Petrel v. State, 675 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). · Go Syfert
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Petrel v. State, 675 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
16 citation events (7 in the last 25 years) across 1 distinct court.
Strongest positive: State v. Young (fladistctapp, 2008-01-02)
Top citers, strongest first. 7 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Young
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · confidence medium
The "officer's reasons for a stop are immaterial and that stop is reasonable when the officer had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred." Petrel v. State, 675 So.2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Hurd v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); Petrel v. State, 675 So.2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) B.H. v. State (2×) also: Cited "see"
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2007 · confidence medium
See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 , 116 S.Ct. 1769 , 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996); Holland v. State, 696 So.2d 757, 759 (Fla.1997); Petrel v. State, 675 So.2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
cited Cited as authority (rule) Covington v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
See Mendez v. State, 678 So.2d 388 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Petrel v. State, 675 So.2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Hernandez
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Contrary to earlier pronouncements made by our state supreme court, [3] under Whren , the test is whether an officer could have stopped the vehicle for a traffic infraction. 517 U.S. at 813, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops under the Fourth Amendment does not depend on the actual motivations of the individual officers involved); see also Anderson, 692 So.2d at 241 ; Petrel v. State, 675 So.2d 1049, 1050 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
cited Cited "see" Anderson v. STEVEN R. ANDREWS, PA
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1997 · signal: see · confidence high
See Petrel v. State, 675 So.2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
cited Cited "see" State v. Nurock
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1996 · signal: see · confidence high
See Petrel v. State, 675 So.2d 1049 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996).
Sharon PETREL, Appellant,
v.
STATE of Florida, Appellee.
95-1381.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District.
Jul 3, 1996.
675 So. 2d 1049
Per Curiam.
Cited by 12 opinions  |  Published

Richard L. Jorandby, Public Defender, and David McPherrin, Assistant Public Defender, West Palm Beach, for appellant.

Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Tallahassee and Elliot B. Kula, Assistant Attorney[*1050] General, West Palm Beach, for appellee.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges the trial court's order denying her motion to suppress evidence. She claims that the stop of her vehicle, which ultimately led to the seizure of evidence, was a pretextual stop.[1] Recently in State v. Daniel, 665 So.2d 1040 (Fla.1995), our supreme court held that in determining whether a stop for a minor traffic violation which results in the seizure of evidence was impermissible under the Fourth Amendment, the proper analysis was whether a reasonable officer following usual police practices would have stopped the vehicle for the traffic infraction. However, more recently, the United States Supreme Court has held that under the Fourth Amendment an officer's reasons for a stop are immaterial and that stop is reasonable when the officer had probable cause to believe that a traffic violation occurred. Thus, the test adopted by the United States Supreme Court is whether an officer could have stopped the vehicle for a traffic infraction. See Whren v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 116 S.Ct. 1769, 135 L.Ed.2d 89 (1996). As we are constitutionally directed to construe the Fourth Amendment consistent with United States Supreme Court rulings, see Article I, Section 12, Florida Constitution, we affirm appellant's conviction and sentence.

Affirmed.

WARNER, FARMER and SHAHOOD, JJ., concur.

1 After appellant was stopped, she was arrested for driving with a suspended license.