Mann v. State, 453 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1984). · Go Syfert
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Mann v. State, 453 So. 2d 784 (Fla. 1984). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
37 citation events (13 in the last 25 years) across 5 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: CHRISTOPHER TAVARIS DEAN v. STATE OF FLORIDA (fladistctapp, 2020-04-08)
Treatment trajectory · 1984 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1984 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 10 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) CHRISTOPHER TAVARIS DEAN v. STATE OF FLORIDA (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2020 · confidence medium
See Lucas v. State, 841 So. 2d 380, 387 (Fla. 2003) (“[A] resentencing court is not limited by evidence presented (or not presented) in . . . the original . . . sentencing phase.”); Mann v. State, 453 So. 2d 784, 786 (Fla. 1984) (recognizing that where a remand directs a new sentencing proceeding, both sides may present additional evidence).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Branton v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2016 · confidence medium
Because his February 4,2013, resentencing was a completely new proceeding, Branton was entitled to produce additional evidence at this hearing not presented at his earlier sentencing, see Mann v. State, 453 So.2d 784, 786 (Fla.1984), and the resentencing court was not limited to the evidence presented, or not presented, at the original sentencing back in 2002.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Fleming
Fla. · 2011 · confidence medium
For example, in State v. Collins, 985 So.2d 985, 994 (Fla.2008), we held “that when a habitual offender sentence is reversed because of insufficient evidence, on remand for resentencing the State may again attempt to prove that the defendant meets the criteria for such sentencing.” See Mann v. State, 453 So.2d 784, 786 (Fla.1984) (rejecting appellant’s argument that the state was not permitted to present new evidence at his resentencing and stating that “[o]ur remand directed a new sentencing proceeding, not just a reweighing” at which “both sides may, if they choose, present addit…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Collins
Fla. · 2008 · confidence medium
See Lucas v. State, 841 So.2d 380, 387 (Fla.2003) ("[A] resentencing court is not limited by evidence presented (or not presented) in ... the original... sentencing phase."); Mann v. State, 453 So.2d 784, 786 (Fla.1984) (recognizing that where a remand directs a new sentencing proceeding, both sides may present additional evidence).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. State
Fla. · 1985 · confidence medium
"Besides relying on the evidence presented in the first sentencing proceeding, at resentencing the state introduced a copy of a Mississippi indictment charging Mann with burglary both with the intent to commit unnatural carnal intercourse and that he did commit that crime against a named female person." Mann v. State, 453 So.2d 784, 786 (Fla. 1984).
cited Cited "see" Galindez v. State
Fla. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mann v. State, 453 So.2d 784, 786 (Fla.1984) (explaining that at a de novo resentencing "both sides may, if they choose, present additional evidence").
cited Cited "see" Brown v. State
Fla. · 1985 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mann v. State, 453 So.2d 784 (Fla. 1984).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Lloyd v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence low
See, e.g., Pelham v. State, 815 So.2d 733 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002); Singleton v. State, 760 So.2d 250 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Yankovski v. State, 785 So.2d 1283 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001); see also Mann v. State, 453 So.2d 784 (Fla.1984).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Murry v. State
Ala. Crim. App. · 1990 · signal: compare · confidence low
Compare Mann v. State, 453 So.2d 784 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181 , 105 S.Ct. 940 , 83 L.Ed.2d 953 (1985).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." William Duane Elledge v. Richard L. Dugger (2×)
11th Cir. · 1987 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence medium
See, e.g., Mann v. State, 453 So.2d 784, 785 (Fla.1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1181 , 105 S.Ct. 940 , 83 L.Ed.2d 953 (1985); Adams v. State, 412 So.2d 850, 854, 857 (Fla.1982) (three mitigating factors, including that the capital offense was committed while defendant was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional disturbance, outweighed by three aggravating circumstances), cert. denied, - U.S. , 106 S.Ct. 1506 , 89 L.Ed.2d 906 (1986).
Larry Eugene MANN, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
63438.
Supreme Court of Florida.
May 24, 1984.
453 So. 2d 784
Per Curiam.
Cited by 30 opinions  |  Published

[*785] Jerry Hill, Public Defender, and W.C. McLain, Asst. Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Michael J. Kotler, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tampa, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

A jury convicted Mann of first-degree murder and kidnapping and recommended the death penalty. The trial court sentenced Mann to death for the murder and to ninety-nine years for the kidnapping. On appeal we affirmed the convictions, but vacated the death sentence and remanded for resentencing. Mann v. State, 420 So.2d 578 (Fla. 1982). On remand the trial court conducted a new sentencing proceeding without a jury and again sentenced Mann to death. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(1) of the Florida Constitution and affirm the death sentence.

In Mann's original sentencing proceeding the state introduced a copy of a conviction showing that Mann had been convicted of burglary in Mississippi. The state also presented evidence (testimony of the victim) to show that Mann committed a sexual battery upon the occupant of the house he burgled. Relying on this conviction and supporting evidence, the trial court found that the aggravating circumstance of previous conviction of a violent felony had been established. § 921.141(5)(b), Fla. Stat. (1979).

On appeal we held that the trial court had erroneously found this aggravating circumstance because burglary is not a crime of violence on its face. 420 So.2d at 580. We also held that the trial court had improperly found the establishment of another aggravating circumstance and that we could not tell what the trial court found regarding the mitigating evidence that Mann presented. We therefore vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing.

On resentencing the trial court deleted the second improper aggravating factor and specifically found in mitigation that Mann suffered from psychotic depression and feelings of rage. The court also again found that the prior Mississippi conviction established the aggravating factor of previous[*786] conviction of a violent felony. We hold that this aggravating circumstance has now been established.

Besides relying on the evidence presented in the first sentencing proceeding, at resentencing the state introduced a copy of a Mississippi indictment charging Mann with burglary both with the intent to commit unnatural carnal intercourse and that he did commit that crime against a named female person. Mann now claims that our first opinion precluded the state from presenting additional evidence. We disagree.

Our remand directed a new sentencing proceeding, not just a reweighing. In such a proceeding both sides may, if they choose, present additional evidence. Moreover, as we stated previously: "We are not presented with a copy of the Mississippi charge document and, thus, cannot determine whether it alleged, and the jury convicted him of, a breaking with intent to commit a crime of violence." Id. at 581. The state remedied this omission on resentencing, and the proof — the indictment, the conviction, and the victim's testimony — establishes a prior conviction of a violent felony.

In aggravation the trial court also again found the murder to have been committed during the course of a kidnapping and to have been especially heinous, atrocious, and cruel. He found that the three established aggravating circumstances outweighed the single mitigating circumstance and again sentenced Mann to death. Compare Adams v. State, 412 So.2d 850 (Fla. 1982) (eight-year-old girl strangled, mitigating circumstances of emotional disturbance outweighed by aggravating circumstances). We find no error and affirm the sentence.

It is so ordered.

ALDERMAN, C.J., and ADKINS, BOYD, OVERTON, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.