Powe v. State, 413 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). · Go Syfert
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Powe v. State, 413 So. 2d 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
20 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Rivera v. State (fladistctapp, 2019-06-21)
Treatment trajectory · 1982 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1982 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 12 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rivera v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
See, e.g. , Henry , 123 So. 3d at 1169 (holding that defendant's counsel was entitled to elicit evidence about degree of felony and maximum prison penalty witness faced to demonstrate his motive and bias to testify against defendant); Jackson v. State , 37 So. 3d 370 , 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding that trial *542 court abused its discretion in prosecution for cocaine trafficking by refusing to allow defendant to cross-examine codefendants, who purchased cocaine from defendant, regarding length of maximum sentence or mandatory minimum prison term; codefendants pleaded guilty and testified ag…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rivera v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
See, e.g. , Henry , 123 So. 3d at 1169 (holding that defendant's counsel was entitled to elicit evidence about degree of felony and maximum prison penalty witness faced to demonstrate his motive and bias to testify against defendant); Jackson v. State , 37 So. 3d 370 , 373 (Fla. 2d DCA 2010) (holding that trial *542 court abused its discretion in prosecution for cocaine trafficking by refusing to allow defendant to cross-examine codefendants, who purchased cocaine from defendant, regarding length of maximum sentence or mandatory minimum prison term; codefendants pleaded guilty and testified ag…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Henry v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
For example, in Powe v. State, 413 So.2d 1272, 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), the first district reversed a defendant’s conviction where the trial court refused defense counsel’s request to inquire as to whether the state’s witness was aware that the charge to which he eventually pleaded carried a five-year minimum mandatory sentence.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harden v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2012 · confidence medium
“The courts have repeatedly held that a defendant has the right to fully cross-examine a State’s witness to reveal bias and any improper motive the witness may have had in testifying against the defendant.” Powe v. State, 413 So.2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) De La Portilla v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
It is thus reversible error for the trial court to prohibit cross-examination "when the facts sought to be elicited are `germane to that witness' testimony and plausibly relevant to the theory of defense.'" Bertram v. State, 637 So.2d 258, 260 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994) (citation omitted); Powe v. State, 413 So.2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Washington v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Powe v. State, 413 So.2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Chatman v. State, 687 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Taylor v. State, 623 So.2d 832 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Washington v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Powe v. State, 413 So.2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Chatman v. State, 687 So.2d 860 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); Taylor v. State, 623 So.2d 832 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Chatman v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
"The courts have repeatedly held that a defendant has the right to fully crossexamine a State's witness to reveal bias and any improper motive the witness may have had in testifying against the defendant." Powe v. State, 413 So.2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
discussed Cited "see" Jackson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · signal: see · confidence high
See Powe v. State, 413 So.2d 1272, 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (reversing because trial court refused to allow defense counsel to inquire about minimum mandatory penalty that State’s key witness avoided with guilty plea; witness’s knowledge of penalty may have been significant factor in decision to testify against defendant); see also Yolman v. State, 469 So.2d 842, 843 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (“It is well established that a defendant has the right to fully cross-examine an adverse witness to reveal any bias, prejudice or improper motive the witness may have had in testifying against the defenda…
cited Cited "see" Eliakim v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · signal: see · confidence high
See Powe v. State, 413 So.2d 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
discussed Cited "see" Douglas v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Powe v. State, 413 So.2d 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982) (scope of cross-examination is reviewed for a clear abuse of trial court's discretion).
cited Cited "see" Sellers v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Powe v. State, 413 So.2d 1272 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982).
Leon Elmore POWE, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
AF-498.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.
May 14, 1982.
413 So. 2d 1272
Shivers.
Cited by 16 opinions  |  Published

David J. Busch, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., Barbara Ann Butler, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

SHIVERS, Judge.

Powe seeks review of his conviction for trafficking in methaqualone asserting as error the trial court's restriction of appellant's cross-examination of a State's witness. We find the trial court unduly restricted defense cross-examination and reverse.

On October 16, 1980, appellant was charged by information with trafficking in methaqualone and with possession of cocaine. The first trial ended in a mistrial. At the second trial, the State presented the testimony of Roy Michel who drove an automobile instrumental in the drug transaction underlying the charges against Powe.

On cross-examination, the defense counsel inquired about any plea bargaining Michel had entered into in return for his testimony. Michel testified that the State dropped a charge of trafficking in methaqualone, that he entered a plea of guilty to a charge of possession of cocaine, and that he was sentenced to five years probation and required to pay a $500 fine. Defense counsel asked several times whether Michel was informed or aware that a conviction for trafficking in methaqualone carried a minimum mandatory five year sentence. The prosecution objected on each occasion to the relevancy of the question and the trial court sustained the objections.

In Wolfe v. State, 190 So.2d 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966) we stated:

[*1273] It has long been the policy of the law that testimony of an accomplice is regarded with disfavor; is subject to close scrutiny; and, should be received with caution by the jury. The reason for the rule arises from the willingness of some persons charged with or convicted of a crime to wrongfully implicate others if by doing so, they may mitigate the penalty against themselves. (footnote omitted)

Great latitude should be allowed in the cross-examination of an accomplice who testifies for the prosecution. Leavine v. State, 109 Fla. 447, 147 So. 897 (1933). 2 Wharton's Criminal Evidence, (1972), Sec. 425, p. 323.

The courts have repeatedly held that a defendant has the right to fully cross-examine a State's witness to reveal bias and any improper motive the witness may have had in testifying against the defendant. Simmons v. Wainwright, 271 So.2d 464 (Fla. 1st DCA 1973); McDuffie v. State, 341 So.2d 840 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977). This right has been specifically extended to defense interrogation of a prosecution witness who was recently under the threat of criminal charges. Rolle v. State, 386 So.2d 3 (Fla. 3d DCA 1980). We find that whether Michel knew of the minimum mandatory penalty for a conviction of trafficking in methaqualone may have impacted significantly on the plea-bargaining agreement and on Michel's willingness to testify against Powe. We recognize that control over the scope of the cross-examination properly lies with the trial court and is not subject to review except for a clear abuse of discretion. Ho Yin Wong v. State, 359 So.2d 460 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). Here, the trial court clearly abused its discretion by unduly limiting the defense interrogation of Michel. Accordingly, we reverse Powe's conviction and sentence and remand for a new trial.

REVERSED and REMANDED.

ERVIN and WENTWORTH, JJ., concur.