Trespalacios v. Valor Corp. of Florida, 486 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). · Go Syfert
Trespalacios v. Valor Corp. of Florida, 486 So. 2d 649 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
16 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 6 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Penelas v. Arms Technology, Inc. (fladistctapp, 2001-02-14)
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Penelas v. Arms Technology, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
For the reasons that the firearm was not defective, that manufacture or distribution of the weapon is not unlawful pursuant to either state law or the federal Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1982), and that neither the manufacturer nor distributor had a duty to prevent the sale of handguns to persons who are likely to cause harm to the public, there was no duty which had been breached by the manufacturer and distributor so as to support a cause of action based on negligence." 486 So.2d at 650 (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Merrill v. Navegar, Inc.
Cal. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
(See, e.g., Linton v. Smith & Wesson, Etc. (1984) 127 Ill.App.3d 676 , 82 Ill.Dec. 805 , 469 N.E.2d 339, 340 [suggesting that the reason "[n]o Illinois decision has imposed a duty upon the manufacturer of a non-defective firearm to control the distribution of that product to the general public" is that "such regulation [has] been undertaken by Congress, the Illinois General Assembly and several local legislative bodies"]; Knott v. Liberty Jewelry and Loan, Inc. (1988) 50 Wash.App. 267 , 748 P.2d 661, 665 ["legislature ... has preempted the field of regulating handguns"]; Trespalacios v. Valor …
discussed Cited as authority (rule) LeMaster v. Glock, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · confidence medium
We note that the only Florida case cited by the trial court, Trespalacios v. Valor Corp. of Fla., 486 So.2d 649, 650 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986), simply stands for the proposition that a plaintiff must identify a product's defect and allege that the defect was the proximate cause of the injury in order to state a cause of action for strict liability.
cited Cited "see" Grunow v. Valor Corp. of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Bennet. 486 So.2d at 650-51 (emphasis added).
cited Cited "see" Knott v. Liberty Jewelry & Loan, Inc.
Wash. Ct. App. · 1988 · signal: see · confidence high
See Trespalacios v. Valor Corp., 486 So. 2d 649 (Fla. Dist.
discussed Cited "see" Nell J. Shipman, as Personal Representative of Estate of Linda Marie Barach, Deceased v. Jennings Firearms, Inc. (2×)
11th Cir. · 1986 · signal: see · confidence high
See Trespalacios v. Valor Corp., 486 So.2d 649 (Fla.App.1986).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Marzullo v. Crosman Corp.
M.D. Fla. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See Moss, 136 F.3d at 1169 ; see also Trespalacios v. Valor Corp., 486 So.2d 649, 650 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) ("... one who is injured while using a perfectly made axe or knife would have no right to a strict liability action against the manufacturer because the product that injured him was not defective”). 8 .
Ramon TRESPALACIOS, As Personal Representative of the Estate of Juan Ramon Trespalacios, Deceased, for the Use and Benefit of the Estate of Juan Ramon Trespalacios, Deceased, for Magda Caridad Romeu Hernandez, Surviving Spouse of Decedent, Individually, and for Ramon Trespalacios and Mirled Trespalacios, Surviving Minor Children of Decedent, by and through Their Natural Grandfather and Next Friend, Ramon Trespalacios, Appellants,
v.
VALOR Corporation of Florida, a Florida Corporation, and Ithaca Gun Company, Inc., a Foreign Corporation, Appellees.
84-2560, 85-155.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Apr 8, 1986.
486 So. 2d 649
Barkdull, Ferguson and Jorgenson.
Cited by 11 opinions  |  Published

[*650] Hershoff & Levy and Jay M. Levy, Miami, for appellants.

Haddad, Josephs & Jack and Lewis N. Jack, Coral Gables, for appellee, Valor Corp. of Florida.

No appearance for appellee, Ithaca Gun Co., Inc.

Before BARKDULL, FERGUSON and JORGENSON, JJ.

FERGUSON, Judge.

This case arose out of an August 20, 1982 incident where the decedent, along with seven other individuals, was shot and killed by a mad gunman, Carl Robert Brown, using a recently purchased "riot and combat" shotgun. Suit was instituted against the seller of the weapon, the distributor, and the manufacturer on theories of negligence and strict product liability. This appeal is taken from the order of the trial court which dismissed the case as to the distributor and manufacturer. We affirm.

On the question of strict product liability it is now a general rule that a manufacturer may be liable where a defect in its product causes harm. On the other hand, it is also settled law that "one who is injured while using a perfectly made axe or knife would have no right to a strict liability action against the manufacturer because the product that injured him was not defective." Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So.2d 1140, 1143 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981). A product which has obviously and inherently dangerous qualities is not necessarily a defective product. See Radiation Technology, Inc. v. Ware Construction Co., 445 So.2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1983); Auburn Machine Works Co. v. Jones, 366 So.2d 1167, 1170-71 (Fla. 1979). The complaint thus failed to state a claim on a strict liability theory because there was no allegation that the product was defective, i.e., that it failed to operate as the consumer expected, and that the defect was the proximate cause of injury. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A comment g (1965).

For the reasons that the firearm was not defective, see Bennet v. Cincinnati Checker Cab Co., 353 F. Supp. 1206 (E.D. Ky. 1973); that manufacture or distribution of the weapon is not unlawful pursuant to either state law or the federal Gun Control Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1982), see Linton v. Smith & Wesson, 127 Ill. App.3d 676,[*651] 82 Ill.Dec. 805, 806, 469 N.E.2d 339, 340 (1984); and that neither the manufacturer nor distributor had a duty to prevent the sale of handguns to persons who are likely to cause harm to the public, see Riordan v. International Armament Corp., 132 Ill. App.3d 642, 87 Ill.Dec. 765, 477 N.E.2d 1293 (1985); Linton; cf. K-Mart Enterprises of Florida, Inc. v. Keller, 439 So.2d 283 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983) (retailer held liable when firearm sold to person who was unlawful user of marijuana and subject of felony information, in violation of federal Gun Control Act, was criminally misused), rev. denied, 450 So.2d 487 (Fla. 1984), there was no duty which had been breached by the manufacturer and distributor so as to support a cause of action based on negligence. See Bennet.

Affirmed.