Brown v. State, 430 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1983). · Go Syfert
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Brown v. State, 430 So. 2d 446 (Fla. 1983). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“what is dispositive is whether there have been successive and distinct forceful takings with a separate and independent intent for each transaction.”
66 citation events (23 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: LaBarbara v. State (fladistctapp, 2009-04-01)
Treatment trajectory · 1983 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1983 2004 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 32 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) LaBarbara v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
what is dispositive is whether there have been successive and distinct forceful takings with a separate and independent intent for each transaction.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) David William Trappman v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2024 · signal: cf. · confidence medium
Cf. Brown v. State, 430 So. 2d 446, 446-47 (Fla. 1983) (upholding convictions for two counts of robbery of a retail establishment in which the taking of property was from two different cash registers controlled by two different employees, and reasoning that “[w]hat is dispositive is whether there have been successive and distinct forceful takings with a separate and independent intent for each transaction”).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Termitus v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
M.D. Fla. · 2017 · confidence medium
A court must inquire as to “ ‘whether there have been successive and distinct forceful takings with a separate and independent intent for each transaction.’ ” Austin, 203 So.3d at 1018 (quoting Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla. 1983)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Austin v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
When presented with multiple armed robbery charges like those presented by this case, a court must inquire “whether there have been successive and distinct forceful takings with a separate and independent intent for each transaction.” Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla.1983).
examined Cited as authority (rule) State of Iowa v. Randy Mitchell Copenhaver (6×) also: Cited "see"
Iowa · 2014 · confidence medium
See People v. Scott, 200 P.3d 837 , 841–43 (Cal. 2009) (finding the statutory language of “possession of another” included constructive possession for the crime and thus, a defendant could commit three robberies against three employees when the three employees had constructive possession of the employer’s money); People v. Borghesi, 66 P.3d 93, 103 (Colo. 2003) (deciding under a statute that required the “presence of another,” two clerks had sufficient control over the store property to support two robbery convictions); Brown v. State, 430 So. 2d 446, 447 (Fla. 1983) (finding two r…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Partch v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Id. (citing Hearn v. State, 55 So.2d 559, 560 (Fla.1951); Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla.1983)); see also Saavedra v. State, 576 So.2d 953, 958 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding the crucial question in determining whether distinct acts occurred is typically whether defendant had time to reflect and form a new criminal intent between the acts). 2 In addition to the foregoing, Florida courts have also held the Florida sexual battery statutes are particularly susceptible to the distinct acts exception because the statutes “may be violated in multiple, alternative ways, i.e., ‘oral, anal, …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Flores-Vega v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
The dispositive issue in a double jeopardy claim *725 involving robbery charges “ ‘is whether there have been successive and distinct forceful takings with a separate and independent intent for each transaction.’ ” Labarbara v. State, 5 So.3d 801, 803 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (quoting Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla.1983)).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Cruller v. State (3×)
Fla. · 2002 · confidence medium
Similarly, in Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla.1983), we addressed the question of whether a defendant could be convicted of multiple counts of robbery where the defendant robbed two store employees and was charged with two counts of robbery.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hayes v. State
Fla. · 2001 · confidence medium
See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302-04 , 52 S.Ct. 180 , 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932); Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla.1983); Hearn v. State, 55 So.2d 559, 560 (Fla.1951).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Consiglio v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
As the supreme court stated in Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla. 1983), "[w]hat is dispositive is whether there have been successive and distinct forceful takings with a separate and independent intent for each transaction." While the temporal separation was very minimal in this case, there were two separate acts: (1) an intent and act to steal money from the victim; and (2) an intent and act to steal the victim's car.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Robinson v. Moore
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
As to point two, see Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla.1983).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ward v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Id. at 447 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Harvey v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
Harvey argues the trial court erred by denying his motion for a judgment of acquittal for the armed robbery of Valentin because multiple robbery convictions require “successive and distinct forceful takings with a separate and independent intent for each transaction.” Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla.1983).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Walden v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla.1983) (‘What is dispositive is whether there have been successive and distinct forceful takings with a separate and independent intent for each transaction.”) Accord Taylor v. State, 589 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), quashed on other grounds, 608 So.2d 804 (Fla.1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Marion v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · confidence medium
We think that the time separation and sequence of events adequately distinguishes the case on which defendant relies, Nordelo v. State, 603 So.2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992). "[W]here property is stolen from the same owner from the same place by a series of acts, if each taking is a result of a separate independent impulse, it is a separate crime." Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla.1983) (citation omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jones v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
These facts do not demonstrate the occurrence of "successive and distinctive forceful takings with a separate and independent intent for each transaction." Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla. 1983); Lundy v. State, 614 So.2d 674 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993); Taylor v. State, 589 So.2d 997 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), quashed on other grounds, 608 So.2d 804 (Fla. 1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1991 · confidence medium
Brown, 430 So.2d at 447 (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Holmes v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · confidence medium
We hold that the crux of the offense of robbery is a taking and that the taking of the money from the custody of the supervisor in the office and the taking of the money from the cash register till that was in the actual custody of the cashier, were sufficiently distinct and different factual events as to support two separate convictions. [1] See Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446 *534 (Fla. 1983).
cited Cited "see" Henderson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla.1983).
discussed Cited "see" Taylor v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see · confidence high
See *662 Castleberry v. State, 402 So.2d 1231, 1232 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), pet. for review denied, 412 So.2d 470 (Fla.1982); McClendon v. State, 372 So.2d 1161, 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); see generally Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla. 1983).
cited Cited "see" Murphy v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla.1983); State v. Mitchell, 719 So.2d 1245 , 23 Fla. L.
cited Cited "see" Goff v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1983).
cited Cited "see" Taylor v. State
Fla. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1983); Hill v. State, 293 So.2d 79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974).
discussed Cited "see" Nordelo v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446 (Fla. 1983) (defendant robbed two cashiers); Cobb v. State, 586 So.2d 1298 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (defendant stole gold chains from one victim and a car from a second nearby victim).
discussed Cited "see" Hamilton v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Castleberry v. State, 402 So.2d 1231, 1232 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981), pet. for review denied, 412 So.2d 470 (Fla. 1982); McClendon v. State, 372 So.2d 1161, 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); see generally Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla. 1983).
cited Cited "see" Garmony v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1984 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446 (Fla.1983); Hillman v. State, 410 So.2d 180 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982).
cited Cited "see" Burris v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1983 · signal: see · confidence high
See Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446 (Fla.1983).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Beaudry v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla.1983).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Drayton v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Consiglio v. State, 743 So.2d 1221 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999); see also Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446 (Fla.1983).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Victor v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see also · confidence medium
As the First District Court of Appeal said in a similar situation, "the case at bar involved two discrete offenses: taking the victim's car at gunpoint, and shortly thereafter, while in a different location, taking his personal effects." Howard v. State, 723 So.2d 863, 864 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); see Marion v. State, 674 So.2d 878, 879 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996); see also Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla.1983) ("The two events were separated in time and each required separate criminal intent.").
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Fountain v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see also · confidence low
Finally, Bashans cannot be distinguished from the present case by saying that Bashans involved a charging document alleging two separate crimes in a single count whereas the present case merely involves a count which alleges "alternative means of committing the offense of armed kidnapping." Because the crimes alleged here involve different victims, each crime against a different victim constitutes a separate criminal offense. *575 See, e.g., Rose v. State, 507 So.2d 630, 631 (Fla. 5th DCA 1987) (collecting cases); see also Brown v. State, 413 So.2d 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), approved, Brown v. …
cited Cited "see, e.g." Hopps v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Brown v. State, 430 So.2d 446, 447 (Fla.1983).
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
Jimmy BROWN, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
62198.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Apr 14, 1983.
430 So. 2d 446
McDonald.
Cited by 47 opinions  |  Published

Nancy A. Daniels and Gwendolyn Spivey, Asst. Public Defenders, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, for petitioner.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Barbara Ann Butler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jacksonville, for respondent.

McDONALD, Justice.

We granted the petition for review of the decision below, Brown v. State, 413 So.2d 1273 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982), based upon apparent conflict with Hill v. State, 293 So.2d 79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974). We approve.

Brown entered a Family Dollar Store, approached one cashier, displayed a firearm, and directed her to empty the money from her register into a paper bag. Failing to find the manager, Brown returned to the first cashier and ordered her to open a second cash register. The cashier did not have a key to the second register and so summoned her only fellow employee who had a key to the second register. The second employee refused to believe that a robbery was actually in progress and would not open the register until Brown displayed his firearm to her. She then opened the register for which she was solely responsible and placed its contents in the paper bag with the money from the first register. Brown was convicted of two counts of robbery and the district court of appeal affirmed his convictions.

In Hill the defendant entered a grocery store, brandishing a gun, and ordered both the cashier and manager to give him money belonging to the store chain from a drawer and a safe. Because all the money which was the subject of the robbery was taken at the same time and place, under the same circumstances and with the same intent, the district court ruled that separate counts charging robbery of both the manager and the cashier charged but a single offense.

[*447] The Hill court cited Hearn v. State, 55 So.2d 559 (Fla. 1951), wherein this Court held that only one larceny was committed where the property, consisting of eleven cattle belonging to different owners, was taken at the same time from the same place under the same circumstances and with the same intent. In Green v. State, 134 Fla. 216, 183 So. 728 (1938), we noted that where property is stolen from the same owner from the same place by a series of acts, if each taking is a result of a separate independent impulse, it is a separate crime. Hence, in larceny cases it is not the fact that the same owner's property is involved that controls, but rather whether there were separate events, each with a separate intent. In Hall v. State, 66 So.2d 863 (Fla. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 931, 74 S.Ct. 321, 98 L.Ed. 422 (1954), we affirmed separate convictions where the taking of cattle on the same day involved the invasion of separate pastures even though the same motor truck was used.

In this case the money taken by the defendant belonged to a single owner, but it was taken by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear from two separate employees. The taking was from separate cash registers, over the second of which the first employee had no control. The two events were separated in time and each required separate criminal intent. Actual ownership of the money obtained is not dispositive of the question of whether multiple robberies have been committed. What is dispositive is whether there have been successive and distinct forceful takings with a separate and independent intent for each transaction.

Hill may be factually different from this case, since only one transaction was found, but, we disapprove Hill to the extent that it implies that there cannot be two robberies when the property taken belongs to the same entity. We approve the First District Court's opinion in this cause.

It is so ordered.

ALDERMAN, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON and EHRLICH, JJ., concur.

BOYD, J., dissents with an opinion.

BOYD, Justice, dissenting.

I respectfully dissent to the approval of two separate convictions for armed robbery since it is clear from the evidence that only one armed robbery took place.

Petitioner went into the store for the purpose of taking money from the store by force, violence, assault, or putting in fear. His intent was to achieve such fear and cooperation by exhibiting his gun to whoever might be in custody of the store's money. The first employee he contacted needed assistance in opening the second cash register as directed so she sought the assistance of the second employee in unlocking it. The store owner was the true victim of the robbery as the clerks were not robbed of their personal possessions. I believe these events constituted one continuous transaction and therefore there was only one armed robbery.

Under the Court's reasoning, if the second clerk had been unable to open the cash register and a dozen other employees had been forced to assist, there would have been fourteen separate armed robberies. On the other hand, if the robber had entered the store and instantaneously and simultaneously put all the employees in fear and demanded that he be given all the storeowner's money, there would be only one armed robbery. I do not believe that such a discrepancy of result turning on such factual distinctions was intended by the legislature.

Based upon Hill v. State, 293 So.2d 79 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), I would hold that there was only one armed robbery.