J. Castagna, MacKenzie, Castagna, Bennison & Gardner, Clearwater, for respondent.

ROBERTS, Justice.

This cause is before us on certiorari granted to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, in Sampson v. Clearwater Federal Savings and Loan Association, denying a motion to quash appeals in the cause, which purportedly conflicts with Wagner v. Bieley, 263 So.2d 1 (Fla. 1972), and Home News Publishing Co. v. U-M Publishing Co., Inc., 246 So.2d 117 (Fla.App. 1, 1971).

Petitioner, Clearwater Federal, filed an action in the Circuit Court in and for Pinellas County to foreclose a mortgage encumbering certain motel property in Clearwater against respondent. By agreement of the parties a "quasi receivership" was established to continue operation of the motel. Funds arising from operations of the Sea Captain Motel were to be deposited in the court's registry, pending further order of the court. Final judgment of foreclosure was entered on April 18, 1974. The mortgagors objecting to the sale procedure appealed the judgment of foreclosure to the District Court of Appeal, Second District. (In Bloznalis v. Clearwater Federal Savings and Loan Assoc., 306 So.2d 219 (Fla.App. 2, 1975), the District Court of Appeal, Second District, affirmed the judgment of foreclosure.) During the pendency of the interlocutory appeal of the judgment of foreclosure, petitioner filed a motion directed to the funds held in the court's registry requesting that the balance of the funds in the registry be paid to petitioner. After hearing, the trial court denied portions of the request without prejudice.

Subsequent to the District Court of Appeal's, Second District, affirmance of the sale procedure, petitioner renewed its motion directed to the remaining funds in the registry. By order dated April 9, 1975, filed April 10, 1975, the Circuit Court entered a "Second Order on Motion to Direct Payment" holding that petitioner was entitled to the funds remaining in the registry. Within 10 days, respondent filed a petition for rehearing directed to the order permitting payment of the funds to petitioner. By order dated May 22, 1975, the trial court denied the petition for rehearing. Respondent thereupon filed his notice of interlocutory appeal and notice of appeal from the "Second Order on Motion to Direct Payment" which notice was timely if measured from denial of the motion for rehearing and untimely if measured from the order directing payment. Petitioner filed a motion to quash the appeal as untimely filed since both notices of appeal were filed more than 30 days from the rendition date of the order being appealed. The District Court of Appeal, Second District, consolidated the notices of appeals and denied the motion to quash appeals.

An interlocutory order entered after judgment, post decretal order, is not to be confused with one entered during the pendency of the proceedings before final judgment. Cf. Wagner v. Bieley, supra. Post decretal orders are not true interlocutory orders, and perhaps the term "interlocutory" is a misnomer. Where an order after judgment is dispositive of any question, it becomes a final post decretal order. To the extent that it completes the judicial labor on that portion of the cause after judgment, it becomes final as to that portion and should be treated as a final judgment, and, therefore, a petition for rehearing could be properly directed to such a post decretal order which constitutes a final and distinct adjudication of rights which have not been adjudicated in the original final judgment. Sub judice, the post decretal[*80] order by the trial court to which the petition for rehearing was directed was dispositive of the question of disposition of the money paid to the receiver, and in itself, was a distinct adjudication so final in nature as to partake of the character of a final decree. A petition for rehearing could properly be addressed to it as one could be addressed to any final decree.

Wagner v. Bieley, supra, and Home News Publishing Co. v. U-M Publishing Co., Inc., supra, cited as the basis for conflict jurisdiction in this cause are to be distinguished from the instant matter since they did not involve post decretal orders final in nature, but rather involved interlocutory orders entered during the pendency of proceedings prior to final judgment. In Wagner, petitioner sought review to this Court of the District Court of Appeal's, Third District, order denying a motion to quash an interlocutory appeal from an order of the trial court which denied summary judgment. This Court therein held:

"Our rules as currently amended do not permit motions for rehearing directed to interlocutory orders, such as orders denying summary judgment; accordingly, such motions cannot operate to toll the time for filing an interlocutory appeal under the Rules."

This Court quoted with approval the following excerpt from Home News Publishing, supra:

"`... A literal interpretation of the rule would seem to indicate that a motion for rehearing may be directed only to final judgments rendered by a court, since that is the only judicial action specified in the rule authorizing the filing of such a motion. If the rule-making authority had intended to authorize the filing of a motion for rehearing directed to an interlocutory order, it could easily have so provided. Unless the filing of a motion for rehearing to an interlocutory order is authorized by a rule of court promulgated by the rule-making authority, then its filing is improper and would not toll the rendition date of the order or the running of the time for seeking appellate review of the order complained about.'"

In Home News, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the action against them on ground of improper venue which motion was denied. They sought rehearing of the denial which was also denied and subsequently sought review by interlocutory appeal. The appellees moved to dismiss the appeal as untimely filed since the improper rehearing petition did not toll the running of the appeal time.

Since we find that the post decretal order in question is a final decree subject to petition for rehearing, the decision of the District Court refusing to dismiss the appeal therefrom was without error and is approved.

Accordingly, the writ of certiorari heretofore issued is discharged.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD and SUNDBERG, JJ., concur.

ENGLAND, J., concurs in result only.