State v. Hagan, 387 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1980). · Go Syfert
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State v. Hagan, 387 So. 2d 943 (Fla. 1980). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“in the absence of a statutory definition, resort may be had to case law or related statutory provisions which define the term, and where a statute does not specifically - 10 - define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense.”
116 citation events (45 in the last 25 years) across 9 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Hall v. State (md, 2016-06-23)
Treatment trajectory · 1980 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
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Top citers, strongest first. 50 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Hall v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Md. · 2016 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
in the absence of a statutory definition, resort may be had to case law or related statutory provisions which define the term, and where a statute does not specifically - 10 - define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Meeks
Fla. · 2001 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
in the absence of statutory definition, resort may be had to case law or related statutory provisions which define the term, and where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Peters
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
appellees may not challenge the constitutionality of a portion of the statute which does not affect them.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nisbany Surit-Garcias v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
“In the absence of a statutory definition, resort may be had to case law or related statutory provisions which define the term, and where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense.” State v. Hagan, 387 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980). “[T]he plain and ordinary meaning of the term can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary.” Jones v. Williams Pawn & Gun, Inc., 800 So. 2d 267, 270 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DAMIEN HERMAN GILLIAMS v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
In the absence of a statutory definition, resort may be had to case law or related statutory provisions which define the term . . . .’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Hagan, 387 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980)). “[I]n cases where the exact meaning of a term was not defined in a statute itself, we have ascertained its meaning by reference to other statutory provisions, as well as case law or the plain and ordinary meaning of a word of common usage.” Id.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) PAMELA PARRIS v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
In the absence of a statutory definition, resort may be had to case law or related statutory provisions which define the term . . . .’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Hagan, 387 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980)). “[I]n cases where the exact meaning of a term was not defined in a statute itself, we have ascertained its meaning by reference to other statutory provisions, as well as case law or the plain and ordinary meaning of a word of common usage.” Id.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) CALVIN COUCH v. THE STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2021 · confidence medium
“In the absence of a statutory definition, resort may be had to case law or related statutory provisions which define the term, and where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense.” State v. Hagan, 387 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980) (citations omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jefferson Eugene Davis v. Gilchrist County Sheriff's Office
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
“The legislature’s failure to define a statutory term does not in and of itself render a provision unconstitutionally vague.” Id. (quoting State v. Hagan, 387 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) R.N., A CHILD v. STATE OF FLORIDA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Finally, we apply these answers to the case before us. i. The Definition of Malice in Section 843.19(4), Florida Statutes “Maliciously” is not defined in the statute, so it “must be understood as a word of common usage having its plain and ordinary sense.” See Seese v. State, 955 So. 2d 1145, 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (citing State v. Hagan, 387 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980); State v. Mitro, 700 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1997)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) STATE OF FLORIDA v. WENDY B. CARRIER
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
State v. Hagan, 387 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980); Waterman v. State, 654 So. 2d 150, 153 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Ortiz v. Regalado
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
King v. King, 82 So.3d 1124, 1130 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); see also State v. Mitro, 700 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla.1997) (using dictionary to define words “available” and “authentic” when statute containing these words was challenged for vagueness); L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370 , 372 (Fla.1997) (relying on dictionary definition when words “common pocketknife” were challenged as vague); State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980) (relying on dictionary definition of “trawl net” to find statute not unconstitutionally vague).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Enoch v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
V; State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Morton v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
See State v. Fuchs, 769 So.2d 1006 (Fla.2000); State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cloyd v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
The plain and ordinary meaning of a word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary, Sieniarecki, 756 So.2d at 75 , or one may look to "`case law or related statutory provisions which define the term.'" State v. Fuchs, 769 So.2d 1006, 1008 (Fla.2000)(quoting State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hughes v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · confidence medium
The plain and ordinary meaning of a word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary, Sieniarecki, 756 So.2d at 75 , or one may look to "`case law or related statutory provisions which define the term.'" State v. Fuchs, 769 So.2d 1006, 1008 (Fla.2000) (quoting State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Nichols (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Applying these principles in the present case, we need reach no question concerning "multistrand monofilament." See State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Tate v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Bouters v. State, 659 So.2d 235, 238 (Fla.1995); State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Enriguez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980); see also State v. Manfredonia, 649 So.2d 1388 (Fla.1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Russ v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Bouters v. State, 659 So.2d 235, 238 (Fla.1995) (citing Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 , 108, 92 S.Ct. 2294 , 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972)); State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) DuFresne v. State
Fla. · 2002 · confidence medium
In the absence of a statutory definition, resort may be had to case law or related statutory provisions which define the term ...." State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980); see also Fuchs, 769 So.2d at 1009 ; Mitro, 700 So.2d at 645 .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hudson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Francis v. State
Fla. · 2001 · confidence medium
As it relates to this case, Francis' challenge is based on the alleged vagueness of the terms "particularly vulnerable" and "advanced age." Our jurisprudence indicates that "where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense." State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980) (relying on dictionary definition of "trawl net" to find statute not unconstitutionally vague), cited with approval in State v. Mitro, 700 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla.1997) (using dictionary to define words "available" and "authentic" when statute containing …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Brake
Fla. · 2001 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Fuchs, 769 So.2d at 1010 (finding that term "contributing to the delinquency or dependency of a child" could be defined by reference to other chapters of Florida law and case law); Mitro, 700 So.2d at 645 (finding that statute requiring documentation of age for issuance of identification card containing date of birth was not unconstitutionally vague because statute referenced another Florida statute setting forth methods of acceptable proof of age for children being admitted to school and terms "available" and "authenticated" could be given their common dictionary definitions); L.B.…
examined Cited as authority (rule) State v. DuFresne (3×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
In the absence of a statutory definition, resort may be had to case law or related statutory provisions which define the term...." State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980), cited with approval in State v. Mitro, 700 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla.1997); L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370 , 372 (Fla.1997); St.
examined Cited as authority (rule) State v. Fuchs (3×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
In the absence of a statutory definition, resort may be had to case law or related statutory provisions which define the term...." State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980), cited with approval in State v. Mitro, 700 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1997); L.B. v. State, 700 So.2d 370 , 372 (Fla.1997); St.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Rollins v. Pizzarelli
Fla. · 2000 · confidence medium
See State v. Mitro, 700 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla.1997); State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980); Delgado v. J.W.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Kirvin (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Accordingly, the test for vagueness of a constitutional provision is "whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice." State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980); see Brown v. State, 629 So.2d 841, 842 (Fla.1994) ("The standard for testing vagueness under Florida law is whether the statute gives a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what constitutes forbidden conduct."); Southeastern Fisheries Ass'n v. Department of Natural Resources, 453 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Fla.1984) ("A vague statute is …
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Mitro
Fla. · 1997 · confidence medium
State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Mark Marks, PA
Fla. · 1997 · confidence medium
"The legislature's failure to define a statutory term does not in and of itself render a penal provision unconstitutionally vague." State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) MC v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
"In the absence of a statutory definition, resort may be had to case law or related statutory provisions which define the term, and where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense." See State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980) (citations omitted); see also Zuckerman v. Alter, 615 So.2d 661, 663 (Fla.1993) (words of common usage, when employed in a statute should be construed in their plain and ordinary sense); Seaboard System R.R., Inc. v. Clemente, for and on Behalf of Metropolitan Dade County, 467 So.2d 348, …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) M.C. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
“In the absence of a statutory definition, resort may be had to case law or related statutory provisions which define the term, and where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense.” See State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980) (citations omitted); see also Zuckerman v. Alter, 615 So.2d 661, 663 (Fla.1993) (words of common usage, when employed in a statute should be construed in their plain and ordinary sense); Seaboard System R.R., Inc. v. Clemente, for and on Behalf of Metropolitan Dade County, 467 So.2d 3…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. De La Llana
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
It is a well-settled principle of constitutional jurisprudence that "[t]he legislature's failure to define a statutory term does not in and of itself render a penal provision unconstitutionally vague." State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Barnes
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
A corollary to this fundamental principle is that "[t]he legislature's failure to define a statutory term does not in and of itself render a penal provision unconstitutionally vague." State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) FLA. E. COAST. INDUSTRIES v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
These concepts were applied in State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 946 (Fla.1980), where the court reversed a trial court's holding that a special law regulating trawling in Charlotte Harbor was vague because it did not define the terms "trawl net" and "trawling operation" and stated: "A statute may satisfy due process requirements even though it contains general terms and does not furnish detailed plans and specifications of the act or conduct proscribed." Based on the foregoing, the Final Order is REVERSED and REMANDED for a hearing on the merits of Appellants' challenge as to the sufficiency of …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Campbell
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
The experts could not agree among themselves as to their meaning. *1087 THE LAW We begin our analysis by observing that "[t]he legislature's failure to define a statutory term does not in and of itself render a penal provision unconstitutionally vague." State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Vikhlyantsev (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Hoyt
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
As the court held in State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 946 (Fla. 1980): We also believe that the terms "trawl net" and "trawling operation" have a definite meaning as used in connection with the fishing industry.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Nephew v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
We affirm, in that we do not find the challenged provision "so vague that men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning." State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Deese
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · confidence medium
State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carlson v. State
Fla. · 1981 · confidence medium
The term "participate" is not itself vague. "[W]here a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense." State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980).
discussed Cited "see" Diaz v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · signal: accord · confidence high
See Hughes v. State, 943 So. 2d 176, 189 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006) (rejecting a vagueness claim and noting “[t]he plain and ordinary meaning of a word can be ascertained by reference to a dictionary.”); accord State v. Hagan, 387 So. 2d 943, 945 (Fla. 1980) (noting that the “legislature’s failure to define a statutory term does not in and of itself render a penal provision unconstitutionally vague”).
discussed Cited "see" Dante Martin v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: accord · confidence high
Importantly, “[t]he Legislature’s failure to define a critical term does not by itself render a statute unconstitutionally vague.” Morton v. State, 988 So.2d 698, 702 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008); accord State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980).
cited Cited "see" TSA STORES v. Department of Agriculture
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980); Westerheide v. State, 767 So.2d 637, 650 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000).
discussed Cited "see" Seese v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980) ("In the absence of a statutory definition . . . such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense."); see also State v. Mitro, 700 So.2d 643, 645 (Fla. 1997) (where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense).
discussed Cited "see" Foster v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980). “[WJhere a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense.” Jones v. Williams Pawn & Gun, Inc., 800 So.2d 267, 270 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (citing Plante v. Dep’t of Bus. & Prof'l Regulation, Div. of Pari-Mutuel Wagering, 685 So.2d 886 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); State v. Barnes, 686 So.2d 633 (Fla. 2d DCA 1996)).
cited Cited "see" Jones v. Williams Pawn & Gun, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980).
cited Cited "see" Sieniarecki v. State
Fla. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943 (Fla.1980).
cited Cited "see" L.B. v. State
Fla. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980) (where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense).
cited Cited "see" LB v. State
Fla. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980) (where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense).
cited Cited "see" Mercade v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hagan, 387 So.2d 943, 945 (Fla.1980) (in the absence of a statutory definition, a court may resort to case law which defines the term).
STATE of Florida, Appellant,
v.
Lee HAGAN, Jr. and James George Stephens, Appellees.
56680.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Sep 4, 1980.
387 So. 2d 943
Sundberg.
Cited by 83 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 90%
Citer courts: Supreme Court of Florida (1)

[*944] Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Eula Tuttle Mason, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellant.

No appearance, for appellees.

SUNDBERG, Chief Justice.

Appellee Lee Hagan, Jr. was charged by information with using more than one trawl net in Charlotte Harbor, Florida, and with using a trawl with a net greater than twenty-five feet, contrary to chapter 76-343, section 1, Laws of Florida, as amended by chapter 77-525, section 1, Laws of Florida. Appellee James George Stephens was charged with violation of the same statute for pulling more than one twenty-five-foot net in Charlotte Harbor. Appellees filed motions to dismiss the charges on the ground that the statute was unconstitutionally vague in defining the proscribed conduct. Following a hearing on the motions, the trial court entered its order holding the statute unconstitutional. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution (1972).

Chapter 77-525, section 1, Laws of Florida, provides:

Section 1. No trawling operation shall use more than one trawl net which shall not exceed 25 feet in length, for the taking of shrimp in the Charlotte County waters of Charlotte Harbor, in the inland waters of the county, or within one-half mile of such inland waters.

The trial court found the special law unconstitutional for the following reasons:

1. [T]he special law is unconstitutionally vague for failure to identify with particularity the boundaries of the prohibited netting areas. The Court specifically finds that the terms "Charlotte County waters of Charlotte Harbor", "in the inland waters of the County", and "within one-half mile of such inland waters" are insufficient to allow the average person to readily identify the boundaries of the protected area;
2. [T]he special law is unconstitutionally vague for failure to define the terms "trawling operation" and "trawl net." Specifically, the law purports to prohibit certain activities of "trawling operations" and by implication would permit those same activities by other[*945] than "trawling operations". The Court finds that the average person cannot be expected from a plain reading of the law to determine whether a contemplated activity would or would not constitute a "trawling operation" and whether a particular net is or is not a "trawl net";
3. [T]he special law is too vague to form the basis for a criminal prosecution of a natural person since it appears on its face not to proscribe any conduct of natural persons, but proscribes only certain activities of "trawling operations" without defining that term to include natural persons;
4. [T]he special law violates Article III, Section 11, (a)(19) of the Florida Constitution prohibiting special laws pertaining to fresh water hunting or fishing in that any reasonable interpretation of the term "inland waters of the County" would include fresh water areas[.]

Unfortunately, we have not been graced by a brief filed on behalf of appellees. We have, nonetheless, carefully considered the matter and conclude that the trial court erred in holding the special law unconstitutional.

First, we note that we are concerned only with the criminal provision with which appellees were charged, i.e., engaging in allegedly unlawful activity in the Charlotte County waters of Charlotte Harbor. Appellees may not challenge the constitutionality of a portion of the statute which does not affect them. State v. Hill, 372 So.2d 84 (Fla. 1979); Jordan v. State, 334 So.2d 589 (Fla. 1976); State ex rel. Hoffman v. Vocelle, 159 Fla. 88, 31 So.2d 52 (1947); Gill v. Wilder, 95 Fla. 901, 116 So. 870 (1928). Therefore, we do not consider the constitutionality of the statute insofar as it affects "inland waters of the county" or "within one-half mile of such inland waters." This disposes of the asserted infirmity based on violation of article III, section 11(a)(19), Florida Constitution, and of the asserted void-for-vagueness infirmity based on these statutory phrases.

In determining whether a statutory provision is so vague as to violate due process of law, we must consider whether the provision is so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning. Newman v. Carson, 280 So.2d 426 (Fla. 1973). The test of vagueness of a statute is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. Washington v. State, 302 So.2d 401 (Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 918, 95 S.Ct. 1582, 43 L.Ed.2d 786 (1975). In applying these principles to the case before us, we conclude that the statutory terms "Charlotte County waters of Charlotte Harbor," "trawl net," and "trawling operation" are not so vague as to render chapter 77-525 unconstitutional on its face.

In concluding that these statutory terms rendered the special law unconstitutionally vague, the trial court relies in part on the failure of the legislature to define the terms within the statute itself. The legislature's failure to define a statutory term does not in and of itself render a penal provision unconstitutionally vague. In the absence of a statutory definition, resort may be had to case law or related statutory provisions which define the term, and where a statute does not specifically define words of common usage, such words are construed in their plain and ordinary sense. See Tingley v. Brown, 380 So.2d 1289 (Fla. 1980); Milazzo v. State, 377 So.2d 1161 (Fla. 1979); Bellamy v. State, 347 So.2d 419 (Fla. 1977); Goldstein v. Acme Concrete Corp., 103 So.2d 202 (Fla. 1958). The prohibited netting area encompassed by the Charlotte County waters of Charlotte Harbor may be ascertained with particular exactitude by resort to pertinent Florida law. See § 7.08, Fla. Stat. (1979) (delineating the boundary lines of Charlotte County); art. II, § 1(a), Fla. Const. (defining the western boundary of the state of Florida as extending three leagues seaward from the Gulf of Mexico coastline). The appellees here are presented with no greater task than that generally[*946] facing an individual in locating the physical boundaries of any jurisdiction to enable him to determine applicable law.

We also believe that the terms "trawl net" and "trawling operation" have a definite meaning as used in connection with the fishing industry. As to the term "trawl net," we note that Webster's Third New International Dictionary (3d ed. 1976), at page 1031, defines the term as "a large conical net with a device for keeping its mouth open that is dragged along the sea bottom in gathering fish or other marine life." A statute may satisfy due process requirements even though it contains general terms and does not furnish detailed plans and specifications of the act or conduct proscribed. Slaughter v. State, 301 So.2d 762 (Fla. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1005, 95 S.Ct. 1448, 43 L.Ed.2d 763 (1975); Orlando Sports Stadium, Inc. v. State, 262 So.2d 881 (Fla. 1972).

We also reject the trial court's holding that the special law is void for vagueness on the basis it proscribes trawling operations without defining that term to include natural persons. Laws by their very nature regulate the activities of persons. Any trawling operation which is conducted or initiated by human agency is subject to the proscription of the special law.

Accordingly, we hold that appellees were validly charged with a criminal offense pursuant to chapter 77-525, Laws of Florida. The decision of the trial court below is reversed and this case is remanded to the trial court for proceedings not inconsistent with this decision.

It is so ordered.

ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, ENGLAND, ALDERMAN and McDONALD, JJ., concur.