Riggins v. State, 557 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). · Go Syfert
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Riggins v. State, 557 So. 2d 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
11 citation events (5 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Anthony Bernard Wiggins v. State of Florida (fladistctapp, 2018-08-16)
Top citers, strongest first. 6 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Anthony Bernard Wiggins v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2018 · confidence medium
See also State v. Williams, 10 So. 3d 1172, 1174 (Fla. 3d DCA 2009) (“A firearm is, by definition, a 3 deadly weapon because it is designed to expel a projectile by the action of an explosive which is likely to cause death or great bodily injury.”); Miller v. State, 613 So. 2d 530, 531 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) (“A firearm is, by definition, a deadly weapon which fires projectiles likely to cause death or great bodily harm; . . . .”); Riggins v. State, 557 So. 2d 185, 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (“it is well settled that a firearm, as here, is a ‘deadly weapon’ within the meaning of” secti…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Baldwin v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Riggins v. State, 557 So.2d 185, 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). [2] This differs from the situation in Skeens v. State, 556 So.2d 1113 (Fla.1990).
cited Cited "see" O'Meara v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. (citing Riggins v. State, 557 So.2d 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)).
discussed Cited "see" State v. Williams
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · signal: see · confidence high
See Riggins v. State, 557 So.2d 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (affirming conviction for aggravated battery, finding that a firearm used to strike the victim is a “deadly weapon”); Dawson v. State, 338 So.2d 242 , 243 n. 2 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976) (“We note that a gun may be used as a club, stick or bludgeon, and thus is a deadly weapon in this capacity as well as in discharging bullets.”); Wade v. Wainwright, 266 So.2d 378, 378-79 (Fla. 4th DCA 1972) (holding that pistol-whipping the victim about the head constituted the offense of aggravated assault).
cited Cited "see" Kio v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: see · confidence high
See Riggins v. State, 557 So.2d 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
cited Cited "see" Dinkins v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1990 · signal: see · confidence high
See Riggins v. State, 557 So.2d 185 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Reynolds v. State, 559 So.2d 918 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
Talmedge RIGGINS, Appellant,
v.
The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
89-1712.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
Feb 20, 1990.
557 So. 2d 185
Hubbart, Baskin and Goderich.
Cited by 8 opinions  |  Published

Bennett H. Brummer, Public Defender, and Daren L. Shippy, Sp. Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Jorge Espinosa, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Before HUBBART, BASKIN and GODERICH, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal by the defendant Talmedge Riggins from a final judgment of conviction and sentence for (1) aggravated battery with a deadly weapon, and (2) discharging a firearm in public. The defendant raises two points on appeal; we find no merit in either point and affirm.

First, the defendant contends that the revolver which he used to strike the victim in this case is not a "deadly weapon," and, therefore, he could not be convicted of aggravated battery with a "deadly weapon" under Section 784.045, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1988). We disagree as it is well settled that a firearm, as here, is a "deadly weapon" within the meaning of the above-stated statute. Goswick v. State, 143 So.2d 817, 820 (Fla. 1962); Emshwiller v. State, 443 So.2d 488 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984); Miles v. State, 338 So.2d 547, 548 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).

Second, the defendant contends that the trial court committed reversible error under State v. Neil, 457 So.2d 481 (Fla. 1984) in refusing to inquire as to why the state exercised peremptory challenges on certain black jurors. We disagree. The defendant makes no showing on this record that "there is a strong likelihood that [the subject jurors] have been challenged solely because of their race," and thus no inquiry by the trial court was required under Neil. 457 So.2d at 486. Instead, the defendant relies solely on the fact that the jurors excused were black and makes no contention that the jurors' answers on voir dire suggest no prima facie reason, other than their race, as to why the state would not want them to serve on the jury. It is settled, however, that this meager showing is insufficient to trigger a Neil inquiry. State v. Slappy, 522 So.2d 18, 21 (Fla. 1988).

Affirmed.