Florida Power & Light Co. v. Periera, 705 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1998). · Go Syfert
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Florida Power & Light Co. v. Periera, 705 So. 2d 1359 (Fla. 1998). Cases Citing This Book View Copy Cite
“foreseeability, as it relates to the proximate cause, generally is a question of fact left for the fact-finder.”
28 citation events (21 in the last 25 years) across 4 distinct courts.
Strongest positive: Hulbert v. Vogt (fladistctapp, 2008-01-18)
Treatment trajectory · 1998 → 2026 · click a year to view as-of
1998 2012 2026
Top citers, strongest first. 20 distinct citers.
discussed Cited as authority (verbatim quote) Hulbert v. Vogt
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2008 · signal: see, e.g. · quote attribution · 1 verbatim quote · confidence high
foreseeability, as it relates to the proximate cause, generally is a question of fact left for the fact-finder.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Williams v. Davis
Fla. · 2007 · confidence medium
Univ., Inc. v. Gross, 758 So.2d 86, 88 (Fla. 2000) (imposing a duty on a university not to assign students to an internship site in an unreasonably dangerous location); Henderson v. Bowden, 737 So.2d 532, 535-37 (Fla. 1999) (using McCain to find a duty on the part of sheriff's deputies to passengers of a vehicle stopped because the driver was under the influence of alcohol when the deputies allowed a drunk passenger to drive the car to a nearby gas station to call his parents); Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Periera, 705 So.2d 1359, 1361 (Fla. 1998) (finding a duty on the part of a power company to…
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Biglen v. Florida Power & Light Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
In [ Florida Power & Light Co. v. ] Periera, [ 705 So.2d 1359, 1361 (Fla.1998)] the court found that the utility's maintenance of a guy wire on a bicycle path created a zone of risk that included bicyclists and motorcyclists using the path.
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Davis v. DOLLAR RENT a CAR SYSTEMS, INC.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2005 · confidence medium
Indeed, the supreme court in Whitt took cost/benefit into account by concluding that it would not "unduly burden" commercial landowners to provide safe ingress and egress. 788 So.2d at 222 . [7] The Hackett court gave examples of ordinances that had specified the exact duty of landowners in such a context, one of which is found in the Florida case of Pedigo v. Smith, 395 So.2d 615, 616 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). 2000 WL 1862676 , at *4. [8] 391 So.2d at 234 (Schwartz, J., dissenting). [1] Henderson v. Bowden, 737 So.2d 532 (Fla.1999); Florida Power & Light Co. v. Periera, 705 So.2d 1359, 1361 (Fla.1…
cited Cited as authority (rule) Florida Power & Light Co. v. Goldberg
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Periera, 705 So.2d 1359, 1361 (Fla.1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Cheeks v. Dorsey
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · confidence medium
"The proper way of determining whether a duty existed is to decide whether the defendant's actions created a foreseeable zone of risk, not by whether the specific injury suffered was foreseeable by the defendant." See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Periera, 705 So.2d 1359, 1361 (Fla.1998).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Johnson v. Lance, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · confidence medium
In Florida Power & Light Co. v. Periera, 705 So.2d 1359, 1361-62 (Fla.1998), the Court further instructs: [T]he proper way of determining whether a duty existed is to decide whether the defendant's actions created a foreseeable zone of risk, not by whether the specific injury suffered was foreseeable by the defendant....
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sipes v. Albertson's Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1999 · confidence medium
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Periera, 705 So.2d 1359, 1361 (Fla.1998) (in negligence action, foreseeability can be relevant both to the element of duty and the element of proximate cause; as to the former it is a legal question of whether the defendant’s conduct foreseeably created a broader zone of risk that poses a general threat of harm to others).
discussed Cited as authority (rule) Sipes v. Albertson's Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 1998 · confidence medium
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Periera, 705 So.2d 1359, 1361 (Fla.1998) (in negligence action, foreseeability can be relevant both to the element of duty and the element of proximate cause; as to the former it is a legal question of whether the defendant’s conduct foreseeably created a broader zone of risk that poses a general threat of harm to others).
cited Cited "see" Bratt Ex Rel. Bratt v. Laskas
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Fla. Power & Light v. Periera, 705 So.2d 1359, 1361 (Fla.1998).
discussed Cited "see" Airplanes of Boca, Inc. v. United States Ex Rel. Federal Aviation Administration
S.D. Fla. · 2003 · signal: see · confidence high
See Florida Power & Light Company v. Periera, 705 So.2d 1359, 1361-62 (Fla.1998); McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So.2d 500, 503-04 (Fla.1992); Napoli v. Buchbinder, 685 So.2d 46 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Kowkabany v. Home Depot, Inc., 606 So.2d 716 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992).
cited Cited "see" Martinez v. Florida Power & Light Co.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see · confidence high
See Florida Power & Light, Co. v. Periera, 705 So.2d 1359 (Fla. 1998).
cited Cited "see" Michael & Philip, Inc. v. Sierra
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Periera, 705 So.2d 1359 (Fla. 1998); McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So.2d 500 (Fla.1992).
cited Cited "see" Clark v. Polk County
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2000 · signal: see · confidence high
See Florida Power & Light Co. v. Periera, 705 So.2d 1359 (Fla.1998).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." NBIS Construction & Transport Insurance Services, Inc. v. Liebherr-America, Inc.
M.D. Fla. · 2022 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Proximate Cause of the Accident Proximate cause is generally a question of fact concerned with “whether and to what extent the defendant’s conduct foreseeably and substantially caused the specific injury that actually occurred.” McCain, 593 So. 2d at 502 ; see also Florida Power & Light Co. v. Periera, 705 So. 2d 1359, 1361 (Fla. 1998).
cited Cited "see, e.g." Sewell v. Racetrac Petroleum, Inc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2017 · signal: see also · confidence medium
See also Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Periera, 705 So. 2d 1359, 1361 (Fla. 1998). 43 of its premises.
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Lindsey v. BELL SOUTH TELECOMMUNICATIONS
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2006 · signal: see also · confidence medium
As the Florida Supreme Court has explained: The issue of proximate cause is generally a question of fact concerned with "whether and to what extent the defendant's conduct foreseeably and substantially caused the specific injury that actually occurred." McCain, 593 So.2d at 502; see also Florida Power & Light Co. v. Periera, 705 So.2d 1359, 1361 (Fla. 1998).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Brother's Trucking Enterprises, Inc.
S.D. Fla. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence medium
The proximate cause issue is generally a question of fact, reserved for the factfinder and is concerned with "whether and to what extent the defendant's conduct foreseeably and substantially caused the specific injury that actually occurred.” McCain, 593 So.2d at 502 ; see also Florida Power & Light Co. v. Periera, 705 So.2d 1359, 1361 (Fla.1998).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Goldberg v. Florida Power & Light Co.
Fla. · 2005 · signal: see also · confidence medium
Proximate Causation The issue of proximate cause is generally a question of fact concerned with "whether and to what extent the defendant's conduct foreseeably and substantially caused the specific injury that actually occurred." McCain, 593 So.2d at 502 ; see also Florida Power & Light Co. v. Periera, 705 So.2d 1359, 1361 (Fla.1998).
discussed Cited "see, e.g." Riedel v. Sheraton Bal Harbour Assoc.
Fla. Dist. Ct. App. · 2001 · signal: see also · confidence low
See also Florida Power & Light Co. v. Periera, 705 So.2d 1359 (Fla.1998). "[A]n innkeeper has a special relationship with his guests which gives rise to a duty to protect them against unreasonable risk of physical harm." Adika v. Beekman Towers, 633 So.2d 1170, 1170-71 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994). "[T]he standard of care owed to an occupant of a hotel room (an invitee) is reasonable care." Phillips Petroleum Co. of Bartlesville, Okl. v. Dorn, 292 So.2d 429, 431 (Fla. 4th DCA 1974).
FLORIDA POWER & LIGHT CO., Petitioner,
v.
Edward PERIERA, Respondent.
89266.
Supreme Court of Florida.
Jan 15, 1998.
705 So. 2d 1359
Harding.
Cited by 24 opinions  |  Published

[*1360] Cheryl Kempf, North Palm Beach, and Suzanne H. Youmans of Engels, Pertnoy, Solowsky & Allen, P.A., Miami, for Petitioner.

Scott A. Mager, Fort Lauderdale, for Respondent.

Paul R. Regensdorf of Fleming, O'Bryan & Fleming, P.A., Fort Lauderdale, for Florida Defense Lawyers Association, Amicus Curiae.

Richard A. Barnett, Hollywood, for the Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, Amicus Curiae.

HARDING, Justice.

We have for review the decision in Periera v. Florida Power & Light Co., 680 So.2d 617 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996), which certified conflict with the decision in Powell v. Florida Department of Transportation, 626 So.2d 1008 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993), on the issue of whether a potential tortfeaser is relieved of the duty owed to an injured party because of the injured party's violation of a statute. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution.

The facts of the two cases at issue here are essentially the same. Both cases involve drivers operating their motorcycles on prohibited[*1361] pathways, in violation of section 316.1995, Florida Statutes (1995).[1]

In Periera, the plaintiff was injured on a bicycle path when his motorcycle struck a guy wire which was maintained by Florida Power and Light Company (FP & L). The trial court granted FP & L's motion for summary judgment. The trial court reasoned that FP & L owed no duty to the plaintiff, because operating a motorcycle on a bike path is prohibited by section 316.1995. On appeal, the Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed the summary judgment, holding that a violation of a statute is prima facie evidence of negligence. Periera, 680 So.2d at 618. The district court ruled that the violation of the statute did not relieve FP & L of its duty as a matter of law, and that FP & L would still have to show that the violation of the statute was the proximate cause of the injury. Id. In doing so, the district court also certified conflict with Powell. Id.

In Powell, the plaintiff was injured while riding his motorcycle on an allegedly defective sidewalk, which was maintained by the Department of Transportation (DOT). The trial court granted DOT's motion for summary judgment. The trial court held that DOT owed no duty to the plaintiff and that operating a motorcycle was prohibited by section 316.1995 and was therefore unforeseeable. On appeal, the First District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court, finding that DOT owed no duty to make sidewalks safe for motorcycle traffic and that no cause of action existed as a matter of law. Powell, 626 So.2d at 1008-09.

There are two distinct issues in this case, duty and proximate cause. Foreseeability can be relevant both to the element of duty and the element of proximate cause. See McCain v. Florida Power Corp., 593 So.2d 500, 502 (Fla.1992). "The duty element of negligence focuses on whether the defendant's conduct foreseeably created a broader `zone of risk' that poses a general threat of harm to others." Id. The issue of duty is a question of law. "The proximate causation element, on the other hand, is concerned with whether and to what extent the defendant's conduct foreseeably and substantially caused the specific injury that actually occurred." Id. The issue of proximate cause is generally a question of fact. "In other words, the former is a minimal threshold legal requirement for opening the courthouse doors, whereas the latter is part of a much more specific factual requirement that must be proved to win the case once the courthouse doors are open." Id. (footnote omitted).

We agree with the Fourth District Court of Appeal that Periera's violation of section 316.1995 does not relieve FP & L of a duty as a matter of law. As the district court stated, "FP & L's guy wire was as much as a hazard to bicyclists, who were lawfully on the bike path, as to motorcyclists, who were not." Periera, 680 So.2d at 618.

We read Powell to say that the plaintiff's violation of section 316.1995 relieved DOT of its duty to maintain a safe sidewalk.[2] The proper way of determining whether a duty existed is to decide whether the defendant's actions created a foreseeable zone of risk, not by whether the specific injury suffered was foreseeable by the defendant. Therefore, we disapprove Powell to the extent that it conflicts with this reasoning.

Once it is established that a duty does exist, only then does the question of proximate cause become relevant. Foreseeability, as it relates to the proximate cause, generally is a question of fact left for the fact-finder. See McCain, 593 So.2d at 503-04. In this[*1362] context, the focus is on specific, narrow facts of the case, not the broader zone of risk that the defendant created. See id. at 503.

We find that Periera's violation of section 316.1995 is prima facie evidence of comparative negligence. Comparative negligence is properly considered within the element of proximate cause. It is up to the fact-finder to decide whether FP & L's negligence (if any), Periera's negligence, or both were the proximate cause of the incident which produced Periera's injury. If it is decided that the negligence of both parties proximately contributed to Periera's injury, then it is up to the fact-finder to determine what percentage of negligence is attributable to each. Therefore, it was improper for the trial court in this case to grant summary judgment.

Accordingly, we approve the decision below to reverse summary judgment and disapprove Powell to the extent that it is inconsistent with our opinion.

It is so ordered.

KOGAN, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, WELLS and ANSTEAD, JJ., and GRIMES, Senior Justice, concur.

1 Section 316.1995, Florida Statutes (1995), states that "[n]o person shall drive any vehicle other than by human power upon a bicycle path, sidewalk, or sidewalk area, except upon a permanent or duly authorized temporary driveway." The cases at issue involved the 1987 and 1989 statutes; however, these statutes are identical to the current version of the statute.
2 Powell states in relevant part:

We agree that DOT owed no duty to Powell and therefore summary judgment was proper.

...

DOT had no duty to foresee, as likely to happen, the use of a sidewalk by a motorcyclist. The trial judge correctly determined that because DOT owed no duty to make sidewalks safe for motorcycle traffic, no cause of action existed as a matter of law.

Powell, 626 So.2d at 1008-09.