Reaves v. State, 485 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1986). · Go Syfert
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Reaves v. State, 485 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“conflict between decisions must be express and direct, i.e., it must appear within the four corners of the majority decision.”
35 citation events (32 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: William J. Plott v. State of Florida (fla, 2014-09-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1986 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1986 2006 2026
Under fire — who is questioning this case
Citations from separate opinions of courts that could overrule this case. This is a warning signal, not a treatment change. The flag color above is unaffected.
Dissent LeShannon Jerome Shelly v. State of Florida (2018)
“Gandy , 846 So.2d at 1144 ; Reaves , 485 So.2d at 830 . 6 *21 It should also be apparent from the majority's circuitous explanation of a conflict between Shelly and Welch , based upon a purported conflict between Moss and Welch , see majority op. at 10-14, that even if the majority's described conflict existed it would not be manifest "within the four corners of" the Shelly decision, Reaves ,…”
Dissent Kimberly Ann Miles v. Daniel Weingrad, M.D. (2015)
“Under article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, this Court “[m]ay review any decision of a district court of appeal ... that expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of another district court of appeal or of the supreme court on the same question of law.” For the exercise of jurisdiction under this provision, the “[c]onflict between decisions must be express and direct,…”
Dissent Allison Chase, etc. v. Horace Mann Insurance Company (2015)
“This Court has explained that, in order for us to have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(8) of the Florida Constitution, the “[cjonflict between decisions must be express and direct, i.e., it must appear within the four corners of the majority decision.” Reaves v. State, 485 So.2d 829, 830 (Fla.1986).”
Dissent Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. National Adoption Counseling Service, Inc. (1986)
“The conflict appears “within the four corners of the majority decision.” Reaves v. State, 485 So.2d 829, 830 (Fla.1986).”
Dissent William J. Plott v. State of Florida (2014)
“State v. Vickery, 961 So.2d 309, 312 (Fla.2007); see Reaves v. State, 485 So.2d 829, 830 (Fla.1986) (“Conflict between decisions must be express and direct, i.e., it must appear within the four corners of the majority decision.”).”
Top citers, strongest first. 13 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) William J. Plott v. State of Florida (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. · 2014 · signal: see · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
conflict between decisions must be express and direct, i.e., it must appear within the four corners of the majority decision.
cited Cited as authority (rule) LeShannon Jerome Shelly v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2018 · confidence medium
Reaves v. State, 485 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1986) (emphasis added).
examined Cited as authority (rule) Kimberly Ann Miles v. Daniel Weingrad, M.D. (4×)
Fla. · 2015 · confidence medium
V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. There is no dispute that our precedent establishes a requirement that the conflict must “appear within the four corners of the majority decision.” Reaves v. State, 485 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Allison Chase, etc. v. Horace Mann Insurance Company (2×)
Fla. · 2015 · confidence medium
This Court has explained that, in order for us to have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution, the “[c]onflict between decisions must be express and direct, i.e., it must appear within the four corners of the majority decision.” Reaves v. State, 485 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1986).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) J.C. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
See Jenkins v. State, 385 So.2d 1356, 1359 (Fla.1980) (“The dictionary definitions of the term ‘express’ include: ‘to represent in words’; ‘to give expression to.’ ‘Expressly’ is defined: ‘in an express manner.’ ”); Aravena v. Miami-Dade County, 928 So.2d 1163, 1166-67 (Fla.2006) (allowing for conflict-based review of “irreconcilable” district court opinions); see also Paddock v. Chacko, 553 So.2d 168, 168-69 (Fla.1989) (McDonald, J., concurring) (“[I]t is neither appropriate nor proper for us to review a record to find conflict ...; the opinion itself must direct…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Department of Health & Rehabilitative Services v. National Adoption Counseling Service, Inc.
Fla. · 1986 · confidence medium
The conflict appears “within the four corners of the majority decision.” Reaves v. State, 485 So.2d 829, 830 (Fla.1986).
discussed Cited "see" D.M., etc. v. M.D., etc. (2×)
Fla. · 2019 · signal: see · confidence high
See Reaves v. State , 485 So. 2d 829 , 830 (Fla. 1986).
cited Cited "see" Anthony Newton v. Caterpillar Financial Services Corporation
Fla. · 2018 · signal: see · confidence high
See Reaves , 485 So.2d at 830 & n.3.
cited Cited "see" Wells v. State
Fla. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Reaves v. State, 485 So.2d 829, 830 (Fla.1986).
cited Cited "see" Arrington R. Wells v. State of Florida
Fla. · 2014 · signal: see · confidence high
See Reaves v. -2- State, 485 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1986).
discussed Cited "see" Persaud v. State
Fla. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Reaves v. State, 485 So.2d 829, 830 (Fla.1986) (denying review in case where "[t]he district court decision correctly states and applies the law based on the facts given," and noting that "[c]onflict between decisions must be express and direct, i.e., it must appear *533 within the four corners of the majority decision"); Ford Motor Co. v. Kikis, 401 So.2d 1341, 1342 (Fla.1981) ("It is not necessary that a district court explicitly identify conflicting district court or supreme court decisions in its opinion in order to create an `express' conflict under section 3(b)(3).").
discussed Cited "see" Hill v. Hill
Fla. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Reaves v. State, 485 So.2d 829, 830 (Fla.1986). *968 Nonetheless, the circumstances of this case demonstrate that there is a conflict in philosophies as to how the appellate courts handle a deficient record, especially when the case involves the best interests of the child.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Gandy v. State
Fla. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Id. at 288 ; see also Beaty v. State, 701 So.2d 856, 857 (Fla.1997) (reaffirming, in light of this Court's decision in Florida Star , that this Court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over district court per curiam decisions issued without opinion). "[I]n those cases where the district court has not explicitly identified a conflicting decision, it is necessary for the district court to have included some facts in its decision so that the question of law addressed by the district court in its decision can be discerned by the Court." Persaud, 838 So.2d at 532 (emphasis added) (citing Rea…
James REAVES, Petitioner,
v.
STATE of Florida, Respondent.
66436.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Apr 3, 1986.
485 So. 2d 829
Per Curiam.
Cited by 23 opinions  |  Published

James H. Greason, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, Ft. Lauderdale, for petitioner.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen. and Richard E. Doran, Asst. Atty. Gen., Miami, for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

We accepted jurisdiction of Reaves v. State, 458 So.2d 53 (Fla.3d DCA 1984), based on asserted conflict with Nowlin v. State, 346 So.2d 1020 (Fla. 1977). Art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. On closer examination, it is clear that there is no direct and express conflict and that review was improvidentially granted.

[*830] The facts of the case are drawn from the district court opinion below. When first arrested following a lethal stabbing, petitioner received and invoked his Miranda[1] right to remain silent. When approached by a second officer shortly thereafter, petitioner agreed to talk and made several inculpatory admissions. Thereafter, petitioner received additional Miranda warnings enroute to and upon arrival at the police station and made another statement after the latter (fourth) Miranda warning. The trial court suppressed the statements as involuntary and the state was not permitted to use them in its case-in-chief. However, at trial, petitioner took the stand and testified contrary to the admissions he had made to the second police officer. Upon motion of the state, the trial court ruled that its earlier use of "involuntary" in suppressing the statements had been inadvertent and that the statements had been suppressed because the police had violated Miranda by persisting in their questioning after petitioner invoked his Miranda rights. Accordingly, the state was permitted to use the suppressed admissions to the second police officer to impeach petitioner's trial testimony.[2] The district court reviewed the record, recited the facts it found pertinent, and held that the admissions were voluntary, even though suppressible under Miranda from use in the case-in-chief, and that the trial court did not err in permitting their use in impeachment. Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 95 S.Ct. 1215, 43 L.Ed.2d 570 (1975); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 91 S.Ct. 643, 28 L.Ed.2d 1 (1971); Walder v. United States, 347 U.S. 62, 74 S.Ct. 354, 98 L.Ed. 503 (1974).

The district court decision correctly states and applies the law based on the facts given.[3] However, in dissent, Judge Hendry canvassed the record and concluded, contrary to the majority, that the statements were in fact involuntary and could not be used in impeachment. Petitioner is asking that we find conflict with Nowlin. In order to do so, it would be necessary for us either to accept the dissenter's view of the evidence and his conclusion that the statements were involuntary, or to review the record itself in order to resolve the disagreement in favor of the dissenter. Neither course of action is available under the jurisdiction granted by article V, section 3(b)(3) of the Florida Constitution. Conflict between decisions must be express and direct, i.e., it must appear within the four corners of the majority decision. Neither a dissenting opinion nor the record itself can be used to establish jurisdiction. See Jenkins v. State, 385 So.2d 1356 (Fla. 1980), where we examined at length the effect of the 1980 constitutional amendment on our conflict jurisdiction. Having determined that there is no direct and express conflict, we deny the petition for review.

It is so ordered.

BOYD, C.J., and OVERTON, McDONALD, EHRLICH and SHAW, JJ., concur.

ADKINS, J., concurs in result only.

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966).
2 Petitioner claimed defense of others and testified at trial that he stabbed the victim in order to prevent him from harming a third person. This was contrary to his admission that he killed decedent in a fit of anger.
3 This case illustrates a common error made in preparing jurisdictional briefs based on alleged decisional conflict. The only facts relevant to our decision to accept or reject such petitions are those facts contained within the four corners of the decisions allegedly in conflict. As we explain in the text above, we are not permitted to base our conflict jurisdiction on a review of the record or on facts recited only in dissenting opinions. Thus, it is pointless and misleading to include a comprehensive recitation of facts not appearing in the decision below, with citations to the record, as petitioner provided here. Similarly, voluminous appendices are normally not relevant.