Dohnal v. Syndicated Offices Sys., 529 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1988). · Go Syfert
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Dohnal v. Syndicated Offices Sys., 529 So. 2d 267 (Fla. 1988). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
24 citation events (15 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Florida Department of Corrections and Mark S. Inch, as Secretary of Florida Department of Corrections v. Miami Herald Media Company, publisher of The Miami Herald, Julie Brown, and Casey Frank (fladistctapp, 2019-08-09)
Treatment trajectory · 1988 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1988 2007 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Florida Department of Corrections and Mark S. Inch, as Secretary of Florida Department of Corrections v. Miami Herald Media Company, publisher of The Miami Herald, Julie Brown, and Casey Frank
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
Accordingly, whether “good cause” exists depends “on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case” and that “the trial court is in the best position to weigh the equities involved, and [its] exercise of discretion will be overruled only upon showing of abuse.” Id. (quoting Donhal v. Syndicated Offices Sys., 529 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1988) (emphasis added)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) RICHARD ALAN SAMAD v. STELLA PLA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2019 · confidence medium
May v. Illinois National Insurance Co., 771 So. 2d 1143, 1145 (Fla. 2000), Dohnal v. Syndicated Offices Systems, 529 So. 2d 267, 268-69 (Fla. 1988), Delgado v. Estate of Garriga, 870 So. 2d 912, 913-15 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004), and Dimick v. Estate of Barry, 787 So. 2d 198, 199 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001), involved statutorily required notices that were untimely but for which extensions were specifically authorized by statute; rule 5.042(b) simply did not come into play and was not even mentioned.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) STATE ATTORNEY'S OFFICE OF THE 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
This court’s decision simply defined the term “good cause” according to well- recognized common law principles and affirmed the trial court’s discretionary finding of good cause in this case. 1 The definition of “good cause” formulated in the opinion is based on “the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case.” State Attorney’s Office of Seventeenth Judicial Circuit v. Cable News Network, Inc., No. 4D18-1335 (Fla. 4th DCA July 25, 2018) (quoting Dohnal v. Syndicated Office Sys., 529 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1988)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) STATE ATTORNEY'S OFFICE OF THE 17TH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT v. CABLE NEWS NETWORK, INC.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
Obviously the trial court is in the best position to weigh the equities involved, and his exercise of discretion will be overruled only upon a showing of abuse. 529 So. 2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1988). 4 Applying the Supreme Court’s formulation of “good cause,” the circuit judge did not abuse his discretion in deciding that the “minimal” revelation of information relating to the security system was outweighed by the public’s need for the information.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gary v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Dohnal v. Syndicated Offices Systems, 529 So.2d 267, 269 (Fla.1988) (quoting Goldman, 79 So.2d at 848 ) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Florida West Realty v. Mdg Lake Trafford
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
In the context of time extensions generally, State v. Boyd, 846 So.2d 458, 460 (Fla.2003) (citing Dohnal v. Syndicated Offices Sys., 529 So.2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1988)), offers guidance: We defined good cause in [ In re Estate of] Goldman, [ 79 So.2d 846 (Fla.1955) ], finding that it is "a substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse, or a cause moving the court to its conclusion, not arbitrary or contrary to all the evidence, and not mere ignorance of law, hardship on petitioner, and reliance on [another's] advice." . . .
cited Cited as authority (rule) Parker v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Dohnal v. Syndicated Offices Sys., 529 So.2d 267, 269 (Fla.1988) (quoting Goldman, 79 So.2d at 848 ) (citations omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. State
Fla. · 2004 · confidence medium
Dohnal v. Syndicated Offices Systems, 529 So.2d 267, 269 (Fla.1988) (quoting Goldman, 79 So.2d at 848 ) (citations omitted).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Delgado v. Estate of Garriga
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
As the Florida Supreme Court has said, "[w]hat is or is not sufficient to establish `good cause' ... is primarily addressed to the conscience and discretion of the probate judge." Dohnal v. Syndicated Offices Systems, 529 So.2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1988) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) State v. Boyd
Fla. · 2003 · confidence medium
Dohnal v. Syndicated Offices Systems, 529 So.2d 267, 269 (Fla.1988) (quoting Goldman, 79 So.2d at 848 ) (citations omitted).
cited Cited as authority (rule) In Re Estate of Yerex
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1995 · confidence medium
Dohnal v. Syndicated Offices Sys., 529 So.2d 267, 269 (Fla. 1988); In re Estate of Sale, 227 So.2d 199, 201 (Fla. 1969).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) In re Estate of Mach (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Cir. Ct. · 1989 · confidence medium
The limits of discretion were well chartered by Justice Shaw in Donahl noted supra. The Probate Court may extend time for “good cause.” Good cause in turn requires that the statute in question “. . . be interpreted so as to facilitate the settlement of estate in the interest of public welfare without unreasonably or unduly restricting the rights of creditors of such estates who in good faith and without laches endeavor to comply with the substantial and essential requirements of the statute in order that rights and justice shall be administered by due course of law.” Donhal, supra, at …
discussed Cited "see" Cohen v. Majestic Distilling Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See generally Dohnal v. Syndicated Offices Sys., 529 So.2d 267 (Fla.1988)(finding good cause to justify an extension of time for a claimant to file suit on a claim where a computer error caused the delay in filing the action and the estate would not be prejudiced); Ricciardelli v. Faske, 505 So.2d 487 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 515 So.2d 229 (Fla.l987)(finding good cause for extension of time to file suit on a claim where the law firm representing the claimant received a copy of the objection to the claim late, and a clerical error in the law firm’s office resulted in calendering the notice…
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Sireci v. Deal
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1992 · signal: see also · confidence low
The court’s decision was not “arbitrary or contrary to all the evidence.” See In re Estate of Goldman, 79 So.2d 846, 848 (Fla.1955); see also Dohnal v. Syndicated Offices Sys., 529 So.2d 267 (Fla.1988).
Linda Susan DOHNAL and Robert Louis Dohnal, As Personal Representatives of the Estate of Susanne Dohnal, Deceased, Petitioners,
v.
SYNDICATED OFFICES SYSTEMS, d/b/a Central Financial Control and Palms of Pasadena Hospital, Respondents.
70682.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jun 2, 1988.
529 So. 2d 267
Shaw.
Cited by 19 opinions  |  Published

[*268] Marian B. Rush of Harris, Barrett, Mann & Dew, St. Petersburg, and W. Langston Holland, St. Petersburg, for petitioners.

Paul W. Hitchens, St. Petersburg, for respondents.

SHAW, Justice.

We have for review Dohnal v. Syndicated Offices Systems, 506 So.2d 1138 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), in which the district court certified the following as a question of great public importance:

DOES CLERICAL ERROR, SUCH AS IN THE INSTANT CASE, SHOW GOOD CAUSE JUSTIFYING AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE SUIT PURSUANT TO SECTION 733.705(3), FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP. 1984), WHERE THE ESTATE HAS SHOWN NO PREJUDICE.

Id. at 1139-40. We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

Palms of Pasadena Hospital timely filed a statement of claim against the estate of Susanne Dohnal. The estate's personal representatives filed an objection to the claim. Seventy days later, the hospital filed with the probate court a motion for extension of time for filing an independent action on the claim pursuant to section 733.705(3), which provides in pertinent part:

The claimant is limited to a period of 30 days from the date of service of an objection within which to bring an independent action upon the claim and within which to file written notice of such action in the estate proceeding. For good cause, the court may extend the time for ... filing an action or proceeding, and filing notice of the action or proceeding, after objection is filed... .

The hospital claimed that clerical error consisting of a missing computer entry caused the delay in filing the action and that an extension would not unduly delay the estate's administration. The trial court found that the hospital had shown good cause and granted the motion. The district court affirmed, finding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion, "particularly because no prejudice to the estate has been shown," 506 So.2d at 1139, relying in part on In Re Goldman's Estate, 79 So.2d 846 (Fla. 1955), and Williams v. Estate of Williams, 493 So.2d 44 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986).

We first address respondent's claim that the district court, in phrasing its question, impermissibly shifted the burden of proof, requiring the estate to show that it is not prejudiced by the extension. The creditor showed that the estate had been open approximately five to six months at the time of the motion, and that the independent action would not unduly delay the estate's administration. When a creditor shows that the estate will not be prejudiced, the burden must necessarily shift to the estate for rebuttal. The instant case does not present the question of the estate's burden where the creditor is silent as to prejudice. In the interest of clarity, we rephrase the certified question:

DOES CLERICAL ERROR, SUCH AS IN THE INSTANT CASE, SHOW GOOD CAUSE JUSTIFYING AN EXTENSION OF TIME TO FILE SUIT PURSUANT TO SECTION 733.705(3), FLORIDA STATUTES (SUPP. 1984), WHERE THE ESTATE IS NOT PREJUDICED.

[*269] We recognized in In re Jeffries' Estate, 136 Fla. 410, 418, 181 So. 833, 837 (1938), that the time limitation within which a creditor must file an independent action is merely a rule of judicial procedure and not a statute of nonclaim.

The statute should be interpreted and applied so as to facilitate the settlement of estates in the interest of the public welfare, without unreasonably or unduly restricting the rights of creditors of such estates who in good faith and without laches endeavor to comply with the substantial and essential requirements of the statute in order that right and justice "shall be administered" by due course of law as commanded by Section 4 of the Declaration of Rights of the Florida Constitution.

The probate court may extend the creditor's time where good cause is shown for the delay. § 733.705(3), Fla. Stat. (Supp. 1984). We defined good cause in Goldman, finding that it is "`a substantial reason, one that affords a legal excuse,' or a `cause moving the court to its conclusion, not arbitrary or contrary to all the evidence,' and not mere `ignorance of law, hardship on petitioner, and reliance on [another's] advice.'" 79 So.2d at 848 (citations omitted). Judge Sharp correctly pointed out in Williams that, "[w]hat is or is not sufficient to establish `good cause' ... is primarily addressed to the conscience and discretion of the probate judge." 493 So.2d at 45.

The determination of good cause is based on the peculiar facts and circumstances of each case. Obviously the trial court is in the best position to weigh the equities involved, and his exercise of discretion will be overruled only upon a showing of abuse. We find none in the instant case. The court found good cause to grant the extension after considering the clerical error, the creditor's diligence, and the lack of prejudice to the estate. The court's decision was not "arbitrary or contrary to all the evidence." See Goldman, 79 So.2d at 848.

Accordingly, we answer the certified question, as rephrased, in the affirmative and approve the district court's decision.

It is so ordered.

McDONALD, C.J., and OVERTON, EHRLICH, BARKETT, GRIMES and KOGAN, JJ., concur.