Sanchez v. State, 693 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). · Go Syfert
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Sanchez v. State, 693 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“we need not reach , as appellant acknowledges that under florida's constitution, the state attorney has the discretion in deciding whether and how to prosecute a defendant.”
8 citation events (8 in the last 25 years) across 2 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: State v. Schultz (fladistctapp, 2013-08-28)
Top citers, strongest first. 3 distinct citers.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Schultz (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
we need not reach , as appellant acknowledges that under florida's constitution, the state attorney has the discretion in deciding whether and how to prosecute a defendant.
examined Cited as authority (verbatim quote) State v. Gonzalez (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2013 · quote attribution · 2 verbatim quotes · confidence high
we need not reach , as appellant acknowledges that under florida's constitution, the state attorney has the discretion in deciding whether and how to prosecute a defendant.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) State v. Croy
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2002 · signal: contra · confidence medium
While Adams does require that, in the absence of textual guidance to the contrary, statutory language defining a general, more serious crime be construed to exclude conduct made criminal by a more specific statute that prescribes less serious punishment, see Burnett v. State, 737 So.2d 1106, 1107 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998); contra Seybel v. State, 693 So.2d 678, 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997), the Adams decision rests on canons of statutory construction, not on any doctrinally independent constraint on prosecutorial discretion.
Guillermo SANCHEZ
v.
The STATE of Florida
Nos. 95-2038, 95-2336.
District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District.
May 7, 1997.
693 So. 2d 678
John E. Bergendahl, Miami, for appellant., Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney General, Sylvie Perez Posner, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Cope, Goderich, Nesbitt.
Cited by 2 opinions  |  Published
PER CURIAM.

We find, as the State properly concedes, that the trial court erred by sentencing the defendant, Guillermo Sanchez, to a three-year minimum mandatory term for the use of a firearm to run consecutively to the minimum mandatory terms imposed pursuant to the habitual violent offender statute. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for resen-tencing consistent with Jackson v. State, 659 So.2d 1060 (Fla.1995).

The defendant’s remaining points lack merit.

Affirmed, in part; reversed, in part, and remanded for resentencing.