Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). · Go Syfert
Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“because dismissal is the most severe of all possible sanctions, it should be employed only in extreme circumstances.”
37 citation events (26 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: Etiany Maria Eloi Zufi v. Robin Gabriel Stockton and Ron Kendall Masonry, Inc. (fladistctapp, 2025-01-08)
Treatment trajectory · 1992 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1992 2009 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 28 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Etiany Maria Eloi Zufi v. Robin Gabriel Stockton and Ron Kendall Masonry, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2025 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
because dismissal is the most severe of all possible sanctions, it should be employed only in extreme circumstances.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Jonida Goga v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc. (3×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see also · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
because dismissal is the most severe of all possible sanctions, it should be employed only in extreme circumstances.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) SYNERGY CONTRACTING GROUP, INC., A/ A/ O JAMES MCGINITY v. HOMEOWNERS CHOICE PROPERTY & CASUALTY INSURANCE CO., INC.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
"Because 'dismissal sounds the "death knell of the lawsuit," courts must reserve such strong medicine for instances where the defaulting party's misconduct is correspondingly egregious.' " Id. (quoting Aoude, 892 F.2d at 1118 ). "[D]ismissal is the most severe of all possible sanctions" and, therefore, "should be employed only in extreme circumstances." Id. (first citing Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So. 2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); and then citing Bird v. Hardrives of Delray, Inc., 644 So. 2d 89, 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Jimenez v. Ortega
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2015 · confidence medium
“The trial court has the inherent authority, within the exercise of sound judicial discretion, to dismiss an action when the plaintiff has perpetrated a fraud on the court....” Cox v. Burke, 706 So.2d 43, 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (citing Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Herman v. Intracoastal Cardiology Center
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
“The trial court has the inherent authority, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, to dismiss an action when the plaintiff has perpetrated a fraud on the court....” Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Herman v. Intracoastal Cardiology Center
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · confidence medium
Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) WENWEI SUN v. Aviles
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · confidence medium
Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Granados v. Zehr
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Gehrmann v. City of Orlando
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Taylor v. Martell
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
For example, in Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139-40 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), the record did not establish that a plaintiff had any prior knowledge of her counsel's inclusion in the complaint of her husband's fraudulent claim.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Laschke v. RJ Reynolds Tobacco Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Ruiz v. City of Orlando
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Amato v. Intindola
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Arzuman v. Saud
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Jacob v. Henderson
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Leo's Gulf Liquors v. Lakhani
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
ANALYSIS In Metropolitan Dade County v. Martinsen, 736 So.2d 794, 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999), this Court restated the well-settled principle "that a party who has been guilty of fraud or misconduct in the prosecution or defense of a civil proceeding should not be permitted to continue to employ the very institution it has subverted to achieve her ends." Hanono v. Murphy, 723 So.2d 892, 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (citing Carter v. Carter, 88 So.2d 153 , 157 (Fla.1956); Ashwood v. Patterson, 49 So.2d 848, 850 (Fla.1951); Cox v. Burke, 706 So.2d 43, 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); Figgie Int'l, Inc. v. Alderman,…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cabrerizo v. Fortune Intern. Realty
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
Furthermore, this Court has recognized the principle "that *230 a party who has been guilty of fraud or misconduct in the prosecution or defense of a civil proceeding should not be permitted to continue to employ the very institution it has subverted to achieve [their] ends." Hanono v. Murphy, 723 So.2d 892, 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998) (citing Carter v. Carter, 88 So.2d 153, 157 (Fla. 1956)("[i]t is offensive to our sense of right that a wrongdoer be allowed to exploit his wrongs to the injury of another and to the profit of himself.")); see, e.g., Cox v. Burke, 706 So.2d 43, 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rosenthal v. Rodriguez
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · confidence medium
Courts throughout this state have repeatedly held "`that a party who has been guilty of fraud or misconduct in the prosecution or defense of a civil proceeding should not be permitted to continue to employ the very institution it has subverted to achieve her ends.'" Metropolitan Dade County v. Martinsen, 736 So.2d 794, 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)(quoting Hanono v. Murphy, 723 So.2d 892, 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)); see also Cox v. Burke, 706 So.2d 43, 47 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); O'Vahey v. Miller, 644 So.2d 550, 551 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Furst v. Blackman
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Savino v. Florida Drive In Theatre Management, Inc., 697 So.2d 1011, 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Hanono v. Murphy, 723 So.2d 892, 895 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Desimone v. Old Dominion Ins. Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Our court has recognized and enforced the principle that "where a party perpetrates a fraud on the court which permeates the entire proceedings, dismissal of the entire case is proper." Savino, 697 So.2d at 1011 (citing Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Hanono v. Murphy
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Savino v. Florida Drive In Theatre Management, Inc., 697 So.2d 1011, 1012 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997) similarly states: We recognized in Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), that where a party perpetrates a fraud on the court which permeates the entire proceedings, dismissal of the entire case is proper.
cited Cited as authority (rule) Cox v. Burke
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Savino v. FLA. DRIVE IN THEATRE MANAGEMENT
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
We recognized in Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992), that where a party perpetrates a fraud on the court which permeates the entire proceedings, dismissal of the entire case is proper.
cited Cited "see" Howard v. Risch
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · signal: see · confidence high
See Cox v. Burke, 706 So.2d 43, 46 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998) (citing Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)).
cited Cited "see" Andrews v. Palmas De Majorca Condominium
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); see also Fla. R.App.
cited Cited "see" Rios v. Moore
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
cited Cited "see" Bertrand v. Belhomme
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); Bird v. Hardrives of Delray, Inc., 644 So.2d 89, 90 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).
cited Cited "see" Hogan v. Dollar Rent a Car Systems, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Kornblum v. Schneider, 609 So.2d 138, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992).
Ilene Sales KORNBLUM, Appellant,
v.
Irving S. SCHNEIDER and Ronald B. Maged, Appellees.
91-2662.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Dec 2, 1992.
609 So. 2d 138
Owen.
Cited by 30 opinions  |  Published

[*139] Robert F. Jordan of Grevior & Jordan, Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

Michael C. Knecht of Knecht & Knecht, P.A., Coral Gables, for appellees.

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING

OWEN, WILLIAM C., JR., Senior Judge.

We grant the motion for rehearing and substitute the following opinion for the opinion filed October 14, 1992.

As a sanction for conduct which the trial judge perceived to be a fraud on the court by appellant,[1] her personal injury complaint was dismissed and judgment was entered for the defendant. We reverse.

The trial court has the inherent authority, in the exercise of its sound judicial discretion, to dismiss an action when the plaintiff has perpetrated a fraud on the court,[2] or where a party,[3] or the party's counsel,[4] persistently fails or refuses to comply with court orders. Because dismissal is the most severe of all possible sanctions, it should be employed only in extreme circumstances.[5] In some cases, where the misconduct of a party or the party's counsel has permeated the entire proceeding, dismissal of the entire case has been upheld,[6] but in others where the fraud or other misconduct pertained to only a part of the claim, dismissal of the unaffected legitimate part of the claim has been held to be too severe.[7]

In this case the record does not establish that appellant either authorized[*140] or had any prior knowledge of her counsel's inclusion in the complaint of the offending allegations and claim.[8] Furthermore, the separate count on behalf of appellant's husband had been voluntarily dismissed, and attorney's fees had been awarded to appellees' trial counsel. Under the circumstances, we conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing appellant's claim for her own personal injuries.

The judgment and the order dismissing appellant's complaint are severally reversed.

GLICKSTEIN, C.J., and DELL, J., concur.

1 The fraud consisted of a separate count on behalf of appellant's husband, seeking damages for his alleged permanent injuries, which the court knew to be contrary to the husband's prior sworn testimony before the court.
2 Tri Star Investments, Inc. v. Miele, 407 So.2d 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1981).
3 Ferrante v. Waters, 383 So.2d 749 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).
4 Johnson v. Landmark First Nat'l Bank, 415 So.2d 161 (Fla. 4th DCA 1982).
5 Hart v. Weaver, 364 So.2d 524 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978).
6 See, e.g., Johnson v. Landmark First Nat'l Bank, supra; Ferrante v. Waters, supra.
7 See, e.g., Kirby v. Adkins, 582 So.2d 1209 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Parham v. Kohler, 134 So.2d 274 (Fla. 3d DCA 1961).
8 Appellant's counsel on this appeal did not represent appellant in the trial court.