Lafferty v. Lafferty, 413 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). · Go Syfert
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Lafferty v. Lafferty, 413 So. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
27 citation events (10 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Charles Ruffenach v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Asset- Backed Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-R8, Raymond Lozano, Alili Rihkrand, Islebrook at Meadow Woods Homeowners' Association, Inc., Orange County, and Cit Financial, Inc. (fladistctapp, 2026-03-20)
Treatment trajectory · 1982 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1982 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 15 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Charles Ruffenach v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, as Trustee for Ameriquest Mortgage Securities Inc., Asset- Backed Pass-Through Certificates Series 2005-R8, Raymond Lozano, Alili Rihkrand, Islebrook at Meadow Woods Homeowners' Association, Inc., Orange County, and Cit Financial, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
Lafferty v. Lafferty, 413 So. 2d 170, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982). 4 245 (Fla. 3d DCA 1968); Lamar v. Lamar, 323 So. 2d 43, 44 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Nivens v. Nivens, 312 So. 2d 201, 202 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975); Mullane v. Lorenz, 372 So. 2d 168, 168 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Lee v. Gilbert, Silverstein & Hellman, P.A., 350 So. 2d 1147, 1147 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Cohen v. Cohen, 400 So. 2d 463, 465 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Gualtieri v. Keyser
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · confidence medium
The Guidelines allow a party to recover a reasonable fee for expert testimony. “[U]pon the specific objection to the setting of an expert witness fee without an evidentiary hearing, the prevailing party will have to present testimony concerning the necessity and reasonableness of the fee.” Lafferty v. Lafferty, 413 So.2d 170, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) The Field Club, Inc. v. Alario
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
Catalano v. Catalano, 802 So.2d 1146, 1148 (Fla. 2d 1DCA 2001) (citing Lafferty v. Lafferty, 413 So.2d 170, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Sea World of Florida, Inc. v. Ace American Insurance Companies
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Lafferty v. Lafferty, 413 So.2d 170, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Golian v. Wollschlager
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Finally, appellants complain that the trial court erred when it awarded expert witness fees to appellee notwithstanding appellee's failure, in the face of a timely specific objection, to present sufficient evidence regarding the necessity and reasonableness of the fees requested. "[U]pon a specific objection to the setting of an expert witness fee without an evidentiary hearing, the prevailing party [is required] to present testimony concerning the necessity and reasonableness of the fee." Lafferty v. Lafferty, 413 So.2d 170, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Island Hoppers, Ltd. v. Keith
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · confidence medium
Lafferty v. Lafferty, 413 So.2d 170, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Catalano v. Catalano
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
In Lafferty v. Lafferty, 413 So.2d 170, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), this court set forth the requirements for evidentiary hearings regarding expert witness fees: [Ujpon the specific objection to the setting of an expert witness fee without an evidentiary hearing, the prevailing party will have to present testimony concerning the necessity and reasonableness of the fee.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Powell v. Barnes
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · confidence medium
Lafferty v. Lafferty, 413 So.2d 170, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) American Cyanamid Co. v. Roy
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1989 · confidence medium
The rule in Florida controlling the taxation of costs for expert witness fees is set forth in Lafferty v. Lafferty, 413 So.2d 170, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982), wherein the court stated: [W]e hold that upon the specific objection to the setting of an expert witness fee without an evidentiary hearing, the prevailing party will have to present testimony concerning the necessity and reasonableness of the fee.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sullivan v. Musella
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · confidence medium
In support of her argument she calls to our attention language found in our decision in Lafferty v. Lafferty, 413 So.2d 170, 171 (Fla.2d DCA 1982): In order to avoid the possibility of abuse, we hold that upon the specific objection to the setting of an expert witness fee without an evidentiary hearing, the prevailing party will have to present testimony concerning the necessity and reasonableness of the fee.
cited Cited as authority (rule) American Indem. Co. v. Comeau
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · confidence medium
Lafferty v. Lafferty, 413 So.2d 170, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
discussed Cited "see" Ghannam v. Mark D. Shelnutt, P.A.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lafferty v. Lafferty, 413 So.2d 170, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) ("[A]n attorney’s fee must always be proved through the presentation of [expert witness] testimony,” (emphasis added)).
cited Cited "see" Dhondy v. Schimpeler
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lafferty v. Lafferty, 413 So.2d 170, 171 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
cited Cited "see" Baker v. Varela
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1982 · signal: see · confidence high
See Lafferty v. Lafferty, 413 So.2d 170 (Fla. 2nd DCA 1982).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Winter Park Imports, Inc. v. JM Family Enterprises, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2011 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Lafferty v. Lqfferty, 413 So.2d 170, 170-71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982) (upon specific objection to setting of expert witness fees without an evidentiary hearing, prevailing party will have to present testimony concerning necessity and reasonableness of fee; if no specific objection is made, trial judge has authority to set amount of expert witness costs based upon his or her experience in these matters, together with observation of witnesses’ testimony or review of record); Catalano v. Catalano, 802 So.2d 1146 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001); Powell v. Barnes, 629 So.2d 185 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993).
A. Wayne LAFFERTY, Appellant,
v.
Mildred Cart LAFFERTY a/K/a Mildred C. Lafferty, Appellee.
81-1784.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District.
Apr 30, 1982.
413 So. 2d 170
Grimes.
Cited by 21 opinions  |  Published

George P. Kickliter, Tampa, for appellant.

Charles F. Clark and Ted R. Manry, III, of Macfarlane, Ferguson, Allison & Kelly, Tampa, for appellee.

GRIMES, Judge.

The husband appeals from an order awarding attorney's fees and costs to his ex-wife for her successful prosecution of a motion for contempt based on the husband's failure to pay alimony.

The only point which requires discussion is the husband's contention that the court improperly ordered him to pay the wife, as part of her costs, $800 for the expert witness fee of her accountant. The colloquy before the court on this subject indicates that in preparation for the contempt hearing the husband had retained a bookkeeper to review his records with a view toward the bookkeeper testifying that he could not afford to pay the back alimony. Counsel for the wife then employed an accountant to review the doctor's records and to testify in opposition. The accountant worked on the case for twenty hours, including three and one half hours in court, and charged $40 an hour.

The husband now asserts that the court could not tax the costs of this expert witness without first taking testimony with respect to whether his charge was a reasonable fee. He cites Posner v. Flink, 393 So.2d 1140 (Fla. 3d DCA), petition for review denied, 402 So.2d 612 (Fla. 1981), in which the court held that as in the case of attorney's fees it was necessary to conduct an evidentiary hearing in order to determine the reasonable fee of any expert witness. In reaching its decision, the court there relied upon section 92.231, Florida Statutes (1981), which is the only statute on the subject pertaining to civil actions.[*171] However, while that section authorizes the court to tax expert witness fees, it does not specify the manner in which this is to be done.

Implicit in the rule that an attorney's fee must always be proved through the presentation of testimony is that such a requirement is necessary to maintain the image of lawyers in the eyes of the public. Moreover, a claim for attorney's fees is substantive in nature in that it entails a recovery for services rendered while the expert witness is compensated for testifying. While tradition cannot serve to make proper an otherwise illegal practice, the court in this case followed the customary method of determining expert witness fees. See, e.g., Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Florida Power & Light Co., 367 So.2d 1104 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), in which the court upheld an expert witness fee of $11,624.76 based upon invoices submitted by the witness. The impracticalities of requiring testimony in every instance are obvious. This would mean that the court could not tax a doctor's expert witness fee in favor of the prevailing party in the ordinary personal injury action without taking testimony on what constituted a reasonable fee. To pursue this line of thought to its reasonable conclusion, the doctor who testified concerning the reasonableness of the fee would then be entitled to an expert witness fee to be set by further expert testimony.

In order to avoid the possibility of abuse, we hold that upon the specific objection to the setting of an expert witness fee without an evidentiary hearing, the prevailing party will have to present testimony concerning the necessity and reasonableness of the fee. If no specific objection is made, as in the instant case, we believe the judge has the authority to set the amount of the expert witness fee based upon his experience in these matters together with his observation of the witness's testimony or his review of the record. We hereby recede from any implication to the contrary which may be contained in our opinion in Lyle v. Lyle, 167 So.2d 256 (Fla. 2d DCA), cert. denied, 172 So.2d 601 (Fla. 1964).

AFFIRMED.

HOBSON, A.C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur.