Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1978). · Go Syfert
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Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1978). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
123 citation events (66 in the last 25 years) across 8 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Brendan Jeremiah Conseillant v. State of Florida (fladistctapp, 2026-02-06)
Treatment trajectory · 1978 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1978 2002 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brendan Jeremiah Conseillant v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
Because the trial court’s revocation of probation was improperly based on Conseillant’s admission to an arrest rather than an admission to actually violating a law, we reverse the revocation order and resulting sentences and remand for further proceedings. 1 See Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978) (“[I]t is generally agreed to be improper to permanently revoke probation based solely upon proof that a probationer has been arrested. . . .
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Watson v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
As this Court stated in Hines [v. State, 358 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978)], '[f]undamental fairness requires that a defendant be placed on notice as to what he [or she] must do or refrain from doing while on probation.' " (third and fourth alterations in original) (citation omitted)); Goers v. State, 193 So. 3d 1068, 1069 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016) ("[T]he language used in a condition of probation is determinative of a probationer's duties and responsibilities while on probation." (alteration in original) (quoting Odom v. State, 15 So. 3d 672, 677 (Fla. 1st DCA 2009))); Stanley v. State, 922 So. 2d 411…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) ANDREW QUIJANO v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
"In order to violate due process, the affidavit must be insufficient to give the defendant notice of the nature of the charges against him and result in prejudice to his ability to prepare a defense." Jackson v. State, 807 So. 2d 684 , 685 n.3 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001) (citing Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Christopher Ray Smith v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
In Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183, 184 (Fla. 1978), a probation- violation affidavit alleged that the probationer violated the conditions of his probation when he was “arrested by Sarasota Deputy B.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Patricia Ann Banks v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
“Fundamental fairness requires that a defendant be placed on notice as to what he must do or refrain from doing while on probation.” Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978); see also Lawson v. State, 969 So. 2d 222, 230 (Fla. 2007) (“In addition to the procedural due process that is required at the time of an alleged violation, the trial court and the probation order must also adequately place the probationer on notice of conduct that is 2 both required and prohibited during the probationary period.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ruben McCloud v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
As a matter of due process, probationers are entitled to notice of which laws the probationer is alleged to have violated and “an opportunity to present a defense to them.” Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978); see also N.L. v. State, 825 So. 2d 509, 509-10 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robert Evins v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
However, we conclude that the court erred in finding that Appellant also violated condition (5) of his probation by being arrested for committing a new criminal offense because “[i]t is improper to revoke probation based solely upon proof that the probationer had been arrested.” Prater v. State, 161 So.3d 489, 491 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014) (citing Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Victor Villanueva v. State of Florida (2×)
Fla. · 2016 · confidence medium
We have recognized that this discretion is broad but not unlimited: “A trial court has the authority to impose any valid condition of probation which would serve a useful rehabilitative purpose.” Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Victor Villanueva v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2016 · confidence medium
We have recognized that this discretion is broad but not unlimited: “A trial court has the authority to impose any valid condition of probation which would serve a useful rehabilitative purpose.” Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Justin Randolph Demott v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2016 · confidence medium
This discretion is set forth in section 948.03(1), Florida Statutes (2015), which provides that the trial court is vested with the authority to “determine the terms and conditions of probation.” Where a trial court determines that it is appropriate to sentence an offender to probation, due process requires that “the trial court and the probation order ... adequately place the probationer on notice of conduct that is both required and prohibited during the probationary period.” Lawson, 969 So.2d at 230 (citing Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) McCarron v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978); Burton v. State, 651 So.2d 793, 794 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gregory Gun v. State of Florida (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Id. at 185 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gregroy Gun v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Id. at 185 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pulecio v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
The First -4- District, in Stephens v. State, 659 So. 2d 1303, 1304 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995) (citing Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978)), pointed out that the supreme court has also held that a court may impose "any valid condition of probation which would serve a useful rehabilitative purpose." In this case, a prohibition of self-employment may not fit within the three Rodriguez factors, but it would greatly increase the stability of Mr. Pulecio's life and assure that he had a far greater chance of satisfying the normal, general conditions of probation during his ten-year term of prob…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Little v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
An affidavit of violation of probation “must allege the basic facts concerning the alleged violation, such as its nature, time, and place of occurrence.” Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Prater v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Holley v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hernandez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
This court has recognized that “ e[t]he Florida Statutes do not authorize, nor would our constitution permit, a permanent revocation of probation based solely upon proof of an arrest during the probationary period.’ ” Sharpston v. State, 895 So.2d 1225, 1226 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (quoting Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) H.B. v. Department of Children & Family Services
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
See, e.g., David v. City of Jacksonville, 534 So.2d 784, 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) (“‘Arrest, without more, does not, in law any more than in reason, impeach the integrity of a witness.’ Harmon v. State, 394 So.2d 121, 125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980).”); Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978) (“The Florida Statutes do not authorize, nor would our constitution permit, a permanent revocation of probation based solely upon proof of an arrest during the probationary period.”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In Re Jeb
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
See, e.g., David v. City of Jacksonville, 534 So.2d 784, 787 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988) ("`Arrest, without more, does not, in law any more than in reason, impeach the integrity of a witness.' Harmon v. State, 394 So.2d 121, 125 (Fla. 1st DCA 1980)."); Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978) ("The Florida Statutes do not authorize, nor would our constitution permit, a permanent revocation of probation based solely upon proof of an arrest during the probationary period.").
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Robinson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
As this court recently stated in Sharpston v. State, 895 So.2d 1225, 1226 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005) (quoting Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978)), "`the Florida Statutes do not authorize, nor would our constitution permit, a permanent revocation of probation based solely upon proof of an arrest during the probationary period.'" In Sharpston , the defendant admitted being arrested, but he never admitted that he actually committed the crime.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. State (2×) also: Cited "see, e.g."
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Id. (quoting Hines, 358 So.2d at 185 (emphasis added)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sharpston v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
For this reason, we reverse the revocation of Robert Sharpston's probation. *1226 As the supreme court has explained, "[t]he Florida Statutes do not authorize, nor would our constitution permit, a permanent revocation of probation based solely upon proof of an arrest during the probationary period." Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Perkins v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
"An affidavit upon which a permanent revocation of probation is to be based must allege the basic facts concerning the alleged violation, such as its nature, time, and place of occurrence." Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jackson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
We recognize that in Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978), the supreme court held that deficiencies in a probation violation affidavit are subject to a harmless error analysis. [3] However, rather than a matter of *686 pleading sufficiency, we see this as an issue of proof and conclude that the court erred in revoking Jackson's probation based on his failure to register under either statute.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Langbaum v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
In Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978), our supreme court held that probation may not be permanently revoked upon a mere arrest. [1] Several years later we relied on that decision in Palmer v. State, 603 So.2d 535 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), and found fundamental error where a violation of probation (VOP) charging document alleged merely that defendant has been arrested.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Stephens v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court has determined that the “constitutional rights of probationers are limited by conditions of probation which are desirable for purposes of rehabilitation,” Biller v. State, 618 So.2d 734 (Fla.1993), and that “[a] trial court has the authority to impose any valid condition of probation which would serve a useful rehabilitative purpose.” Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Burton v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
"An affidavit upon which a permanent revocation is to be based must allege the basic facts concerning the alleged violation, such as its nature, time, and place of occurrence." Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Zeigler v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
The Florida Supreme Court has stated that, "[a] trial court has the authority to impose any valid condition of probation which would serve a useful rehabilitative purpose." Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Thorpe v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1994 · confidence medium
E.g., Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Green v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978); Rock, 584 So.2d at 1112 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rock v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cosby v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · confidence medium
Edwards v. State, 439 So.2d 1028 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); Cuciak v. State, 410 So.2d 916, 918 (Fla.1982); Raulerson v. State, 358 So.2d 826, 830 (Fla.1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 959 , 99 S.Ct. 364 , 58 L.Ed.2d 352 (1978); Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cuciak v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 1982 · confidence medium
In Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978), this Court stated: "If a probationer needs additional information in order to properly prepare a defense to the charges, the various methods of discovery under our rules are available to him." This decision has been followed in Coby v. State, 397 So.2d 974 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Suarez v. State, 377 So.2d 769 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979); *918 and Cioeta v. State, 367 So.2d 718 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Winfield v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
The affidavit charged defendant only with violating the probation condition of paying restitution and did not advise the defendant that her violation of this condition rested upon her having the ability but failing to work. "[A]n affidavit upon which a permanent revocation of probation is to be based must allege the basic facts concerning the *53 alleged violation... ." Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cuciak v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1981 · confidence medium
In Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978), the Supreme Court stated: If a probationer needs additional information in order to properly prepare a defense to the charges, the various methods of discovery under our rules are available to him.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rodriguez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Thomas v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978); Hayes v. State, 345 So.2d 765 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Bonanno
La. · 1979 · confidence medium
In addition to the sanctions authorized in Part A hereof, if at any time prior or subsequent to final disposition the court finds that either the state through the district attorney or assistant district attorney or the defendant or his counsel has willfully failed to comply with this Chapter or with an order issued pursuant to this Chapter, such failure shall be deemed to be a constructive contempt of Court." [6] See Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183 at 185 (Fla.1978); compare La.C.Cr.P. aart. 895. [7] Presumably, Ruff could have been subpoenaed by the defense.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cioeta v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1979 · confidence medium
Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978).
discussed Cited "see" Quinton Marcus Reddick v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978) (explaining a VOP affidavit need only allege the basic facts and “need not be set forth with the specificity required in criminal indictments and informations”).
discussed Cited "see" DAVID O. PAYET vs STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2022 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hines v. State, 358 So. 2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978) (explaining that “[t]he Florida Statutes do not authorize, nor would our constitution permit, a permanent revocation of probation based solely upon proof of an arrest during the probationary period”).
discussed Cited "see" Andre Cordell Mason, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia
Va. Ct. App. · 2015 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla. 1978) (The written notice in revocation proceedings “need not be set forth with the specificity required in criminal indictments and informations.
cited Cited "see" Person v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978); Hernandez v. State, 33 So.3d 143 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010); Sharpston v. State, 895 So.2d 1225 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005). 2.
cited Cited "see" Darby v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183 (Fla.1978).
cited Cited "see" Darby v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183 (Fla.1978).
discussed Cited "see" Levarity v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978) (“[A]n affidavit upon which a permanent revocation of probation is to be based must allege the basic facts concerning the alleged violation, such as its nature, time, and place of occurrence.
cited Cited "see" Freda v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183 (Fla.1978); Thomas v. State, 634 So.2d 276 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Norris v. State, 383 So.2d 691 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
discussed Cited "see" Lawson v. State
Fla. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183, 185 (Fla.1978); see also Zachary v. State, 559 So.2d 105, 106 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990) (striking a condition for vagueness where the order did not "sufficiently apprise [probationer] of what she must do or refrain from doing"); Pratt v. State, 516 So.2d 328, 328 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (finding condition "insufficient to apprise [probationer] of which otherwise lawful acts are prohibited"); Mastick v. State, 409 So.2d 203, 204 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) ("A probation order must sufficiently instruct the probationer as to what he must do or refrain from doing while on probation.…
cited Cited "see" Ontiveros v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hines v. State, 358 So.2d 183 (Fla.1978); Manies v. State, 621 So.2d 679 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993).
David Joseph HINES, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
51907.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Apr 20, 1978.
358 So. 2d 183
Hatchett.
Cited by 88 opinions  |  Published

[*184] Jack O. Johnson, Public Defender, and Douglas A. Wallace, Asst. Public Defender, Bradenton, Florida, for petitioner.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and C. Marie King, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for respondent.

HATCHETT, Justice.

The issue we must resolve is whether an affidavit charging a violation of probation is sufficient upon which to base a permanent revocation of probation if it merely alleges that the probationer has been arrested for a felony. This case is before us for review upon a conflict between the decision below, reported at 346 So.2d 1235 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1977),[1] and the decisions to the contrary on the same issue in Frederick v. State, 339 So.2d 251 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); Singletary v. State, 290 So.2d 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974); and Crum v. State, 286 So.2d 268 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973). We determine that such an allegation is a sufficient basis for the revocation of probation if the probationer is given adequate written notice of the felony upon which the revocation is to be based, consistent with the requirements of minimal due process.

In the present case, petitioner was charged with violating his probation in that he "was arrested by Sarasota Deputy B. Blosser for burglary," on 3/13/76. The probationer had been arrested near the scene of the crime shortly after it had occurred. Subsequent to his arrest, the probationer confessed to his involvement in the burglary. The trial court revoked his probation based on the confession and on the burglary tools seized from the petitioner's automobile.

Petitioner concedes that the evidence introduced at the probation revocation hearing was sufficient to justify the revocation of his probation. He contends, however, that an affidavit merely alleging that a probationer has been arrested for a certain felony is a sufficient basis only for the temporary revocation of probation; a permanent revocation must be based upon allegations that the probationer actually committed the crime charged, and providing sufficient factual allegations as to the essential elements of that crime. Petitioner further argues that in spite of the adequate proof introduced at the revocation hearing, it has long been held that a valid guilty verdict will not cure a failure by the state to allege a criminal offense, nor cure the omission of any essential allegations in the charging document.

The state contends that an allegation in the affidavit for violation of probation is sufficient if it states that the probationer has been arrested for a felony. Section 949.10, Florida Statutes (1975),[2] makes the felony arrest of a felony probationer prima[*185] facie evidence of the violation of his probation. If such an allegation is sufficient to justify incarceration, it would clearly appear adequate as a charging document upon which to base a revocation hearing. The state contends that the affidavit in the present case was clearly sufficient to temporarily revoke the probation and the probation officer should not be required to file an additional affidavit merely to bring the probationer to the revocation hearing. The state further contends that the probationer in this case never sought any further information concerning the facts of the crime with which he was charged, nor did he raise in the trial court any question concerning the adequacy of his notice of the crime with which he had been charged.

Probation revocation procedures must comply with minimal requirements of due process. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973).[3] Although a probationer may be temporarily incarcerated for a ten day period based upon a felony arrest,[4] it is generally agreed to be improper to permanently revoke probation based solely upon proof that a probationer has been arrested. Fundamental fairness requires that a defendant be placed on notice as to what he must do or refrain from doing while on probation. A trial court has the authority to impose any valid condition of probation which would serve a useful rehabilitative purpose. The Florida Statutes do not authorize, nor would our constitution permit, a permanent revocation of probation based solely upon proof of an arrest during the probationary period. If a person has willfully failed to comply with his conditions of probation, then his probation can be permanently revoked after he has been given adequate notice of the charges and an opportunity to present a defense to them.[5] Therefore, we hold that an affidavit upon which a permanent revocation of probation is to be based must allege the basic facts concerning the alleged violation, such as its nature, time, and place of occurrence. However, an allegation concerning the commission of a crime need not be set forth with the specificity required in criminal indictments and informations. The primary goal is notice comporting with minimal due process rights. If a probationer needs additional information in order to properly prepare a defense to the charges, the various methods of discovery under our rules are available to him.[6]

In the present case, the written factual allegations in the affidavit for violation of probation were insufficient to provide notice to the probationer with what criminal acts he was charged. In this case, however, we find this to be harmless error since the record shows that the probationer clearly had actual notice of the charges, that he was arrested near the scene of the crime shortly after its occurrence, and that he made a confession to his involvement. There was no violation of the probationer's due process rights. Petitioner's probation was revoked upon adequate proof of burglary for which he was arrested by Deputy[*186] Blosser on 3/13/76. The circumstances here are not comparable to those cases in which a person's probation has been revoked based upon proof of charges other than those with which he was notified in the affidavit of violation.[7]

Accordingly, the district court's decision below is approved.

It is so ordered.

OVERTON, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD and ENGLAND, JJ., concur.

1 The district court's opinion in this case does not discuss the issue with which we are concerned. We tentatively accepted jurisdiction pursuant to Foley v. Weaver Drugs, Inc., 177 So.2d 221 (Fla. 1965). The record shows that the defense filed a motion to dismiss the affidavit for violation of probation on the ground it was legally insufficient. The issue was raised on appeal, and the district court apparently resolved this issue on the basis of its previous decision in McLain v. State, 343 So.2d 939 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977), cert. den. 354 So.2d 982 (Fla. 1977).
2 Section 949.10, Fla. Stat. (1975), provides:

Subsequent felony arrest of felony parolee or probationer prima facie evidence of violation. — The subsequent arrest on a felony charge, in this state, of any person who has been placed on parole or probation following a finding of guilt of any felony, or a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to any felony, shall be prima facie evidence of the violation of the terms and conditions of such parole or probation. Upon such arrest, the parole agreement or probation order shall immediately be temporarily revoked and such person shall remain in custody until a hearing by the parole and probation commission or the court.

3 The Court in Gagnon, supra, cited the essential elements of due process necessary in a final revocation hearing: (1) written notice of claimed violation; (2) disclosure of evidence against the probationer; (3) an opportunity to be heard and present witnesses and evidence; (4) the right to confront witnesses in most instances; (5) a neutral and detached hearing body; (6) a written statement by the fact finder as to the evidence relied on and the reasons for revocation.
4 The constitutionality of this statutory procedure was upheld in Bernhardt v. State, 288 So.2d 490 (Fla. 1974), see also Singletary v. State, 290 So.2d 116 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
5 The U.S. Supreme Court in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, held that a final probation revocation proceeding must address two separate issues: (1) whether the probationer in fact committed the violation charged; and (2) whether the commission of the act warranted revocation.
6 For example, in Sukert v. State, 325 So.2d 439 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976), the probationer was denied due process when the state did not disclose to him certain "privileged" documents which were later used against him at the revocation hearing.
7 See, State v. Spratling, 336 So.2d 361 (Fla. 1976).