State ex rel. Slora v. Wessel, 403 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). · Go Syfert
State ex rel. Slora v. Wessel, 403 So. 2d 496 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
4 citation events across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Pozo v. Roadhouse Grill, Inc. (fladistctapp, 2001-08-10)
Top citers, strongest first. 1 distinct citer.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pozo v. Roadhouse Grill, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
Thus, Roadhouse's allegation that Pozo was "authorized to do business in Orange County" and was "licensed to practice law in the State of Florida" is insufficient to establish venue based on Pozo's residency. *1259 Additionally, although Pozo failed to argue this point, the law is settled that where a corporate defendant resides in the same county as an individual defendant, venue is only proper in the county of joint residence. [2] Enfinger v. Baxley, 96 So.2d 538 (Fla.1957); Lifemark Hospitals of Florida, Inc. v. Roque, 727 So.2d 1077, 1078 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999), Methodist Hospital Foundation,…
STATE of Florida ex rel., Roger C. SLORA
v.
John D. WESSEL, as Circuit Judge of the Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, in and for Palm Beach County, Florida
No. 81-1386.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Aug 19, 1981.
403 So. 2d 496
Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Robert L. Bogen, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for petitioner., Edna L. Caruso, West Palm Beach, for respondent.
Hersey, Hurley, Letts.
Cited by 3 opinions  |  Published

Lead Opinion

PER CURIAM.

The petition for writ of prohibition is denied. Motion for rehearing, if any, must be filed by noon, Friday, August 21, 1981.

LETTS, C. J., and HERSEY, J., concur.

Concurrence

HURLEY, Judge,

concurring specially.

I concur with the court’s determination because, in my view, the petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the trial judge is a “material witness,” i. e., that he possesses relevant information “going to some fact affecting the merits of the cause . . . about which no other witness might testify.” Wingate v. Mach, 117 Fla. 104, 157 So. 421, 422 (1934) (emphasis supplied). Rule 8.220(b)(1)(viii), Fla.R.Crim.P., provides a mechanism by which the state may obtain a handwriting exemplar from the defendant. Thus, through the use of expert testimony, there exists an alternate but well-recognized method for establishing the authorship and integrity of the document in question without requiring testimony from the trial judge.