Shelton v. State, 654 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). · Go Syfert
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Shelton v. State, 654 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
42 citation events (18 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Bell v. State (fla, 2013-02-07)
Treatment trajectory · 1995 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1995 2010 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 14 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Bell v. State
Fla. · 2013 · confidence medium
The First District’s decision expressly and directly conflicts with Shelton v. State, 654 So.2d 1295, 1296 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), in which the Fourth District addressed a similar prosecutorial comment on the lack of evidence contradicting an element of the crime of sale of cocaine: “But is there anything showing that [the defendant] didn’t make that sale?
discussed Cited as authority (rule) White v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
In a variety of iterations, Florida courts have consistently held such testimony to be inadmissible: — "not unusual" or "abnormal" not to recover marked money or drugs after an undercover buy, Shelton v. State, 654 So.2d 1295, 1296 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); — "very often" happens in drug sales that one person possesses drugs and another collects the money, Thomas v. State, 673 So.2d 156, 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); — not unusual for someone with contraband in luggage to consent to a search and people traveling under a false name "generally are involved in illegal activity," Dean, 690 So.2d at 721-2…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Armalin v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
See also Thomas v. State, 673 So.2d 156 , 158 *460 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)(finding reversible error where the state elicited testimony from a detective that, in a drug transaction, often one individual is actually in possession of the drugs while another person collects the money to prevent robberies); Shelton v. State, 654 So.2d 1295, 1296 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)(finding reversible error where an officer was allowed to testify that money marked for identification was not always recovered and that the lack of recovery would not be considered abnormal); Dunning v. State, 695 So.2d 473, 474 (Fla. 4th DC…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Rodriguez v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2004 · confidence medium
See Lowder, 589 So.2d at 935 ; see also Nowitzke v. State, 572 So.2d 1346, 1355 (Fla.1990) (finding error where prosecutor elicited testimony from police in homicide case that other drug addicts steal from their families and commit homicides in connection with drug deals); Shelton v. State, 654 So.2d 1295, 1296 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (finding trial court abused discretion in permitting testimony, that typically one does not find marked money on drug dealers after sales, where no drugs or money was found on defendant following an alleged sale to undercover officer).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Smith v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
See, e.g., Jackson v. State, 575 So.2d 181, 188 (Fla.1991) (noting that "the state cannot comment on a defendant's failure to produce evidence ... because doing so could erroneously lead the jury to believe that the defendant carried the burden of introducing evidence"); Jackson v. State, 832 So.2d 773, 777-78 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (concluding that the prosecutor's question during closing argument implying that no evidence had been presented to counter an officer's identification testimony impermissibly shifted the burden of proof); Shelton v. State, 654 So.2d 1295, 1296-97 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) O'CONNOR v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
This anecdotal testimony "concerning characteristic patterns in a type of criminal activity was inadmissible." Lawrence v. State, 766 So.2d 250, 251 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000); see also Dean v. State, 690 So.2d 720, 723-24 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); Shelton v. State, 654 So.2d 1295, 1296 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Dunning v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
See Thomas v. State, 673 So.2d 156 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Shelton v. State, 654 So.2d 1295, 1296 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Wheeler v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · confidence medium
For example, in Shelton v. State, 654 So.2d 1295, 1295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995), we condemned testimony by a police officer that "it is not unusual to not find marked money on a drug seller after a sale." In Hargrove v. State, 431 So.2d 732, 732 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983), we condemned rebuttal testimony of a police officer that based on his experience, the post-arrest statement that "I don't mess with the stuff" is a phrase uttered frequently by drug dealers to throw suspicion off themselves.
discussed Cited "see" Stancle v. State (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See id. at 1296 .
cited Cited "see" Moore v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · signal: see · confidence high
See Shelton v. State, 654 So.2d 1295, 1296 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995); Lowder v. State, 589 So.2d 933, 935 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
cited Cited "see" Reyes v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Shelton v. State, 654 So.2d 1295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Eric Lawrence v. State of Florida
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2024 · signal: see, e.g. · confidence low
See, e.g., Shelton v. State, 654 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (holding that in prosecution for sale of cocaine based on alleged sale of cocaine to undercover officer in exchange for marked bill, when the defendant was arrested within a minute of the sale and neither the bill nor any drugs were found, testimony of undercover officer that it was not unusual in drug cases not to recover drugs or money was highly prejudicial and inadmissible); Smith v. State, 152 So. 3d 1279 (Fla. 1st DCA 2015) (holding officer’s affirmative response after being asked, “And in your years 6 of experience in …
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Neal v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2010 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Shelton v. State, 654 So.2d 1295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995) (finding reversible error where an officer was allowed to testify that money marked for identification was not always recovered and the lack of recovery was not abnormal); Lowder, 589 So.2d at 935 (holding it was error for the detective to testify that "[pjeople who sell narcotics usually have cash in their pocket.”). .
cited Cited "see, e.g." White v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence low
Dean v. State, 690 So.2d 720, 723 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997); see also Shelton v. State, 654 So.2d 1295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).
Jeffrey SHELTON, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
94-2205.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
May 31, 1995.
654 So. 2d 1295
Klein.
Cited by 26 opinions  |  Published

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and Paul E. Petillo, Asst. Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, and Carol Cobourn Asbury, Asst. Atty. Gen., West Palm Beach, for appellee.

KLEIN, Judge.

Appellant appeals his conviction for sale of cocaine, arguing that the court erred in admitting[*1296] an officer's testimony that it is not unusual to not find marked money on a drug seller after a sale. He also argues that the court erred in overruling his objection to the prosecutor's statement in closing argument that there was no evidence showing that the defendant did not make the drug sale. We reverse.

An officer doing undercover work testified that the appellant solicited him to purchase cocaine rock, whereupon the officer gave the appellant a $20 bill, from which he had recorded the serial number, and in return received the rock. The officer then radioed nearby police officers who, after appellant walked away from the officer making the sale, picked the appellant up within a minute of the sale. The officer who obtained the rock then drove to where the appellant was picked up and identified him as the seller. Neither the $20 bill nor any drugs were found on the appellant. The state put on no other evidence other than expert testimony that the substance sold to the officer was cocaine. The defendant put on no evidence.

During cross-examination of the officer who purchased the rock, defense counsel brought out that the defendant did not have the $20 bill in his possession when he was arrested. On redirect, the following occurred:

[STATE]: When this — when you mark money for identification, based on your experience as an undercover detective, do you always recover the money?
[DEFENSE]: Objection, relevance.
THE COURT: Overruled.
[OFFICER VASH]: No. We don't always recover the money.
[STATE]: So it's not unusual that the money wouldn't be —
[DEFENSE]: Objection. Leading.
THE COURT: As phrased.
[STATE]: Would it be considered abnormal or out of the ordinary that the money was not —
[DEFENSE]: Objection, relevance.
[STATE]: — received?
THE COURT: Overruled.
[OFFICER VASH]: No, it would not be abnormal.
[STATE]: Do you always recover drugs on these undercover arrests?
[DEFENSE]: Objection. Deals with other cases, deals with the motion in limine, we move for mistrial.
THE COURT: Overruled.
[OFFICER VASH]: No, rarely.

This testimony was inadmissible and highly prejudicial. In Lowder v. State, 589 So.2d 933, 935 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), the court stated:

[E]very defendant has the right to be tried based on the evidence against him, not on the characteristics or conduct of certain classes of criminals in general. Florida courts have frequently criticized the use of testimony from police officers regarding their experience with other criminals as substantive proof of a particular defendant's guilt or innocence * * * [I]t was also error to allow a police officer to testify as an expert as to a relationship between possessing $1,290 in cash and dealing in narcotics.

See also Hargrove v. State, 431 So.2d 732 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983) (court condemned, as irrelevant, testimony of a police officer that based on his experience, the post-arrest statement that "I don't mess with the stuff" is a phrase uttered frequently by drug dealers to throw suspicion off themselves), and Osario v. State, 526 So.2d 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (officer's testimony concerning his experience with common drug-courier practices was irrelevant and prejudicial).

An additional error occurred in closing argument:

[STATE]: Defense counsel will bring up different things about statements that were made at different times. But is there anything showing that he didn't make that sale? He was there.
[DEFENSE]: I object to that, that shifts the burden of proof, the burden is on the prosecution.
THE COURT: Overruled.
[STATE]: He was there on the street, he was arrested.

[*1297] This comment was improper not only for the reason suggested by the defendant — that it could have misled the jury on the burden of proof, Jackson v. State, 575 So.2d 181 (Fla. 1991) — but also because it could have been interpreted by the jury as a comment on the defendant's failure to testify. In State v. Marshall, 476 So.2d 150, 151 (Fla. 1985), the following similar comment was held to be reversible error:

Ladies and gentlemen, the only person you heard from in this courtroom with regard to the events on November 9, 1981, was Brenda Scavone [a witness for the prosecution].

See also Sgroi v. State, 634 So.2d 280 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994).

We therefore reverse and remand for a new trial.

DELL, C.J., and SHAHOOD, J., concur.