Pfeifer v. Pfeifer, 616 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). · Go Syfert
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Pfeifer v. Pfeifer, 616 So. 2d 1190 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
10 citation events (3 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Corey v. Corey (fladistctapp, 2009-12-30)
Top citers, strongest first. 5 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Corey v. Corey (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2009 · confidence medium
Courts relied upon an analysis of several factors, often described as "particular circumstances," Bienvenu, 380 So.2d at 1165 , or "unique circumstances," Pfeifer v. Pfeifer, 616 So.2d 1190, 1191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993), in order to determine whether the presumption had been overcome.
cited Cited "see" Smallwood v. Finlayson (In Re Finlayson)
Bankr. S.D. Florida · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pfeifer v. Pfeifer, 616 So.2d 1190, 1191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
cited Cited "see" Hyatt v. Hyatt
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Pfeifer v. Pfeifer, 616 So.2d 1190 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
discussed Cited "see" Pitts v. Pitts
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1993 · signal: accord · confidence high
Accord Pfeifer v. Pfeifer, 616 So.2d 1190 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (Error to deny attorney's fees and costs to wife, due to existence of undisputed and substantial disparity in the income of the parties). *283 In this regard, the record reflects that the former husband's income exceeded that of the former wife, and, as the custodial parent, the wife's financial responsibilities were greater than those of the former husband.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Chapman v. Prevatt
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see also · confidence medium
We observed that "[r]equiring an eight year old child to switch schools yearly is clearly a disruptive influence indicating that rotating physical custody is not in the best interests of the child." 623 So.2d at 564 ; see also Pfeifer v. Pfeifer, 616 So.2d 1190, 1191 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (affirming rotating custody arrangement permitting each parent to have custody of child a portion of each week where both parents continued to reside in the same neighborhood after separation); Wilking v. Reiford, 582 So.2d 717, 719 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (reversing a yearly rotating custody arrangement where the …
Cynthia Carrie PFEIFER, Appellant/Cross-Appellee,
v.
Stanley Johnson PFEIFER, Appellee/Cross-Appellant.
92-1238.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Apr 21, 1993.
616 So. 2d 1190
Per Curiam.
Cited by 9 opinions  |  Published

Nancy W. Gregoire and Joel L. Kirschbaum of Ruden, Barnett, McClosky, Smith, Schuster & Russell, P.A., Fort Lauderdale for appellant/cross-appellee.

James W. Knight, Jr. and Richard Barnett of James W. Knight, Jr., P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for appellee/cross-appellant.

PER CURIAM.

We affirm the final judgment of dissolution, including the provisions for child custody and rehabilitative alimony, but we reverse the order denying the former wife's application for attorney's fees and costs.

We affirm the trial court's decision to permit each of the parties to have custody[*1191] of the minor child a portion of each week because of the unique circumstances of this case, and the considerable discretion granted to the trial court on custody issues. Cf. Gerscovich v. Gerscovich, 406 So.2d 1150 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). Because both parents have continued to reside in the same neighborhood after separation, and each has demonstrated their sincere desire to continue a strong and positive relationship with the child, we believe both should be given an opportunity to do so, provided the arrangement does not prove harmful to the child. The trial court made explicit findings that the custody arrangement would also minimize the conflicts between the parties while assuring extensive participation by each in the care and nurturing of the child. The parents here demonstrated not only sincere concern, but also that their employment schedules would facilitate, rather than hinder, the custody arrangement.

We reverse the denial of attorney's fees and costs to the former wife because of the existence of an undisputed and substantial disparity in the incomes of the parties. We reject the former husband's assertion that the wife is able to pay these fees out of other awards made to her. The purpose of the other awards, such as rehabilitative alimony, would be substantially undermined if they were required to be used for attorney's fees.

Accordingly, we affirm the final judgment of dissolution but reverse the denial of fees to the wife and remand with directions that reasonable fees and costs be awarded.

GLICKSTEIN, C.J., and ANSTEAD and KLEIN, JJ., concur.