Quayside Assoc v. Harbour Club Villas, 419 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). · Go Syfert
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Quayside Assoc v. Harbour Club Villas, 419 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“here ... the terms of a written instrument are disputed and reasonably susceptible to more than one construction, an issue of fact is presented which cannot properly be resolved by summary judgment.”
22 citation events (6 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Fecteau v. Southeast Bank, NA (fladistctapp, 1991-08-21)
Treatment trajectory · 1982 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1982 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 9 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Fecteau v. Southeast Bank, NA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
here ... the terms of a written instrument are disputed and reasonably susceptible to more than one construction, an issue of fact is presented which cannot properly be resolved by summary judgment.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Shady Hills Energy Center, LLC v. Seminole Electric Cooperative, Inc.
M.D. Fla. · 2022 · confidence medium
Ass'n, Inc., 419 So. 2d 678, 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Nature's Products, Inc. v. Natrol, Inc.
S.D. Fla. · 2013 · confidence medium
Ass’n, Inc., 419 So.2d 678, 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)). “ ‘Where the wording of an agreement is ambiguous, its interpretation involves [a] question of fact, precluding summary disposition.’ ” PartyLite Gifts, Inc., 895 F.Supp.2d at 1235 (quoting Smith v. Shelton, 970 So.2d 450, 451 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007)); see also Hibiscus Assocs.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Security Life of Denver Insurance v. Shah
S.D. Ga. · 2012 · confidence medium
Ass’n, 419 So.2d 678, 679 (Fla.Dist.Ct.App.1982) (citations omitted)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Partylite Gifts, Inc. v. MacMillan
M.D. Fla. · 2012 · confidence medium
Quayside Associates, Ltd. v. Harbour Club Villas Condominium Assoc., 419 So.2d 678, 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Gillentine v. McKeand, 426 F.2d 717, 721 (1st Cir.1970) (applying Massachusetts law); Trafton v. Custeau, 338 Mass. 305 , 155 N.E.2d 159, 161 (1959). 25 The determination of whether the terms of a contract are ambiguous is a question of law.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Langner v. Charles A. Binger, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
Quayside Assocs. v. Harbour Club Villas Condominium Assoc., 419 So.2d 678, 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982) (citations omitted); Metropolitan Dade County v. Resources Recovery Constr.
cited Cited "see" General Tool Industries, Inc. v. Premier Machinery, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Quayside Assocs., Ltd. v. Harbour Club Villas Condominium, Ass’n, Inc., 419 So.2d 678, 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
discussed Cited "see" Lightspeed of Miami, Inc. v. Jack Eckerd Corp.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
I would make it clear, however, that, quite apart from Eckerd’s rights under its own lease, a genuine issue, resolvable only by extrinsic evidence, is ■ presented as to whether a proper interpretation of Light-speed’s lease obligated the landlord to prohibit Eckerd’s competitive activity, see Liza Danielle, Inc. v. Jamko, Inc., 408 So.2d 735 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); see generally Quayside Assocs., Ltd. v. Harbor Club Villas Condominium Ass’n, 419 So.2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Hoffman v. Terry, 397 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Mead v. Mead, 193 So.2d 476 (Fla. 3d DCA 1967), cert. denied,…
cited Cited "see" John Alden Life Insurance Co. v. Home State Financial Services, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Quayside Associates, Ltd. v. Harbour Club Villas Condominium Association, Inc., 419 So.2d 678, 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
QUAYSIDE Associates, Ltd., Appellant,
v.
HARBOUR CLUB VILLAS CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC., Appellee.
81-1333, 81-1334.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Aug 24, 1982.
419 So. 2d 678
Daniel S. Pearson and Ferguson, JJ. and Owen, William C., Jr. (Ret.), Associate Judge.
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published

Lapidus & Stettin and Richard Lapidus, Miami, for appellant.

Floyd, Pearson, Stewart, Richman, Greer & Weil and Ellen C. Freidin, Miami, for appellee.

Before DANIEL S. PEARSON and FERGUSON, JJ. and OWEN, WILLIAM C., Jr. (Ret.), Associate Judge.

PER CURIAM.

This appeal is from a Final Summary Judgment entered on a petition for declaratory decree determining that appellant is liable to indemnify appellee pursuant to terms of a settlement agreement. We reverse.

As part of an agreement terminating litigation between the parties Quayside gave Harbour Club Villas Condominium Association, Inc. (Villas) $3,000,000.00 and an indemnification agreement which provided:

Quayside shall indemnify, defend and save harmless Villas and all the Unit owners of Villas from any and all claims,[*679] damages, judgments, actions, losses, costs, penalties, liabilities, and/or expenses without limitation (including attorneys' fees whether incurred in the course of primary or appellate litigation or settlement or otherwise) arising or sustained in any manner and for any reason whatsoever against Villas in connection with or as a result of the payment and receipt of the $3,000,000.00 or against Quayside in connection with the enforcement of this Agreement... .

The attorney for Villas who had been paid $3,500.00, by contract, for representing Villas in litigation which preceded the settlement (and who did not participate in the settlement negotiations) brought suit against Villas for additional fees. Villas contends that the additional fees demanded by the attorney is a claim covered by the indemnification agreement. Quayside contends that it had been specifically agreed prior to implementation of the agreement that Villas' attorneys fees would not be covered by the agreement. The parties petitioned the court for a declaratory judgment and each filed a motion for summary judgment. The trial court entered judgment for Villas on a finding that the settlement agreement, exclusive of parol evidence, was clear and unambiguous.

What is clear to us is that it is unclear whether the demand for additional fees made against Villas for services rendered to it by its attorney prior to the settlement agreement (and paid for) is a claim arising or sustained against Villas in connection with or as a result of the payment and receipt of the $3,000,000.00. The construction of a contract is ordinarily a question of law and belongs to the courts provided that the terms used are unequivocal, clear, undisputed and not subject to conflicting inferences. Friedman v. Virginia Metal Products Corp., 56 So.2d 515 (Fla. 1952). Where, as here, the terms of the written instrument are disputed and reasonably susceptible to more than one construction, an issue of fact is presented which cannot properly be resolved by summary judgment. Goldbloom v. J.I. Kislak Mortgage Co., 408 So.2d 748 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982); Hoffman v. Terry, 397 So.2d 1184 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981); Ellenwood v. Southern United Life Ins. Co., 373 So.2d 392 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).

Summary judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further consistent proceedings.