green
Positive treatment
10.1 score
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers.
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Bove v. Naples HMA, LLC
DCA 1999) (holding that jury should decide whether what plaintiff knew when her husband’s infection was diagnosed was enough to conclude that the statute of limitations had expired when the suit was filed); Davis v. Green, 625 So.2d 130, 132 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993) (holding that there was a genuine issue of material fact concerning when the medical malpractice statute of limitations began to run).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Cohen v. Cooper
(2×)
also: Cited "see"
Finally, “[sjummary judgments should be cautiously granted in negligence and malpractice suits.” Davis v. Green, 625 So.2d 130, 131 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993).
discussed
Cited as authority (rule)
Hernandez v. AMISUB (AMERICAN HOSP.)
In Tanner , the Florida Supreme Court modified the Nardone rule by holding that the statute of limitations in medical malpractice cases would commence only when the plaintiff had knowledge of either the negligent act giving rise to the malpractice action or knowledge of the injury and "knowledge that there is a reasonable possibility that the injury was caused by medical malpractice." Tanner, 618 So.2d at 181 (footnote omitted); accord Hillsborough Community Mental Health Ctr. v. Harr, 618 So.2d 187, 189 (Fla. 1993); Arango, 656 So.2d at 250-51 ; Davis v. Green, 625 So.2d 130, 131-32 (Fla. 4th…
Brian L. MACKES
v.
ST. LUCIE PAPER & PACKAGING, INC., a Florida corporation
v.
ST. LUCIE PAPER & PACKAGING, INC., a Florida corporation
No. 93-0155.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Oct 20, 1993.
C.R. McDonald, Jr., Fort Pierce, for appellant., William F. Gállese of Brennan, Hayskar, Jefferson, Gorman, Walker & Schwerer, P.A., Fort Pierce, for appellee.
Glickstein, Gross, Klein, Robert.
Cited by 1 opinion | Published
The trial court granted a permanent injunction after a hearing which was noticed only for a temporary injunction. There was no notice for trial or order setting trial as required by Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.440(b) and (c). We therefore reverse the order insofar as it is a permanent injunction. Since appellant has given us no good reason not to do so, we leave the order in effect as a temporary injunction if the appellee posts a bond, the amount to be set by the trial court.
Reversed.