Mitchell v. State, 703 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1997). · Go Syfert
Mitchell v. State, 703 So. 2d 1062 (Fla. 1997). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“the robbery statute does not define" "weapon," "deadly weapon," or "firearm.”
29 citation events (24 in the last 25 years) across 3 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Ricardo Vega v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (ca11, 2021-09-28)
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 8 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (quoted) Ricardo Vega v. Secretary, Department of Corrections (2×) also: Cited as authority (rule)
11th Cir. · 2021 · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence low
the robbery statute does not define" "weapon," "deadly weapon," or "firearm.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) M. D. M. v. STATE OF FLORIDA (2×)
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2023 · confidence medium
Thus, in order to violate either statute the BB gun must have qualified as a "deadly weapon." On that issue, the Florida Supreme Court has repeatedly and unequivocally "held that whether a BB gun—loaded or unloaded—is a deadly weapon is a jury question." Mitchell v. State, 703 So. 2d 1062, 1062 (Fla. 1997) (citing Dale v. State, 703 So. 2d 1045 (Fla. 1997)).
cited Cited "see" A.B. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mitchell v. State, 703 So.2d 1062 (Fla.1997).
discussed Cited "see" Suit v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mitchell v. State, 703 So.2d 1062 (Fla.1997); Jones v. State, 869 So.2d 1240 (Fla. 4th DCA 2004); Stanley, 757 So.2d at 1275 ; E.S. v. State, 886 So.2d 311 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004); J.W. v. State, 849 So.2d 1111 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); King v. State, 779 So.2d 466, 467 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); D.M.H. v. State, 717 So.2d 149 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998).
discussed Cited "see" A.L.M. v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Mitchell v. State, 698 So.2d 555, 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), review granted, 701 So.2d 868 (Fla.1997), approved, 703 So.2d 1062 (Fla.1997) (finding an aggravated battery conviction was supported when the defendant used a BB gun as a bludgeon to strike his wife, causing two gashes on her head); Taylor v. State, 672 So.2d 580 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)(finding that a surprise attack with a crowbar, which was wielded with enough force to split open the victim’s head, was competent substantial evidence of the use of a deadly weapon).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Bunkley v. State
Fla. · 2004 · signal: see also · confidence low
While Ortiz was decided in the context of a motion to dismiss, the Second District has repeatedly affirmed that the Ortiz decision rested on the rule that "whether the knife was a common pocketknife was a question of fact that must be resolved by a jury." Baldwin v. State, 857 So.2d 249, 252 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (citing Ortiz, 504 So.2d at 40 ), review dismissed, 865 So.2d 479 (Fla.2003); see also Mitchell v. State, 698 So.2d 555, 561 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (citing Ortiz for the rule that "whether a pocketknife is a weapon is a factual question for the jury"), approved, 703 So.2d 1062 (Fla.1997); Be…
cited Cited "see, e.g." Flowers v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Mitchell v. State, 698 So.2d 555, 562 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997) (“with both words and actions [the defendant] implied that the gun was loaded and operable”), affirmed, 703 So.2d 1062 (Fla.1997).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Rios v. State
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · signal: see also · confidence low
See Dale v. State, 703 So.2d 1045, 1047 (Fla.1997)("[W]hether a BB or pellet gun is a deadly weapon—i.e., whether it is `likely to produce death or great bodily injury'—is a factual question to be answered by the jury in each case."); see also Mitchell v. State, 698 So.2d 555, 560-62 (Fla. 2d DCA), approved, 703 So.2d 1062 (Fla.1997).
Dexter MITCHELL
v.
STATE of Florida
No. 91107.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Dec 18, 1997.
703 So. 2d 1062
James Marion Moorman, Public Defender and Carol J.Y. Wilson, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Clearwater, for Petitioner., Robert A Butterworth, Attorney General; Robert J. Krauss, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Chief of Criminal Law and Wendy Buffington, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, for Respondent.
Anstead, Grimes, Harding, Kogan, Overton, Shaw, Wells.
Cited by 13 opinions  |  Published
1 passage pin-cited by 1 case
Pinpoint authority: bottom 64%
Citer courts: Eleventh Circuit (1)

Lead Opinion

SHAW, Justice.

We have for review Mitchell v. State, 698 So.2d 555, 557 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997), wherein the district court certified:

If the State fails to prove that a BB pistol is loaded and operable at the time of an offense, can it be classified as a dangerous or deadly weapon when the defendant’s actions cause the victim to reasonably believe that the BB pistol is loaded and operable?

We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. We recently addressed this issue in Dale v. State, 703 So.2d 1045 (Fla.1997), wherein we held that whether a BB gun— loaded or unloaded — is a deadly weapon is a jury question. We approve Mitchell.

It is so ordered.

KOGAN, C.J., HARDING, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur.

Dissent

OVERTON, Justice,

dissenting.

“I dissent for the reasons expressed in my dissent in Dale v. State, 703 So.2d 1045 (Fla.1997).”