State v. Hicks, 478 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1985). · Go Syfert
Search
State v. Hicks, 478 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1985). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
34 citation events (11 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Carliovis Bandera-Valier v. State of Florida (fladistctapp, 2026-04-24)
Treatment trajectory · 1985 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1985 2005 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers. How cited ↗
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Carliovis Bandera-Valier v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2026 · confidence medium
“In Florida, the right to counsel has been extended to all probation violation hearings.” White v. State, 336 So. 3d 427 , 428 (Fla. 2d DCA 2022) (citing State v. Hicks, 478 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1985)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Leon Bernard Camel v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
I, § 16(b), Fla. Const. (emphasis added); and see State v. Hicks, 478 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1985) (holding that a defendant has a right to counsel in probation revocation proceedings).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Maxwell v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · confidence medium
The probationer, for instance, is entitled to the provision of effective assistance of counsel “before he is required to respond in any manner to the revocation charges.” State v. Hicks, 478 So. 2d 22, 23 (Fla. 1985).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Bowden v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2014 · confidence medium
State v. Hicks, 478 So.2d 22, 23 (Fla.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Brady v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
However, Florida has adopted the rule that "unless there has been an informed waiver [of the right to counsel, a probationer] is entitled to counsel, and it must be afforded him before he is required to respond in any manner to the revocation charges." State v. Hicks, 478 So.2d 22, 23 (Fla.1985).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Pearl v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Wyo. · 2000 · confidence medium
State v. Hicks, 478 So.2d 22, 23 (Fla.1985).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gibson v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
As our supreme court noted in State v. Hicks, 478 So.2d 22, 23 (Fla.1985), there is no constitutional requirement that counsel be appointed in all probation revocation proceedings.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Tyler v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
The supreme court later adopted the opinion of this court as its own, and added that "Unless there has been an informed waiver thereof such a person is entitled to counsel, and it must be afforded him before he is required to respond in any manner to the revocation charges." Hicks, 478 So.2d at 23 (Fla.1985) (emphasis added).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Register v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1987 · confidence medium
The Court held that, “unless there has been an informed waiver thereof such a person is entitled to counsel, and it must be afforded him before he is required to respond in any manner to the revocation charges.” Id. at 23.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Floyd v. PAROLE AND PROBATION COM'N
Fla. · 1987 · confidence medium
We doubt that we could improve upon his opinion and therefore adopt it as the opinion of this Court. 478 So.2d at 23-24 (emphasis supplied).
cited Cited "see" Speckhardt v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See State v. Hicks, 478 So.2d 22, 23 (Fla.1985); Brady v. State, 910 So.2d 388, 390 (Fla. 2d DCA 2005).
discussed Cited "see" Edwards v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
The probationer should also be told of the potential consequences of a guilty plea, the right to counsel, and the right to a final hearing on violation of probation, at which time a probationer has the "opportunity to be fully heard on his or her behalf in person or by counsel." § 984.06, Fla. Stat. (1997); see State v. Hicks, 478 So.2d 22 (Fla.1985); Allen; Donley v. State, 557 So.2d 943 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990); Washington .
discussed Cited "see" White v. DEPT. OF HEALTH & REHAB. SERVICES
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Hicks v. State, 452 So.2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), expressly approved, 478 So.2d 22 (Fla. 1985). [7] The performance agreement in this case required the parents to earn a minimum of $618 per month.
Retrieving the full opinion text from the archive…
STATE of Florida, Petitioner,
v.
Carl Lee HICKS, Respondent.
65495.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Oct 31, 1985.
478 So. 2d 22
McDonald.
Cited by 20 opinions  |  Published

[*23] Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Carolyn V. McCann, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for petitioner.

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender and Margaret Good, Asst. Public Defender, Fifteenth Judicial Circuit, West Palm Beach, for respondent.

Enoch J. Whitney, Gen. Counsel, Tallahassee, amicus curiae for Florida Parole and Probation Com'n.

McDONALD, Justice.

We accepted jurisdiction of Hicks v. State, 452 So.2d 606 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984), because of conflict with Sanderson v. State, 447 So.2d 374 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, and we approve Hicks.

The issue in this case is whether a person subject to probation revocation has an absolute right to counsel in such a proceeding, and, if so, whether the right must be afforded him before he is required to admit or deny the revocation charges. We hold that unless there has been an informed waiver thereof such a person is entitled to counsel, and it must be afforded him before he is required to respond in any manner to the revocation charges.

We note at the outset that there is no constitutional requirement for the appointment of counsel in all probation revocation hearings. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 93 S.Ct. 1756, 36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973). We predicate our decision here on the ground that a uniform rule in all probation revocation hearings is more easily understood and easier to administer than requiring attorneys in some cases but not in others. We do not believe that a uniform requirement will unduly tax the resources of the public defender system; we believe it will result in a more orderly and uniform administration of the criminal justice system.[*] Judge Downey, writing for the district court, has cogently stated reasons to adopt the ruling we make. We doubt that we could improve upon his opinion and[*24] therefore adopt it as the opinion of this Court.

The opinion of the district court of appeal is approved.

It is so ordered.

BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.

ADKINS and ALDERMAN, JJ., dissent.

ON REHEARING

PER CURIAM.

On rehearing we are asked to decide whether this decision, which related to a probation violation, is also applicable to a parole violation hearing. We should not address on rehearing an issue that was not presented, essential, or directly germane to the case under review and therefore decline to decide the applicability of our holding to parole violations.

We do feel that it is appropriate to determine whether our holding relative to probation violations is retroactive or prospective in its application to other probation violation hearings. We hold that it has prospective application only.

It is so ordered.

BOYD, C.J., and ADKINS, OVERTON, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.

[*] Further, a probation revocation usually leads to sentencing; an attorney is required at a sentencing proceeding. It seems illogical not to mandate an attorney when revocation is likely to lead to incarceration and to require an attorney only when the length of that incarceration is being decided.